

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Dr. N.P. Tiwary

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Subhalaxmi Bal

By

N. P. Tiwary

Rtd. Professor

Department of Philosophy

Patna Univesity, Patna

MOTILAL BOOKS

PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS

ASHOK RAJ PATH, PATNA – 800 004

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Publisher & Distributor

MOTILAL BOOKS
PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS
Ashok Rajpath, Patna – 800 004
Phone No. 0612–2678442
E-mail: patnamlbd@gmail.com

ISBN No. 978-81-956387-41

- No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means incuding information storage and retrieval systems without permission in writing from the publishers.
- © Author

- 1st Edition, 2022
- **Price** : ₹ 369

Exclusive Stockist

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS INTERNATIONAL
41U.A. Bungalow Road (Back Lane) Jawahar Nagar, Delhi–110 007

असली Hologram की पहचान—इस पुस्तक के आवरण पृष्ठ पर MOTILAL BOOKS Publisher & Distributor का असली Hologram सटा हुआ है जिसकी विशेषताएँ इस प्रकार है—

यह Hologram 3D-effrect वाला है, जो पूर्णत: नवीनतम तकनीक पर आधारित है। इसके मध्य में हमारे कम्पनी का LOGO है, जिसमें पुस्तक एवं वृक्ष स्पष्ट रूप से दिखाई देता है। जो सिल्वर रंग का है और किसी भी प्रकाश में हिलाने-डुलाने पर सतरंगी प्रतीत होता है।

- *Typesetter :*
  Seen Graphics
  Patna – 800 006
  Mobile No. 8789493621
- *Typesetter :*
  B. Printers
  Patna – 800 006

- All dispute subjects to PATNA Jurisdiction.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Preface

The scope of Contemporary Western Philosophy is very wide. Though it starts from linguistic trends by criticizing traditional metaphysics, it returns to a new metaphysics of Strawson and Quine at last. Here, I have to depict a short picture of the development of Contemporary Western Philosophy from pragmatism to H. P. Grice via Moore, Russell, Frege and Wittgenstein. Pragmatism comes by revolting Idealism of Hegel and Bradley. So, this work starts with the introduction of Hegel's and Bradley's idealism. Idealism is the core metaphysical theory contrasted with the another core metaphysical theory; materialism. The ancient Greek philosophy starts with the materialism. The ancient Greek philosophy starts with the materialism of Thales and ends with the idealism of Plato and Aristole. A rich contribution we find in the Greek Philosophy is nothing but metaphysics directly and epistemology indirectly. Sophists were the first who established epistemology directly with bringing the concept of skepticism, developed in many phases. In modern philosophy Descartes' Philosophy stars with skepticism and Hume's philosophy concludes in skepticism. A great history of skepticism we can find in philosophy of the West since the period of sophists to till now. Skepticism leads the western philosophy in rationalism and empiricism. Modern western philosophy has its problems in the question, what is the source of knowledge? Is knowledge independent of knower? etc. Searching of answer to these question modern western philosophy reached the reason and the sense-perception as the source of knowledge. Reason, by which we know the every happening of the universe including the origin of universe itself, concludes the epistemological theory, rationalism. But with sense-perception as source of knowledge, an opposite theory comes out and that is empiricism. Rationalism starts with Descartes and empiricism with Locke. But both rationalism and empiricism, unlike sophists, establish metaphysical theories of idealism in the shape of dualism, monism and pluralism and realism in the form of representationalism, subjective idealism and skepticism. Representationaism indirectly accepts idealism. So, there raise many contradictions in empiricism. Kant tries to remove these contradictions, and establishes a new theory of knowledge, criticism. Criticism leads to two directions : phenomenology and noumenalism, or metaphysical entity—phenomena and noumena.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Noumena is the reality which we cannot know at any cost. This leads to the epistemological theory, agnosticism. Phenomena is not real but apparent. What we know is not things-in-itself but things-as-appeared. Thus, the seed of appearance and reality of Bradley is found here. Hegel removes this duality, and establishes that all is rational and real. His famous statement is "real is rational and rational is real." It is the realism of idea, i.e., Absolute Idealism. Pragmatism, in the 19th century, revolts this idea of Hegel and philosophy turns into the theory of utility and meaning. Pragmatism starts, with Pierce's theory of meaning, and James tries to search the truth in 'work' or 'use'. He says, workability is useful and useful is workability. So, the truth is not idea or matter but usefulness or workability. Dewey's instrumentalism rectifies James theory of truth, and approaches that what is instrumental to achieve the goal of human life is true or real. In fact, pragmatism has seeds of process philosophy which has later been developed by whitehead and Bergson.

The seed of phenomenology finds in Kant's criticism and phenomenology leads existentialism. Human existence, now, is the core theme of philosophy. Neitzsche is the pioneer of this theory, and then contemporary western philosophy turns to the postmodernism with Rorty, Levinas and Deridda. From pragmatism to postmodernism contemporary western philosophy turns into a lot of phases. Now, the structure of this philosophy has entirely changed with linguistic trends which seeds can be found in Moore, Russell, Frege and logical positivism. Wittgenstein is the father of western linguistic philosophy. Ryle and Austin developed it. After linguistic philosophy a new trend has come with strawson and Quine. Both do not deny linguistic approach of philosophy, but with this approach they establish a new metaphysics—descriptive metaphysics and radical empiricism. H.P. Grice has defended the dogma of empiricism which has been criticized by Quine. Thus, contemporary western philosophy has vivid angles, which have been sketched briefly in this work.

In the end, I would also like to thanks the editorial board of Motilal Books Publishers & Distributors and these team for whose active publication the book has been able to get published soon. I also thanks the publishers for his role and activism. I would also like to express my gratitude to Seen Graphics whose team made this very rare task easy by typesetting this book in less time.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

This work is based on various books and articles. I thank to authors of these books and articles. Some materials are collected from Internet, provided by my research scholar and presently Guest faculty in the Department of Philosophy, Patna University, Sushant Kumar. So, I thank him. I think, this work must be useful for students of graduate and post graduate levels, as well as those who is preparing different competitive examinations of National and state levels.

January, 2022
Patna

N. P. Tiwary

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

CONTENTS

1. **INTRODUCTION** 1-20
   - ❑ Idealism of Hegal (Or, Absolute Idealism) 4
   - ❑ Idealism of Bradley (i.e., Absolute Idealism) 11

2. **PRAGMATISM** 21-45
   - ❑ Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) 25
   - ❑ Theory of Meaning 25
   - ❑ William James (1842-1910) 30
   - ❑ Theory of Truth 30
   - ❑ The Varieties of Religious Experience 34
   - ❑ John Dewey (1859–1952) 37
   - ❑ Instrumentalism 37
   - ❑ Common Faith 41
   - ❑ Education 44

3. **PHENOMENOLOGY** 46-65
   - ❑ Phenomenological Method 47
   - ❑ Notion of Intentionality 49
   - ❑ Philosophical Reduction 50
   - ❑ Intersubjectivity 53
   - ❑ Theory of Essence 58
   - ❑ Psychologism 60
   - ❑ Philosophy As a Rigorous Science 64

4. **EXISTENTIALISM** 66-103
   - ❑ Characteristics of Existentialism 66
   - ❑ Kierkegaard 68
   - ❑ Subjectivity As Truth 68

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

- ❑ Leap of Faith 72
- ❑ Martin Heidegger 75
- ❑ The Concept of Being (Dasin) 75
- ❑ Man as Being in the World 80
- ❑ Critique of Technological Civilisation 83
- ❑ Jean Paul Sartre 86
- ❑ Concept of Freedom 87
- ❑ Bad Faith 91
- ❑ Humanism 92
- ❑ Maurise Merleau-Ponty 99
- ❑ Perception 99
- ❑ Embodied Consciousness 102

5. POSTMODERNISM 104-151

- ❑ Friedrich Wilhelm Neitzsche 108
- ❑ Critique of Enlightenment 109
- ❑ Will to Power 112
- ❑ Genealogy of Morals 117
- ❑ Schopenhaur's conception of "will to live" 124
- ❑ Richard Mckay Rorty (1931-2007) 128
- ❑ Critique of Representationalism 129
- ❑ Against Epistemological Method 132
- ❑ Edifying Philosophy 136
- ❑ Emmanuel Levinas (1906) 138
- ❑ Ethics As First Philosophy 140
- ❑ Philosophy of the 'Other' 142
- ❑ Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) 145
- ❑ Theory of Deconstruction 146

6. REALISM 152-206

- ❑ Realism : Neo And Critical 152

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

- Neo-Realism 155
- Critical Realism 165
- British Realism : Moore and Russell 174
- Moore–Refutation of Idealism 174
- The Defence of Common Sense 178
- The Proof of External World 182
- Bertrand Russell 183
- Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description 184
- Theory of Descriptions 186
- Sense and Reference 194
- Logical Atomism 196

7. FREGE 207-214

- Sense and Reference 207
- Concept and Object 212

8. LOGICAL POSITIVISM 215-235

- The Verification Theory of Meaning 217
- Elimination of Metaphysics 223
- Function of Philosophy 227
- A. J. Ayer—The Problem of Knowledge 230

9. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 236-278

- Language and Reality (Language Game) 236
- Meaning and Use 242
- Critique of Private Language 246
- The Picture Theory of Meaning 253
- Notion (Concept) of Philosophy 258
- On Certainty 263
- Facts, Objects, Propositions and Names 268
- Forms of Life 271
- Wittgenstenian Fideism 275

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

10. GILBERT RYLE 279-288

- ❑ Philosophy and Systematically Misleading Expressions 280
- ❑ Concept of Mind 283
- ❑ Cartesian Dualism and Category Mistake 284
- ❑ Mind as Disposition 286

11. JOHN LONGSHAW AUSTIN 289-297

- ❑ Analysis Of Speech Acts 289
- ❑ Distinction Between Performative And Constative Statements 293

12. PETER FREDERICK STRAWSON.....298-310

- ❑ Descriptive Metaphysics 298
- ❑ Concept of Person 303

13. WILLIARD VAN ORMAN QUINE.....311-319

- ❑ Two Dogmas of Empiricism 311
- ❑ Radical Empiricism 316

14. H. P. GRICE 320-323

- ❑ In Defense of A Dogma 320
- ❑ Theory of Meaning..... 321

15. DOGMA :
QUINE, GRICE AND STRAWSON.....324-334

16. CONCLUSION 335-342

- ❑ Henry Bergson (1859–1941) 335
- ❑ A. N Whitehead (1861–1947) 339

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

1. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Western Philosophy is a reaction against metaphysics, i.e., idealism and materialism; starting with Logical positivism of the scholar of vienna circle. According to these scholars function of philosophy is not to search the truth but to analyse the philosophical statements and points out their validity or invalidity. In other words, contemporary western philosophy turns philosophy in a limit of linguistic analysis. To it philosophy is not metaphysics and epistemology, as the ancient and modern philosophy in the west established. Western philosophy starts with the Greek thinker, Thales who said that ultimate reality is water and all things comes out in the universe including universe itself from water. Later on Greek thinkers, like Democritus established that universe is evoluted from the atoms of four elements—earth, water, air and fire. From Thales to Democritus Greek philosophy was swinging between materialism and idealism, eternalism and non-eternalism. But from socrates to Aristotle it transformed into the metaphysics of Idea. Plato is very clear in this transformation, where Aristotle adopted both form (idea) and matter and socrates gave the method of philosophy. Though Aristotle accepted dualism in clear way, Plato accepted it indirectly. However both accepted the ultimate reality as God, the highest good. After Aristotle Greek metaphysical views turned into the sophistic skepticism, and here the seed of epistemology remained. Thus, Greek metaphysics turned into epistemology. Infact, Western modern philosophy developed epistemology. It does not mean that there is no epistemology in Greek Philosophy. Plato distinguished knowledge from opinion, Socrates identifies knowledge with virtue and Aristotle gave rational method (deductive) to understand philosophical thought. However, epistemology is under current with metaphysics. In Greek Philosophy metaphysics is more important. But in modern philosophy epistemology is premier than metaphysics. Metaphysics

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

has its own ground in rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz and empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Rationalist philosophers were influenced by mathematics and empiricist philosophers were influenced by natural sciences. Descartes started his philosophy with skepticism and Hume ended his empiricism in skepticism. Skepticism is the foundation of epistemology. Whereas descartes with his skepticism established metaphysical realities like soul, God and explained with these realities. Spinoza with his geometrical method established the monistic metaphysics of pantheism and Leibnitze with his mathematical aptitude established the pluralistic metaphysics of monadism. Dualism of Descartes converted into pluralism of Leibnitz through monism of Spineza. Infact these rationalist supported the eternalism. But empiricism of Locke concludes into the skepticism of Hume. Berkeley with his 'esse-est-percipi' turned his philosophy into the metaphysics of Idealism. Locke went to the representative realism with simple and complex ideas, and Hume established skepticism through impression and idea. Thus, rationalism gives us a definite knowledge, empiricism does not. Therefore, Kant tried to reconcile between empiricism and rationalism by saying that knowledge is a fusion of both subject and object. He defined knowledge as a synthetic judgement apriori. It means knowledge starts with sense-perception (empiricism) and ends in reason (rationalism) through space and time and understanding. To gain knowledge we have to pass at least three stages—space-time, understanding and reason. When we see an object in space and time, we do not know it immediately. We know it, when it reaches reason through twelve categories of understanding. Thus we know never the original object. What we know is the phenomena. Original object is noumena. Kant accepted the limit of human knowledge. Human knowledge is always phenomenon, not noumenon or real. Kant at first criticized both empiricism and rationalism and then reconciled between the two on their merits. Knowledge, according to Kant, must be new, certain (definite) and universal. Empiricism gives new knowledge and rationalism gives certain (definite) and universal knowledge.

Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena gives a scope to establish a modern Idealism of Hegel, i.e., Absolute

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Idealism. Infact, contemporary western philosophy is the revolution against Hegelian Idealism.

After Aristotle's rationalist and idealist philosophy of Greek, Western philosophy turned into the medieval theology of christianity. In other words, medieval period of philosophy in the West is known as Christian theology or medieval philosophy. Church was the authority and what the Father said is the philosophy, because Father is the representative of God. What he said is the saying of God. So, in the medieval philosophy there is no epistemology or metaphysics but only theology. Theology was philosophy and philosophy was theology. Therefore this period was called as 'dark period of philosophy'. Philosophy was the slave of church. But with Galileo science has influenced philosophy and the period of enlightenment started in philosophy with Bacon and Descartes. Here is the start of modern philosophy which was also a reaction against the theological philosophy of church. Science begins with Galileo and Newton which is continuously developing through many phases to quantum physics and now in technology, particularly science of internet, cyber, computer and so on.

Development of science affected both human life and human society. Man's thinking has also changed. It also affects philosophy too. Now, the philosophy of 20th century which is called contemporary philosophy is purely based on science. Science does not believe in any supra-reality. It verifies any thought by observation and experiment, then accept or deny the validity of any entity or reality. Therefore, philosophers of vienna circle refute the metaphysics of Hegel or Marx. A. J. Ayer was one of the members of this circle. According to him, "later 19th century and earlier 20th century Hegel's idealism was dominant, however, Marx and Engels had set out to 'turn Hegel on his head'. Even Marx and Engels had made little impact on the philosophical world." (A.J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. p. 19) It means that before commencing 'logical positivism' Hegel's idealism was very dominant in the philosophical world. Therefore, to understand the thought of contemporary western philosophy it is essential to know Hegel's idealism very well.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Idealism of Hegal
(Or, Absolute Idealism)

In the western philosophy there are three prominent schools of idealism. They are Objective Idealism, Subjective Idealism and Absolute Idealism. Plato's ideas represents as Objective Idealism and Berkeley's philosophy has been termed as Subjective Idealism (though some critics point out that Berkeley is swinging between both objective and subjective idealism, but his treatment of his philosophical thought—esse-est-percipi—makes him subjective Idealist). Hegel and Bradley are representatives of Absolute Idealism. Both accept that ultimate Reality is nothing but Absolute. To understand Hegel's idealism we have to proceed through his philosophical method, i.e., dialectic. Infact, Hegel's idealism has, at least, two parts—one is the method of discussion which leads to establish a philosophical, say, metaphysical doctrine. It is the logic of Hegel which has been discussed in the book 'Science of Logic' authored by Hegel himself. The second part of Hegel's idealism is his metaphysical theory, i.e., Absolute Idealism which has been dealt with in his another book 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. Now, we have to see how Hegel presented his idealism in these two parts one by one.

Dialectical Method : We can find two terms operative in Hegel's dialectic—contradiction and sublation. Hegel says that 'everything is inherently contradictory and in the sense that this law in contrast to others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things. It is one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity. Nevertheless, if it were a question of grading to two determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence. For, as against contradiction identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being, but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity."[1] By analysing this sayings of Hegel, we can find the following points :

1. G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic (translated by A.W. Miller), P. 439.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(a) Each and every things, by nature, are contradictory. Contradiction is inherent in everythings.

(b) Law of contradiction shows the truth and the essential nature of things in contrast to other things. For example, A is thing who is contradictory to B. It means what is the nature of A is not the same nature of B. Both's nature is contradictory, because B comes through the process of dialectic in A. A, –A, and then B. So, the nature of A is quite different from B.

(c) Contradiction does not mean to determine identity essentially and immanently. In other words, contradiction of A, i.e., –A is not identical to B. B is a new thing which comes through the process of –A (contradiction of A).

(d) B is not the end of contradiction, but it has also its own contradiction, –B, which goes to its contrast C. Thus, B through –B turns into C, and C through –C turns into D, and so on. It is a continuous process, dynamic process.

(e) Therefore, contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality. All things have a contradiction within them, and due to contradiction these things change in another things. So, in Hegel's view, contradiction is an activity, a movement. Thus, Hegel's method of dialectic in form of contradiction is dynamic. Hegel, "contradiction is internal to each other. Internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity is not as yet a livingness, but the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it."[2]

Contradiction in Hegel's philosophy is not a negative term, but its basic nature is positive. Within contradiction we can find both negativity and positivity. Contradiction of X, the positive term, is –X, the negative term; and contradiction of –X is X. Contradictory

2. Ibid, P. 440

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

terms are not static but dynamic. It is a continuous process. A contradicts B, B contradicts C, C contradicts D, and so on. This process continues till contradictions end. At last, contradictions end in an imaginatory element. In words of Hegel "Nothing exists as just brutally given and simply possessing one or two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is just first and primary and on which other things depend without mutual relation. People intend to think about such things, but they cannot really succeed in doing so unless they stay on the level of imaginative pictures. Imagining that such things exist is possible only as long as we are ignorant of what is actually present. What appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and mediated."[3]

In the above statements some key and significant terms are used by which Hegel explains contradiction as well as sublation and dialectic. These terms are mediation and mediated, and the opposites, immediacy and immediate. 'Mediate' is the middle which connects two extremes. In accordance with everything is mediated, nothing exists as immediate first. In the Logic mediation will involve the gradual development of categories to a point where there is nothing that is posited at first and independent. In Hegel's dialectic the thesis is always regarded as 'immediate' or as characterized by 'immediacy'. The contradictory term, anti-thesis is 'mediate' or 'mediation'. The third term, the synthesis (which synthesize both terms, thesis and anti-thesis) is the merging of 'mediation' and emerging as a new 'immediacy'. And this process goes on. The synthesis of a triad both abolishes and preserves the differences of the thesis and the anti-thesis. This activity of the synthesis is, in Hegel's words, sublation (aufheben). It is also an operative term, as contradiction is, in Hegel's dialectic. Sublation has three manifesting distinct with mutually interrelated moments. The first moment is of 'transcendence' in which sublation goes beyond a 'limit' or 'boundary'. The second moment is the negation of the first negation — 'limit'. Here the 'limit' is 'overcome' or removed. And the third and last moment is of 'preservation' in which what has been 'gone beyond' or transcended is brought again into a new relation. These three moments of sublation (though distinct) form a

3. David Kolb, The critique of pure modernity—Hegel, Heideggar and After, P. 46

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

unitary process of Logic which is differentiated into its various components only for the purpose of helping an 'understanding' of the process itself. The very process by which a category 'passes beyond itself' and posits another category to which it is intimately related is, at one and the same logical moment, the process by which it 'transcends' its limited abstract self-identity, 'negates' that identity and emerges into a connected unity or nexus, in which it is preserved as an intrinsic part of some greater whole. The differences between the first and the second member of each triad are sublated by the third. The first is thesis, the second is anti-thesis and the third is synthesis. This triad of dialectic, or the dialectical method, has been applied by Hegel himself to establish his Idealism, the Absolute Idealism.

Absolute Idealism : This triad of Dialectic has been applied by Hegel in his metaphysical thought. On the basis of this triad, Hegel first formulates the category of Being as a pure indeterminate immediacy with no differentiation either within itself or relatively to anything external. To substantiate this definition of Being, an example must be taken. 'This table' has been abstracted from all its qualities-squareness, brownness, hardness, even tablehood, then 'this table' is merely a pure Being which is common in all other things of the universe. So, Being has no determinations. According to Hegel Being though absolutely in determinate, contains its own opposite 'the mediation'–hidden within itself, and that this opposite has to be extricated or deduced from it and made to do the work Being, as a vacuum, is the same as Nothing. The absence of everything is simply nothing. Hegel says, "Nothing, pure Nothing : it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, without determination or content .... Nothing, Therefore, is the same determination (or rather lack of determination), and thus altogether the same thing, as pure Being."[4] Thus Being is seen to contain Nothing. However, the deduction of Nothing from Being and their identity is not immediate. This identity is possible through a mediation and it is the category of Becoming that mediates between Being and Nothing (Non-being). Becoming is the category that sublates Being and Nothing, i.e., Non-being into itself. It is true that the higher categories contain the lower ones; similarly in another

4. G.W.F. Hegel, Ibid, P. 94

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

sense it is also true that the lower categories contain the higher ones. If Becoming is deduced from Being, then Being must contain Becoming. Conversely, Becoming must contain Being, because it is deduced from Being. This is the dialectical principle known as "the unity and the struggle of opposites." And this is also the essence of Absolute Idealism. In fact, idealism of Hegel is itself the story of struggle between opposites and ultimately their unity in sublation of Absolute Idea.

Hegel's Absolute idealism is influenced by Kant's transcendental dialectic, as Hegel himself accepts : "These Kantian antinomies still remain an important part of the critical philosophy, they principally effected the fall of the previous metaphysics, and may be looked on as a chief transition to modern philosophy; for they in particular assisted to produce a conviction of the invalidity of the categories of finitude by examining their content, and this is a more correct method than the former method of subjective idealism according to which their only fault is suppose to be that they are subjective and not that which they are in themselves."[5]

Hegel underlines Kant's philosophy as a turning point of new metaphysics which leads to subjective idealism, but subjective idealism has its own weakness. So, Hegel transforms Kant's subjective idealism into his own Absolute Idealism. According to Kant all our knowledge 'begins' with and terminates in sensibility. Even then he (Kant) warns that our knowledge does not 'originate' from sensibility. Empiricists have failed to determine that there lies much in the things which is not given in sensation, is not as such directly manifest. It requires the use of 'understanding' and 'reason'. Hegel adds one more requirement, i.e., dialectic. In Kant's philosophy reason is never in immediate relation to an object. It is understanding which function through the process of abstraction, is to present contradiction between individual and universal, identity and difference, and so on. The realm of reason seeks to unify that which the understanding has divided. Reason shows that the function of understanding, to define things in terms of their isolation, constitutes a process of abstraction. The function of reason is to make manifest the concrete relation in which an idea, concept

5. Ibid, P. 204

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

or thing subsists. Kant argues that the function of reason is to draw a limit to the extent of the categories of understanding. Hegel criticizes Kant's concept of reason. According to him, reason fails to overcome the antinomies between finite and infinite, simple and complex, freedom and causality, conditioned and unconditioned. The essential defect of these antinomies is that it posits the finite as something existing on its own and then tries to make the transition to the infinite as something different from the finite. Hegel regards reason as the indispensable corrective to the deficiencies of understanding. In the process of unifying the opposites, reason sublates the finite and its negation, so that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. This 'wholeness' in which contradictions are sublated, is nothing but the 'Absolute' or the 'Truth' in Hegel's words. Hegel himself says, "The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature."[6]

This statement of Hegel proposed a theory of wholeness, i.e., Absolute in which all odds and evens ended. Absolute is the result of end of all contradictions. Contradictions make Absolute themselves. In his book "Phenomenology of Spirit" Hegel elaborates his conception of Absolute as spirit. Spirit or Absolute is a doctrine about the relationship between thought and objective reality. In this sense, spirit is the mediation or middle point between the Idea and Nature. Idea is the categories and the Notion which are also known as truth in the most absolute and objective form. Nature is the sphere of external existence which the truth is 'about'. Hegel designates the term 'Idea' to the absolute truth. According to him (Hegel) 'Nature' is the term that truth which we find in the outward existence of the world. However, 'spirit' as the mode of existence of the whole in which everything which is known is embodied in being. Idea and Nature are dialectical opposites, but spirit is the unity between them. Hegel mentions that there is something which is identical neither with the sphere of our thought nor with the objects of our thought. This something is the Geist (spirit) which imparts an

6. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (translated by A. V. Miller), P. 11

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

intellectual form of both these spheres—Idea and Nature. Spirit is the active synthesis of our consciousness of the world, and what we are conscious of consciousness of the world, in Kantian term, is phenomena and conscious of is noumena. Hegel does not satisfy Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. To Hegel the prominent question is how in consciousness we are related to our objects, and when our object is our own consciousness. It is clear that our consciousness have an existence in itself which is in principle hidden from us and separate from that consciousness as it exists for us. Thus, according to Hegel, there are two aspects of spirit — (a) Spirit requires the distinction of subject and object. (b) Spirit overcomes the supposed distinction between subject and object. First aspect is called as the moment of estrangement and the second is unification or transcendence Spirit.

Hegel takes over the doctrine from Kant that consciousness is necessary bipolar, and "rational awareness" requires separation. Consciousness is only possible, when the subject is set over against an object.[7] Thus Hegel believes in contradictions, conflicts and struggles among two opposites. This conflict, as Hegel assumes,[8] is an antagonism between idea and reality, thought and the real, between consciousness and existence. This conflict is estrangement located in the spirit. Similarly transcendence or unification of estrangement is also located in the spirit. Hegel says, "Spirit or Mind is essentially the same unifying agency as life-Infinite life may be called a Mind because Mind cannotes the living unity amid the diversity. Mind is the living law that unifies the diversity so that the latter becomes living."[9] Therefore unification does not differ from being (sein). Both unification and being are identical or equivalent. The copla "is" in every proposition expresses a unification of subject and predicate, in other words, a Being.[10] Being as pure is attributable to everything, and Being as determinate refers to particular things in the world. Pure Being is what particular beings have in common and is, as it were, their substraction. Hegel often

7. Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, P. 26
8. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, P. 35
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

terms the pure being as the essence of all things. Pure Being is the Absolute Spirit or Idea. So, the ultimate reality is Absolute in which all evens and odds, contradictions and conflicts vanish.

However, in Taylor's view Hegel's central ontological thesis (i.e., Absolute Idealism)—that the universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity—is quite dead.[11] It is the cause that logical positivist and other criticize Hegel's idealism. Marx said that he brought Hegel's dialectical method on the feet (ground) which was running with the head (imagination). But Hegel's idealism is not dead. It alives in the thought of Bradley, Green and other idealist thinkers of 18-19th century. Among them Bradley is the most significant.

Idealism of Bradley (i.e., Absolute Idealism)

Bradley's Absolute Idealism has two aspects—negative and positive. Negative aspect is Appearance (universe is not real but appearance only) and positive aspect is Reality (Reality as Absolute).

Negative Aspect (Appearance) : Universe, according to Bradley, is not real because it is contradictory and so, appearance only. Bradley proves his assertion—"universe is contradictory and appearance"—on the following arguments :

(A) Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities of an object found in the universe. According to him some qualities like extension (existence of an object) are primary, because it inheres into the object, and remains till the object does not destroy. But smell, colour, sound, taste and touch are secondary qualities of an object, because these qualities depends upon an individual. If an individual does not see the object, he could not say about colour or smell or taste etc. of an object. So, secondary qualities are subjective and primary qualities are objective.

According to Bradley, if secondary qualities do not exist as such in any object, it implies that they exist only when the object becomes 'related' to some sense-organs. For example, colour appears in an object, when the object is related with eyes. Therefore, Bradley

11. Charles Taylor, Ibid, P. 538

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

terms secondary qualities as appearance, and primary qualities like extension are real—"secondary qualities are appearance, coming from the reality which itself has no quality but extension."[12]

Materialism also supports that extension is the fundamental or primary quality of a matter or a material objective. Bradley argues that if the primary quality of extension forms the substantive essence of matter and secondary qualities are only adjectival to it; the problem arises how to understand the relation between the two. If secondary qualities belong to matter or material object are appearance, it means that matter (or material object) has its unreal character. If secondary qualities belong to matter are not appearance, it raises the question where does appearance belong ? Nowhere, according to materialism, but matter itself. Here we find contradiction, because matter is real according to materialism, but in the reference of secondary qualities, it is unreal. So materialism falls into an insoluble dilemma.

Bradley further argues that if secondary quality is said to be a conditional appearance, it is equally the same case with the primary quality of extension. In words of Bradley, "extended comes to us only by relation to an organ, and, whether the organ is touch or is sight or muscle-feeling, or whatever else it may be, makes no difference to the argument. For, in any case, the thing is perceived by us through affection of our body, and never without that."[13] It means without secondary quality extension is not conceivable. No one can think of extension without thinking at the same time of a 'what' that is extended. If the idea of extension comes to us through touch, the extended comes qualified by touch. Similarly, through eyes qualified by colour and so on. It proves that thought of the sole reality of extension is the violent abstraction of one aspect from the rest, and the mere confinement of our attention to a single side of things, a fiction which forgetting itself, takes a ghost for a solid reality.

On the above arguments, Bradley concludes that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, developed by materialism and empirists like Locke, has been seen to bring us no nearer to the true nature of reality. Therefore, matter as reality

12. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 10
13. Ibid, Page 12-13

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

advocated by materialism is selfcontradictory in nature and thus it is merely an appearance, not reality in real sense.

(B) Qualities, either primary or secondary, needs a substratum. Substratum may be subjective (in the case of secondary quality) or objective (in the case of primary quality). Quality is an adjective of a substance. So, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities lead to the distinction between 'substantive' (substance) and 'adjective'. But in Bradley's view this distinction is totally absurd. For example, a lump of sugar is substantive. Colour of sugar, i.e., whiteness, its taste, i.e.; sweetness and its nature, i.e.; hardness are adjectives. These adjectives (white, sweet and hard) qualifies substantive, the lump of sugar. If we take away qualities (adjectives) from the lump of sugar, nothing is left to be substantive, the lump of sugar. Thus, no thing can be found in addition to the qualities. However, we cannot identify a thing with its qualities. If sugar were identical with sweetness, it could not be at the same time hard because in this case sweetness and hardness would be identical which is totally absurd. So, a substantive can be neither something other than its qualities, nor identical with the qualities. However, we can solve this dilemma through a third alternative and that is "the substantive is a name for qualities in relation." When white, hard, sweet and the rest coexist in a certain way, that is surely the secret of the thing, that is what is called sugar and is the substantive.

According to Bradley this solution leads to the fallacy of ad infinitum. White is not the same as its relation to sweet or hard. It means that relation is different to qualities. Then the question arises how qualities have relations. Bradley says, "If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what is not; and if you predicate what is not different, you say nothing at all."[14] Thus the idea of relation of relation to qualities in unintelligible and absurd. It is the wrong assumption that a relation must be predicate or attribute of the terms, because it (relation) is not a predicate qualifying the terms. It is more or less independent of the terms. If two terms A and B are related by some relation R, then R being independent of A and B is outside, or external to the terms. If so then how can R be related to A, without a fresh connecting relation R_1,

14. Ibid, P. 17

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and R_1 is also external to A and R. So, it needs third fresh connecting relation R_2 and again R_3, R_4 .... and so on. Thus the external view of relation falls into the fallacy of an infinitum (infinite regress).

According to Bradley we can remove this fallacy, if we suppose that everywhere there must be a whole embracing what is related or there would be no differences and no relation.[15] It is only on the supposition of such a whole which relaxing its unity, takes the form of an arrangement of the many related elements, that we can explain the world's multiplicity and relations. However, in the view of Bradley, such arrangements are good for practical life. It may work, but the theoretical problem is not solved. Such arrangements are meant by the splitting of the whole into parts; and their arrangement by different sorts of relations may be good for practical life. But logically or rationally these arrangements are fallacious.

(C) According to Bradley, qualities are nothing without relations. In immediate preservation or mere unbroken feeling, we have no relations or no qualities. It is only when the different aspects of immediate experience are distinguished; we get by abstraction these aspects as qualities of the given. In words of Bradley, "There is an operation which, removing one part of what is given, presents to other part in abstraction. This result is never to be found anywhere apart from a persisting abstraction."[16] These words of Bradley clearly assert that qualities cannot be qualities but mental operation only for qualities, or, in other words, they are merely relation of the given to the mind. It means both qualities and relation are only mental. Then the question arises that if both are the same, how qualities are related to relation. In view of Bradley, distinction of aspects would be impossible, if the aspects are not related. It concludes that there would be and qualities without differences of aspects, and there would be no differences without distinction, and no distinction can be made without the mind's interrelation of the aspects distinguished. Thus qualities presuppose relations and are not intelligible without them.

However, relation is unthinkable without qualities. Relation

15. Ibid, P. 18
16. Ibid, P. 23

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

must relate some terms. When something given in immediate presentation is split up by our mental operation into different interrelated aspects, that is, qualities in relation. It is true that qualities cannot be in the given without relations, but it would be wrong to suppose that qualities can be wholly resolved into relations. To turn qualities in relation into mere relation is impossible, relations must depend upon terms, just as much as terms upon relations. It means that qualities are supported by relations, and relations cannot exist without qualities as relata. This leads to the fallacy of vicious circle.

On the basis of relational approach to and distinction between primary and secondary qualities, substratum and attributes, relation and quality, Bradley proves that our immediate experience through its relational activity establishes the contradictory nature of the universe. So, the universe is not real but only appearance. In Bradley's words, "a relational way of thought—anyone that moves by the machinery of terms and relation—must give appearance and not truth."[17]

Positive aspect (Reality) : Though this world is an appearance due to its self-contradictory nature, it must have a positive ground; because every negation implies some positive basis, as Bradley says in his famous book "Principles of Logic" in the context of negative judgement. So, he applies this principle in the context of appearance too. Rejection of the relational form of the universe as mere appearance implies some reality. It is assumed that something is an appearance, because it does not possess the characters of reality. The basic character of reality is that it does not contradict itself. So, the first criterion of reality is self-consistency. Self consistency means that there is no contradiction in the reality, and such reality is nothing but Absolute. Self-consistent or uncontradictory reality must be one. So, the Absolute is one and only one. Merely and only one reality or Absolute must be harmonious and free from all conflicts. There cannot be many independent reals. If there are many independent reals, we have to suppose that they are connected together into a harmonious whole by some relations. If a relation between any two reals affects their natures, they are

17. Ibid, P. 28

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

mutually influenced and determined, so we cannot think that the reals are mutually independent. If a relation does not so affect the reals, then it is external to or outside them. At this point we have to suppose for connecting the first relation with either term. In this case we go to the fallacy of infinite regress, and no relation can be established. Thus the impossibility of many reals is proved, and along with it the unity of the real is also established. "Bewildering mass of phenomenal diversity must hence somehow be at unity and self-consistent; for it cannot be elsewhere than in reality, and reality excludes discord."[18]

According to Bradley, in so far as phenomena are appearances of the real, they must somehow belong to the real, that is, they must be in the real. This gives the further knowledge about reality. And the knowledge is that "everything which appears is somehow real in such a way as to be selfconsistent."[19] In other words, all objects which are found to be self-contradictory in the phenomenal world constructed by our thought, must remain in the real in such an arrangement as to be in complete harmony. Therefore Bradley says that "embracing all differences in an inclusive harmony, the real is individual."[20] This individual real has been termed by Bradley as "concrete universal". So, the Reality or Absolute is not abstract, according to Bradley. It is merely an experience. Bradley holds that it must be made up of the very stuff of which every given or immediately present fact is composed, namely 'experience'—"Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly. I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality."[21]

---

18. Ibid, P. 123
19. Ibid
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, P. 127–128

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

This view of reality does not lead to subjective idealism. Subjective idealism does not distinguish between subject (knower) and object (known). In Bradley's sense, the distinction between subject and object is the result of our mental abstraction. Our thought splits up the concrete whole of experience into its fragmentary aspects like subject and object. So, both subject and object are fictitious appearance only. If we go back to immediate experience we do not find these fragments. "What we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist."[22] It is such experience which has been termed by Bradley as reality, and called it as "sentiment experience." Bradley further elaborates this point, and says that the whole of experience has not been split up by thought into 'that' and 'what', subject and object, feeling and the felt, neither has the 'this' been yet contrasted with any 'that'. It is an undivided whole without any feeling of limitation that is presented to us. Therefore the character of immediate experience is not incompatible with the absolute. It is true that what is present in each case of immediate experience in different from that in another, and each is in this sense fragmentary. But it does not contain any feature which can resist its absorption in Absolute experience. On the contrary, immediate experience possesses some essential features which our intellect demands of reality. Each fragmentary experience transcends itself and points to something beyond itself. If the different fragments of experience were not included in one whole, it would not have been possible to contrast them, differentiate them and interrelate them. Thus, the Absolute experience is implied by every finite experience. It means that reality and appearance are not entirely different and isolated from each other. The ground of difference between the two is only consistency.

Finite experiences (appearances) are non-consistent; whereas Absolute (real experience) is self-consistent. Self-consistency of Absolute is a metaphysical theory which satisfies the demands of intellect or thought. In Bradley's words, "since metaphysics is mere theory and since theory from its nature must be made by the intellect, it is here the intellect alone which has to be

22. Ibid, P. 128

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

satisfied."[23] But the intellect is not completely satisfied if feeling and will remain unsatisfied, because in concrete human experience all the elements—thought, feeling, will and the like—remain inseparably merged in one undivided whole. To satisfy the intellect fully metaphysics must take account of all sides of our being. And, it is fortunately not an impossible demand. Thus Absolute or reality, according to Bradley, is all inclusive. However, it is neither a self-conscious spirit nor a person. It is also not identical with God of religion. According to Bradley, God is a finite object standing above and apart from man.[24] As an object of worship God must be distinct from the worshipper, because He (God) is not the all inclusive Reality but an aspect of it only. "If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the whole. God is but an aspect and that must mean but an appearance, of the Absolute."[25] Similarly, Bradley says that self-hood and personality are essentially marks of finitude. The self as pitted against not-self cannot be the real, the all inclusive whole; but only real, the all-inclusive whole; but only a part or aspect of it. Personality implies selfhood and will and progress in time — all marks of imperfection. Therefore, a person is finite or meaningless. Hence the Absolute is not merely personal, but personal and more too. In other words, the Absolute is super personal. Thus, like self-hood personality is a finite appearance of the Absolute. The Absolute has this appearance, but also transcends it. In this regard, the Absolute or the Reality is a positive ground of non-consistent and contradictory universe, the negative aspect of the Absolute — appearance.

Degrees of Reality : Though appearance is a negative aspect of the Absolute, it is also related to it. The Absolute, being all inclusive, is a perfect and real. It is true. Appearance is also true but it is partial true, not perfect true like Absolute. So, appearance or the contradictory and non-consisted universe has the degree of truth or reality. In this regard Bradley has been influenced by Hegelian view. According to this view all finites are expressions of the Absolute

23. Ibid, P. 136
24. Ibid, P. 394
25. Ibid, P. 395, P. 397

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Reality in different ways, and all of them are fragmentary in nature and therefore imperfect. Hegel himself distinguishes between the higher and the lower categories. The higher is more concrete, more complete or inclusive, more harmonious; and the lower is more abstract, less complete and less harmonious. So Hegel arranges the categories of logic, nature and spirit in the ascending order of perfection. In the similar way, Bradley regards all finites as appearances of reality and as such imperfect and ureal. But all are not equally imperfect. As Bradley says that "of two given appearances the one more wide, or more harmonious, is more real. It approaches nearer to a single, all-containing individuality. To remedy its imperfections, we should have to make a smaller alteration. The Truth and the fact, which to be converted into the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by degrees of reality and truth. To possess more the character of reality, and the contain within oneself a greater amount of the real, are two expressions for the same thing."[26] For instances, both body and soul are appearances and hence unreal, the soul is more real than the body. The soul shows greater identity, self-consistency, self-completeness than the body.

Thus, the criterion of degrees of reality is imperfection. The Absolute or Reality is completely perfect. So, the Absolute proper has no degrees. Bradley says, "The Absolute, considered as such, has of course no degrees; for it is perfect, and there can be no more or less in perfection. Such predicates belong to and have a meaning only in, the world of appearances."[27]

But Haldane says that Reality itself has degrees. According to him knowledge or thought is foundational. It is the fundamental reality of which mind and object are different limited aspects or determinations. He controverts the idea of Berkely and the like idealists that knowledge is the product or effect or activity of some substance. In fact, knowledge constitutes the nature of substance, quality and everything else we can mention; "thought is constitutive, rather than constituted. It does not truely find itself in

26. Ibid, P. 322-23
27. Ibid, P. 318

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

reality, for it constructs reality by its own activity."[28] So, knowledge in us or our experience is only a finite determination of that one absolute knowledge. It is the manifestation of the eternal knowledge through the finite conditions of body and life. This view of Haldane reaches at the point of the relativity of human experience. We are what we are, and we cannot take in at any one moment all the possible aspects of reality. In order of accomplish anything we, finite beings, have to limit our endeavours and our purposes.[29] Thus we have to break up the whole of reality or knowledge and abstract only those aspects of it which the purpose of the moment needs. Therefore, finite human experience presents the different aspects of reality, each of which is true only in relation to a particular stand point from which reality happens to be viewed. This means that our experience or knowledge is never absolute, it does not give the whole truth about reality, it is only relatively true. Bradley also agrees at this point with Haldane. Appearances are our experience in partial sense of truth. So, they are not absolutely real but relatively true. All objects, even subject or knower, are related to each other, in this world. However, Bradley differs from Haldane in the regard of degrees of Absolute or Reality.

Haldane claims that Absolute or Reality must have degrees. According to him, reality being constructed by thought, and different thought-constructs being more or less perfect, there must be degrees belonging to Reality itself. But Bradley disagrees with this view. To Bradley, our views of Reality are contained of course within Reality, but in a transmuted form in which their distinctions, and therefore degrees are absorbed and merged in an undifferentiated unity. So, the Absolute or Reality has no degrees. The question of degrees of reality belongs to appearance or, non-consistent and contradictory universe.

❑❑❑

28. Lord Haldane, The Doctrine of Degrees in knowledge, Truth and Reality, P. 23
29. Ibid, P. 5

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

2. PRAGMATISM

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true, if it works satisfactorily. It is the movement that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that impractical ideas are to be rejected. This philosophical movement, which was originated in the United States of America in the latter part of the 19th century, is related to Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce coined the term 'pragmatism' in 1878. William James, friend of Peirce, delivered a lecture on the topic "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" in 1898 at the university of California, Berkeley and then he referred the term "Pragmatism" coined by Peirce. But Peirce did not satisfy with James interpretation of pragmatism. Therefore he changed the nomenclature as "pragmaticism" for his own pragmatic ideas. He said that "pragmaticism—a name is so ugly that it enough to be safe from kidnappers."

Though Peirce was the founder of pragmatism, James and John Dewey popularized it. Dewey termed his pragmatist ideas as "Instrumentalism". Though pragmaticism differs from James' pragmatism, Dewey's interpretation of pragmatism equated as instrumentalism. According to R. M. Chisholm. "Pragmatism, and instrumentalism are versions of a theory concerning the nature of believing."[1] Chisholm points out the some features of this theory as follows : "The theory could be spelled out this way.

(i) To believe or accept a certain state of affairs is to be prepared for or set for, the occurrence of that state of affairs.

(ii) To be prepared for, or set for, the occurrence of a given state of affairs is to be in a state that will be 'fulfilled' or 'satisfied'. if, and only if, that state of affairs occurs, and 'disrupted' or

1. Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of knowledge, P. 97

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

'disequilibrated' if, and only if, that state of affairs does not occur.

(iii) The belief that the state of affairs will occur is true if, and only if, the state of affairs does occur. And therefore

(iv) The belief will lead to satisfaction if and only if, it is true, and to dissatisfaction if, and only if it is false."[2]

Thus, the truth of a belief is a kind of satisfaction and the falsity of a belief is a kind of dissatisfaction. It implies that pragmatists did not believe in objectivity of science, because one's belief must differ from other's belief. So, pragmatism is a reaction against the rationalism of science. James himself said, "Against rationalism is a pretension and a method pragmatism is fully armed and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas and no doctrines save its method."[3] Being anti-rationalist pragmatism does not yield any concrete theory or doctrine, as science and ancient metaphysics do. Ancient metaphysics supports either Idealism or materialism as a theory of ultimate reality, whereas ancient epistemology supports Idealism and Empiricism as theories of knowledge—origin and sources of knowledge. To some extent pragmatism is nearer to empiricism but against the epistemological idealism. It is said that "Pragmatistic emphasize the practical function of knowledge as an instrument for adapting to reality and controlling it. Pragmatism agrees with "empiricism" in its emphasis on the priority of experience over a priori reasoning."[4]

In the words of James mentioned above, pragmatism is a method merely which does never reach any conclusion like rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism at its peak reaches the Absolute Idealism of Hegal : "Real is rational and rational is real." And empiricism turns into skepticism of Hume at the highest points. Pragmatism also includes skepticism. Russell says, "Scepticism is not avoidance of options, it is option of a certain kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error that is your faith-vetoer's exact position."[5] He further says that "the scepticism

2. Ibid
3. William James, Pragmatism, P. 54
4. Britannica Ready Reference Encyclopedia, Vol. 8, P. 58
5. Bertrana Russell, Philosophical Essays, P. 82

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

embodied in pragmatism is that which says, since all beliefs are absurd, we may as well believe what is most convenient"[6] It is clear that pragmatism is a method or movement of one's convenient ideas. Therefore, the Italian pragmatist Papini observed it as a corridor in a hotel. In his words, as quoted James, "it (pragmatism) lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel .... they all own the corridor and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms."[7]

The other features of pragmatism can be enumerated in the following ways :

(a) However pragmatism leads to skepticism, it does not believe that all our knowledge is doubtful or knowledge is absolutely impossible. In fact pragmatism believes in relative knowledge, not in absolute or perfect knowledge. And relative knowledge is always subjective. Subjectivism leads to skepticism though pragmatists both accept and reject skepticism in their ideas. As Russell observes, that skepticism though necessary at the start, must be banished later on if we are to get the full benefits of pragmatism.[8] In other words, pragmatism starts with skepticism but not ends in it (skepticism), as Descartes' philosophy.

(b) Pragmatism seems to accept the theory of correspondence. But it is not correct. According to the theory of correspondence that any idea is true, if it is according to that fact. I have an idea of red pen, this idea must be true, if I really find a red pen according in the physical world; otherwise it is false. But criteria of pragmatism to decide the truth and falsehood of an idea or belief is not correspondence between ideas and facts but the verification of one's belief or idea. Similarly, pragmatism is not comfortable with the coherence theory of truth. If two ideas are coherent with each other, they are true, otherwise false. But pragmatism has no such kind of criteria to prove its theory of belief. According to pragmatism beliefs or ideas must be verified in action. If I believe that X is honest, it must be verified X's honesty on the action what X does. If X act

6. Ibid, P. 105
7. William Jaines, Ibid
8. Bertrand Rucsell, Ibid, P. 105

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

honestly, then I can say that he is honest, otherwise my belief regarding X is false. So, the basis of pragmatism is verification.

(c) Verification must have a method and it is inductive method which pragmatists and also scientists apply. Russell says that "One of the approaches to pragmatism is through the consideration of induction and scientific method."[9] By inductive method we cannot find a definite and certain conclusion or establishment. It leads to probability. Thus, the conception of truth and falsity in pragmatism is a probable establishment. Probability always gives a chance to improve one's idea or belief. So, pragmatism falls in uncertainty forever.

(d) Lastly, as Russell points out that pragmatism also embodies evolution[10] and is a friend of religion, except Italian pragmatism[11]. Many religious people have accepted pragmatists as their allies. Thus pragmatism is the basis of a defence of orthodoxy. As well, pragmatism interprets ideas as instruments and plans of action rather than as images of reality, more specifically, it (pragmatism) suggests and anticipates possible conduct, hypotheses or forecasts of what will result from a given action or ways of organizing behavior. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller said that in order to judge whether a belief is true, it is only necessary to discover whether it tends to the satisfaction of desire.[12] The nature of the desire to be satisfied to only relevant in so far as it may involve conflict with other desires. Thus psychology is paramount, not only over logic and the theory of knowledge, but also over ethics.

Thus, pragmatism has many phases of movement. It is anti-rationalist, partially supporter of empiricism, skeptic, probable, religious, psychological, evolutionary, accepting inductive method, and so on. Perhaps, it is the cause that after Dewey pragmatism lost much of its momentum. But it never dies. It has come into new shape thought in contemporary times. "There has been a recent resurgence of interest in pragmatism, which several high-profile philosophers exploring and selectively appropriating themes and

9. Ibid, P. 93
10. Ibid, P. 105
11. Ibid, P. 83
12. F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanian, P. 154

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

ideas embedded in the rich tradition of Pierce, James and Dewey. While the best known and most controversial of these so-called "neopragmatist" is Pichard Rorty, the contemporary philosophers are often considered to be pragmatists : Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Jurgen Habermas, Susan Haack, Robert Brandom and Cornel West."[13]

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)

Charles Sanders Pierce was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician and scientist. He is the father of pragmatism. He was born on 10 September, 1839 at Cambridge (USA) and died on 19 April, 1914 at Milford (USA). His father, Benjamin Peirce, was professor of mathematics at Harvard University. From his father, he received most of the substance of his early education as well as a good deal of intellectual encouragement and stimulation. He graduated from Harvard in 1859. He received the B.Sc. degree in chemistry in 1863. From 1859 to 1891, for 32 years, he was employed by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, mainly surveying and carrying out geodetic investigations. He also taught logic in the Department of Mathematics at Johns Hopkins University during 1879–84. His works are "Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce", "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" etc.

Theory of Meaning

"The whole function of thought is to produce habits of action ..... to develop its meaning we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is what habits it involves. What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, when stimulates to action is derived from perception, as for the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result. Thus we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice."[14]

13. Douglas McDermid, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
14. C. Hartshorne, P. Weise, A. W. Burks (editors), The collected papers of Charles Senders Peirce, P. 400

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

The above statements of Peirce establish his conception of meaning in the following ways :

(a) The function of our thought produces our habits of action. Thus according to Peirce no thought is valid without action. If we think, we must have a habit of action. To act in accordance with our thought is our habit.

(b) Habit of action develops the meaning of our thought. What we think, it must have meaning and its meaning has been determined by our action. To act is our habit.

(c) The meaning of a thing must involves habits which depend on when and how it causes to act. "When" stimulates our action from perception and "how" produces some sensible result.

(d) Thus, the meaning of our thought must depend on the possible different use or practice of a thing.

According to Peirce meaning of a thing or any idea always depends on its practicality. For example, the word "hard". "Hard" means a thing which cannot be pressurised by our fingers or palm. If we sketch hard thing from our nails, there is no spot of nail-sketching on it. This practical bearing denotes the meaning of "hard". In fact this practical bearing is nothing but a "sign". So, meaning is "sign" merely. Secondly, Peirce says that habit of action includes belief. Belief is an establishment of a rule of act on, as Peirce understands. There is a process to establish belief. In our thought there is a process of inquiry which starts with 'doubt'. The aim of doubt is to establish 'belief'. There is difference between doubt and belief, as Peirce accounts. Doubt is that circumstance in which some question has been raised, and no certainty. But in belief there is certainty regarding our thought, action or thing. Due to uncertainty doubt can never indicate ways of our action. But belief does it. It points out the way of our action as well as it also conducts our action. Therefore Peirce terms doubt as an irritation, it is a status of unpeace. Establishment of belief, as Peirce says, is a settlement of opinion. Different opinions come from doubt. So, the process of inquiry is necessary to overcome doubt and to establish belief by settling opinions.

Now, on the above background we are able to analyse the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

conception or theory of meaning propounded by Peirce. At the time of Peirce there are three theories of meaning surfaced on the earth. They are the theory of meaning as Stated Essence or Essential Theory of meaning, Referential Theory of meaning and Imagist Theory of meaning.

Essential Theory of Meaning : A term is defined with its essence, and the meaning of that term depends on its essence. For example, the meaning of the term 'man' depends on its essential attributes or essence, i.e., animality and rationality; as Aristotle said.

But it is difficult to know the essence or essential attributes of every terms or things. Animality is also an essential attribute or essence of 'animal'. So, only 'rationality' cannot define the term 'man'. Therefore, this theory of meaning is unsatisfactory.

Referential Theory of Meaning : This theory mentions that each and every word must refer an object or a thing. For example, the word 'pen' refers an object or a thing which is useful for writing and which is a 'pen' in fact.

Though this theory is better than essential theory, it has also lacking. It is unable to refer 'verb' or 'nothing'. Verb and nothing have their own meaning. It only refers concrete words, but not abstract words like God, soul, etc. Abstract words have also their own meaning. Thus, the referential theory of meaning has a limited scope.

Imagist Theory of Meaning : According to this theory the meaning of a word or statement is those images which are originated in human mind. So, the meaning of a word or statement is nothing but the images which are produced by the word in our mind. As Berkeley says that the meaning of a table is not a concrete table but idea of a table in either finite or infinite mind. This idea is nothing but the image of a concrete table.

But this theory falls into the fallacy of solipsism. Different mind has a different idea or image of a concrete table. Thus the meaning of a concrete table is vivid and various. This leads to confuse human mind which meaning of a table is correct. In facts, this theory of meaning does never succeed to find out the meaning of any word or statement.

That is why Peirce refutes all these three theories of meaning,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and he gives a new theory for establishing the meaning of a word, and the theory is 'Operational Theory of Meaning'. According to this theory, the meaning of a word or statement is based on action. It is the Peirce's view that the meaning of word does not indicate or refer anything nor it is the image or essence of a thing rather it is a 'sign' merely. 'Sign' includes essence, idea, feelings, thought, image, belief, word and so on. There are various kinds of sign. Peirce does not accept that all kinds of sign determine the meaning of a word. According to him the sign which are intellectual concepts determines the meaning of a word. Intellectual concepts are those which are relevant for thought as well as for cognition. Since proper names and some feelings do not act, so they cannot determine the meaning. For example, red, green, yellow, Ram, Shyam, Sita, Anuradha etc. Thus, Peirce's intellectual concepts limit the area of meaning. In fact, in his view, the meaning of a word must have practical bearings : "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."[15]

Thus, the meaning of a word depends upon the consequences what the word bears. The example of the word "hard" which I have already mentioned in the previous paragraph clearly indicates what practical bearings are. According to James "practical bearings" means 'utility' of the word. If the word 'pen' is useful for us, it has utility and the usefulness (activity) of 'pen' is its meaning, i.e.; practical bearings. But Peirce does not agree with James. He says that utility and practicality are not the same. In fact, he mentions that practicality is not a kind of experiment but it is an experimental phenomena. Generally we can accept that knowing the meaning of word 'hard', we have to pressurise on the hard object by a finger or palm or sketching it by nail. But in Peirce's view it is not necessary in real sense to pressurise or to sketch the hard object but it is the idea regarding the experiment of pressuring or sketching hard object. It is the meaning of practical bearings in Peirce's view. He says that the meaning of a word does not originate from the definite experiment rather it originates from 'experimental phenomenon'. Experimental phenomenon is a status of thinking in which we think

15. Ibid, P. 402

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

what will be the consequence, if we act on a thing like 'hard'. Therefore, to Peirce 'act' does not mean act in real sense but it is conceptual or conceived act. Conceived act means to think the possible consequence of an act. It means that Peirce's pragmatism is not the theory of use or action, as James termed it, but it is the conceptual theory of act. That is why, Peirce uses 'sign' for the meaning of a word. According to him there are two kinds of sign : verbal sign and conteptual sign. We determine the meaning by both signs. Either sign does not give any cognition till we understand the meaning of a word by its act. Act of a word determine the meaning of the word in the shape of either sign. Thus, Pierce's theory of meaning establishes the unique kind of operational meaning.

Criticism Though Peirce is the pioneer of giving the unique operational theory of meaning, this theory has some lacunas. Peirce's "practical bearings" has not been clearly understood. Perhaps Peirce himself does not clear on this term. Secondly, the explanation of conceivable effects, i.e., the thought of consequences of action is vague. Each and every man has his own thought. So, conceivable effects to lead different thought of consequences of act. Thus, the meaning of a word is not clear. Individual thought kills the universality of meaning. Peirce replies that universality remains in the meaning. It is true that two individuals think differently, but they must think about the consequences of action simultaneously in the same. This sameness defends universality of the meaning of a word. However, the question remains that how a man knows the consequences of action. If we do not know the idea of consequence of an action, like sketching by nails or pressurise by finger or palm, previously how we can know the meaning of 'hard'. At first we must know the meaning of hard in practical way, then we can think of consequences of an act of any 'hard' thing. Lastly, Peirce is unable to satisfy us that his theory of meaning does not clearly remove dilemma of determination of meaning or standard of meaningful. What is, Peirce, meant by the term conceived action, practical bearings or conceivable effects is not clear. However, Peirce's theory of meaning has a significant place in not only American Philosophy but Western philosophy of 19th-20th century. It is the seed of verificational theory of meaning of Ayer. It is the foundation of James' theory of truth. It affected American life very much.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Neopragmatism of Rorty, Putnam, Haack, Hapermas etc. has its own foundation in Peirce's theory of meaning or 'pragmaticism'.

William James (1842-1910)

William James was an American philosopher, historian and psychologist. He was born on 11 January, 1842 at New York (USA). He died on 26 August, 1910 at Choconia (New Hampshire, USA). He was influenced by Pierce and Fechner. He influenced Dewey, Bergson, Wittgenstein and Rorty. He educated in Harvard Medical College during 1864–69. His notable ideas are "Will to believe doctrine", "Pragmatic theory of truth" and "Radical empricism." His main works are "The Principles of Psychology" (1869) and "Psychology : The Briefer Course" (1892).

Theory of Truth

Before discussing James' theory of truth, we have to introduce two theories of truth namely correspondence and coherence which were (and even now are) familiar among philosophers at the time of James. Correspondence theory of truth mentions that any idea or statement is true, if it is in accordance or correspondence to facts. "It is dark outside" is true, if and only if "it is dark." Thus correspondence means the relationship of fit between the 'saying'—the statement and the 'it'—or state of affairs, event, idea etc. which it is about. Correspondence is not such a mysterious thing that cannot be serviceable, because it originated from our common sense idea of truth. The word 'correspondence' is only a tool or relational term aimed at capturing a feature of reality and its linguistic representation. At this stage, William James says that 'Truth emerges from facts, but they dip forward into facts again and add to them, which facts again create or reveal new truth and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs (the statements) that start and terminate among them .... The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process : the process, namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its valid-action".[16]

16. William James, Pragmatism, P. 147, P. 133

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

The above words of James clearly mention that truth comes from facts. But facts themselves are not true, because facts are changeable and create new truth. So, correspondence theory of truth is not satisfactorily. According to James, truth is not a property, as Aristotle says. According to Aristotle "truth is implies that saying or statements are what truth and falsity are primarily properties of".[17] But it (truth) is an idea which is made true by events or facts. Truth is an idea or belief which must be verified by action. In fact, truth is the function of beliefs or statements which depends upon the process of valid-action. It is clear that James does not accept correspondence theory of truth in toto, but he must accept its merit, i.e., corresponding facts which can be verified.

According to coherence theory of truth propositions are to be held true if and only if they copy the eternal thought that considers them. The world of ideas (Plato) and cogito (Descartes) are such thought that make our propositions true. In other words, if our ideas are coherent with each other, they are true. In the words of Armour, "the contention which forms the core of coherence theory of truth is that truth is a certain relation which holds amongst judgements."[18] But according to James, this theory is also unsatisfactorily. This theory seeks to consider formal truths and the way we come to now them, which seem not to carry any empirical reference. In so doing, it neglects the possibility of discrepant, but internally coherent, systems. And when systems that exhibit these discrepancies were formulated, coherence theory collapses. Therefore, James says that "the truth of any statement consists in the consequences and particularly in their being good consequences."[19] These statements of James point out that the truth is not correspondence to facts or coherence among judgements or ideas, but it depends upon the good consequences. Good consequences means utility of the truth. In fact truth is useful, and utility is truth : "It is useful because it is true or it is true because it is useful."[20] He further says that "both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that there is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name of whatever

17. A O'Hear, What Philosophy Is, P. 88
18. L. Armour, The concept of truth, P. 151
19. William James, Ibid, P. 230
20. Ibid, P. 135

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience."[21]

Thus, in the view of James, truth is the name of usefulness. The idea or statement is true, if it has its utility and utility or usefulness must be validated or verified. For example we have an idea of pen which colour is red, and we say that "this pen is red." Now, we have to verify our this statement. If we find the pen, in real sense, as red, our statement is true. But it is not perfectly true, because if we cannot write with this red pen; it means it (the statement or our saying "this pen is red") is not true. If we can write with this pen, then the statement is true; because it inherents utility. Writing with this red pen is useful for us and therefore the our idea or statement of this red pen is true. So truth and usefulness go with simultaneously by validating-process. Therefore James says that "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, verify. False ideas are those we cannot."[22] In other words, an idea is true, if it works. So truth is workability. Workability is utility which can be verified on practical ground. Before verification we must have the belief that this red pen is workable or useful. Without believing we cannot establish truth or falsity of an statement. Therefore it is said that "the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of beliefs and good, too, for definite, a signable reasons."[23] In fact, the initial unverified belief is a necessary condition for the subsequent established theory and by so doing they make out a case for the usefulness of believing before we have evidence. Assignable reasons means the agreement with reality. So, truth is an agreement with reality. It seems that James has inclined towards metaphysics. But it is wrong. To James reality is not a metaphysical entity. It is clear what James says about "agreement". According to him, "To agree in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to guided either straight upto it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed."[24] These words of James

21. Ibid
22. Ibid, P. 133
23. Ibid, P. 75
24. Ibid, P. 212

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

metaphorically indicates that agreement is regarded as practical, not as merely intellectual.

Russell points out the difficulties involved in James' theory of truth. Firstly James' assertion that "a truth is anything which it pays to believe" is vague. This assertion implies that the consequences of entertaining it, and what are the consequences of rejecting it. We must know also what consequences are good, what bad, what better and what worse. This view is disputable and disputed. Therefore, our test of truth becomes practically useless.[25] Secondly, James is unable to distinguish between criterion and meaning of the truth. Catalogue in the library is the criterion of books which shows that books mentioned in the catalogue are in shelves or almirahs. But it does not mean that we find the book mentioned in the catalogue in real sense, may be the book is missing, or, it means that we get the book which does not mention in the catalogue. So, catalogue is the criterion of books, not the meaning of books. This is the case with true belief or truth as workability. It is difficult to determine whether a belief is useful than whether it is true. According to Russell, to James utility is a criterion, then utility is the meaning of truth is supposed to follow.[26] As, workability or utility is the criterion of truth, it implies that there will be no absolute truth. For example, "this red pen" is not useful for illiterate men but useful for literate men. Thus, both truth and falsity involve in the term "this red pen". So, James' theory of truth propounds relativism which leads to solipsism. However, James replies that his conception of truth, being relative, does not lead to solipsism. May be beliefs are relative, but there are some "brute facts" in the workability or utility of the truth. Workability depends upon circumstances and references. If we say that "ice is green", the truth of ice does never work, because ice is not green. It is a brute fact that ice naturally is always white. In the view of James, truth is always relative, because it depends on human beings' ideas in accordance with circumstances or references. Even then the practicality or workability of ideas is the same. All literate men must accept that this red pen is true, because they write with them, but for all illiterate men it is false, because they cannot write. Thus, the "idea

25. Bertrand Russell, Ibid, P. 118
26. Ibid, P. 121

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

of this pen" is true objectively and therefore, no fallacy of solipsism. Lastly, the theory of truth of James is also not individualistic. This theory accepts the "sentiment of rationality" which all human beings have.[27]

Though there are difficulties or fallacies in James' theory of truth, it has its own significance. It has a scientific vision which accept the validity of an idea by experiment. James also refers to validity or verification for establishment of workability or utility in truth. That is why he himself terms his theory of truth as 'melioristic'.

The Varieties of Religious Experience

James, in his two books namely "Pragmatism" and "The varieties of Religious Experience," depicts the various aspects of God—theological, biological, philosophical and psychological. In Pragmatism theological aspect of God has been discussed. The rest aspects of God have been discussed in the second book as well as in the first one.

Theological Aspect : According to James God is a matter of belief, not for rational arguments. A man heartly believes that God is in heaven and all is right with the world. So, there should not raise the question of the existence of God. In fact, God exists in our heart, not in our mind. It is true that each and every man has its own God. So, according to James belief in God is a pluralistic phenomena or faith which is compatible with the idea of pragmatism. This faith lies between naturalism and absolutism. It also leads to believe that there is a possibility of various other superhuman forces, besides God. These forces are responsive to the needs of man, and cooperating with him for the salvation of the world. Thus, theological aspect of God appears as a species of polytheism. Though the original polytheism of mankind, as James remarks, has only imperfectly and vaguely sublimated itself into monotheism, monotheism as religious has always viewed God as but one helper the midst of all shapers of the great world's fate.[28] Being religion as pluralistic or meleoristic in type, pragmatism must be religious[29],

27. Basant Kumar Lal, Samkalin Paschatya Darshan, P. 50.
28. William James, Pragmatism, P. 298
29. Ibid, P. 300

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

but not dogmatic. Everyone can decide for himself what form of religion will work best with him, because evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experiences.[30] Thus theological aspect of God is an inner personal experience which is the earnest belief in human hearts and no need of rational explanation.

Biological Aspect : The theological aspect of God leads us to believe that "religion is primarily a matter and necessity of life—it is a biological reaction."[31] James attempts to distinguish between the basic nucleus of religious beliefs and the additional intellectual, metaphysical doctrines foisted on them, which in James' view, is overbeliefs.[32] Metaphysical doctrines are different, so they are conflicts and battles of opinions. However, there is a wonderful unanimity in the basic feelings. Feeling and conduct of religious men possess striking similarity, though their thoughts and words vary. In James' words, "When we survey the whole field of religion, we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there; but the feelings on the one hand and conduct on the other are almost always the same, for Stoic, Christian and Buddhist saints are practically indistinguishable in their lives."[33] The theories, being variable, are secondary. The essence of all religions must be looked for in this unanimity of feeling and conduct. The conduct is an expression of feeling. The religious feeling, as the intellect can grasp and express, is analysable into a feeling of uneasiness. Therefore James says that religious feeling is a sense that there is something 'wrong' about us, as we naturally stand. It is also a solution or a feeling of relief—a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers.[34]

The above observation of feeling and conduct regarding religious experience has been termed as biological by professor Leuba. In the view of Professor Leuba, "God is not known, he is not understood, he is used" in life; that "Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of

30. Ibid, P. 109
31. Ibid, P. 503
32. Ibid, P. 504
33. Ibid,
34. Ibid, P. 508

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

religion. The love of life, at any and every level of development, is the religious impulse."[35] So, at bottom religion is biological.

Philosophical Aspect : The philosophical question regarding the existence of God is irrelevant in respect of biological aspect of God. According to Dewey, the heart of religion, as Schleiermacher holds, is the "sense of dependence" and the religious attitude is a sense of the possibilities of realizing an ideal, and its devotion to this ideal does not depend on "the proof of its antecedent existence", but on its ability to provide a satisfactory basis on which the religious life can depend and progress.[36] Therefore, belief in the existence of God starts, like other beliefs, as a provisional postulate for life.

Psychological Aspect : James criticizes those who try to discredit the religion by showing its low origin, such as unbalanced hysterical mind, unhealthy nerves, perversion of the sexual instinct and the like. Such attempts in James' view, are childish like the refutation of the value of a scientific discovery or an industrial commodity. The origin is no criterion of value. Value must be ascertained by its satisfactory results. For determining the value of a religion we must judge it by the inner happiness, the serviceability, the consistency with other ideas. Moreover, just as religion can be traced to certain bodily and mental circumstances of persons, disbelief can similarly be traced to certain other conditions and criticized by its origin; and thus the issue will remain unsettled. Therefore James says that "the plain truth is to interpret religion one must in the end look at the immediate content of the religious consciousness."[37]

In sum and substance, James concludes that the philosophy of religion is fruitful; if it must collect, observe, compare and frame hypotheses on and such facts of immediate religious consciousness. In a word, it (the philosophy of religion) should adopt the same procedure as the other empirical sciences. Therefore it should be a science of religions. Then the status of this science (of religions) would be as respectable as that of the physical science, and even for

---

35. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, P. 506-7
36. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, P. 288-91
37. William James, The Varieties of Religions Experience, P. 12 (footnote)

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

those who have no religious experience of their own it would be what optics is for the blind.[38] If instead of this empirical scientific procedure, the philosophy of religion assumes to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical reason alone or of logical reason drawing rigorous inference from non-subjective facts.[39] No doubt, it can raise grand apriori systems, but then it travels away from the concrete facts of religion towards the unreal religion of abstraction and verbalism fails to convince one of the truth of religion, because its formulas are the stereoscopic or kinetoscopic photographs seem outside the instrument, they lack the depth, the motion, the vitality. Therefore James says that "in all sad sincerity I think that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless."[40] So, the various religious experience are ultimately beyond reason and arguments. It is the inner and heartly experience.

John Dewey (1859–1952)

John Dewey was also an American philosopher, psychologist and educational reformer. His ideas have been influential in education and social reform. He was born on 20 October, 1859 at Berlington (U.S.A.) and died on 1 June, 1952 in New York. He educated from Johns Hopkins University in 1884 and from University of Vermont in 1879. His notable ideas are "Reflective Thinking". "Functional Psychology" and "Immediate Empiricism". He is considered as one of the fathers of "functional psychology." His major work was "The Reflex Arc concept In psychology", published in 1896.

Instrumentalism

The philosophy of John Dewey is the apex of pragmatism which started with Peirce. He once said that "Peirce wrote as a logician and James as a humanist."[41] This distinction between Peirce and James characterizes not only the course of pragmatism but also the

38. Ibid, P. 456
39. Ibid, P. 433
40. Ibid, P. 455
41. Britannica.com

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

shaping of Dewey's own thought. At the time when Dewey was struggling to free himself from the hold of Hegelian idealism in 1890s, he was at first influenced by James. Later he recognized the value of Peirce's work, which clearly prefigured certain ideas that he had developed independently. And his ideas or philosophy of pragmatism is popularly known as instrumentalism. To understand his instrumentalism we must at first understand his idea of nature, or, naturalism.

Naturalism : At the early stage Dewey was very much influenced by Hegel's idealism. But very soon he realised that idealist views could not be verified on the basis of experience. Being pragmatist, Dewey was also empiricist. So he did not accept any entity beyond experience. He believed in scientific approach of experiment which is based on the method of observation and experiment. Experience includes both methods. In other words, empiricism or pragmatism accepts the method of observation and experiment. According to Dewey experience is always natural, not supernatural. No matter or idea (consciousness) is supernatural. Idealism or materialism distinguishes between matter and consciousness. But Dewey did not believe in dualism of matter and consciousness. In accordance with him from one viewpoint what experience is matter, is consciousness in other viewpoint. Natural order is both material and conscious. So there is no difference between matter and consciousness. Both are the same and natural.

To Dewey experience is not an individual mental function, but it is with nature. There are things, functions, events etc. in nature; and we experience all these natural happenings. We have an experience of stones, plants, animals, health and diseases, heat and electricity, devotion and religiousness, love and beauty etc. So there is nothing and emotion beyond experience. Nature, in view of Dewey, is not eternal. It is a continuous flow of change. It is not bounded with eternal laws. There are chance and freewill in nature. Nature in its inner form is evolutionary or developing. If it is eternal nature will never develop and the world is on the verge of decay. Nature is changing, uneternal and irregular. Therefore there is conflict and struggle in nature. And this results in many problems. Thought or thinking process is necessary to solve these problems. Thought is

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

rational which is originated in the womb of nature. Reason or intellect does never originate without nature. It originates in the sufficient circumstances which produce by the natural struggle and conflicts. In other words, to solve natural problems like events—floods, earthquakes, volcanos, diseases, animals, hills, rivers, etc.—rational thought is originated from nature itself. Reason, by removing natural problems, systemizes the natural order or nature itself. According to Dewey, there is no pure and absolute knowledge. Knowledge remains in action. Nature acts, so nature gives us knowledge which is nothing but our experience. Therefore nature and experience are the one and same. In Dewey's words, "Experience is of as well as in Nature .... reaches down into nature, it has depth, it has also breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent."[42]

Instrumentalism : The main characteristic of any living beings is their activities. If any living being does not act or work, it means that he is not a living being. But due to irregularity in nature, there originates many problems in which any action or work is impossible to perform. But this impossibility leads to end of life. Therefore it is essential to solve problems, and for that purpose thought comes. Impossibility of work is unable to produce thought. But being a human being, we have thought. So thought is the essential means of solving all problems originated from nature. According to Dewey there is no need of thought, if our act will be according to our innate or intuitive tendency. But when we find difficulty to adjust this tendency. But when we find difficulty to adjust this tendency with environment or nature, we need thought or thinking process to solve the difficulty of adjustment with environment. Therefore, thought, according to Dewey, is the process of solving problems what we experience with nature.

In fact, thought is rational, and it has its own aim, as indicated in the above paragraph. So, it is in heirarchial order. Dewey accounts the five subsequent stages of this order. At the first stage, we try to come out from problems by imagination or hypotheses of alternative ways or means. In the second stage there is a great internal discussion on those alternative ways or means. In the third stage we determine our works or actions and imagine or make hypothese of

42. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, Quoted from Basant Kumar Lal, Ibid, P. 60.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

some methods to perform. The fourth stage evaluates the utility of these methods. At the last or final and fifth stage the best useful hypothetical or imaginary method adopted, and perform our work or activity in accordance with this imaginary useful method and verify it. If this method succeeds in verification, our problems solve. But it does not succeed in verification, we have to proceed another process of thinking, and again start to adopt the above mentioned five stages till our imagination or the thypotheses will be not succeed in verification. It will be the continuous process of thinking to solve our problems which originate from nature.

According to Dewey our rational thought is the indicator to point out the concepts which are basically an instrument. In fact, concepts have instrumental value. They are values as means. They are a plan to remove circumstances which produce problems. They are unverified hypothesis. A plan is always rational, so concepts are Rational thought or plan is not only theoretical or mental rather it is practical. The consequence of rational thought seems in performing actions or doing works by us. Since doing or acting works is the basis of validity of rational thought to solve problems, Dewey terms the rational thought as scientific method. It is said that "to instrumentalism scientific theories should be thought of primarily as tools for solving practical problems rather than as meaningful descriptions of the natural world."[43]

In the view of Dewey knowledge is not the realization of an eternal and supernatural entity, but it is a consequence of scientific method. The spectatory theory believes in an eternal spectator, like Absolute, in idealistic thought. But Dewey refutes it, and says that the successful experiment is knowledge. When we are at fix in some difficult and hard situations, we are in the status of ignorance. When we succeed to do work after removing these difficult and hard situations through rational thinking, we get the right knowledge of those circumstances. Knowledge does not arise from perception, as classical empiricists say. According to Dewey, simple or mere experience is not knowledge. Simple or more experiences produce problems and when these problems establish an order in our experience by solving problems, we get real, true or valid knowledge.

43. Britannica.com

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

So, real and valid or true knowledge depends upon our actions or experiment. Therefore, Dewey believes in an experience with experiment, not in perceptual experience or merely contact between sense organs and objects. In fact, Dewey's empiricism is not like classical empiricists of Locke, Berkeley or Hume but his empiricism is unique which is called as "Experimental Empiricism".

Rational thought makes a hypothesis of concepts or ideas which are the indicator of knowing which action or doing is true. Doing or action is the criteria of truth. If our thought is in accordance with our actions or doings, it is true otherwise false. So, truth is not a metaphysical entity nor an attribute of any entity but it is only action or doing. Truth is doing and doing is truth. Doing is experimental, so truth also determines by scientific method. Hence truth is not metaphysical but it is also an instrument, like knowledge to solve our problems originated from nature. According to Dewey, we find truth in judgement established by scientific method. These judgements are, in fact, "warranted assertability", not truth. Thus Dewey assesses his ideas of pragmatism in instrumentalism and naturalism.

In sum and substance, Dewey's instrumentalism gives a new vision to understand the world in the form of nature, and also to understand truth and knowledge as instruments of doing and validity of doings. Therefore Dewey says that "Knowing is knowing by doing, and, knowledge is an instrument of action." And, "truth is identified with the outcome of competent inquiry." Competent inquiry means 'actions' that reflect both truth and knowledge.

Common Faith

Dewey in his work "A Common Faith", points out the direct purpose of the work in following words : "Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant."[44] There are three major themes present in this work of Dewey. The first establishes distinct differences between "the religious" and religions themselves as experience. The second affirms God as

44. T.A. Alexander (Ed.), Dewey's Terry Lectures : A Common Faith, P. 80

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"creative intersection of the ideal or possible and the real or actual". The third establishes "the infusion of the religious as a pervasive mode of experience into democratic life."[45] A. E. Elder reviews the book, and says that "there is potential in man a religious attitude towards life—a natural capacity for faith—which can so enrich life and advance human well-being, that if through misunderstanding or other causes it is suppressed, then human life as a whole is adversely affected and remains a poor and stunted thing.[46] Religious attitude is not necessarily expressed through devotion to one particular religion, because according to Dewey, this (religious) faith is present in experience itself. R. S. states in his review of "A Common Faith" that "the central argument is designed to show that religion should be detached from its supernatural associations within organized historical institutions, and widened, on the basis of its function in experience, so as to cover all devotion to ideal ends inclusive enough to integrate a whole self and arouse emotional support."[47] By analysing this statement, we can find that Dewey does not mean religion as the center of supernatural forces, but it depends on human experience and feelings. Baurain states about Dewey's idea of religious as follow : "the religious is characterized by a rejection of creeds, doctrines, rituals and other elements of organized religion. Instead, an authentically religious attitude or orientation is existential and humanist. Moral faith rests not upon a divine Supreme Being or divinely revealed truths, but upon the dynamic potential of inquiry to discover knowledge and pursue ideals, that is, to act on experimental knowledge in order to improve life."[48] Thus, in Dewey's view, religious men are those who enhance their knowledge on the basis of their experience for the purpose of improving or developing their life. Religious experience itself is not explicity tied to singular religious, and that experience can and should be creatively harnessed to enrich life. It is common faith, according to Dewey.

---

45. Ibid, P. 23
46. A. E. Elder, Review on A Common Faith, Philosophy, Vol. 10, P. 235
47. Shane Ralston, Review on A Common Faith, The Journal of Philosophy, IV. 31 (21), P. 584
48. Bradley Baurain, Common ground with a common faith : "Dewey's idea of the religious", Education & Culture, 27 (2), P. 74–91

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Dewey avoids the metaphysical dualisms implicit in most doctrinal religion by unifying the ideal and the real under the banner of religious experience. In Ralston's words : "Dewey's union of the ideal and the real under the heading of religious likewise reflects an attempt to 'convert the ontological into the logical' by showing that religious is a quality of lived experience, not of a supernatural thing, church, object of reference, divine idol or realm of supersensible objects. To do otherwise endangers the process of inquiry by bifurcating reality into pregiven realms of religious and nonreligious objects, the former transcending the experiential conditions of the latter."[49] However, Dewey carefully defines the difference between religion and the religious in the first chapter of his book "A Common Faith". According to M. C. Otto, "perhaps the most arresting thing is the distinction insisted upon between religion, any religion past or present, and the religious attitude or function. This is so sharply drawn that it almost seems as if Mr. Dewey were saying that every activity in the world may take on a religious character, excepting religion."[50] This assertion of Otto clearly explains that Dewey, being a naturalist, assumes that every doing or activity in the world is nothing but religious only, but not religion itself. Religion is not an activity, it is an inertia nonactive supernatural and abstract idea. Religion is not ideal. Ideal is religious activities. According to Alexander, in the book "A common Faith" Dewey asserts that both 'faith' and the religious attitude have nothing to do with "doctrines" of any sort. In fact, Dewey's lectures were for those antireligious naturalists and humanists who had set up a new dualism between "Man and Nature" in place of the old.[51] Thus, this common faith is a push against the strict, binding doctrines of religious creed or scientific law that suppressed creativity and lived experience, disenfranchising many. In fact, in direct reference to A Common Faith, Dewey himself states that "my book was written for the people who feel inarticulately that they have the essence of the religious with them and yet are repelled by the religions."[52]

49. Shane Ralston, Education & Culture 23 (2), P. 63–75
50. M. C. Otto, The Philosophical Review, 44 (5) P. 496–97
51. T. M. Alexander, The Human Eros : Ecoontology and the Aesthetic of Existence, P. 356
52. R. S. (Webster) Journal of Philosophy of Education, P. 622

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Dewey utilizes the word 'common' in the title of his this book, referring to the potential for religious expression and spirituality in everyone and echoing his view on democracy. Alexander states, "To see something as 'common', for Dewey, is to grasp it imaginatively in terms of its possibilities for growth. Dewey's use of the word 'common' should not be taken to indicate a complacent optimism based on satisfaction with things as they are now. To grasp the possibilities in the present requires creative exploration and struggle."[53] Alexander defines Dewey's use of the term "common faith" as "a faith in the potentialities of human life to become genuinely fulfilled in meaning and value, but only if those potentialities are actualized through action."[54]

Ultimately, in order to achieve this "common faith" Alexander states, "Dewey urges that we put the question of revealed truth aside and look at the effect such experiences have on the lives of the individuals who undergo them."[55]

Education

John Dewey is a reformist pragmatic philosopher, especially in the field of education. His idea of education is termed as "educational progressivism" or "progressive education". Progressive education is essentially a view of education that emphasizes the need to learn by doing. According to Dewey, human beings learn through a "hands-on" approache.

It is the pragmatic belief that reality must be experienced. From Dewey's educational point of view, this means that students must interact with their environment in order to adapt and learn. It is the case with teachers also. Dewey felt the same idea was true for teachers, and that teachers and students must learn together. His view of the classroom was deeply rooted in democratic ideals, which promoted equal voice among all participants in the learning experience.

The pragmatic and democratic approach of Dewey to schooling may not stand out as radical today. But in the early and mid-1900s,

53. T. A. Alexander, Ibid, P. 23
54. Ibid, P. 21
55. Ibid, P. 24

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

his view of education was in contradiction to much of the then-present system of schooling. Dewey's approach was truly child-centered. A child-centered approach to education places the emphasis of learning on the needs and interests of the child. According to Dewey, children should be allowed to explore their environments. He believed in an interdisciplinary curriculum that focuses on connecting multiple subjects, where students are allowed to freely more in and out of classrooms as they pursue their interests and construct their own paths for acquiring and applying knowledge. The role of the teacher in this setting would be to serve more as felicitator than an instructor. In Dewey's view, the teacher should observe the interest of the students, observe the directions they naturally take, and then serve as someone who helps develop problem—solving skills.

Traditionally, a teacher would stand in front of a group of students who are all sitting in rows. The teacher is usually the deliverer of information and the job of the students is usually to receive this information and regurgitate it in some form of a written test. In contrast, in a classroom based ideas, according to John Dewey, a teacher deliver background content information and students working in groups, with those groups exploring different concepts within the content. In Dewey's view of education, we can see lots of conversion and lots of collaboration. With the written test, there must be projects, presentations or other differentiated techniques of evaluation required for students. All these techniques are usually used in the modern day system of education too. It is the significance of Dewey's progressivism or pragmatism in education.

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

3. PHENOMENOLOGY

In the "Britannica Ready Reference Encyclopedia" Phenomenology has been defined as a philosophical discipline which emphasizes the immediacy of experience and an attempt to isolate it and set it off from all assumptions of existence or causal influence as well as lay bare its essential structure. It (phenomenology) restricts the philosopher's attention to the pure data of consciousness, uncontaminated by metaphysical theories or scientific assumptions.[1] According to phenomenology, a material object is not a mysterious something 'behind' the appearances presented in sensation. If it were, the material world would be unknowable, indeed, the term 'matter' is unintelligible unless it somehow can be defined by reference to sensations. In speaking about a material object, then, reference must be made to a very large system of possible sense data, only some of which (if any) are ever actualized.[2] Spiegelberg characterizes phenomenology as "a rigorous science in the sense of a coherent system of proposition that goes beyond positive science by aiming at absolute certainty for its foundations and at freedom from presuppositions that have not passed phenomenological scrutiny. Its subjectmatter is the general essences of the phenomenon of consciousness. Among these phenomena, the phenomenologist distinguishes between the intending acts and the intended objects in strict parallel. Phenomenology is based on the intuitive exploration and faithful description of the phenomena within the context of the world of our lived experience, "Lebenswelt", anxious to avoid reductionist oversimplifications and over complications by preconceived theoretical patterns. In order to secure the fullest possible range of phenomena and at the same time doubt-proof foundations it uses a

1. Britannica Ready References Encyclopedia, Vol. 7, P. 264
2. Ibid, P. 263–64

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

special method of reductions which suspends the beliefs associated with our naive or natural attitude and shared even by science; it also traces back the phenomena to the constituting acts in a pure subject, which itself proves to be irreducible. Finally, its ultimate objective is the examination and justification of all our beliefs, both ordinary and scientific, by the test intuitive perception."[3] These characteristics of phenomenology must be found in Husserl's thought. In fact Husserl is regarded as the propounder of phenomenology. There are various concepts discussed by Husserl in his phenomonelogical thought. The most important concept is "phenomenological method." In fact, phenomenology is not a metaphysical or epistemological theory but itself a philosophical method, a unique revolution in the world of philosophy. It is a movement against the speculative philosophy.

Phenomenological Method

Husserl concentrates with a systematic development of his phenomenological method. In his book "The Philosophy of Arithmetic" he tries to explain psychologically some of the basic concepts of logic and mathematics. Findlay says that Husserl is trying to develop a rational genealogy of mathematical notions and methods out of primitive mental acts and confrontations.[4] Husserl, in his book "Logical Investigation, Vol. 1", presents two investigations and in "vol. 2" of the book four investigations. He examines various interpretations of the nature of logic and is critical of logic grounded on psychology as an empirical causal science. His phenomenology, which is descriptive in nature, is different from empirical psychology. Because it deals with ideal types, the essential meaningful structures which inform our experience.

According to Husserl, ideal logical entities are only given to us in experience. Ideal laws or logical laws concerning notion such as proposition, truth, subject, predicate, object, ground and consequent which are essential for any subjectmatters in science are given to us in experience. This also implies that all categorical distinctions

3. Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl's phenomenology and existentialism", published in the journal of philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 2, P. 62–74
4. Translation of "Logical Investigation" By Findlay.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

recognized by logic, extend beyond the limit of language and are implicit in our unverbalist experience. It is the first investigation. In the second investigation Husserl seeks for a middle line between J. S. Mill and Frege. Mill believes in logico-mathematical entities as derives from experience, Frege argues that such entities are completely independent of it. And, Husserl views that we have an immediate intuition of logical and mathematical truths. For example, we can intuitively grasp the fact that 3 + 3 = 6 without reference to any particular exemplification.

Now, the other four investigations, in the "Logical Investigation Vol. 2", are as follows :

(a) Husserl is concerned with a systematic enquiry into the nature of whole and part. He tries to show that there is a law of connection of parts dependent on the specific nature of the contents concerned. He contends that we have a direct intellectual awareness of certain meaningful logical structure, as having whole and part relationships. He takes into account the gestalt psychology example of Rubin's vase[5], wherein basically, we seem to have an innate tendency to perceive one aspect of an event as the figure or fore-ground and the other as the ground or back-ground. There is only one image here, and yet, by changing nothing but our attitude, we can see two different things. It does not even seem to be possible to see them both at the same time. Another example of the doctrine of foreground and background can be illustrated by Jastrow's duck-rabbit[6] example, made famous by Wittgenstein. The difference is due to my structuring what I see differently in the two cases : my participations of further experiences are different when I see a duck and when I see a rabbit. In the first case I anticipate feathers, in the second, fur. Also my anticipations of how the object will appear if it moves or if I move around it are different.

(b) Husserl deals with the related issues of complete and incomplete expression, with the import of what is now called the logical laws of formation, and the distinction between senselessness

5. Akoijam Thoibisana's article "Phenomenology as Research Methodology" published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, January-June, 2012, P. 89
6. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and absurdity. This investigation is one of the most illuminating, since it endeavors to give pure grammar of meaning, which will determine formally what combination of words will form meaningful expressions, a topic not without some interest in linguistic today.

(c) & (d) In the last two investigations Husserl is concerned with the analysis of the theory of consciousness, intentionality and the nature of evidence, truth and perception.

All together phenomenological method has been developed by six investigations. All these investigations establish that any doubtless, certain and essential absolute or unconditional subject is directly seen in our consciousness; and to know this consciousness-oriented subject we have to apply phenomenological method with its four stages : bracketing (epoche), reduction, ideation and essential intuition.

Notion of Intentionality

Brantano's idea of intentionality has influenced Husserl very much. According to Brantano, intentionality consists in a certain kind of directedness of our consciousness upon an object. But Husserl argues that many acts have no object. For example, hallucinations and many acts of thinking, as when somebody thinks of Pegasus or of the largest prime number. In the philosophy of language a parallel problem is resolved by distinguishing between an expression's sense and its reference. An expression has a sense which is grasped by everyone who masters the language. In virtue of this sense, the expression refers to its reference, if it has one. However, some expressions like 'the largest prime number", have no reference although they have a sense and can be used in meaningful discourse. Husserl refers the term 'intentionality' to the relationship consciousness as toward things, whether those things are directly given or meant only in their absence. What is needed is our intuition towards something, both empty and filled, or signitive and intuitive intention.

Husserl develops the notion of intellectual intuition which was overlooked by traditional empiricism. Intuition usually means some facilities whereby things, or experiences, were directly given to us. While the empiricist holds that experience only gives us a grasp of

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

how things actually are, for Husserl the doctrine of intuition goes far beyond what most philosophers have thought of as intuition. For Husserl, intuition gives us far more than simply sense data. For instance, general essence such as colour are directly intuited in our apprehension of particular colour, and are not derived by a process of abstraction as for example John Locke thought. Similarly, we have an intuition of concepts like unity, plurality, identity, etc. to which no possible sensedatum can correspond but of which meaning can nevertheless be obtained in an intuitive understanding.

The contribution Husserl made to his 'intuition' is the role of imaginative variation, and the emphasis on possibility, rather than just actuality. Suppose, we see a red patch. We can imagine it to be different: it could be green, or it could be a different shade of red, and it could also have a different shape, or different texture, it could be transparent or opalescent or specular and so on. That is, we have an ability to imagine how things could be, other than the way they are presented. Husserl not only uses this imaginative capacity but also thinks that it is the very essence of the intuition that we have of a thing. Thus, intuition tells us not only about how a thing is, it also tells us how it might otherwise be. This is the distinctive character of Husserlean intuitive system. It is this intuitive grasp of how a thing might be. A grasp of what Husserl called a things' essence that makes phenomenology a very distinctive philosophical method.

Philosophical Reduction

The goal of Husserl's phenomonology is to attain the intuitive apprehension of essence of a phenomena. Husserl terms this essence as 'eidetic vision'. This 'vision' shows how objective judgements are grounded in conscious experience not in the first person experience of particular individual but in the properties essential to any experience of the kind in question. In "Logical Investigation, Vol. 2" we find direct access to the essences by opening up a new realm for philosophy through the use of the methodological tools, the exercise of 'epoche' (to hold back) or suspension of judgement, in which phenomenologists 'brackets' the basis of their own interpretive stances. There is difference, as Husserl says, between "natural attitude" and "phenomenological attitude". Natural attitude involves a straightforward involvement with

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

things and the world. Phenomenological attitude is the reflective point of view from which we carry our philosophical analysis of the intentions exercised in the natural attitude and the objective correlates of these intentions that put aside our action or suspend all the intentions and convictions of the natural attitude. This does not mean that we doubt or negate them, only that we take a distance from them and contemplate their structure. This suspension is called, as Husserl terms, the phenomenological reduction or 'epoche'.

The method of bracketing leads to 'eidetic intuition', 'Eidetic Intuition' is the process of generalization which Husserl calls "free variation of imagination." It (eidetic intuition) is the insight that this or that features belong to the 'eidos', the essence of the things in question. The 'eidetic' analysis of intentionality and its objects yields 'apodictic truth' according to Husserl. 'Apodictic truth' is necessary truth. Human being, for example, cannot be without a past and future and that each material perceptual object has sides and aspects other than those presented at any moment. In view of Husserl phenomenological experience and statements would never be adequate to what they describe, even then they could be 'apodictic'.

In bracketing we ignore the everyday ontological commitment and concentrate on the structure of experience itself. That is, in bracketing, the existence of the external object is 'put into bracket', or suspended or 'ephoche'. What remain then is the structured experienced, a realm of essence and meaning. This gives us two continuities : Firstly, there are the continuities that comes from the experiencing subject—one judges, imagines, speculates, draws conclusion and so on. Secondly, there are the continuities that comes from the side of the object. When Husserl talks about these continuities in his own technical language, he postulates two corresponding series of entities; namely, an entity coming from a subjective continuity is called 'noesis' and an entity coming from an objective continuity is called 'noema'. In plural terms 'noeses' and 'noemata' respectively. Therefore, the phenomenological description of an object is called 'noematic' analysis, and that of the subjective intention is called 'noetic' analysis. That is the 'noema' and object is described phenomenological, and the noesis is the corresponding

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

mental activity described by phenomenology, wherein the objective and the subjective are correlative but never reducible to one another.

'Noemata', the term in plural sense, are more interesting. It is term which are things given to us in experience. It is not activity of the experiencing subject. For instance, we can again take the experience of a red object. There are two possible experiences : (a) The first experience could well be illusory—the object might, on closer examination, show itself to be green. (b) The second experience, even if it is not illusory, the object will always have other features which go beyond what can be grasped in a single experience, that is, the texture of its surface, how it feels, the colour of the other side of it, and so on. In this second experience the object has always a horizon of other possible experiences. According to Husserl this kind of object is transcendent. It means that the horizon of other possible experiences will always transcend, what can be given in any one experience. But the experience itself is not transcendent. It is given 'all at once.'

Again, for example, an experience of a green tree is simply an experience as of a green object. Here there is no horizon of hidden possibilities of that experience for us to be explore. If we find out that the object is infact red, then we will find out this by a different experience rather than by finding out the true nature of the first experience. Hence we can have indubitable knowledge of experience of 'noema', an absolute and immanent as Husserl calls. Thus, there are two different kinds of 'noemata'—tránscendent and immanent. Transcendental generally means that something is beyond any possible experience, that it belongs to some short of metaphysical realm. But Husserl defers this meaning of transcendental. According to him, transcendent 'noemata' belong to experience, the experience that consist of as yet unexplored but possible horizon. In the book 'Ideen' Husserl extends the methods of 'epoche' to the ege and its cogitations. Thus, Husserl extends his notion of bracketing, to bracket even the 'noeses' and 'noemata'. This leads to the postulate of transcendental ego which is the source of all experience in the view of Husserl. According to him, transcendental ego is something that it not given directly but that which relates itself to the contents of every experience, or alternatively, formulates what constituents every experience.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Intersubjectivity

Husserl, in his book "Cartesian Meditations", deals with the problem of Intersubjectivity, specially in the fifth Meditation. Here he attempts to "uncover the sphere of transcendental being as a monodological intersubjectivity."[7] The theory of intersubjectivity demonstrates the independent existence of other 'Is'. By way of the objection of solipsism Husserl arises the problem of the other. The Cartesian solipsism and the Husserlean solipsism differs from each other. For Descartes problem of solipsism appears as an ontological problem as to how the ego which is self-enclosed can justify its beliefs in the existence of other substances. Since it is formulated as a problem of knowing from the certainty of the existence of one substance, i.e., ego cogito, to reasonable assurance about the existence of other substances. It means that since the problem is being formulated in ontological terms as a movement from one kind of being to other beings. The Cartesian solution necessarily has to be ontological, that is, by way of another superior entity, the omnipotent God. But Husserl objective is to remove the ontological formulation of the issue, hence the problem of solipsism cannot be identified with its Cartesian version. If one were to do so, by definition, the phenomenological solution attempted by Husserl would necessarily fail, for then it would appear that Husserl is attempting to solve an ontological issue at the phenomenological level, whereas the phenomenological stratum itself has been made accessible only after the suspension of all ontological claims. Hence, it is first necessary to clarify the sense in which the problem of solipsism is encountered in phenomenology.

According to Husserl, Descartes lacks a conception of intentionality of consciousness. The ego, the non-intentional character of the Cartesian conception of consciousness, appears as a self-confined substance without any real connection to the world. The Cartesian doubt is ontological in the sense that the truth of any objective existence is suspended. The 'epoche' of Husserl has certain similarities with Cartesian doubt, yet it is not an ontic denial, it does not replace truth with falsity. What the 'epoche' really does is to open

7. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns, P. 89

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

ourselves to the things as they present themselves to the consciousness. In Cartesian terms, after the 'epoche' we are not left merely with the consciousness which, by its intentive acts, is directed to objects as they are given to those acts. In simpler language, what the 'epoche' does is to reveal the intentive direction of consciousness to the object. Here by object strictly means object as presented to consciousness as a phenomenon. Thus, the world is not denied, but what is being opened up is the structure of the experience of the world as it is given to us prior to all ontological hypothesis. The reduction, therefore, opens the gate-way for a pure experience. At this point the problem of solipsism and intersubjectivity arises.

For phenomenology the experience of the world as phenomenon is the experience of not merely the 'noema' of the objects alone, but these 'noema', in their very presentations, are grasped as real or transcendent object. In phenomenological language, in perception, the thing-in-itself is given and not merely a sensedatum or a copy of it. In that sense, Husserl's theory of 'noema' is not a representative theory which was the Cartesian solution. Although the object itself is given, yet it is not given in all of its aspects. But I grasp the object as that which has undisclosed aspects, which could be presented to other acts. This is the meaning of transcendency of the objects. Hence, a faithful phenomenological description of the experience itself suggests that to be real object is to be accessible to other intentive acts. Thus there could be two senses of transcendency of a real object : weak and strong. In the weak sense an object may be transcendent to a particularly intentive act, if it is such that it is capable of being grasped in its other aspects by some other acts of the ego itself. In this sense, a single solitary ego is presupposed. But Husserl's contention is that the experience of transcendency is a strong claim and not a weak one, because my experience itself reveals that the object which is given to me is also an object of intentionality radically other aspects of the object. It is the stronger claim that other egoes perceive other aspects. That is why, strictly speaking, the other is an alter ego, i.e., a consciousness like mine but yet different from mine. This is, as Husserl claims, what experience is seen to be after reduction. Thus, the phenomenological conception of objectivity itself demands a

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

clarification of the sense in which the object is given to another ego. It complicates the matter whether the proof of the alter ego must itself be phenomenological. In other words, it is not enough if I merely construct an argument which would imply the postulate of other subjects, rather to be strictly phenomenological, I must show how in my own experience the other ego is given not an object but as a co-constituted subject. In other words, what is to be clarified is a transcendental hypothesis about the other. Since the requirement of a phenomenological clarification of transcendental intersubjectivity, Hesserl must show how the other, as an alter ego, can be experienced in my own consciousness after the reduction.

The concept of alter ego, as Husserl describes in the fifth Meditation, is not equivalent to the concept of multiplicity of egos. In terms of the concept of objectivity, ego and alter ego are put in relation with each other. So, there is no problem regarding the existence of the other in question, but the real issue or problem is how of other subject's giveness, the other subject is to be correlated with the activity of conscious subject to whom he is given. For this, the task would be to show that the other subject is a transcendental ego in the sense of being a subject beyond the mere conception of a wordly phenomenon. For understanding such a task one needs to discover the implicit and explicit intentionality of my own where the other subject becomes fashioned in me. Husserl undertakes the task of making explicit "the form of experience through which the consciousness not only intends merely an object within the world, as in the case of perceived object, but also another subject with its own stream of experience and its own objects."[8] Accordingly Husserl presents an analogical account of the experience of others by explicating certain features which it shares with other forms of experiences. For him the experience of the other is, to some extent, analogous to presentation and recollection. According to Husserl other's body belongs to the sphere of my ownness, for in relation to my actual and possible acts of consciousness it can be termed as 'transcendent' in the weak sense. He further says that the experience of other's body as body, 'Leib', not merely as a physical object, 'Korper', involves a kind of analogizing apprehension. In my

8. David Carr, Interpreting Husserl, P. 53

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

own case the relation between my body and consciousness is seen in terms of body as an organ or expression of the consciousness, analogously other's body can be apprehended as the organ or expression of a consciousness. This consciousness is a special kind of act, namely, 'appresentation'.[9] This act involves the perception of the other side of an object which is not directly presented to the consciousness. In other words, in the act of appresentation, along with the perception of the presented portion of the object, the other side, i.e., the inner horizon of the same object is perceived as a present. This act is different from the act of imagination or recollection, because it presents something to the consciousness which does not have spatio-temporal presence at all. It can be legitimately held that one can imagine or remember the other side of a presented object by having a determined image of the object. If it is so, then demarcating the difference between the act of appresentation and the act of imagination or recollection means that appresentative consciousness is always necessarily accompanied by the presentation in the perception. In other words, the act of appresentation is not an independent act, because, it is intended in a horizon consciousness. According to Husserl, as in my own case, in other's case too, his consciousness is given in appresentation as 'Co-present with his body, as it were his consciousness is the other side of his body and here in the case of others also, the presented, as in my own case, is meaningful only with the togetherness of the appresented, for appresentation necessarily involves the presentation in perception. This analogy to perception makes explicit the fact that others body plays a very vital role in the appresentation of other's consciousness. Beyond this, this analogy to perception does not say anything. After seeing this lacuna, Husserl introduces the analogy to recollection.

Recollection is a very special kind of act which renders present something which, at present, is not present. It is different from the act of imagination. It, essentially, is the consciousness of something which is perceived or otherwise experienced by me in the past. From this point of view, recollection is constituted of the objects of experience as well. In this sense, by recollection the present ego carries out an accomplishment through which it constitutes a

9. Edmund Husserl, Ibid, P. 109

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

variational mode of itself, in the mode of past, as existing. The experience of recollection is a stream of consciousness which constitutes it. Thus, recollection is the living past which is different from the living present. One living present, in recollection, sees another original living present as past as in the case of the experience of the other. This is an analogy which can more clear by observing both the act of recollection and the act of appresentation more clearly. In the act of recollection one stream of consciousness is given to another and both the streams are just complementary parts of the same stream. Both the streams of consciousness, the past and the present, form the continuity. But the recollected (i.e., past) can never be simultaneously with the recollective (i.e., present) act. On the other hand, in case of the experience of the others the object act is present simultaneously with the subject act. In the case of recollection the experienced present, temporally speaking, at the very next moment becomes past. Hence the recollected has a kind of evidence and can be verified, if the necessity arises, by a certain procedure. In other words, the act of recollection involves the 'reactivation' or 'going back' of the things which are already experienced and retained, whereas the experience of the other involves the mediation of other's body. Despite these seeming differences, in recollection an inseparable correlation between the experience and the experienced. For example, 'to recall a musical performance is to recall hearing it and conversely, to recall hearing is to recall the performance itself.'[10] Similarly, in the case of the experience of the others the very act of being aware of another person as a stream of consciousness implies being aware of his experiences.

In words of Husserl, "When I am face to face with another person, I am aware not only of him but also that I am an object for him and that our surroundings are given to him as they are to me, or rather as they would be given to me if I were in his place"[11] In this sense, the appresented includes other's consciousness, his body, my body and the whole surroundings as they are for him. This is the most important point from the perspective of the alter ego. The alter

10. David Carr, Ibid, P. 56
11. Edmund Husserl, Ibid.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

ego has its own world as I have one of my own and both the worlds are appearances or modes of the same givenness, i.e., of the one and the same world. In this way, the strong sense of the transcendence can be understood in analogy to the weaker sense of it, that is, as the other is given to me by relation to my own actual and potential acts likewise the intersubjective object has the same status in relation to the multiple acts of different subjects. In Husserl's words, "any acts and the acts of other are so based that they stand within the function at community of one perception."[12] Thus is the phenomenological account of transcendental intersubjectivity.

Theory of Essence

The idea of essences is central in Husserl's phenomenological thought. An essence could be understood as a structure of essential meanings that explicates a phenomenon of interest. The essence or structure is what makes the phenomenon to be that very phenomenon. That is, the essence or structure illuminates these essential characteristics of the phenomenon without which it would not be that phenomenon. According to Husserl, grasping essences is by no means something mysterious or enigmatic. Natanson terms "the word essence as bad name in philosophy partly because ordinary parlance gives it the connotation of mystery. The 'essence' of something is an almost occult quality, a hiddenness of things. Husserl takes the opposite task : essences are simply aspects or qualities of objects-as-intented. An older tradition speaks of 'whatness' or 'quiddity'. The phenomenologist believes that essences do not lurk somehow behind or within objects but are the objects grasped in its intentional character, grasped as being this or that."[13] Seeing essences belongs, instead, to the everyday world, the everyday experiencing of the world. In Husserl's words, "The truth is that everyone sees 'ideas', 'essences' and sees them, so to speak, continuously, they operate with them in their thinking and they also make judgements about them. It is only that, from their theoretical 'standpoint', people interpret them away."[14]

---

12. Ibid
13. M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl : Philosophers of Infinite Tasks, P. 13-14
14. E. Husserl, Ibid, P. 41

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

We see essences continuously, i.e., when we experience the world, we see essences. When I lift my gaze from the keyboard and look out of the window of my study, I see apple trees and horses. In order for me to see these phenomena I must, per se, in an immediate way grasp their essences. I cannot say that I see an apple tree or a horse without grasping the essence of these phenomena that which makes the apple tree an apple tree, and not a plum tree or a bush, or that which makes the horse a horse, and not a cow of mule. I cannot even separate an apple tree or a horse from their essences. When we attend intentionality to a phenomenon, when we understand that phenomenon and what it is, we are involved with essences. An exploration of Husserl's ideas of intentionality makes clear that when the phenomenon presents itself as something, it presents its essence. Being intentional means seeing phenomena, their meanings, and their essences, in one way, or another. Merleau-Porty in his famous book "Phenomenology of perception" says that "Phenomenology is the study of essences."[15]

Being in the intentional relationship, essences are not produced or constructed by us as intentional subjects. We cannot conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness, which 'interprets', 'deciphers' or 'orders' a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses. The word 'phenomenon' means "thing as intended." Thus essences belong to the in-between world, that 'single fabric' that connect us with everything else in the world, with other subjects or objects. Essences belong to the 'flesh of the world'. The process of illuminating essences begins in particularity. According to Husserl, "this process is based on the modification of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into an arbitrary example which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding 'model', a point of departure for the production of an infinity open multiplicity of variants. Therefore, it is based on a variation."[16] The basic lies in the fact that all phenomena, concretely experienced or imagined, can take a different forms, if we think of, imagine, or in other ways intend them. We can see trees or horses in various ways, so there are different 'variations'. Husserl says that even these possible

15. Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology of perception, Preface.
16. Husserl, Logical Investigations, (Translated by J. N. Findlay) P. 340

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

variations are endless, there is an original 'model' that guides the variations and sets its boundaries. For example, there is a 'stop' when the horses suddenly become donkeys, zebras or toy horses. Thus something remains throughout that 'consciousness game', namely the essence, which makes a horse a horse and thus differentiates it from a donkey, a zebra, or a toy horse, may it be longer ears, certain stripes, certain feet or tails. Husserl explains that "It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing, an 'invariant' is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing, as an example of this kind, would not be thinkable at all."[17]

In view of Husserl, there is a general form of the phenomenon, an essential meaning or essence to the phenomenon, which makes the phenomenon what it is. If the essential meaning changes in a certain way, it is a different phenomenon. Husserl talks of two kinds of essences : universal and open. Essences, according to him, leave open possibilities for further exploration. In Merleau-Ponty's view, Husserl is misunderstood that he never radically wanted to split between essence and existence, and explains the idea by saying that "Husserl's essences are destined to bring back all the living relationships of existence, as the fisherman's net draws up from the depths of the ocean quivering fish and seaweed."[18]

Meaning is infinite, always contextual and recognized as expandable and expanding. Consequently, essences are also open, infinite and expandable and they are never finally completely explored and described. Meaning emerges in relation to 'events' of the lifeworld, and when the lifeworld changes, meaning changes as well. Also, it (meaning) covers the most essential parts as well the concrete events of the phenomenon in research.

Psychologism

Husserl in his two volumes of "Logical Investigations" attacks of a view of logic which he calls "Psychologism." To understand the meaning of psychologism, we must see the two trends of

17. Ibid, P. 341
18. Merleau-Ponty, Ibid, P. XV

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

philosophical investigation : the empiricist trend deriving from Locke and Hume, and the Kantian transcendentalism. According to the first trend, empiricism, logic consists of inductive generalizations from sense-experience. The second trend, Kantian transcendentalism, accepts that logic as a pattern of human consciousness imposes upon the empirical world. Husserl argues that, notwithstanding the fundamental differences between these two trends of thought, they are in one important respect very similar. For both consider logic as structured by human consciousness, i.e., human pscyhe, and thus psychologism. Husserl rejects both views. He claims against the Kantians that the laws of logic are 'out there', a pattern in or of the world, not merely one we impose upon it. Against the empiricism Husserl says that the laws of logic constitute an ideal and aprioristic order of being, not merely a short-hand-way of summarizing in 'abstracto' concrete experiences. In words of Husserl, "Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact the same as relativism. It makes no difference whether, as a formal idealism, based on a transcendental psychology, it seeks to save the objectivity of knowledge, or whether leaning on empirical psychology it accepts relativism as its ineluctable fate. Every doctrine is 'ipso facto' relativistic, a case of specific relativism, if, with the empiricists, it treats the pure laws of logic as empirical, psychological laws. It is likewise relativistic, if with the apriorists, it deduces these laws, in more or less mythic fashion, from certain 'original forms' or 'modes of functioning' of the human understanding, from consciousness as such, conceived as generic (human) reason, from the psycho-physical constitution of man, from the 'intellectus ipse' which, as an innate (generically human) disposition, precedes all actual thought and experience."[19]

Now, the question is : What is specific relativism ? Husserl replies that "specific relativism makes the assertion : anything is true for a given species of judging being that, by their constitution and laws of thought, must count as true."[20] But he himself further disagrees with this reply. "This doctrine is absurd. For it is part of

19. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, section 38
20. Ibid, section 36

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

its sense that the same proposition or content of judgement can be true for a subject of the species 'homo', but may be false for another subject or a differently constituted species. The same content of judgment cannot, however, be both true and false. This follows from the mere sense of "true' and 'false'. What is true is absolutely, intrinsically true : truth is one and the same, whether men or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it. Logical laws speak of truth in this ideal unity, set over against the real multiplicity of races, individuals and experiences, and it is of this ideal unity that we speak when we are not confused by relativism"[21]. Still the problem stands regarding the knowledge of these objective truths. Husserl simply suggests that the knowledge of these objective truths is acquired by phenomenological analysis.

J. S. Mill in his book "System of Logic" says that "truths are known to us in two ways : some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of intuition, or consciousness; the latter, of inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred. Whatever is known to us by consciousness is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels."[22] Husserl does not satisfy with this dichotomy between knowledge through intuition and knowledge through inference. According to Mill and the other empiricists, the laws of logic are inferred from concrete sense-experience. The principle of non-contradiction, for instance, Mill considers "to be, like other axioms, one of our first and most familiar generalizations from experience."[23] They are the results of inductive inference and are not known directly by intuition. For the Kantians too, the laws of logic are inferences, although deductive rather than inductive in nature. Since they are implicit in our conceptions, they can be inferred from these conceptions by arguing 'backwards' towards their necessary presuppositions. Hence, not withstanding the fundamental differences between their views, both the empiricists and the

21. Ibid.
22. J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Introduction
23. Ibid, Logic II, Section 5, P. VII.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Kantians regard logic as something not known directly i.e., by intuition. In Husserl's view both views (the empiricism and the Kantianism) are mistaken. The laws of logic belong to the things that are directly apperceived. They are 'known beyond possibility of question' (Mill) or 'apodictically true' (Husserl). They belong to the synthetic apriori so far they are experientially given, but not 'transcendental' as Kant likes to put. Husserl calls the 'apperception' or experience as 'categorical intuition' which is opposed to 'sensuous intuition'. In his later works Husserl affirms a completely new science which is called 'eidetic psychology' first and 'phenomenological psychology' afterwards.[24] Husserl's eidetic psychology tells about the nature of 'eidetic intuition' which refers to the apperception of the essential structure of objects. It is not from our sense-experience that we know of infer the laws of logic, but from the eidetically perceived eidos of these laws. In S. K. Pal's words "in the Introduction to this book (Phenomenological Psychology) he (Husserl) characterizes the new psychology as a prioric, eidetic, intuitive, or a pure descriptive and intentional study of psychical facts. The epithet 'a prioric' implies that "this psychology aims first of all at all those essential universalities and necessities without which psychological being and living are simply inconceivable". The title 'intuitive' stands for the source of this apriori. The term 'intentional' implies the most universal characteristic of psychic being and living : Psychic life is the life of consciousness, and this consciousness is consciousness of something."[25]

Thus, in the 'Logical Investigations' we can see the rejection of subjectivism and relativism which are characteristics of modern philosophy, and a return to the great ontological ideas of antiquity. Husserl discusses two significant views :

(a) The significance of the object as opposed to the subject, of the known as opposed to the knower, of ontology as opposed to epistemology.

(b) The significance of universals as opposed to particulars, of the eidetic 'mundus intellegibilis' as opposed to the factual

24. S. K. Pal, Phenomenology as the foundation for psychology : A critique, the article published in Journal of ICPR, Vol. 8, No. 2, P. 50.

25. Ibid, P 50-51

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

world of sense-perception, of understanding as opposed to explanation. And, these two significances constructs his theory of psychologism.

Philosophy As a Rigorous Science

In his own article "Philosophy as rigorous science" Husserl criticizes naturalism and historicism. Naturalism attempts to apply the methods of the natural sciences to all other domains of knowledge, including the realm of consciousness. Reason becomes naturalized. Although an attempt is then made to find a foundation for the human sciences by means of experimental psychology, it proves to be impossible because in so doing one is unable to grasp precisely what is at stake in knowledge as found in the natural sciences.

What a philosopher must examine is the relationship between consciousness and Being, and in doing so, he must realize that from the standpoint of epistemology, Being is accessible to him only as a correlate of conscious acts. He must thus pay careful attention to what occurs in these acts. This can be done only by a science that tries to understand the very essence of consciousness, and this is the task that phenomenology has set for itself. Because clarification of the various types of objects must follow from the basic modes of consciousness. Husserl's thought remained close to psychology. In contradistinction to what is the case in psychology, however, in phenomenology consciousness is thematized in a very special and definite way. Consciousness is the locus in which every manner of constituting and founding meaning must take place. In human intuition conscious occurances must be given immediately in order to avoid introducing at the same certain interpretations. The nature of such processes as perception, representation, imagination, judgement and feeling must be grasped in immediate self-giveness. The call "To the things themselves" is not a demand for realism, because the things at stake are the acts of consciousness and the objective entities that get constituted in them : these things form the realm of what Husserl calls the phenomena. Thus, the objects of phenomenology are 'absolute data grasped in pure, immanent intuition", and its goal is to discover the essential structures of the acts (noesis) and the objective entities that correspond to them (noema).

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Phenomenology must also be distinguished from historicism, a philosophy that stresses the immersion of all thinkers within a particular historical setting. Husserl objects to historicism because it implies relativism. He, though credits German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey for having a developed a typification of worldviews, doubts and even rejects the skepticism that flows necessarily from the relativity of the various types. History is concerned with facts, whereas phenomenology deals with the knowledge of essences. To Husserl, Dilthey's doctrine of worldviews was incapable of achieving the rigour required by genuine science. Contrary to all of the practical tendencies found in worldviews, Husserl demands that philosophy be founded as a rigorous science. Its task implies that nothing should be accepted as given beforehand but that the philosopher should try to find the way back to the real beginnings. This is tantamount to saying, however, that he must try to find the way to the foundations of meaning that are found in consciousness. Just as for the German philosopher Kant, the empirical has merely relative validity and never an absolute, or apodictic, validity, so for Husserl too what is to be searched for is a scientific knowledge of essences in contradistinction to a scientific knowledge of facts.

Thus, Husserl, by criticizing both naturalism and historicism, establishes that philosophy must be perfect science, that is, philosophy must be certain and doubtless. It is possible, when all doubtful knowledges must remove. The undoubtable knowledge comes from perception or phenomenology only. Therefore Husserl says that phenomenological knowledge is scientific only, and this kind of knowledge is also absolutely pure and rigorous. So, philosophy is a rigorous science.

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

4. EXISTENTIALISM

Characteristics of Existentialism

Existentialism is a thought originated in the womb of consequence of second world war. This war is an instrumental to thinking about human existence and the freedom of human beings. The most notable problem of existentialism is the priority of essence and existence. This theory denies the priority of essence to existence. By essence is meant the inherent universal nature, for example humanity, common to all individuals or particular instances of a class (e.g. John, Ram). Existence related to the actual being of the individual, the particular human being. Therefore essence is a universal, a possibility and existence is a particular, an individual, an actuality belonging to a specific place and time. Essence (humanity) is only conceivable by reason or intellect. But existence (any particular man) can be grasped by one's own immediate experience.

In the Western philosophy from Greek thinkers to modern one, there is the question whether universals are prior to individual or vice versa, whether reason is prior to sense, emotion, intuition and will or vice versa. The rationalist school accept the first alternative- universals are prior to individuals. But the empiricist school advocates the second alternative sense, emotion, intuition and will are prior to universals. Existentialist school belongs to the second category. This school attaches the greatest value and importance to the individuals rather than universals, more particularly to the existence of the human individual. Because it is inwardly perceived, felt, enjoyed, suffered, willed and lived rather than to the intellectual concept of humanity as a class, society, or state or community.

Existentialism, in its second characteristics, emphasizes the utmost freedom and responsibility for the individual in all the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

spheres—ethical, religious, political, cultural and social. It is a revolt against authority. In Kierkegaard we can see this spirit of revolt against the church, and the many forms of religious authoritarianism that tend to destroy the inner spiritual development of the individual. This tendency of revolt is also found in Heidegger, Marcel and Sartre.

Thirdly, existentialism is an anti-rationalist, anti-intelletualist and anti-objectivist theory. It is against Hegel's panlogism which fails to fathom the depth and wealth of inner ethical and religious experiences and reduces them to some static and abstract categories of Reason. It means that existentialism denies reason and intellect, abstract and absolute reality. It only emphasizes on the subjectivity and individuality of a thing, including human existence.

Lastly, existentialism is a denial of metaphysical speculative theories. It means that it does not accept any metaphysical speculations regarding ultimate things carried on through intellectual concepts and symbols. These metaphysical speculations, as existentialist thinkers accept, cannot penetrate beneath the common husk of reality. The honest motto of existentialist thinkers is to be (to exist) rather than to know. Thus existentialism is a theory regarding the existence, particularly human existence.

The beginning of existentialism is with ideas of Kierkegaard. It is ashtonishing that Kierkegaard propounded his idea of existentialism many years ago before second world war. But it is popular after the second world war. When his Danish works have been translated into English and made known to the outer world. So, the existentialism gets its popularity in the middle twentieth century, but the birth century of this popular theory is nineteenth with Kierkegaard. In words of D. M Datta, "The psychological novels and plays of Jean-Paul Sartre, a popular but intellectual French writer, were the most arresting expression of the existential outlook. But Sartre drew his inspiration chiefly from the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, a student of the German phenomenologist, Husserl. Again Heidegger was deeply influenced by the writings of the Danish thinker, Soren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard has now come to be regarded as the very trunk of the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

tree of Existentialism of which the roots perhaps go as far back as Socrates, and the branches spread in modern times."[1]

There are two schools of existentialism—Theistic and Anti-theistic. Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel belong to the theistic school. Heidegger and Sartre are members of anti-theistic school. These five are the most prominent existentialists.

Kierkegaard

Soren Kierkeguard, a Danish religious philosopher, was born on 5 May, 1813 at Copenhagen, Denmark. He was regarded as the founder of existentialism. He studied theology at the University of Copenhagen. He is remembered for his critique of systematic rational philosophy, particularly Hegelianism on the ground that actual life cannot be contained within an abstract conceptual system. With this instance, he intended to make possible an adequate consideration of faith and, accordingly, of religion specifically christianity. His works include. "Either/Or" (1843), "Fear and Trembling" (1843) and "The sickness unto Death" (1849). He insistently attacked the organized church in his later years. Exhausted by the strain he died at the age of 42 on 11 November, 1855 at Copenhagen. His work strongly influenced twentieth century continental philosophers and theologians including Karl Barth, Kal Jaspers, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.

Soren Kierkegaard was a Danish philosophers. So his works is found in Danish language. If his works have not been translated in English language, we could not know him and his thought. His translated work "Philosophical Fragments" has been published in 1938 and "Concluding unscientific postscript" in 1941. The translators of both books were David F. Swenson, and D. F. Swenson with W. Lowrie respectively.

Subjectivity As Truth

Swenson termed Kierkegaard's existentialism as "the Copernican revolution." This revolution consisted in a passionate and dialectical denial of objectivity as the criterion of truth, and justifying subjectivity as the very nature of truth and reality. Kierkegaard says that "Truth or value that I hanker after is not

1. D. M. Datta, The Chief currents of contemporary philosophy, P. 508

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

merely for satisfying the idle intellect, but for being "appropriated", or realized in my life. It should, therefore, satisfy me. But the conception of objectivity demands, on the contrary, that truth should not depend on my satisfaction, it should satisfy others and I should cultivate a detachedness which should drown my personal verdict in the verdict of others. This means a spiritual suicide."[2] It is clear that in the view of Kiekegaard the criterion of truth is not objectivity, truth must be subjective. To prove his idea of subjectivity as truth, he takes help of logic and metaphysics.

According to Kierkegaard, "all logical thinking employs the language of abstraction and is sub specie aeterni."[3] It moves in the region of "possible" and not of actual existence. Therefore Logic cannot apply to the particulars and changing facts and situations of life, i.e., to concrete existence. Concrete existence is truth. Secondly, metaphysics a'so fails to explain concrete existence, because it is a fallacious reduction of things to thought. In fact both logic and metaphysics describe truth as universal, abstract and objective. But it cannot serve the aim of philosophy. The true aim of philosophy is to explain the existence, not the essence. Both Logic and Metaphysics explain essence only. Essence exists in existence. So it is aposteriori to existence. It is the mistake of objectivist thinkers. In fact, subjectivity is the only absolutely certain truth—"Only in subjectivity is decisiveness, to seek objectivity is to be in error. An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual"[4]

Socrates' principle of "know thyself" is the seed of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Kierkegaard himself accepts that his task is a 'Socratic task'. 'In the principle that subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, there is comprehended the Socratic wisdom, whose everlasting merit it was to have become aware of the essential signifi-cance of existence of the fact that the knower is an existing individual."[5]

---

2. Soren Kierkegaard, concluding unscientific postscript (trans. by Swenson and Lowrie), P. 113
3. Ibid, P. 273
4. Ibid, P. 181–182
5. Ibid, P. 183

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

But Descartes' view is opposed to Socratic principle of knowing thyself. It is true that the verb of thinking must need the existence of thinker. That is why Descartes propounds the principle of "Cogito ergo sum"—I think, therefore, I am. Here essence is prior to existence. But Kierkegaard sees fallacies in Descartes' principle. Firstly, the principle of cogito ergo sum is a tautology. "I must exist in order to think. Because I exist and because I think, therefore, I think that I exist." Existence of 'I' is already asserted in 'I think' and nothing new is asserted by 'I exist'. So, the proposition 'cogito ergo sum' falls in the category of tautological fallacy. Secondly, this proposition of Descartes does not prove only one's own self's existence but the existence of selves in general. This is a false idea. Each individual self can only be subjectively aware of its own inner existence. It can neither externalise and demonstrate its own existence to others, nor can it know another self, which can be known also subjectively by that self alone. The concept of all selves, or the self in general, or of 'we' is an unspiritual abstraction that reduces spirits to objects. The spirits cease to be spirits. There is no immediate relationship ethically between subject and subject. "When I understand another person, his reality is for me a possibility, and is related to me precisely as the thought of something I have not done is related to the doing of it."[6] Thus Kierkegaard proves that all ethical and religious talks in terms of 'universal spirit', 'collective spirit', 'humanity', 'the present generation' are unspiritual.

Now the question of the nature of subjectivity arises in Kierkegaard's philosophy. In philosophy, 'subject' is generally meant by 'knower', the subject of the verb 'to know'. So, subjectivity means the nature or state of the knower. But this is not the meaning of subjectivity in Kierkegaard's philosophy. Here is the subjectivity means the self-consciously existing concrete subject—the individual. This subjective existence is called sometimes subjectivity, and sometimes Existence only. According to Kierkegaard subjective knowledge is not the knowledge of one's own inner mental objects like memory images, imaginary constructions etc. Knowledge of these mental objects is a kind of introspection which sees, as Kierkegaard says, in the objective attitude with the

6. Ibid, P. 285

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

difference that the objects perceived are only internal. But Kiekegaard's subjectivity is much deeper and dynamic. It needs a total abandoning of the objective attitude, ceasing thereby to be a mere passive cognitive subject entertaining outer and inner objects. In fact, subject is more an ethical subject than a cognitive subject in Kierkegaard's philosophy. It is also more a conscious doer than an objective onlooker. The ethical existential subject is different from the aesthetic subject. The aesthetic subject is objective in outlook, as the cognitive subject. The only difference between the aesthetic and the cognitive subjects is that the aesthetic subject is interested in enjoying the objects, whereas the cognitive is interested in knowing the objects. These subjects (aesthetic and cognitive) are not absolutely certain but only 'possible'. The ethical subject is the willer of its own will, is independent of the external, and enjoys an absolute certainty. In words of Kierkegaard, "The only reality that exists for an existing individual is his own ethical reality. The real subject is not the cognitive subject, since in knowledge he moves in the sphere of the possible, the real subject is the ethically existing subject."[7] Thus Kierkegaard categorizes the subject into three heads : ethical, cognitive and aesthetic. The rest two are 'possible' but the first one is actual. The first is also spiritual subject. Therefore Kiekegaard says that 'subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality.' Hence, 'truth is inwardness—existential inwardness, qualified as ethical'.[8] Kierkegaard terms the subject as ethical because "what am I to do with myself" is the proof of my existence. I exist, therefore, I do. It is the assertion of Kierkegaard's existentialism.

However, some critics assert that Kiekegaard's existentialism leads to egoism and atheism. Kierkegaard replies them that his view is neither egoist nor atheist. His subjectivity (in ethical and spiritual sense) is "only by the exclusive inward direction of attention, interest and efforts to my own existence that I can indirectly benefit also others by unconsciously setting an example to each for his own inwardization. For one who believes in God and remembers his own helplessness, it is rather the height of folly and egoism to think that he, and not God, can help others. Subjective

7. Ibid, P. 280–281
8. Ibid, P. 227

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

deepening dynamically relates me to God, and though faith in him, I can resign everything, including welfare of others, to His infinite care and providence. The utmost positive benefit I can do to others is to treat with respect each one as a subject, a spirit with a noble inward task and destiny like mine"[9] Thus, the existentialism of Kierkegaard does not fall under the caption of egoism and atheism. Therefore his existentialism is called as theistic, though there is no God in popular sense in Kierkegaard's existentialism.

Leap of Faith

In his work "concluding unscientific postscript" Kierkegaard says that the "subjective conception of inwardness makes truth an equivalent expression for faith."[10] Religiously faith, in Kierkegaard's philosophy, is equivalent to truth as subjectivity. To analyse his conception of faith Kiekegaard himself analyze his own existence, i.e., his life and purpose with infinite interest. He says that every bit of simple belief (faith) seizes his mind every moment and transforms him being in every sphere. "It is one thing to think and another thing to exist in what has been thought."[11] Thought and existence are not the same.

Thinking, as Kierkegaard depicts, is of two kinds : (i) speculative and objective (ii) subjective and existential. He explains these two with the example of death. In the first kind of thinking one can philosophize on the fact of human mortality and its consequences, indulging in speeches, sermons and speculations, even with great emotion; but always thinking objectivity of the death of man in general, of possibles. But in the second kind of thinking one begins to think seriously of one's death and its consequences in relation to him, that death can overtake him the next moment. It begins to change one's entire existence—his thoughts, feelings, acts and imagination—with the grim and dogging sense of perishability. Therefore, subjective thinking is a 'deed' that transform one's existence, and it can rightly be called as existential. It is 'living in the truth' rather than knowing and preaching the truth. According to Kierkegaard the speculative philosophers like Hegel and others as

9. Ibid, P. 124
10. Ibid, P. 182
11. Ibid, P. 228

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

well as the religious preachers have lacking existential quality. Existential qualities should have made the words of these philosophers and preachers penetrate and change their own lives first. Speculative and objective thinking is merely thought. Subjective and existential thinking is existence.

Existence is contradictory : "the existing individual is both infinite and finite."[12] I, being an individual existence, am finite, imperfect, live in time; yet my existence inwardly yearns after the infinite, perfection, immortality, eternity, absolute happiness. An ardent intense feeling of this inner conflict and paradox of existence, the disparity between "what I am" and "What I should" and can be arouses an ironical feeling. Also a deep melancholy, bitter suffering. This suffering leads to seek deceptive relief in unethical directions. This direction falls in an objective speculation like aesthetic works of art or literature. But the purpose of existence is the attainment of eternal and absolute happiness. To achieve this purpose the exister has to sacrifice all his temporary and relative goods. The absolute end of an exister has not only to be thought of as absolute but also to be existentially accepted in life as absolute.

The exister must choose : "Either the relative wordly goods, Or the Absolute Good. There is no room for both, the relative and the Absolute, in ethical life."[13] This uncompromising and stern call of duty for sacrifice and abstinence creates in the exister fear and trembling. This consciousness of the inability to live up to the highest call causes 'despair.'

Despair is an intolerable state. The individual cannot get out of it (despair) by his own limited efforts. Despair is an ethical tension under which the intense feeling of helpness and the need for assistance, the exister takes the inner 'existential leap to faith'. Existential leap to faith is such belief that the Infinite will itself help the exister to satisfy the passion of the Infinite ingrained in his existence. The ethical will to attain the good is thus transformed into the will to believe in the benevolence of the Infinite, the root of the yearning for the Infinite. Thus the ethical struggle existentially develops into religion—"Postuloation of God, the faith born of

12. Ibid, P. 350
13. Ibid, P. 364

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

despair, is not arbitrary; but a life-necessity."[14] Despair existentially implies and expresses an inward reaching out to a source of help and the help in this situation can only come from God—the omniscient, omnipotent spirit capable of helping the imperfect exister realize absolute happiness. Therefore, despair existentially evolves faith.

Despair is momentary. It fades away, when the exister realized that "every moment is wasted in which he does not have God."[15] After realizing it, the exister is still compelled to pay some attention to the relative goods of outer life and forget God to that extent. This inability to sustain the God-relation, without break, creates a deep subjective consciousness of guilt. It is not humanly possible to get rid of this guilt. This paradoxical situation creates a crisis. This crisis drives the exister to mad desperation which sometimes finds outward manifestation in religious madness, sometimes in monastic renunciation and other form of self-torture. These are only lower expressions of the crisis, and do not solve it. The highest resolution of this crisis finds its expression in being inwardly aware of this guilt and constantly recollecting and confessing it as an unqualified, unmitigated guilt. This is the 'religiousness of hidden inwardness'.

Thus, leap of faith is the process of ethical and religious development consisting of three gradual stages of existential transformation : Initial Expression (The Absolute direction towards the absolute purpose), Existential Expression (The suffering) and Decisive Expression (Eternal recollection of guilt). These are the negative mark but for positive : "In the religious sphere the positive is recognizable by the negative."[16] Religious despair is the loss of hope about the attainment of God and thus it implies by its intensity, the positive growth of love for God. It is the eternal happiness. Eternal happiness is not a static conception. It consists in every moment in ever-renewed consciousness of God-relation. The love of God has to be renewed in every humble act of life with the increasing faith that it would please God, feeling certain that "what pleases God will prosper." This certainty of faith has constantly to grapple with and overcome the temptations and uncertainties of the

14. Ibid, P. 179
15. Ibid, P. 179
16. Ibid, P. 474

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

changing conditions of life. Love and regard for God have constantly to be existentially reaffirmed in life's decisions and acts. Religious life would go dead but for the struggle. The religious man does not leave the world but remains in it. He transforms his outward activity into an inward matter, inwardly before God, by admitting that he can do nothing of himself. Thus, Kierkegaard accepts the notion of God as a unifying, integrating and edifying inner principle of life. He says that "God exists only for subjectivity in inwardness." So there is no need of arguments for proving the existence of God. God is not objective and speculative entity. He is an existential subjectivity inherent in the existence of all individuals. He is, in real sense, is existence, not thought or concept.

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger was born on 26 September, 1889 at Messkirch, Schwarzwald (Germany). He taught at the universities of Marburg from 1923 to 1927 and Freiburg from 1927 to 1944. In 1927 his magnum opus, "Being and Time", was published. It strongly influenced Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists, and, despite Heidegger's protestations, he was classed as the leading atheistic existentialist. His declared purpose in the work was to raise a new the question of the meaning of being. His preliminary analysis of human existence, Dasein or "being-there", employed the method of phenomenology. In that early 1930s his thought underwent a turning around, which some seen as an abandonment of the problem of "Being and Time." He passed away on 26 May, 1976 at Meskirch.

Heidegger Joined the Nazi party in 1933. He supported Hitler's policies as vector of Freiburg during 1993–34, and less actively through the end of the war. His complicity with the Nazis, which he never publicly disavowed, has prompted debates about whether his philosophy is inherently "totalitarian". Heidegger's work strongly influenced Harmeneutics and Poststructuralism.

The Concept of Being (Dasein)

The concept of Being, i.e., Dasein is the central idea of Heidegger's thought. But the term is ambiguous. According to Kokelmans. Being is a process or an activity that reveals the truth.[17]

17. Joshep J. Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being : Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy, P. 54

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Dreyfus states that Being cannot be understood as a process or an event; and Zimnermann thinks Being as a history shaping ways in which entities can reveal themselves and become real.[18] Heidegger himself defines Being, in his book "Being and Time", as the Being of the entities. Again in the same book he identifies Being with phenomenon and ontology with phenomenology[19]. In his book "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger terms Being as a 'quiet power',[20] and finally he says in his book "An Introduction to Metaphysics" that "the word Being is no more than an empty word. It means nothing real, tangible, material. Its meaning is unreal vapour."[21] Thus in view of Heidegger Being is nothing at last.

In his book "Existence and Being" Heidegger says that "Being can manifest itself only by the negation of what-it-is-not, i.e., Non-being or Nothing."[22] Nothing reveals itself as integral to the Being of what is. Being reveals itself just, because Nothing negates itself. Heidegger poetically says, "Nothing nothing itself." It means that nothing is the source of negation, not the other way about. The feeling of dread, Angst, is an experience of revealing Nothing. Dread is not fear, Furcht, of this or that. It is a terror from an undefinable source threatening our own existence in the world. An intense feeling that one is confronted by sure death creates dread like this. In such a dread there is an 'uncanny' and stupefying feeling : "All things and we with sink into a sort of indifference. There is nothing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and overwhelms us while what-is slips away, is this 'nothing'. Dread reveals Nothing."[23] This

---

18. Hubert Dreyfus, Being in the world : A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, P. 11
    Michael E. Zimmermann, Heidegger's confrontation with Modernity : Technology, Politics, Art, P. 116.
19. Muhammad Kamal, Heidegger And the Transition To Postmodernity, An article published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 29, no. 1, January 2002.
20. Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, Quoted from David Farrel Krell, In Basic Writings, P. 220
21. Ibid, An Introduction to Metaphysics, P. 35-36
22. Ibid, Existence and Being, P. 370
23. Ibid, P. 366

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

'withdrawl' of 'what-is-in-totality' leaves with us not only a positive experience of nothing, but also an experience of pure Being into which all beings and we sink and 'return' as into their and our source and 'enduring' 'home'. "An experience of Being", as Heidegger holds, "as sometimes 'other' than everything that 'is' comes to us in dread, provided that we do not, from dread of dread, i.e., in sheer timidity, shut our ears to the soundless voice which attunes us to horrors of the abyss".[24] He further says that "the clear courage for essential dread guarantees the mysterious of all possibilities : the experience of Being".[25] Therefore Heidegger terms Dasein as "being there" only. Heidegger says that "the Essence of Dasein lies in its essence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand, they are in each case possible ways for it to be and no more than that."[26]

These words of Heidegger point out that Dasin is not the self substance, as Descartes assumes that the essence of which precedes its existence. Secondly, since Dasein has no prior essence to its existence and its existence is the projection of possibilities, then possibility is prior to actuality. Dasein is not only an actual entity but a possibility of various ways of existence. This feature of Dasein indicates that unless Dasein articulates all its possibilities or fulfills itself, it cannot be defined and it will remain without having a prior nature or essence. It is the death of the self as a metaphysical subject. In Descartes' or Kant's philosophy the self is a metaphysical subject which has been denied by Heidegger.

Being in the world is an ontological constitutes entails Dasein's involvement in the world. This involvement is not interpreted from the viewpoint of a detached observer of events, but from the viewpoint of a dweller and an actor within the world. Dwelling and acting shift the focus of the cognitive relationship between human beings and the world to a new and pragmatic understanding of this relationship. "Human beings are not in the world", as Heidegger observes, "the way that a chair is in a room." Human existence is

24. Ibid, P. 385
25. Ibid, P. 386
26. Ibid, Being and Time, P. 42

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

being in the world and it should be understood as essentially a worldly phenomenon. The world is not an external space but a place where Dasein dwells. The world is an ontological condition, the environment and home without which Dasein cannot exist.

The things Dasein encounters in the world are not just present at hand, or the objects of theoretical investigations but handy or ready to hand for definite purposes. Dasein's involvement with ready to hand entities is primordial to a theoretical investigation. Dasein makes use of things, encountering them not as mere objects of contemplation but as equipment. Heidegger says that "the less we just stare at the hammer thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly it is encountered as that which it is as equiment."[27] These words show that the theoretical relationship, as modern thinkers like Descartes and Kant accept, are not the only possible way of having contact with things. For example, the craftsman does not view the hammer as an entity with certain physical properties, but as something for hammering. As a consequence, the world does not become a collection of extended things in space, but a web of significance. Dasein's approach to this web is a practical one of circumspect concern. It does not mean that the primordiality of the practical approach does not reduce the significance of theoretical cognition. Heidegger does not say that ready to hand is metaphysically prior to present at hand, nor that this use of ready to hand entities is at the same time blind. It has its own sight which guides the manipulation of the entities. The craftsman knows what a hammer is for, but does not need to know the physical properties of a hammer in order to use it.

There is also another class of being which turns Dasein ontologically into social being. This class is called as 'Mitsein', i.e., the being of the other. Mitsein is an ontological condition like being in the world is for Dasein. The being of Dasein presupposes the being of the other (Mitsein), so the existence of Mitsein does not require proof. "The entity which is 'other' has itself the same kind of Being as Dasein. In Being with and towards others, there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. The relationship of

27. Ibid, P. 98

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Being which one has towards the other, then becomes a projection of one's own Being oneself; into something else, the other would be a duplicate of the self."[28] The existence of the other (Mitsein) is not problematic. It is not a threat to one's existence. My relationship with the other is a projection towards myself, because the other is a duplicate and Dasein like me. This does not signify that the other is identical with the self, and hence the differences between them are eliminated. Dasein is in each case mine, and my being is unique and different in the sense that I have my own way and my own possibilities, which constitute my essence. The other like the self, also has its own way and its own possibilities.

According to Heidegger, Being is of two levels : authentic and inauthentic. Authentic Being is being different from the other. The self and the other in the authentic mode of existence mutually recognise their differences. The being of Dasein is essentially being in the world with others, and the self and the other mutually recognise their differences. This relationship, as Heidegger observes, is not only epistemological, it is also built on the existential of 'care' or 'Fursorge'. The recognition of the difference between the self and the other is an indication of the way these two entities care for one another.

In authentic Being reduces language to idle talk and thinking to calculation. According to Heidegger language is primarily phonerentric, and speech (Rede) is the ontological foundation of language. "Understanding" is not a faculty in the human mind, as Kant depicts, but an ontological condition prior to theoretical condition. It is also a prior condition for interpretation (Auslegung), because Dasein cannot interpret the meaning of an entity unless it understands it in the context of its fore structure. Language is proper to Dasein, because Dasein has privileged access to being or truth. But the language of the inauthentic mode of existence, or being of modernity is characterised by ambiguity. Thus Dasein's relationship to the truth remains in oblivion. In fact, language is the house of Being, Dasein dwells in this house and is its custodian. But the question arises how can Dasein as the custodian of the dwelling commit itself to the revealing of the truth and how can it regain its

28. Ibid, P. 203–210

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

creative power. Heidegger answers that the saving power to end the darkening of the world is creative work or art. The work of art can play a central role to delineate Dasein as a custodian of the truth. In the work of art Dasein is engaged in creation and producing authentically. Writing against the despotism of modernity towards art is the only hope to rescue us and the world from the destructive forces of industrial technology.

Man as Being in the World

D. M. Datta distinguishes between objective aspects of Being and transcendal aspects of Being.[29] Science deals with objective aspects of Being. Metaphysics or ontology studies Being as transcendental and underlies the objects of ordinary experience as well as the experience. In Heidegger's view ontological or metaphysical study of being is possible for a human being as Dasein. Man as Dasein can inwardly study Being immediately in and through his own self. Being reveals itself through the self revealing human self which is but one of its expressions. Thus metaphysics is a self-study of the human Dasein. This metaphysical study of man is different from the scientific study of man, as a thing among other things of the world. The metaphysical study reveals the inner, unique, personal, authentic aspects of man. The scientific study reveals the unauthentic, objectified and general aspects of man as a member of the human class. The authentic inner and uniquetly personal aspects of the human individual are called the 'existentialia' or existential aspects. The individual finds himself there-in-the world. He is there (Dasein) related to the whole world, and things and persons in it, in a unique and compelling way. The things of the world are of two kinds for him : those that just happen to be there before him and, those that he makes and uses as his tools. His 'care' or 'concern' for things and persons that is to say, his interest—is the inner organizing principle that determines for him his relation to things, and to the world as a whole. Therefore, 'care' is said to be the "Being of Dasein". The unique way in which he is related to the world is reflected in his varying mood, which shows how he is tunned to the world. It also reveals the world in a general way. Curiosity, anxiety, happiness, boredom, fear, dread etc. reflect

29. D. M. Dutta, Ibid, P. 532

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the divergent ways in which the human Dasein, the individual-in the-world, is related and tuned to the world. They also reveal the world that affects him. For example, boredom is a mood which "reveals what-is-in totality", that is, the whole world as affecting and functioning on the individual who has ceased to be interested in any particular thing of the world.

Dread of death is a key-mood of great significance. It makes man live existentially with a sense of his own personal destiny, its responsibilities and duties. It pulls him up into authentic existence out of the state of "self-estrangement", the state of decline, i.e., his unauthentic, self-forgetful, common existence as one of the many. He as the being-in-the-world (Dasein) tries to understand 'who' he is, 'wherefrom' his being is, 'whereto' the being tends, 'for whom' it is. Thus the human Dasein tries to explore its present, past, future and its own inner possibilities which it is free to develop, it feels the inner call of duty or conscience to project his future by developing "the potentiality of Being" latent in him. He realizes the 'guilt' of his self-forgetful life and 'resolves' to awake to his authentic existence. This inner, moral struggle of the Dasein is the expression of the existential 'care' or 'concern' (sorge) which constitutes the Dasein's inner Being. It involves an existential temporality—the Dasein's potentiality for an authentic existence is its future, the unauthentic, fallen state, in which it finds itself already thrown and entangled, is its past that is to be overcome. The concrete moral situation which is presented by the concern for realization of potentiality, that is, the situation on which action is demanded, is its present. Therefore, existentially the future, past and present of the Dasein are not successive here as in our ordinary time. These three are the elements of the unitary existential effort (care or concern). Heidegger calls them poetically as the three 'ecstasies' of Being.[30] They are unified in the Being of the Dasein which has always in it its future potentiality that determines again its past and present. The successive moments of past, present and future with which we conceive time in everyday life are really nothing but a repetition of 'nows'—that which once was 'now', is 'now' or will be 'now'. Nature as a collection of such present objects connotes no inner existence,

30. Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, P. 96

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

no potentiality. Therefore, no genuine future, past and present. That is why Heidegger says that 'only existent man is historical. Nature has no history."[31]

This existential aspect of the human individual, the Dasein, is also a partial account of Being of which the authentic existence of man is but an aspect. The authentic human self is not a substance, nor a subject. It is the name of the abiding 'resolve' born of 'care', man's determination to realize his inherent potentiality. One important character of the self, and therefore also of Being-in-itself is self-manifestness, self-revelation, openness. This self-revealing nature is common to all the expressions of Being, of care or concern which is the being of the human Dasein. Thus understanding, finding-oneself-in-the-world, awareness of fall or guilt, speech etc. are all self-revealing. This conception of Being as self-revealing, of thought as an "occurance of Being" is of fundamental importance to Heidegger's epistemology and metaphysics, like vedantic, particulary advaitic, notion of knowledge and reality. As D. M. Datta observes that "this conception resembles the Indian Vedantic (Advaitic) idea of Being (sat) as self-manifest (Sva-prakash), and the consequent theory of knowledge. The motion of the human Dasein involved in error resembles also the Vedantic motion of Jiva involved in Avidya."[32]

According to the conception of Being as self-revealing, human knowledge is not the product of an interaction between the mind and its object. Knowledge is the self-revelation of Being which constitutes the Being of the object as well as that of the mind. A true mental process, or the proposition expressing it, only lets some aspect of Being reveal itself freely without obstruction. So, Heidegger terms "the essence of truth as freedom."[33] According to him, freedom means 'let be' (seinlassen).[34] A true idea or a true proposition functions in such a way that what-is may reveal itself as "what and how it is". It lets what-is manifest itself, expose itself, and exist. Man's behaviour and practical life are based on such truth—

31. Ibid, P. 336
32. D. M. Datta, Ibid, P. 535 (footnote)
33. Martin Heidegger, Ibid, P. 330
34. Ibid, P. 333

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the revelation of what-is, the knowledge of things in their limited particular aspects. Such fragmentary revelation of Being necessarily involves concealment of what-is-in-totality and consequent error and deception. In order to live and exist in the world man must know and insist every moment, on those particular aspects of Being which are useful and relevant to practical necessity. Thus man must live in deception about Being as such. Heidegger says that "Man errs. He does not merely fall into error, he lives in error always because by existing he insists and is thus already in error. No error is part of the structure of Dasein, in which historical man is involved."[35] The common man, who takes the manifest actualities as the ultimate, is not aware of the concealment, deception and untruth involved in the existence of himself and of things in the world. So, the myself and things in the world are mystery, and philosophy realises this mystery when it begins to wonder : "What is what-is" ?

Philosophy tries to transcend and penetrate to the Being underlying what-is, i.e.; what appears as manifest. It realizes the mystery, the forgotten concealment and dissimulation of Being, which underlies human knowledge and truth. But it cannot solve the mystery. In Heidegger's words, "We never get to know a mystery by unveiling or analysing it; we only get to know it carefully guarding the mystery as mystery."[36] Thus "Man as Being in the world" is himself a mystery and mystery only.

Critique of Technological Civilisation

Previously it has been indicated that Heidegger is a critic of industrial technology. This technology produces new civilization, the technological civilization—modern one. Modernity is characterised by the disclosure of all things as raw material to be modified and utilised by consciousness. Modern philosophy, which metaphysical roots go back to, Plato has provided logical conditions to legitimise this disclosure. Plato's metaphysics defines Being as the idea and all disclosure of being as aiming at assimilation to that model, to the accommodation to the idea; 'to be' thus means to be raw material and to be produced. The mountains reveal themselves as coal mines, the

35. Ibid, P. 344-45
36. Ibid, P. 279

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

forest as timber and the dams as electric power. Michael Zimmerman describes Plato's metaphysics as productionist metaphysics, and the view of Martin Heidegger it is foundation for the modernist-technological view of the world.[37] Therefore the history of western thought is a process in which productionist metaphysics has degenerated, because technology has dehumanised society and compelled mankind to treat itself and all other kinds of beings as "standing-reserve" (Bestand) for total mobilization. Heidegger says that "the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule of enfraiming threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus when enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense."[38]

The problem is not in technology itself but in its philosophical foundation, which is inherent in the metaphysical outlook of modernity, in its hostile attitude towards both human existence and nature. Heidegger believes that modernity has squeezed the world between the Soviet system and American capitalism. From the metaphysical view, these systems are two sides of the same coin : "the same ready technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man."[39] In accordance with Heidegger both systems have symptoms of the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the transformation of human beings into mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.[40] Productionist metaphysics sees nature as an alien force to be controlled and utilised, at the same time reducing human existence to an object for investment and productivity. It extends the market to every aspect of human life and replaces creative thinking

37. Michael E. Zimmerman, Ibid, P. XV.
38. Martin Heidegger, "The Question concerning Technology", Quoted from David F. Krell, Ibid, P. 333.
39. Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, (Translated by Ralph Manheim P. 37
40. Ibid, P. 38 .

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

with the logic of calculation, leading to an "inauthentic" way of working and producing. There are, in Heidegger's view, several features of the darkening of the world and the rise of this demonic culture. One of them is the misinterpretation of human existence and capacity as intelligence of cleverness in examining, calculating and modifying given entitles. This intelligence has also been subject to organization, and as a consequence, intelligence has fallen to the level of a tool in the service of the others.[41]

"Inauthenticity" is the key concept in Heidegger's philosophy to understand the criticism of modernity and technological civilization. In his book "Being and Time" (sections 126–128) Heidegger describes 'inauthenticity' phenomenologically the 'everydayness' of human beings in modern society. As Heidegger observes, 'inauthenticity' prevails us one of the symptoms of the darkening of the world, as the result of the standardisation of human beings through the rejection of the elements of difference and heterogeneity and replacing these elements with homogeneity and uniformity. The inauthentic mode of existence signifies that I conform to what others think, believe and do. In falling into the abyss of inauthenticity, my distinct way of being, which makes me different from others, is not only unrecognised but also forcibly eliminated. The best example for understanding the inauthentic mode of existence of modernity, i.e., technological civilization, is the cultural condition imposed by Fascism and stalinism in the first half of the twentieth century. These systems practically employed measures to standardise human beings and eliminate the difference. The inauthentic mode of existence affects every aspect of human life. It modifies even speech and primodial task of language in revealing the truth, because inauthenticity changes the state of language to idle talk and human quest for truth to curiosity. "Idle talk is something which anyone can make up, it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer."[42]

---

41. Ibid, P. 46–50
42. Heidegger's Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, P. 213

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

The intelligibility in idle talk is 'ambiguity', a characteristics of thinking in the modern age of technological civilization. Because everyone knows how to talk about what has to happen first about what is not yet up for discussion but 'really' must be done. Already everyone has surmised and scented out.[43] It is the observation of Heidegger on the modern technological civilization. Heidegger sees the danger in this civilization but he is also optimistic about removing this danger by art. According to him art does not depend on calculative thinking and does not ravage the world, as the modern technological civilization does. Instead art reveals and guards the truth. His hope may be seen in the following lines : "But where danger is, grows the saving power also".[44] According to Heidegger the technological civilisation is very dangerous to the human existence, the Dasein. However, only one hope is art in which Dasein, the Being as such, is creating and producing authentically. So, authenticity is the hope, inauthenticity is the danger. The characteristic of technological civilisation is inauthenticity, so it is dangerous.

Jean Paul Sartre

Jean Paul Sartre was born on 21 June, 1905 in Paris (France). He was a philosopher, novelist and playwright. He is the foremost exponent of existentialism. He studied at the sorbonne, where he met Simone De Beauvior. Simone became his life long companion and intellectual collaborator. His first novel "Nausea" (1998) narrates the feeling of revulsion that a young man experiences when confronted with the contingency of existence. Sartre used the phenomenological method of Husserl with great skill in three successive publications : Imagination : A psychological Critique (1936), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1939) and the Psychology of Imagination (1940). Besides these three, his famous works are "Being and Nothingness" (1943), "Existentialism and Humanism" (1946) and "Critique of Dialectical Reason" (1960). In 1964 he declined the Nobel Prize for literature. He died on 15 April, 1980 in Paris.

---

43. Ibid, P. 217
44. Basic Writings, P. 340

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Concept of Freedom

The concept of freedom-the human freedom-is the core subject of Sartean existentialism. This concept is not psychological but ontological. Freedom is an answer to the question of the ontological status of human being, i.e., consciousness. Due to consciousness human beings are absolutely free.[45] Freedom, being an existential notion, is opposed to a rational criterion for moral responsibility depends upon a clear ontology of what it means to be person in concrete situations in the world. For Sartre, notion of a person forks into the aspects of consciousness and ego. The former, called being for itself, stands in sharp contrast in the non-conscious stuff of the world, the being-in-itself. This distinction is at the crux of Sartre's rejection of any psychological determinism that could scuttle human freedom. Freedom for Sartre is the realm of consciousness, which he accepts as a transparent and intentional awareness of its object. Sartre, in asserting the contentless nature of consciousness, attempts to refute all taints of idealism to his philosophy. Consciousness cannot 'hide' anything from itself, so it is pure transparent. To have a belief is to be conscious of that belief. Conversely, a belief cannot be 'caused' by factors outside consciousness. Of course, it could be shown through a process of racitocination that a belief is embedded in a causal chain of sorts. Sartre rejects the relevance of such a causal chain to his theory of freedom, because freedom is the unique ontological status to human consciousness. Also he refuses the causal chain due to conceive of freedom in terms extraneous to consciousness.

The crux of Sartre's rejection of any applicability of leaner causation to freedom as human consciousness is his contention that consciousness has a stand-alone ontological status, when it comes to navigating matters of freedom and human agency. Anything that does not enter consciousness can necessarily not be in a causal relation internally with it. In other words, there can be no externality to consciousness's relations. Sartre defines the 'for-itself' or consciousness in its larger aspect as human reality in concrete situations as 'what it is not' and 'not what it is'. This implies a lack of identity at the heart of 'for-itself', which is always merely

45. Professor Nityananad Mishra, Samkalin Paschatya Darshan, P. 140

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

a presence to itself, and never a totality of identity. This very notion of identity, however, would have been alien to the 'for-itself' had it not been in asharp dialectical relation with the 'in-itself', which coincides with itself perfectly and simply and is 'what it is'. Any externality to the 'for-itself' or consciousness would have placed it on the same continuous as the inert and self-coinciding-in-itself. To admit to the exteriority of consciousness would be to accept a kind of physicalism or materialism with respect to consciousness itself, a position that is as un-existential as conceivable. According to Sartre, the kind of causation that may exist between the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' is explainable on neither of the two terms. If an attempt were made to explain it in terms of the 'in-itself', then abject materialism would ensue. On the other hand, the question of explaining the causation between the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' in terms of the former could not be admitted as long as such a causation is not admitted as a part of consciousness itself, in the sense that causation that is not entirely within consciousness cannot result in affecting that consciousness in such a way that the latter becomes conscious of being an effect of that causal process.

The perimeters of consciousness, while binding it to the criteria of self-transparency, interiority and intentionality, also at the same time open it up to be used as the foundation of a rich existentialist idiom. Transparency translates into the existential notion of responsibility for actions and freedom. Any attempt at skirting responsibility for one's actions, implies a secondary activity following a pre-reflective, non-thetic act of consciousness Sartre identifies as anterior the pre-reflective, non-thetic consciousness upon which a secondary act of consciousness reflects. The pre-reflective consciousness, in being a pure spontaneity, is the foundation of an authentic life. It is also the source of anguish in its nakedness and transparent immediacy, for it is in the spontaneity of the pre-reflective, non-thetic consciousness that a person grasps her freedom as causally undermined. Pre-reflective consciousness is non-thetically also a consciousness of itself. Every act of consciousness is also aware of itself and this puts paid to need for a subsequent act of consciousness for an awareness of the consciousness in the preceding act. As every act of pre-reflective consciousness is non-thetically also a consciousness of itself, a reflective act of consciousness is thetically conscious of the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

pre-reflective act of consciousness and a consciousness of itself at the same time.

Sartre founds his existential diagnosis of the human condition upon the purity and spontaneity of the pre or un-reflective non-thetic consciousness. It is in the un-reflective spontaneity of consciousness that a person discovers her freedom. Such a freedom could only ensue if such a consciousness were a consciousness of its own spontaneity playing on the transparent nature of consciousness as Sartre conceives of it. Thus, Sartre's existential concerns that make him emphasise, if not propound, the thesis that every act of unreflective consciousness is also consciousness of its own spontaneity. Reflective consciousness dilutes the spontaneity of the unreflective consciousness by forming a thesis out of it. It must be remarked here that Sartre's emphasis upon the unreflective aspect of consciousness parallels his concern with existing in the world as a real-time agent of praxis, rather than one of contemplation and reflection. However, even an act of reflective consciousness, by taking as an object the preceding unreflective consciousness, cannot entirely strip it away of its spontaneity, in the sense that in being a transparency of its object, it cannot 'not be' conscious of its object's spontaneity i.e., the unreflective consciousness. Therefore the relation between the unreflective and the subsequent reflective act of consciousness must be one characterised by instability and be seen as problematic, with the latter never being quite able to fix its causality in terms of the former. It would be submitted that to be reflectively conscious of a preceding unreflective consciousness is, as Sartre defines, an attempt by reflective consciousness to fix the former on a causal and thetic scheme, and to make a thesis out of it on the lines of 'it follows that' This attempt by reflective consciousness is essentially an instance of flight from responsibility. Therefore there cannot be a satisfactory causal explanation of the spontaneous pre-reflective consciousness upon a template of reflective consciousness and the pre-reflective consciousness 'escapes' getting tied up in the knots of causation at both ends of the temporal continuum. The cause has to lose its externality to even enter into an internal relationship with consciousness. It would result in it losing its character of being a cause. All this simply implies that consciousness cannot have an externality in relation to

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

causation. On the posterior aspect of temporality the spontaneity of consciousness cannot be convincing linked to an explanatory chain of causation with the consciousness that reflects upon it. Thus, the human freedom with spontaneous consciousness becomes diluted through a posterior rational evaluation of its value. According to Sartre, reflection cannot be explained on epistemic grounds as the process by which self-knowledge is gained, for the real purpose reflection serves is ontological, namely to secure the self-identity and unification of the 'for-itself' in the manner of the 'in-itself's stability' and self-identity. The failure of any causal relationship between the pre-reflective and the reflective consciousness implies that any ratiocination by the latter regarding the former is bound not only to be inaccurate, but would be an exercise in self-deception. Self-deception is a 'bad faith' which has been described in the following pages. At this time, here the relation between freedom and facticity would be discussed.

According to Sartre the non-causal character of human freedom does not make it oblivious to a person's historical and synchronic facticity.[46] He concedes that a person will have a certain history to her that will have a bearing on her conscious projects in the world. A prisoner who has been wrongly imprisoned cannot be conceived as free on an ordinary, common sense-based understanding of freedom. Here, Sartre distinguishes between freedom as an external identification of a person with her deeds in the world and freedom as an ontological state of being cutting consciousness sharply away from the world of non-conscious stuff. With respect to consciousness's relation to its facticity, one might analyse what may be called the 'free-prisoner' paradox. A human being with consciousness will always be capable of not coinciding with her facticity. This is an ontological statement about the total human condition in the world. Sartre does not necessarily conceive of freedom as a virtue[47]. In the view of Sartre freedom is reflective of the tragic human condition of its not being the 'in-itself', of consciousness's awareness of itself as void, a nothingness, and of its

46. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, P. 494
47. Sebastian Gardner, Sartre's Being and Nothingness : A Reader's Guide, P. 198–99

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

struggle to constitute and reconstitute its projects without cessation. In its most extreme form the Sartrean conception of human freedom reflects a consciousness's inability to coincide with even a linearly deterministic reading or understanding of itself.

Bad Faith

Bad faith is an important concept in Sartre's existentialism. It is a concept of self-deception. Detmer calls it as 'lying to oneself'. Being 'lying to oneself' bad faith is to exploit the various dualities in the structure of consciousness in order to lie to oneself in such a way so that through the very act of lying, one erases all evidences of the lie. How could a person lie to herself without also being conscious of that lie ? It is the question one might ask.[48] For instance, I cannot convince myself that I am the Prime Minister of India, when I know that it is not true. On the other hand, bad faith is explainable on ontological rather epistemological grounds. The fundamental structure of the 'for-itself' involves the non-thetic, non-positional pre-reflective consciousness which is pure spontaneity and transparency. The subsequent act of reflective consciousness which makes a thetic object out of the pre-reflective consciousness does so on contentious grounds, for to make a thesis out of the latter is in some manner to dilute its spontaneity in a thetic framework. This uneasy relationship between these two acts of consciousness is the foundation of bad faith. Underlying this fundamental structure is the teleological motivation for the 'for-itself' to recover consciousness as a coincident identity with itself. Another prism to look at the bad faith problem through is the facticity-transcendence duality, wherein a person either identifies with her past facticity or her future self-transcendence at the cost of the other.[49]

A person might also enter into bad faith by exploiting the nature of perception which always apprehends its objects through the prism of its wants, interests, priorities etc., while confining to the background all that is concomitant and not a priority. Bad faith involves deftly switching between the centre of attention and corresponding hazy background. It is confining evidence of self-

48. David Detmer, 'Bad Faith'—the article in "Jean-Paul Sartre : Key concepts", edited by Churchill Steven and Jack Reynolds, P. 118
49. Ibid, P. 122–125

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

deception to the latter realm while focusing attention on the content of the belief in an evidentiary vacuum. Nevertheless, all these structures of bad faith not withstanding, what makes bad faith truly possible is the interiority of consciousness itself. Interiority implies that consciousness as a pure spontaneity and also in its thetic nature must be exhausted within itself. To be conscious of a belief is to be not conscious of all those aspects of the belief, such as its causal antecedents dug out through an admixture of rational and empirical investigations, that are not part of that consciousness. Since an act of consciousness is necessarily finite in time and also an interiority, a spontaneity and a disinclination to enter into causal relations with other acts of consciousness, consciousness itself becomes the grounds for self-deception. A consciousness that is a spontaneous finitude can more easily be grasped in reflection for effecting bad faith by exploiting the various dualities in the structure of consciousness. The spontaneity of the pre-reflective consciousness is the platform of both autonomy and bad faith, the latter (bad faith) manifesting itself as a reflective consciousness. For bad faith in intending the pre-reflective consciousness cannot entirely miss its spontaneity and finitude. Therefore bad faith would not be possible unless its seeds germinate in the spontaneity of the pre-reflective consciousness itself, as it is seized upon clumsily by the reflective consciousness in pursuit of its teleological objective of seeking self-identity and coincidence with itself.

Humanism

There are different versions of humanism. Among them existential humanism of Sartre is significantly unique. In fact, being an atheist Sartre does not believe in God or any super-human reality. Therefore he says that "man, first of all, exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterwards."[50] In other words, "man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself."[51] Before establishing his version of humanism Sartre criticizes two significant and influential versions of humanism, and they are Christian Humanism and Positivist Humanism. According

50. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, P. 28 (Translated by Philip Mairet),
51. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

to Christian Humanism, man has been created in the image of God. Therefore, incomprehensible, immaterial, almight God, who transcends all existence, all power, all knowledge, wanted to become copies of Himself. This does not mean that He simply impressed His image like a seal on some plastic material, but that He raised man to a creature in which He recognised His own image and came to the consciousness of Himself, and that man in a completely decisive way, belongs to the self-manifestation of God. Hence, the history of mankind is theology. So, Christian Humanism is the theological humanism which can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, man like other creatures of the universe is, in essence, a creature. He is nothing by himself, but owes everything, even his existence, to the will of his divine creator. Being ourselves His creatures we feel solidarity of universal brotherhood with all fellow beings. Secondly, the fact God created man after his image determined man's special status before all other creatures. In fact, one sees the image of God-in-man, which is merely suggested in other creatures, is founded the unity of humanity. The image of God in man is the true sign of his divine destiny and calling, and the ground of the future integration of the humanity. For the sake of his destiny and calling, all men should maintain with each other the greatest possible unity and peace.

This Christian Humanism fails to accord full dignity and sovereignty to human beings. It is based on charity and love, so it could not rise above humanitarianism. Also, disintegration and conflicts among different religious sects within christianity have added misery to mankind. The religious conflicts are sometimes engineered for political purposes, economic factors add fuel to them. This is because the Church does not always accord the significant guidance to the path of humanity. Only the renaissance movement raised its voice against dogmatic worldviews, thereby paving the way for true humanism.

French intellectuals formulated a secular humanism based on reason at the end of 19th century. This humanism is called positivist, because positivism sees man as an end in-itself and as a supreme value. The propounder of positivism August Comte alongwith his followers asserted that God is a useless and costly hypothesis, and we could do without it. Positivism offers an alternative system of

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

values to regulate the whole course of our private and public life, by bringing noble feelings, reason and human actions into a unity. Actually, positivism regards life as continuous and earnest act of worship—worship to elevate and purify our feeling, enlarge and enlighten our thought, ennoble and invigorate our actions. To Comte, it is "religion of humanity" that could replace all imperfect dogmatic systems based on theology. According to Positivism, if we are to have a morality, a society and law-abiding world must essentially have certain secular value, and it should be taken seriously. These values are seen to have an apriori existence ascribed to them. It means that it must be obligatory apriori to be honest, not to lie, not to beat one's wife, to bring up children and so forth. However, these values are thought to be inscribed in an intelligible heaven, although of course, there is no God.

Sartre rejects both kinds of humanism. "If God exists, man is nothing."[52] In other words, no God but only man exists. Man is the supreme and sovereign reality. Man has no pre-determined essence, rather he makes of himself only through his face activities. Positivist humanism sees man as pre-determined, fixed end-in itself. But according to Sartre man is by nature free and still to be determined. In view of Sartre humanism does not propose that man is 'magnificent'. For example a character, in the story "Round the World in Eighty Hours", says that while flying over mountains in an aeroplane, "Man is magnificent" ! This signifies that, although I personally have not built aeroplanes, I have the benefit of those particular inventions. I personally, being a man, can consider myself responsible for, and honoured by, the achievements that are peculiar to some other expert personalities. This means that we can ascribe value to men at large, while only some other individuals are responsible for something. Sartre terms this kind of humanism as absurd, because for someday some non-human being might come to pronounce a general judgement upon man and declare that "man is magnificent". It is not admissible that a man should pronounce judgement upon man. An existentialist would never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined. So, we do not have any right to believe that humanity is something to which we would set up a

52. Ibid, Lucifer and the Lord, translated by Kitty Black, collected in Jean-Paul Sartre Two plays, P. 182–183.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

cult after the manner of Comte, the positivist. This cult of 'Religion of Humanity' is shut-up upon itself, and ironically this might end in Fascism.

Sartre propounds the new kind of humanism, namely 'Existential Humanism'. According to him, to be man is to be free. Man is always outside of himself. It is in his projecting and losing himself beyond that he makes man to exist. As well as, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is self-surpassing and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and centre of his transcendence. So, there is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. In "Being and Nothingness" Sartre analyses the ontology of human reality. According to him consciousness is nothingness. Man is by nature incomplete, at every moment he experiences that he is not what he has to be. This primordial experience of nothing new occurs within the limits of human expectation. It is because I expect to find 2500/- rupe in my wallet that I find only 2200/-. This world disclosed non-being to someone who has first posited certain possibility. Nothingness is an irreducible experience which cannot result from prior affirmation. The necessary condition of our saying 'no' is that non-being is a perceptual presence to us and outside of us, as nothingness haunts being. There is difference between being-in-itself (en-soi) and being-for-itself (pour-soi). En-soi is the full, self-identical being. It has no lack, no incompleteness. It is what it is, being of full positivity. For example a chair is always a chair. Pour-soi is human being as conscious reality, never identifiable with itself. For it, en-soi is a goal towards which consciousness moves, but which it never achieves. Therefore, consciousness is defined as perperual negation. Pour-soi, as human consciousness is impersonal, non-substantial being infected with internal negation, which is temporal and the source of values. The nature of consciousness is such that it goes beyond itself, to be what it is not, not to be what it is. In this sense, consciousness is possible, because it is free. This free consciousness exists in ekstatic unity of past, present and future—possible as consciousness is freedom. This is made clear by Sartre when he says that man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently, there is no difference between the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

being of man and his being free. Not only that "human reality does not exist first in order to act later, but for human reality, to be is to act and to cease to act is to cease to be."[53] Thus, freedom, being and action are the same thing. It shows that Sartre does not believe in the socalled objectivity of values. Human individual is the being that gives rise to values. Man wants to proceed to a form of existence from the present position, as past does not satisfy him. He has a goal, a purpose and he thinks that realization of that goal will satisfy him. This process of realization is called by Sartre as surpassing. Due to this act of realizing a purpose, an object receives significance, becomes endowed with value.

Sartre connects man's movement of surpassing the present with his desire to reach the future. Just as a crescent moon can be understood with reference to the full moon, so also an individual being is to be understood with reference to the complete to be realised. So, value becomes an extended nothingness that always haunts us. This emptiness is ingrained in his nature in such a manner that it can never get rid of it. Therefore, his consciousness is always fragmented, he is in anxiety. To get beyond this anxiety he takes refuge in bad faith, which is nothing but a lying to oneself. In fact, freedom is the only foundation of values. Man, who is thrown into this alien world, is denied any external value to support him. Man is alone, unjustified and irreducibly free. He uses his freedom by constantly interpreting and signifying the world around him, by making fresh judgements in every new situation, and above all, by an ever renewed effort of self-justification. Sartre throws all burden on the individual's shoulders. In his play "Lucifer and the Lord" the hero Goetz says, "I tried to make myself a pillar and carry the weight of celestial vault. I shall tell you a secret, heaven is an empty hole."[54] He further says, "God is loneliness of man. There was no one but myself, I alone decided on evil and I alone invented God. It was I who cheated I who worked miracles. I who accuse myself today, I alone who can absolve myself, I, the man. If God exists, man is nothing, if man exists. There was no trial, I tell you God is dead. We have no witness now, I lone can see your hair and your brow. How REAL you

53. Ibid, Being and Nothingness (Translated by Hazel E. Barnes), P. 613

54. Ibid, Lucifer and the Lord (translated by Kitty Black), p. 156

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

have become since He no longer exists."[55] Thus, there is a clear picture of a solely human universe in Sartre's existentialism. This universe results from man's self-transcending and constitutive subjectivity, his freedom of choice.

Man is with total freedom, along with inevitable responsibility of the whole world. Humanism in Sartre's existentialism puts every man in possession of himself as be 'is' and place the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.[56] An individual is responsible for war which he has not started, not even fought. This is because he lets the war to be fought. This way Sartre advocates individualism, but not absolutely. His individual freedom also chooses the freedom for other fellow-beings along with the one himself. When we self that man chooses himself, we do mean that everyone of us must chooses himself, but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself, he choose for all men."[57] By explaining these words Sartre says that in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wishes to be, there is not one which is not creative. At the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. Furthermore, what a man chooses is always the better, and nothing can be better for him unless it is better for all. If we admit that existence precedes essence and wish to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is much greater than it is generally supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. To be specific, when a man commits himself to anything fully realising that he is not only choosing for himself but also comes out as a legislator deciding on behalf of the whole of mankind in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. It means that man is discovering himself discovers also the others. I do not get a true picture of my existence unless there is intervention of the other. So others are necessary for my own existence and self-knowledge. This fact of knowing others through one's own existence is called by Sartre intersubjectivity. Sartre also speaks of being a human universality, and it is the condition of man's actions. These

55. Ibid, P. 182–3, P. 284
56. Ibid, op. cit, p. 29
57. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

conditions are objective, as these exist at all places. An individual has to lead his life according to these conditions. Of course, this universality is not completely pre-given, it is being built up all the time.

In the "Critique of Dialectical Reason" Sartre admits that the most important philosophical question is the status of dialectic. He regards it is both the method of thought and the structure of reality. However, reason and the object of knowledge, which are both in motion, are mutually dependent on each other. Dialectic may be located in the world but it is constituted through man in the process of totalizing his experience.[58] It is true that man is within nature and the process of nature is the foundation of human life. But it is not true that human knowledge reduces itself to the model of nature. Human reality differs from the physico-chemical processes. The dialectic of nature is, in fact, paradoxical, because at first human ideas are imposed upon human reality and then our knowledge is reimposed upon human reality with the belief that it originated in nature. According to Sartre, human relations are governed by a dialectical principle that man is mediated by the things to the extent that things are mediated by man. Each man begins his work upon nature as a solitary individual, but two solitary workers may be unified by a third person who brings both of them into a single totalization.[59] The concept of this third party stresses the collective background of individual actions implying their social mediation. Similarly, the dialectic of dyad individual nature leads to the unavoidable fact of scarcity for there is not enough for everyone. Like need, scarcity also unifies the practical field of multiplicity of men. The scarcity would be eliminated only when goods are shared equitably and when labour is reduced to a marginal fact of life through automation.

Thus, man experiences alienation, which he wants to overcome by his free choice and there is a dialectic of freedom and alienation. But a solitary individual does not have the freedom of choice to alter the situation in order to abolish alienation. This can come about only through grouping. For this formation of groups is a very important factor in social dialectics Sartre gives an example to establish that

58. *Ibid*, Critique of Dialectial Reason, P. 45-6
59. *Ibid*, P. 114

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the individual moves through the series to the group-in-fusion.[60] A number of men stand in a line at the bus stop. They have a common purpose, i.e., getting into the bus, through which they are united. But among themselves they are in condition of solitude. The object, the bus, for which they are waiting, defines a relation of the individuals as interchangeable and external. In such a situation the relation of one man to another is togetherness. It seems to have an inertness of matter, but the group possesses a vitality of free projects. In fact, every individual reaches, in a new fashion, not as a mere individual, but as a singular interaction of the common person. Impersonality, isolation, automation etc., which defines series, are thrown away in the intensely personal relations of the group in fusion. This group is the beginning of humanity where men recover their lost being, their supposed freedom. In this way Sartre's humanism is an existential, ontological harmony between the individual and the society.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty was a French phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Husserl and Heidegger. The constitution of meaning in human experience was his main interest. He wrote on perceptions, art, politics, religion, psychology, psychoanalysis, language, nature and history. He was born on 14 March, 1908 at Rochefort and died on 3 May, 1961 in Paris. He was influenced by Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, as well by Descartes and Kant. His most prominent works are "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945), "The Structure of Behaviour" (1965) and "Humanism and Terror" (1947).

Perception

The book "Phenomenology of Perception" authored by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is published in 1945. This book deals with the primacy of perception phenomenologically and existential outlook. According to him perception has an active dimension, in that it is a primordial opennes to the lifeworld. This primordial openness is at the heart of his thesis of the primacy of perception. The slogan of Husserl's phenomenology is "all consciousness is consciousness of something", which implies a distinction between acts of thought

60. Ibid, P. 256

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(noesis) and "intentional objects of thought (noema). Thus, the correlation between noesis and noema becomes the first step in the constitution of analyses of consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty Husserl's work brings to light phenomena which are not assimilable to noesis-noema correlation. This is particularly the case when one attends to the phenomena of the body (which is at once body-subject and body-object), subjective time (the consciousness of time is neither an act of consciousness nor an object of thought) and the other (the first considerations of the other in Husserl led to solipsism). The distinction between noesis and noema does not seem to constitute an irreducible ground. It appears rather at a higher level of analysis. Merleau-Ponty; therefore, does not postulate that "all consciousness is consciousness of something" which supposes at the outset a noetic-noematic proud. Instead, he develops the thesis according which "all consciousness is perpetual consciousness." In doing so, he establishes a significant turn in the development of phenomenology, indicating that its conceptualisations should be re-examined in the light of the primacy of perception, in weighing up the philosophical consequences of this thesis.

According to Merleau-Ponty one's own body is not only a thing, a potential object of study for science, but is also a permanent condition of experience, a constituent of the perceptual openness to the world. Therefore, he underlines the fact that there is an inherence of consciousness and of the body of which the analysis of perception should take account. The primacy of perception signifies a primacy of experience, so to speak, in so far as perception becomes an active and constitutive dimension. Merleau-Ponty demonstrates a corporeity of consciousness as much as an intentionality of the body, and so stands in contrast with the dualist ontology of mind and body in Descartes. He says, "In so far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not dependent on my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way that I do not choose."[61] Corporiety intrinsically has a dimension of expressivity which proves to be fundamental to the constitution of the ego is one of the conclusions of "the structure of behaviour" that is constantly reiterated in Merleau-Ponty's later works. Following this theme of

61. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, P. 440

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

expressivity, he goes on to examine how an incarnate subject is in a position to undertake actions that transcend the organic level of the body, such as in intellectual operations and the products of one's cultural life. He carefully considers language as the core of culture, by examining in particular the connections between the unfolding of thought and sense-enriching his perspective not only by an analysis of the acquisition of language and the expressivity of the body, but also by taking into account pathologies of language, painting, cinema, literature, poetry and song.

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between primary and secondary modes of expression. This distinction appears in his book "Phenomenology of Perception"[62], and is sometimes repeated in terms of spoken and speaking language. Spoken language or secondary expression, returns to our linguistic baggage, to the cultural heritage that we have acquired, as well as the brute mass of relationships between signs and significations. Speaking language or primary expression, such as it is, is language in the production of a sense, language at the advent of a thought, at the moment where it makes itself an advent of sense. It is speaking language, that is to say, primary expression, that interests Merleau-Ponty and which keeps his attention through his treatment of the nature of production and the reception of expressions, a subject which also overlaps with an analysis of action, of intentionality, of perception, as well as the links between freedom and external conditions.

According to Merleau-Ponty science is an ex-post facto abstraction. Causal and physiological accounts of perception, for example, explain perception in terms that are only arrived at after abstracting from the phenomenon itself. Merleau-Ponty chastised science for taking itself to be the area in which a complete account of nature may be given. The subjective depth of phenomena cannot be given in science as it is. This characterizes Merleau-Ponty's attempt to ground science in phenomenological objectivity and, in essence, institute a "return to phenomena".

Thus, Merleau-Ponty attempts to reveal the phenomenological structure of perception. He writes that while the "notion of sensation

62. Ibid, P. 207

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

seems immediate and obvious", it is in fact confused. He asserts that because "traditional analyses" have accepted it, they have "missed the phenomena of perception." He argues that while sensation could be understood to mean "the way in which I am affected and the experiencing of a state of myself", there is nothing in experience corresponding to "pure sensation" or "an atom of feeling". He writes that "the alleged self-evidence of sensation is not based on any testimony of consciousness, but on widely held prejudice."[63]

Embodied Consciousness

In his book "Phenomenology of Perception" Merleau-Ponty develops the concept of the body-subject as an alternative to the Cartesian "cogito". This distinction is especially important in that Merleau-Ponty perceives the essences of the world existentially. Consciousness, the world, and the human body as a perceiving thing are intricately intertwined and mutually "engaged". The phenomenal thing is not the unchanging object of the natural sciences, but a correlate of our body and its sensory motor function. Taking up and "communing with" the sensible qualities it encouters, the body as incarnated subjectivity intention elaborates things within an ever-present world frame, through use of its pre-conscious, pre-predicative understanding of the world's makeup. The elaboration, however, is "inexhaustible", the hallmark of any perception. Things are that upon which our body has a "grip", while the grip itself is a function of our connaturality with the world's things. The world and the sense of self are emergent phenomena in an ongoing "becoming". The essential partiality of our view of things, their being given only in a certain perspective and at a certain moment in time doesnot diminish their reality, but on the country establishes it, as there is no other way for things to be copresent with us and with other things than through such. Abschattungen (sketches, faint outlines, adumbrations). The thing transcends our view, but is manifest precisely by presenting itself to a range of possible views. The object of perception is immanently tied to its background to the nexus of meaningful relations among objects within the world. Because the object is inextricably within the world of meaningful relations, each object reflects the others. Through

63. Ibid, P. 4-5

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

involvement in the world-being in the world the perceiver tacitly experiences all the perspectives upon that object coming from all the surrounding things of its environment, as well as the potential perspectives that object has upon the beings around it. Each object is a "mirror of all others." Our perception of the object through all perspectives is not that of a propositional or clearly declineated, perception, rather, it is an ambiguous perception founded upon the body's primordial involvement and understanding of the world and of the meanings that constitute the landscape's perceptual "gestalt". Only after we have been integrated within the environment so as to perceive objects as such can we turn our attention toward particular objects within the landscape so as to define them more clearly. This attention doesnot operate by clarifying what is already seen, but by constructing a new "Gestalt" oriented toward a particular object. Because our bodily involvement with things is always provisional and indeterminate, we encounter meaningful things in a unified though ever open-ended world.

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

5. POSTMODERNISM

"Postmodernity is a movement, it is an attitude or a mood, but not a systematic thing where you can develop concepts and relationships, precisely what the postmodernists are against. Any attempt to oversystematize thought by being reduced to any kind of system is to reduce thinking as such. So postmodernism is basically a mood."[1]

These words of Bishop Gregorias point out that postmodernism is not a systematical theory of metaphysics or epistemology or any field of philosophy. If the term "postmodernism" indicates anything, it comes after the systematic theory of modernism. Modernism is a systematic theory in which many concepts and relationship have been developed. It is the outcome of scientific inventions and industrial revolution. But in the mid-1960s modernism has been criticized by some postmodernist thinkers like Levinas, Rorty and Derrida and others. Therefore, it said that "Postmodernism is largely a reaction to the assumed certainty of scientific, or objective, efforts to explain reality ..... it (postmodernism) is highly skeptical of explanations which claim to be valid for all groups, cultures, traditions, or races, and instead focuses on the relative truths of each person."[2]

It is clear that postmodernism is not a definite scientific or philosophical theories or concepts, but it is mood of thinking varies person to person. So, an element of scepticism and relativism involves in postmodernism. Therefore we cannot define this term (postmodernism). It has a wide and vast field of literature, art, philosophy, architecture, drama, dance and also film. Hugh J. Silverman right says that "Postmodernism has no place of origin.

1. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Vol. XIV, No. 3, May-August 1997, P. 84.
2. https;/www.pbs.org. (Taken from google)

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

The meeting and function of postmodernism is to operate at places of closure, at the limits of modernists' productions and practices, at the margins of what proclaims itself to be new and a break with tradition, and at the multiple edges of these claims to self consciousness and auto reflection. Postmodernism does not open up a new field of artistic, philosophical, cultural or even institutional activities. Its very significance is to marginalize, delimit, disseminate and decentre the primary and often secondary works of modernist inscriptions."[3]

Silverman's above observation regarding postmodernism leads to the conclusion that no body can trace out the specific place of origin of postmodernism. Secondly, postmodernism shows the limitations and lacking of modernism. Thirdly, it applies in various fields of art, philosophy, culture and even institutional activities. Thus, it delimits or marginalizes the modernist concepts of scientific and industrial era between 16-17th century to early 20th century.

Though postmodernism is an attitude or movement to criticize modernism, it is very difficult to demarcate postmodernism from modernism. In fact, postmodernism is a reaction against modernism, but its mood is not the denial of modernism rather that a reconstruction or reinterpretation of modernism. It is an attempt to give a new meaning of modernism. However, some thinkers term it (postmodernism) as the end of modernity. So, we can say that postmodernism is either the end of modernity or continuation of modernism. Jurgon Habermas supports the first view (end of modernity) and Jean Francois Lyotard assumes the second view (continuation of modernism).

Habermas' view : According to Habermas, "postmodernism is a farewell to modernity and its discourse as a whole, is in pursuit of an anarchism .... a specialized knowledge and is beyond discursive thinking and critical authority, which culminate in the business of Deconstruction."[4] Postmodernism is a departure from modernity,

3. Hugh J. Silverman (editor), Continental Philosophy Postmodernism Philosophy and Arts, Routledge, London & New York, 1990, Page 1.
4. Jurgen Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity, published in the Journal of Philosophy, 1988, P. 528

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and it puts its place in anarchism. In Habermas' view, post-modernism is also a specialized knowledge beyond discursive thinking and critical authority. Therefore it leads to the destruction in the field of any discipline, either it be literature or art, philosophy or music, architecture or drama, etc. Thus, in the view of Habermas, "postmodern mode of thinking can only result in an empty and formalistic incantation of an undermined authority."[5]

In fact, Habermas sees a complete discontinuity and disarity between modernism and postmodernity. According to him, in modernity there is scientifically, pragmatic approach to solve genuine problems and rationality, but in postmodernity these aspects do not remain because postmodernism and modernism are simply incommensurable and the discourse of postmodernity is not rationality, scientificity, rather fiction and literature. But the critics of Habermas term his (Habermas) attitude towards modernism and postmodernity relationship as a necessarily "modernistic way of judging". According to Bishop Gregorious, "This attempt fixes him in the modernist rather than postmodernist camp. He is still talking about propositional truth and their legitimization. Thus he is still in the positivist link."[6] In fact, according to Habermas postmodernity is nothing but a "die modernity." i.e., death modernity. (modernity is dead or ends.)

Lyotard's view : Jean Francois Lyotard is the most provocative postmodernist. He is the most explicit exponent of postmodernism. According to him, postmodern does not mean anti-modern, Rather it is a continuation of modernity—"the whole idea of postmodernism is perhaps better rethought under the rubric of rewriting modernity."[7] Thus, postmodernism is not the end of modernity or "die modernity". According to Lyotard the concept of postmodernity draws from the reflections on the peculiarity of modern knowledge. Modern knowledge has the form of unity, and this unity has come into being through the recourse to great metanarratives. The

5. Ibid
6. R. P. Singh, Philosophy : Modern and Postmodern, Intellectual Publishers, New Delhi, 1997, Page IX.
7. J. F. Lyotard, "Reecrire La Modernite", in La Inhuman, Paris, 1985, Page 33-34.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

modernity creates three such grounds of metanarratives : (a) the emancipation of humanity (enlightenment) through totalising reason, (b) teleology of spirit (Idealism) and, (c) the hermeneutics of the meaning (historicism). The present time is characterized through the situation where these bringing unities have lost their validity. With this the sense of totality has become obsolete. Thus postmodernism does not believe in a certain holistic knowledge. The dissolution of a certain holistic knowledge or the totality is the precondition of postmodern pluralism. But this kind of pluralism is not very original. This pluralism has been articulated since the end of 18th. century in Europe, particularly by German romanticism. The loss of totality and the dissolution of unity were lamented by most of the writers till the late 19th century. This irrevocable plurality, which is regarded as positive, is the main focus of postmodernity. The postmodern interest is directed towards the periphery, border zones, areas of conflicts, frictions from which something unknown may emerge, something, which would defy the functional instrumental rationality, something paralogous.

Postmodernism is concerned with such things as undecidables, the limit of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, and theorizes its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, non-rectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the world knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. According to Lyotard, the postmodernity has primarily emerged from the survey of decisive scientific and theoretical innovations of the 20th century (Einstein, Heisenberg, Godel). Also, he explains postmodernity with a review of artistic phenomena of 20th century. Thus, Lyotard claims that postmodernity is undoubtedly a part of modern, because postmodernism is a phase in modernism, a constant push to negate the existent and produce the new.

Thus, postmodernism can be understood in two way, "die modernism" and "continuation of modernity". In addition, there must be sketched one more feature of postmodernism, and that is the language as the model of structural system more deeply than that of the modernistic views. The linguistic turn has levied the postmodernist-poststructuralist assumption that language constitutes the human world and the human world constitutes the whole

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

world. For most of this century language has been moving to center stage in philosophy, among figures as diverse as Wittgenstein, Quine, Heidegger and Gadamer, while growing attention to communication theory, linguistics, cybernetics and computer languages demonstrates a similar emphasis over several decades in science and technology. Both Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida have given similar emphasis on language as a decisive leap for the formation of new forms of thought, i.e., poststructuralism or postmodernism.

In conclusion we may say that postmodernism symbolizes a complete radical critique of the notions like absolute truth, totality and universality and upholds plurality, incoherency, etc. It challenges the quest for philosophic or scientific certitude. Also, it propagates that there is no absolute referent beyond the polysemy of text. It holds that truth is a property of linguistic entities, not an accurate representant of the world. Finally, it maintains that there is no fixed meaning of a text, meaning can be inserted, self created and an absence can be read. As well, it observes that there is no clear-cut margin between philosophy, literature and fiction. In the words of David Wood, "Postmodernism does not entirely push the end but the limit of philosophy. It has opened up this scrutiny but it also debunks the nihilistic claim that this is a time to end philosophy. Philosophy is not merely literature because the margin as limit is philosophy."[8]

Friedrich Wilhelm Neitzsche

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was a unique thinker in the contemporary phases of philosophical thought. He was purely individualist. He was born in Germany 15th October, 1844 in a small town of Rocken (Lutzen). He was not only a philosopher but also a cultural critic. He was also a poet and philologist. He was influenced by Schopenhaur—his contemporary thinker, Hegel, Plato and Aristotle. He died at Weimar (Germany) on 25th August 1900. He influenced upon Freud, Sartre, Heideggar and Foucault. His important works are "Thus spoke zorathustra" published in 1883, "Beyond God and Evil" published in 1886, "The Antichrist" (1895),

8. David Wood, Philosophy of the Limit, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1990, Page XVI.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"The Gay Science" (1882), "On the Genealogy" (1887), "The Birth of Tragedy" (1872). But his most important work "The Will to Power" was published in 1901 after his death.

On the basis of his abovementioned books we can divide his individualistic philosophical thought into the three caption : Critique of Enlightenment, Will to Power and Genealogy of Moral. We now attempt to understand all these three ideas of Nietzsche as follows.

Critique of Enlightenment

In his work, "A History of Philosophy" Frank Thilly sketched out three phases of enlightenment. The first phase of enlightenment started in the sixth century B.C. in Greece. During this period philosophical ideas was influenced by natural science. So, the inquiry 'mind' turns outward to the world of physical things. The effort is made to understand the meaning of the cosmos, system after system is offered to solve the riddle of the universe, the object of chief interest is the world and its ways, man's place in nature being determined by the conclusions reached in metaphysics. Thus the first phase of enlightenment, i.e., Greek enlightenment doesnot limit itself with the growth of individualism, instead it develops naturalism and universalism.

The second phase of enlightenment came into the christian era. In this era philosophy was the slave of church. So, religion, not natural science, was the chief current of philosophy. The authority of church was philosophy. But during this period reason was also an important element to understand the authority of church. Acquinas was the most important example who tried to balance between faith and reason. Without reason faith should not follow. So, "slowly but surely the authority of the church is weakened in the field of the mind, and the individual begins to assert his intellectual independence." Thus the freedom of thought is the essential feature of this age of christian enlightenment.

But the most important and developed phase of enlightenment occurred in the 18th century when both empiricism and rationalism were at peak. This period of enlightenment may be called 'European enlightenment', because both theories of empiricism and rationalism developed in European countries. This is the period of

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

renaissance. Now, philosophy becomes fully independent from the slavery of church and adopts the scientific means to understand its problems. Liberty, Justice, equality, fraternity are the main pillars of this enlightenment. Every man was independent to think, speak, act. In Thilly's words, we can say that "liberty of conscience and worship, equal opportunity and economic freedom, representative government and equality of all individuals before the law"[9] are the main features of European or the third phase of enlightenment.

Thus the main features of enlightenment is scientific, rational, naturalistic, universalistic, free from all authority within the frame of state or society laws. In fact, the basic tenent of enlightenment is intellectual and anti-individualistic. Neitzsche critized enlightenment on the basis of its these two significant features.

Neitzsche wrote an essay entitled "Homer on competition" in 1872. In this essay he criticized the Greek enlightment in following words, "For the ancient Greeks, the process of self-creation was inseparable from struggle with others and so could only be carried out in public. Without a good type of Eris, or discord, neither the individual nor the state could have flourished. Hence instead of consigning 'selfishness' to the private domain, the Greek regarded it as the principal virtue to be displayed in public : "without envy, jealousy and competitive ambition, the Hellenic state, like Hellenic man, deteriorates." By analysing this statement of Neitzsche we find that (a) Greek thinkers believed in universality, not in privatization or individualism. (b) Their struggle is not only for them themselves, but for all the follow human beings. (c) Therefore, there was no jealousy, no enviousness, no competition. But in the view of Nietzsche all these features of Greek enlightment is in vain. In his view, all men must face struggle within themselves. They all are selfish. Without jealously, enviousness and competition no one develops one's own personality. So, struggle is not public, but private. Each and ever individual must struggle independently for his own existence. It is the reality of life. Therefore Nietzsche said that the strength of struggle come from within, not from outside. It comes from our instincts, not from intellect. In 'Ecce Homo' he

9. Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, P. 383

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

represented this view. He proclaimed that "I am warlike by nature. Attacking is one of my instincts."[10]

Christian enlightenment influenced upon the modern or western culture. Not only christian enlightenment, but the third phase of European enlightenment also affected the modern civilisation and culture. Therefore, Nietzsche criticized the modern or western culture and civilisation. In fact, this criticism is the criticism of both christian and European enlightenment. It is said that western or modern culture is mostly affected by christianity. So, Nietzsche started attacking against christianity to critize western culture. Christian meekness, forgiveness, patience and love are no more than the mimicry of impotent hatred which dares not be anything but meek and patient, or seem anything but loving, though it dreams of heaven and hell. This attitude is associated particularly with the slaves in the Roman Empire who early adopted christianity. Therefore Nietzsche speaks of a 'slaves' revolt' in morals and of a 'slave morality.' He contrasts this with the 'master morality' of other civilizations. However, his own ethics is clearly distinguished from both types of morality.

According to Nietzsche christianity regards everyone as slave, so patience and love in christianity are only the mimicry of an impotent hatred. In fact Nietzsche's critique of christian morals is only referred as ressentiment. By this means the secret hatred and envy of all those more favoured than oneself and that kind of renunciation of revenge which is inseparable from the faith that 'vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord'. Nietzsche's "revaluation of all values", thus, doesnot involve a new table of virtues. It consists in an internal criticism of what he considers christian ethics, and he tries to show that what usually passes for christian morals is immoral when judged by its own professed standards. Some forms of pity and neighbourly love are also condemned for other reasons. Instead of perfecting oneself, which would involve hardness against oneself, one 'flees' to one's neighbour and would fain make a virtue of that. According to Nietzsche pity rests upon the assumption that suffering necessarily

10. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo : Wie man wird, was man ist, (P. 231 How one Becomes what one Is)

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

is an evil. This assumption has been criticized by Nietzsche, because he assumes that what men desire most is 'power'. So, some suffering is required both a means to the requisite self-control and as an ingredient of the creative life. So, suffering is not evil but to some extent it is essential to gain 'power'. Nietzsche also says that our love of our fellowbeings is also need, however in christian culture this notion is used negatively. In fact, this notion of love and pity is also used in negative sense in the third phase of enlightenment.

The third phase of enlightenment emphasizes on reason and intellect. But in the view of Nietzsche intellect or reason is merely an instrument in the hands of instinct, of the will for life and power. It is the 'little reason' created by the body. The body and its instincts are the 'big reason'—"There is more reason in your body than in your wisest wisdom". Knowledge has value only in so far as it preserves and promotes life, or preserves and develops the species, hence, illusion is as necessary as truth. To put truth above error and illusion, to love truth for its own sake instead of as a means of life, is turning things upside down, is a diseased instinct. Indeed, this ideal of truth for the truth's sake is only another form of asceticism, the denial or negation of life for something else. If life has been denied, there is no scope of love and pity. So, in the view of Nietzsche, rationalism or intellectualism, being a kind of asceticism, falsifies the morality of love and pity, like christianity.

Thus, by criticising the all phases of enlightenment Nietzsche tries to prove himself as an anti-intellectualist and irrationalist.

Will to Power

Nietzsche accepts the fundamental notion of Schopenhauer that the will is the principle of existence, but this will he conceives not merely as the will to live but as the will for power. According to him life is essentially a striving for a surplus of power, and this exuberant instinct is good. (Alles Gute is Instinkt). It is the prominent concept in Nietzsche's philosophy. According to Nietzsche, The will to power is the main driving force in humans. This concept has been interpreted in various ways, because Nietzsche never systematically defined it during his life-time. The concept of will has been interpreted as an individual psychology or pleasurism or logotheraphy. Alfred Adler terms this concept (will to

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

power) as an individual psychology of Nietzsche. In view of sigmund Freud calls it as a principle of pleasure and Viktor Frankl's view this concept (will to power) is a logotheraphy, i.e., a theory of will to meaning. Each of these schools advocates and teaches a very different essential driving force in human beings.

Cosmological Interpretation of will to power : Nietzsche has developed a theory of the "eternal recurrence of the same" throughout in his notebooks during his life time in 1880s. In his later notebook the physical possibility of this idea and mechanics of its actualization occur. Thus the will to power as a potential physics is integrated with the postulated 'eternal recurrence'. Nietzsche imagines a physical universe of perpetual struggle and force that repeatedly completes its cycle and returns to the beginning. By this imagination a theory of "how things are" has been established. Therefore Paul Loeb says that "Nietzsche did indeed believe in the truth of cosmological eternal recurrence, not metaphysical." Here a question has been raised whether the cosmologically or metaphysically 'eternal recurrence' could justify a transvaluation of one's life, and be a necessary precursor to the overman (superman) in his or her perfect acceptance of all, i.e., for the love of life itself, and amor fati.

Psychological Interpretation of will to power : The will to power is a psychological principle, say some contemporary thinkers, because it has been frequently applied to human behaviour by Nietzsche. In his unpublished notebook, which is published by his sister after his death, "The will To Power" Nietzsche claims that the will to power is a more metaphysical general force underlying all reality, not just human behaviour. In this way, the concept of will to power is both metaphysical and psychological. This reminds us of Schopenhaur's conception of "will to live". For example, according to Nietzsche, "the world is the will to power and nothing besides." But in view of many scholars Nietsche's principle of the will to power is less metaphysical and more pragmatic (psychological) than Schopenhaur's will to live. Schopenhaur thinks that the will to live is the most real in the universe. But Nietzsche claims that the will to power is a particularly useful principle for human's purposes.

Biological Interpretation of will to power : Wille Zur Macht and other scholars interpret the conception of the will to power as

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

equivalent to social Darwinism. Alfred Baumler, a Nazi scholar, is influenced by social Darwinism and therefore he justifies the human expansive quest for power. But Heidegger criticizes this view of Macht and Baumler. According to him, Nietzsche had no in his mind about a raw physical or political power, because he (Nietzsche) himself utters that

"I have found strength where one doesnot look for it : in simple, mild, and pleasant people, without the least desire to rule and, conversely, the desire to rule has often appeared to me a sign of inward weakness : they fear their own slave soul and shroud it in a royal cloak (in the end, they still become the slaves of their followers, their fame, etc.) The powerful natures dominate, it is a necessity, they need not lift one finger. Even if, during their lifetime, they bury themselves in a garden house." (From Nietzsche's Notebook "The Will to Power", p. 206)

These statements of Nietzsche clearly show that there doesnot seem a biological tenent in the conception of the will to power, but Heidegger says that the will to power must be considered in relation to the ubermensch (superman), and the thought of eternal recurrence. Mazzino Montinari criticizes Heidegger's view and claims Neitzsche as 'macroscopic'. Gilles Deleuze emphasizes the connection between the will to power and eternal return. Both Derrida and Deleuze carefully point out that the primary nature of will to power is unconscious. This means that the drive to power is always already at work unconsciously, perpetually, advancing the will of the one over the other. Thus this creates the state of things in the observable or conscious world still operating through the same tension. Derrida doesnot confine the will to power to human behaviour, the mind, metaphysics, nor physical reality individually. It is the underlying life-principle inaugurating all aspects of life and behavior, a self-preserving force. A sense of entropy and the eternal return, which are related, is always indissociable from the will to power. The eternal return of all memory initiated by the will to power is an entropic force again inherent to all life.

However, this view of Derrida and Deleuze has been opposed by saying that the will to power can be understood (or misunderstood) to mean a struggle against one's surroundings that culminates in personal growth, self-overcoming and self-perfection, and assert

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

that the power held over others as a result of this is coincidental. In Nietzsche's words,

"My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ('union') with those of them that are sufficiently related to it : thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on." (Ibid, p. 186)

In these words of Nietzsche we cannot find the tendency of psychological, metaphysical, cosmological or biological aspects inherent in the conception of the will to power, but we can find a principle of equilibrium. The will to power is rather than attempt to "dominate over others", it is better understood as the tenuous equilibrium in a system of forces, relations to each other. While a rock, for instance, doesnot have a conscious (or unconscious) 'will', it nevertheless acts as a site of resistance within the 'will to power' dynamic. Moreover, rather than "dominating over others", "the will to power" is more accurately positioned in relation to the subject (a mere synecdoche, both fictitious and necessary, for there is "no doer behind the deed" and is an idea behind the statement that words are 'seductions' within the process of self-mastery and self-overcoming. Thus 'the will to power' is a 'cosmic' inner force acting in and through both animate and inanimate objects. Not just instincts but also higher level behaviours, even in humans, were to be reduced to the will to power. This includes both such apparently harmful acts as physical violence dominating on one hand, and such apparently non-harmful acts as gift-giving love and praise on the other hand, though its manifestations can be altered significantly, such as through art and aesthetic experience.

Nietzsche in his book "Beyond Good and Evil" says that 'philosphers' 'will to truth' i.e., their apparent desire to disappasionately seek objective, absolute truth, is actually nothing more than a manifestation of their will to power, this will can be life-affirming or a manifestation of nihilism, but it is the will to power all the same." This statement of Nietzsche also proves that the conception of the will to power is not metaphysical or cosmological but it is simply an affirmation of life that lies in nihilism. Some

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

interpreters dispute the suggestion that the conception of the will to power is merely and only a matter of narrow, harmless, humanistic self-perfection. According to them power means self-perfection as well as outward, political, elitist, aristocratic domination. In fact, Nietzsche explicitly and specifically defines the idea of the egalitarian state as the embodiment of the will to power in decline :

"To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless, in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be 'unjust', since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought of at all without this character. One must indeed grant something even more unpalatable : that, from the highest biological standpoint, legal conditions can never be other than exceptional conditions, since they constitute a partial restriction of the will of life, which is bent upon power and are subordinate to its total goal as a single means, namely, as a means of creating greater units of power. A legal order thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power complexes but as a means of preventing all struggle in general perhaps after the communistic clinche of Duhring, that every will must consider every other will its equal-would be principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness."

(Neitzsche, on the Genealogy of Morals, Book II, p. 11)

This quotion indicates that human life does not exist without injury, exploitation, destruction, assault. It means that violence is an essential part of human life. So, it is absurd to say about equality. Equality is against the development of human personality. And for the development of human personality it needs the sense of pleasure. Alfred Adler says that "Nietzsche's 'will to power' and 'will to seem' embrace many of our views which resemble in some respects the view of Fere and the older writers, according to whom the sensational of pleasure originates in a feeling of feebleness." (Alfred Adler, the Neurotic constitution, P. ix) Alfred's this statement indicates his idea of individual psychology which is opposed to the view of Freud's principle of pleasure as well as Frankl's logotheraphy.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Alfred's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power is concerned with the individual patient's overcoming of the superiority inferiority dynamic. Frankl compares his view of logotherapy with Alfred's view and says that "the striving to find a meaning in one's life is the primary motivational force in man. That is why I speak of a will to meaning in contrast to the pleasure-principle, or, the will to pleasure on which Freudian psychoanalysis is centered, as well as in contrast to the will to power stressed by Alderian psychology."

(Viktor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning, p. 154)

Genealogy of Moral

In his famous book "Genealogy of Morality" Neitzsche disagrees with the traditional view of morality and describes his own thinking about some moral concepts like good, bad, evil, guilt, sin etc. The book is consisted of three parts, namely, first, second and third essays. In the first essay good, bad and evil have been discussed. Second and third essays describe the fate of bad conscience and sin and the ascetic ideal respectively. Before these essays, a relation between genealogy and morality has also been set up.

Relation Between Genealogy And Morality : According to Neitzsche morality is a system of errors that we have incorporated into our basic ways of thinking, feeling and living. It is the great symbol of our profound ignorance of ourselves and the world. Human beings, as Nietzsche claims, have been educated by four errors. They are :

(a) We, human beings, see ourselves only incompletely.

(b) We endow ourselves with fictitious attributes.

(c) We place ourselves in a 'false rank' in relation to animals and nature, that is, we see ourselves as being inherently superior to them.

(d) We invent ever new tables of what is good and then accept them as eternal and unconditional.

These 'errors' point out that in view of Nietzsche the human species may never attain its "highest potential and splendour."[11] But the moral philosophers may deny this opinion of Neitzsche. In fact

11. F. Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, Preface, P. 6

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

they cannot see any deficiency in the thought of morality. "In their attempts to account for morality philosophers have not developed the suspicion that morality might be 'something problematic', in effect what they have done is to articulate "an erudite form of true belief in the prevailing morality and as a result, their inquiries remain 'a part of the state of affairs within a particular morality."[12] Nietzsche does not so much inquire into a 'moral sense' or a moral faculty as attempt to uncover the different senses of morality, that is the different 'meanings' morality can be credited with in the history of human development, morality as symptom, as mask, as sickness, as stimulant as poison and so on. Morality is a surface phenomenon that requires meta-level interpretation in accordance with a different, superior set of extra-moral values "beyond good and evil". In fact, Nietzsche terms the traditional, particularly European modern morality as "herd animal morality"[13] which considers itself to be the definition of morality and the only morality possible or desirable, at work in modern thinking as the assumption that "there is a single morality valid for all."[14]

Nietzsche wants to develop the sharp, unbiased eye of the critic of morality in a better direction than his friend Paul Pee's speculations. He refers Paul's book "The Origin of Moral Sensations" published in 1877 and accepts that he developed his own hypotheses on the origin of morality at initial level. He thinks in the direction of a real history of morality later on. This history of morality is a genealogical inquiry "that which can be documented, which can actually be confirmed and has actually existed .... the whole, long, hard to deciper, hieroglyphic script of man's moral past."[15] The moral genealogists lack their knowledge about the past, they have merely modern experience. They think that genealogy of morality is beyond questioning. But Nietzsche thinks that it is great question to be discussed on the genealogical (historical) treatment of morality. He begins the 'genealogy' proper by paying homage to English psychologists, a group of researchers who have held a

12. Ibid, Beyond Good and Evil, P. 186
13. Ibid, P. 202
14. Ibid, P. 228
15. On the Genealogy of Morality, Preface, P. 7

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

microscope to the soul and, in the process, poineered the search for a new set of truth : 'plain, bitter, ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral'.[16] Nietzsche criticizes these psychologists for their lacking of a real historical sense, for bungling their moral genealogies as a result, and for failing to raise questions of value and future legilation. So, without the historical development and origin of morality we cannot know the genealogy of morality, because 'genealogy' means the origin and historical development of morality.

Good, Bad and Evil : In the first essay of his book "On the genealogy of Morality" Nietzsche imagines a society splitted into two distinct groups :

(a) a militarily and politically dominant group of 'masters'.

(b) a completely subordinate group of 'slaves'.

Masters exercise absolute control over slaves. They are powerful, active, relatively unreflective agents who live a life of immediate physical self-affirmation. They drink, they brawl, they wench, they hunt. They are powerful enough to succeed in most of these endeavors and uninhibited enough to enjoy living in this way. They use the term 'good' to refer in an approving way to this life, and to themselves as people who are capable of leading it. They also employ the term 'bad' to refer to those people, most notably the slaves, who by virtue of their weakness are not capable of living the life of self-affirming physical exuberance. Therefore, the terms 'good' and 'bad' form the basis of a variety of different masters' moralities. One of the most important events in Western history occurs when the slaves revolt against the masters' form of valuation. After all, the slaves are not only physically weak and oppressed, they are also by virtue of their very weakness debarred from spontaneously seeing themselves and their lives in an affirmative way. They develop a reactive and negative sentiment against the oppressive masters which Nietzsche calls 'ressentiment'. This ressentiment eventually turns creative, allowing the slaves to take revenge in the imagination on the masters whom they are weak too weak to harm physically. This form of revenge builds a new concept 'evil'.

In a slave morality the negative term 'evil' is central, and slaves can come to a pale semblance of self-affirmation only by observing

16. Ibid, I, P. 1

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

that they are not like the 'evil' masters. In the mouths of the slaves, 'good' comes to refer not a life of robust vitality, but to one that is 'not-evil', that is, not in anyway like the life that the masters live. In other words, in the eyes of slave masters are 'evil' and they (slaves) are suffering, if they are good. According to Nietzsche slaves suffer because they are inherently weak, and it is simply a biological fact that some humans are much weaker than others, either by nature or as a result of unfortunate circumstances. Humans can bear suffering, but what they cannot hear is seemingly senseless suffering, and this is what the slaves' suffering is. It has no meaning, it is a mere brute fact. It is a priestly statement that "you slaves are suffering, because you are evil". The sick, suffering slaves become 'sinners'. Since 'evil' designates the kind of intense vitality the masters exhibit in their lives, the way to escape it is to engage in a progressive spiral of forms of life-abnegation and self-denial. In the long run, this therapy makes the original disease the suffering that results from human weakness—worse. In the short run of two thousand years or so, it has mobilized what energy the slaves command in the service of creating what we know as western culture.

The Fate of Bad Conscience : In the second essay of the present book Nietzsche develops about the origins and emergence of feelings and debt, i.e., personal obligation. According to Nietzsche human mind denotes a being that values, measures and weighs. The faculty of human mind is thinking which has been developed through the process of inferring, calculating, weighing and anticipating. In this process human mind also develops the moral principle of 'guilt' descending from the material concept of 'debts'. Both concepts 'guilt' and 'debts' lie in the sphere of legal obligations, where man finds the breeding-ground of the "moral conceptual world" of guilt, conscience and duty.

The second essay starts with the paradoxial task of nature, namely, that of breeding an animal that is sanctioned to promise and so exist as a creature of time, a creature that can remember the past and anticipate the future, a creature that can in the present bind its own will relative to the future in the certain knowledge that it will in the future effectively remember that its will has been bound. For this cultivation of effective memory and imagination to be

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

successful, culture needs to work against the active force of forgetting, which serves an important physiological function. The exercise of a memory of the will supposes that the human animal can make a distinction between what happens by accident and what happens by design or intention. It also presupposes an ability to think causally about an anticipated future. The successful cultivation of an animal sanctioned to promise requires a labour by which man is made into something "regular, reliable, and uniform". This is, as Nietzsche terms, "the morality of custom" and "the social strait jacket". The disciplining of the human animal into an agent that has a sense of 'responsibility' for its words and deeds has not taken place through gentle methods, but through the harsh and cruel measures of coercion and punishment. According to Nietzsche, "Each step on earth, even the smallest, was in the past a struggle that was won with spiritual and physical torment."[17] The problem for culture is that it has to deal with an animal that is partly dull, that has an inattentive mind and a strong propensity to active forgetfulness. In most societies and ages this problem has not been solved by gentle methods. In Nietzsche's view, without blood, torture and sacrifice, including "disgusting mutilations" would never have arisen. All these terms are used in modern psychology, as Nietzsche thinks and opines that at bottom all religions are systems of cruelty, and blood and horror lie at the basis of all "good things". In a certain sense it is possible to locate the whole of asceticism in this sphere of torment. "A few ideas have to be made ineradicable, unforgettable and fixed in order to hypnotize the whole nervous and intellectual system through these 'fixed ideas'.[18]

The fruit of this "labour of culture" performed on man in the prehistorical period is the 'sovereign' individual who is master of a strong and durable 'will', a will that can make and keep promises. On this account freedom of the will is an achievement of culture and operates in the context of specific material practices and social relations. It is supra-ethical, as Nietzsche views, because it has gone beyond the level of custom. The period of the morality of custom predates what we call 'world history' and is to be regarded as the

17. Ibid, III, Section 9.
18. Ibid, II, Section 3

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"decisive historical period" which has determined the character of man. The sovereign individual is the kind of self-regulating animal that is required for the essential functions of culture, for example, well-functioning creditor debtor relations. Here the question of bad conscience can be raised. Nietzsche develops his theory on the origin of bad conscience as a "serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of all change which he experienced."[19] This change refers to the establishment of society and peace and their confining spaces, which brings with it a suspension and devaluation of the instincts. Human beings walk as if a "terrible heaviness" bears down on them. In this new scenario the old animal instincts, such as animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of changing and destroying, do not cease to make their demands, but have to find new and underground satisfactions. Through internalization, in which no longer dischargeable instincts turn inward, comes the invention of what is popularly called the human 'soul'. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and granted depth, breath and height inproportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed. This is, in view of Nietzsche, the origin of "bad conscience".

According to Nietzsche, the bad conscience is the most insidious illness that has come into being and from which man has yet to recover, his sickness of himself. As well as the "prospect of an animal and turning against itself" is an event, and a spectacle too interesting "to be played senselessly unobserved on some ridiculous planet". Furthermore, the bad conscience contributes to the appearance of an animal on earth that "arouses interest, tension, hope", as if through it "something were being prepared, as though man were not an end but just a path, an episode, a bridge, a great promise".[20] The bad conscience is not simply to be looked upon indisparaging terms, thought it represents a painful and ugly growth. Indeed Nietzsche talks of the "active bad conscience." It can be regarded as the true womb of ideal and imaginative events. Through it an abundance of disconcerting beauty and affirmation has been brought to light. In the course of history the illness of bad

19. Ibid, II, Section 16
20. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

conscience reached a terrible and sublime peak. In prehistory the basic creditor-debtor relationship that informs human social and economic activity also finds expression in religious rites and worship. For example, the way a tribal community expresses thanks to earlier generations. Over time the ancestor is turned into a god and associated with the feeling of fear, the birth of superstition.

Sin and the Ascetic Ideal : The sense of 'guilt' has evolved through several momentous and fateful events in history. In the earliest societies a person is held answerable for his deeds and obliged to honour his debts. In the course of history this material sense of obligation is increasingly subject to moralization, reaching it summit with guilt before the christian God. Nietzsche in his third essay introduces the "ascetic priest". In the first essay he introduces the priests as the 'masters', ruling class of the society. "Masters" distinguishes themselves from the "other masters" by an extreme concern for purity.[21] Originally, this concern is the superiority of the master-caste as a whole over the slaves. The priests are masters and thus can afford to wash, wear clean clothes, avoid certain malodorous or unhealthy foods etc. Slaves have no such luxury. However, priestly purity has a dangerous tendency to develop into more and more extreme, and more and more internalized forms. Priests become expert in asceticism and dealing with all forms of human suffering. It is in the hands of the priest, an artist in feelings of guilt. That guilt assumes form and shape, as Neitzsche says, "Sin"—for that is the name for the priestly reinterpretation of the animal "bad conscience"—has been the greatest event in the history of the sick soul uptill now. With sin we have the most dangerous and disastrous trick of "religious intepretation."[22] The value of the priestly type of existence, in the eyes of Nietzsche, lies in the fact that it succeeds in changing the direction of "ressentiment".[23]

In the 'healing instinct of life' operates through the priest, in which ideas of guilt, sin, damnation, and so on, serve 'to make the sick harmless to a degree'. As well, the instincts of the sufferer are exploited 'for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and

21. Ibid, I, p. 6–7.
22. Ibid, III, Section–20
23. Ibid, Section 15

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

self-overcoming.[24] The priests' remedy for human suffering is the ascetic ideal, the ideal of a human will turned utterly against itself or self-abnegation for its own sake. Such an ideal seems to express a self-contradiction in as much as we seem to encounter with it life operating against life. Physiologically and psychologically this view, according to Nietzsche, is nonsense. He suggests that-the self contradiction turns out to be only apparent, it is a psychological misunderstanding of something, the real nature of which was far from being understood". In his view the ascetic ideal has its source or origins in "the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life." The ideal indicates a partial physiological exhaustion, in the face of which the "deepest instincts" of life, which have remained intact, continually struggle with new method and inventions. The interpretation of suffering developed by the ascetic ideal for a longtime now has succeeded in shutting the door on a suicidal nihilism by giving humanity a goal, and that is morality.

Schopenhaur's conception of "will to live"

Schopenhaur accepts the Kant's view of phenomena : the world of experience is a world of phenomena, conditioned by the nature of human intelligence. The mind has its forms of perceiving-space and time-and its categories of knowing, this assertion of Kant has been rectified by Schopenhaur. Kant proposed twelve categories of knowing, but Schopenhaur reduces them into one (single) category of causality. Being the world is apart from intelligence, we donot know and can never know, in the sense of in which we know phenomena. It is the great unknown, the noumena of which the perceived world is the phenomenon. We do not come face to face with the thing-in-itself in an intellectual intuititon. Therefore we can know nothing of it except that it exists. The forms of the mind, space, time, causality and the rest are inapplicable to it. According to Schopenhaur, "it is true, if I were merely an intellectual being, an outward-looking subject, I should perceive nothing but phenomena arranged in space and time, and in causal relation. In my own innermost consciousness, however, I come face to face with my true, real, basal self; in the consciousness of activity I become aware of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is 'will'. It is the primary, timeless,

24. Ibid, Section 16

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

spaceless, uncaused activity that expresses itself in me as impulse, instinct, striving, craving, yearning. I also become aware of myself as a phenomenon, as a part of nature I image myself as an extended organic body. I know myself in two ways : as will and as body. But it is the one will which, in self-consciousness, appears as the consciousness of activity and, in perception, as my material body. The will is my real self, the body the expression of the will."

Thus, Schopenhaur interprets all things in analogy with his conception of the human being : the world is will and idea, idea to the intellect, but in reality will. "When I look inward, I come face to face with will. When I look outward, I perceive this will of mine as body. My will objectifies itself as body, expresses itself as a living organism." Therefore, we can say that other bodies are analogically, as good as mine, the outward manifestations of will. In the stone will manifests itself as blind force. In man it becomes conscious of itself. The magnetic needle always points to the north, bodies always fall in a vertical line. Substances form crystals when acted on by other substances. All such occurrances give evidence of the operation of forces in nature which are akin to the will in us. In the vegetable kingdom we too discover traces of unconscious striving or impulse. The tree desires light and strives upward. It also wants moisture and pushes its roots into the soil. Will or impulse guides the growth of the animal and directs all its activities. The wild beast desiring to devour prey develops teeth and claws and muscles. The will creates for itself an organism suitable to its needs; function preceeds organization. The desire to but is the cause of appearance of the horns. The will, therefore, is the basal principle of life.

The will, the primitive impulse, becomes consciousness in man and the higher animals. It creates intelligence as its organ or instrument. Intelligence is the lamp that illuminates the will's way through the world. The will makes for itself a brain which is the seat of intelligence. Intelligence and consciousness are functions of the brain. On the lower stages of existence the will is blind craving. It works blindly, without consciousness. In man it becomes conscious. Intelligence is grafted on the will and becomes the greatest of all instruments of self-preservation. But it always remains in the service of the will. Will is the master and intellect is the servant. Will controls perception, memory, imagination, judgement, and

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

reasoning. We perceive, remember, imagine what we will to perceive remember and imagine. Our arguments are always pleas of the will. As we pass downward in the scale of existence from man to the mineral, we observe intelligence falling into the background; but the will remains as the one, constant, persistent element. In the child and the savage impulse predominates over intelligence. In the animal kingdom instinct gradually becomes unconscious. In the planet it is unconscious. In the mineral all trace of intelligence disappears. This basal will, which manifests in mineral and in man, is not a person, also not an intelligent God. It is a blind unconscious force that wills existence. It is neither spatial nor temporal. However, it expresses itself in individuals in space and time. It means that the will acts in such a way that our mind perceives it in individual, i.e., spatial and temporal form. It manifests in eternal, immutable types. The different organic species are eternal immutable types, because they donot change. The individuals belonging to the species grow and die, but the will-type or the species endures. These types form an ascending scale, a graduated series, rising from the lowest stages of matter to man. Individuals may come and individuals may go, but will goes on forever. Hence, the fundamental part of us, the will, is immortal, the particular, individual form in which it expresses itself is mortal. Therefore, suicide means the destruction of a particular expression of the will, but not of the will itself.

The will to be, the will to live, is the cause of all struggle, sorrow and evil in the world. A world of ceaseless striving and battle in which the different forms of the blind will to exist struggle with one another. A world in which the little fishes are devoured by the larger ones is not a good world but an evil one, indeed the worst of all possible worlds. This is the pessimism of Schopenhaur. The human life is not worthliving, because it is full of misery. It follows from the very nature of the human will that it should be full of pain and misery. Life consists of blind craving, which is painful so long as it is not satisfied, and which when satisfied is followed by new painful desires, and so on. So, we are never permanently satisfied. There is a worm in every flower. We are like shipwrecked mariners who struggle and struggle to save their wearied bodies from the terrible waves, only to be engulfed at last. The life of most men is but a

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

continuous struggle for existence, a struggle which they are bound to lose at last. Every breath we draw is a protest against the death which is constantly threatening us, and against which we are battling every second. But Death must conquer after all, for we are his by birth, and he simply plays with his prey a little while longer before devouring it. However, we take great pains to prolong our lives as far as we can, just as we blow soap-bubbles as long and as large as we can, though we know with absolute certainty that they must break at last.

The life of most men is weary yearning and torture, a dreamy tottering through the four ages toward death accompanied by a succession of trivial thoughts. It is like a clock-work that is wound up and goes without knowing why, and everytime a man is conceived and born, the clock of human life is wound up a new, in order to grind out the same old hackneyed tune which it has played so many countless times before, measure for measure, beat for beat, with insignificant variations. Since life is selfish and base and it follows from the very nature of the will that it should be so, it (life) is evil. The progress of knowledge and civilization does not mend matters, it simply brings with it new needs and with them, new sufferings and new forms of selfishness and immorality. The socalled virtues, love of labor, perserverance, temperance, frugality, are merely a refined egoism. In much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. History is an interminable series of murders, robberies, intrigues, and lies; if you know one page of it, you know them all. Sympathy or pity is the basis and standard of morality according to Schopenhaur, and the race is wicked because it is selfish. To be good, an act must be prompted by pure sympathy. If the motive is my own welfare, the act has no moral worth at all. If the motive is the harm of others, it is wicked. The empirical character of man is wholly determined, but the fact of remorse suggests that the will is free. Therefore my will must be ultimately responsible for my character. The intelligible ego has fashioned the empirical ego. Since the selfish will is the root of all evil and the source of all sorrow, Schopenhaur suggests, human beings must negate the will, suppress his selfish desires, in order to enjoy happiness and peace. The philosophical or artistic genius may be delivered from the selfish will, forget himself, lose himself in

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

philosophical thought or artistic contemplation, a method that affords only temporary relief, though it offers a foretaste of deliverance. The individual can also free himself from his selfish will by contemplating the wickedness of the world, the futility of all desire, and the illusoriness of individual existence. If he will think of these things and remember that all individuals are one in essence, that they are all manifestations of the same primal will. He will feel sympathy or pity with all creation. He will see himself in others and feel the sorrows of others as his own. This is the moral way, but it likewise furnishes only temporary relief. The best way is total negation of the will in an ascetic life. Resignation and Willlessness ensure, the will is dead. The saint finds deliverance from his own will, from the impulses which bind the human beings to the world. The will dies as soon as it becomes aware of what it is through the knowledge of life, the road to which is suffering. It is the pessimistic approach of Schopenhaur which root is the will to live.

Richard Mckay Rorty (1931-2007)

Richard Mckay Rorty was an important American philosopher of the late twentieth century and early twenty first century. He was born in New York city on the 4th October, 1931. He obtained his education from the university of Chicago and also from the Yale University. He had strong interest in both the History of Philosophy and Comparative Analytic Philosophy. So he trained in both the scheme of philosophy. In the early period of his learning in philosophy, he developed interest in pragmatism, particularly pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey who influenced very much on Rorty. However, he did not follow pragmatism in toto, but he critically analysed pragmatism and then accepted it in new form. So his pragmatism is called as "Neopragmatism" or "The New Pragmatism". He was not only influenced by Dewey but also by Michael Foucault, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger too. So, his pragmatic ideas of philosophy turned to the comparative study of analytical philosophy. In fact, his later ideas belonged to contemporary analytical faculty of philosophical thought. He was the Emeritus Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at the Standford University of America. He also worked at Princeton University where his tenure was long. He died on 8th June, 2007 at Palo Alto of California. He authored many books on literature and

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

philosophy. His most important works on Philosophy are "Consequences of Pragmatism : Essays 1972-80" published in 1982, "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" published in 1979, "Philosophy, and Social Hope" published in 1999, "Objectivity, Relativism and Truth" published in 1991, "The Linguistic Trends" published in 1967, "The Future of Religion" published in 2002, and "Philosophy as cultural politics", 2007.

Though Rorty was the campanion of neopragmatism, his philosophical thought has also a tendency of postmodernism. In fact his thought on contemporary analytic philosophy is an example of his postmodernism. It is the feature of postmodernism that it criticizes all the theories previously established. It is the case with Richard M. Rorty too. He also criticized Kant's critical philosophy and established the function of philosophy in the light of analytical philosophy. To understand his postmodernistic view on philosophy we can classify his philosophical thought as such :

(a) Critique of Representationalism

(b) Against Epistemological Method

(c) Edifying Philosophy

Critique of Representationalism

Etymologically Representationalism means the theory of representation. Representation in the field of philosophy means ideas belong to different schools. Rorty called Kant as a representative thinker who tried to reconcile two different representative school of ideas, namely empiricism and rationalism. Generally the reconcilation between empiricism and rationalism is called as "Criticism". But Rorty terms it as "Representationalism". Kant criticized both epistemological theories, i.e., empiricism and rationalism. These theories discuss the source of knowledge. According to empiricism knowledge is gained by the human experience. Locke said that human mind is tabula raza, the clean slate. It is inactive. But when a man perceives a thing, his mind becomes active. A man perceives the simple and scattered ideas of the thing. Human mind starts to unite all these scattered simple ideas and makes it complex. After these complex ideas, a man knows the perceived things what they are. So, a man gains new knowledge perceived things what they are. So, a man gains new knowledge

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

about the thing. But rationalism doesnot accept this view of empiricism. According to it there is no new knowledge about any thing, because "ideas are inherent in intellect previously." It means that human mind has inborn ideas. So, the source of knowledge is reason, not perception. Reason-based knowledge has no novelty, or newness in knowledge. Empricism yields new knowledge, so its truth or validity is possible. A Crow is black—we use to perceive it daily. But it is not necessary that after many many years in future we will perceive the crow as black, it may be that our perception shows the white crow. Therefore the truth of knowledge gained by perception or experience is possible. There is no necessity in knowledge, but in rationalism knowledge is certain and essential. However, rationalism does not give new knowledge, because all knowledge are inborn or innate.

Kant pointed the weakness of both empricism and rationalism. According to him, knowledge must be certain, necessary and novel. It is the fusion of subject and object. So Kant took the merits of both theories and reconciled them. After criticizing empiricism and rationalism Kant established his own view on knowledge, therefore its views about knowledge is called as "Criticism". But Rorty's view is different. According to him Kant was not dogmatist (rationalist) nor empiricist but 'indifferentist'. To indifferentists 'all paths have been tried in vain'. Kant did not bring about perpetual philosophical peace, also not formented the analytic or continental division. In his book "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature", Rorty suggests that "Kant's characterization of the history of philosophy as a struggle between those who would reduce concepts to intuitions and those who would reduce intuitions to concepts only makes sense if one is already convinced that human cognition consists of a synthesis of two different kinds of representations. But since Kant acknowledges that we have no direct awareness of pre-schematized intuitions, the very distinction between intuitions and concepts is merely theoretical and thus optional."[25] This statement of Rorty shows that Kant did not succeed to reconcile between empiricism and rationalism. The result of struggle between empiricism and rationalism is to reduce perception into reason and reason into perception. Rorty uses the terms "concepts" and "intuitions" in stead

25. Richard M. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, P. 154

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

of perception and reason respectively. In my view, Rorty's use of terms as concepts and intuition is absolutely correct. In fact, we receive concepts of a thing by sense-perception, but by reason we have intuitions of a thing in our mind. Both concepts and intuitions present in human mind. Thus the reconcilation between perception and ideas is futile. That is why Rorty says the Kant's attempt to reconcile between empiricism and rationalism as only "theoretical and optional." We can think about the reconcilation between the two theories and also think that it is true. It is our optional view. But in the practical level it never comes to be true. Because the reconcilation between the two opponent theories is based on the degree of certainty of truth and novelty. Rorty remarks that the dispute between empiricism and rationalism raised by Kant is not as a conflict between rival reductionist strategies but as a disagreement about whether judgements about "secondary qualities" (i.e. empirical judgements) could be reduced to judgments about "primary qualities" (i.e. judgments that seems to depend upon reason alone). In his own words, "Had Kant instead said that the rationalists wanted to find a way of replacing propositions about secondary qualities with propositions which somehow did the same job but were known with certainty, and that the empiricists opposed this project, the next two centuries of philosophical thought might have been very different."[26]

It is clear that Kant's reconcilation between two representative theories, in Rorty's view, is not successful, because the rift between these two theories would never come to end. So Rorty suggests that "if Kant had said that the empiricist and rationalist debate was not about "putative components of propositions" but about "the degree of certainty attaching to them," the analytic and continental rift might never have opened up."[27] This suggestion of Rorty draws the conclusion that "Instead of distinguishing between two different ways in which intuitions and concepts can be related to each other- a more pragmatically minded Kant would have contrasted the act of describing things in a conventional vocabulary with the creative effort to articulate a new vocabulary."[28] Difference between

26. Ibid, P. 148
27. Ibid, P. 149
28. Andrew Cutrofello, Ibid, P. 15

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

conventional vocabulary and new one is the difference between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophy respectively as Rorty claims. Thus, the critique of Representationalism in Rorty's philosophy leads to two different kinds of philosophy—systematic and edifying which have been discussed in the following pages.

AGAINST EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHOD

In the systematic philosophy we find the useful description of the world. Through this description we know the real nature of the world and for the purpose we use to adopt the source of knowledge, i.e., sense-perception and reason. With the sense-perception we come to the conclusion that the world is real, it is natural and material. But with the reason we come to the conclusion that the world is non-material, non-natural but only idea. Thus the source of knowledge concludes itself into two metaphysical theories : Materialism and Idealism. Rorty disbelieves in these theories. In other words, Rorty refutes both metaphysical and epistomological theories mentioned above. According to him, system building in philosophy is an unwarranted obsession that dominated the philosophical scenario ever since the time of Descartes. The system builders or the systematic philosophers opine that any system of epistemology is a gradual and continuous process that rests on certain firm foundations that are highly indubitable. The Western classical tradition starting from Descartes to Kant is a testimony to this fact. Rorty doesnot accept this foundationalist view. His anti-foundationalist view is that instead of system building or systematic philosophy based on certain predetermined and supposedly indubitable foundations, philosophers must try to build their respective world-views by taking man, society, ethmic community as a whole into consideration as well, the most important aspect to be considered is human solidarity.

According to Rorty the history of modern philosophy is nothing but the history of rise and fall of the prized discipline called epistemology. Philosophy as epistemology because well fixed by the end of the nineteenth century. During this period the first task of philosophy is to resolve epistemological issues before any progress can be made with other problems and areas in philosophy. Rorty claims that the historical reconstruction of epistemology is basically

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Kantian in its perspective. According to Kant concepts and percepts together produce knowledge. Rorty opines that the "rational reconstruction" of our knowledge consists in the distinction between what is "given" and what is "added" by our mind. The analytical philosophers, like Wilfred Sellars and W. V. Quine, disapproved and refuted this distinction. They argued that we understand knowledge only when we understand the social justification of belief. Thus, we do not have any reason to view knowledge as an accurate representation of something or the other. The aim of both sellars and Quine is to lead us to a holistic view of knowledge. Rorty terms this view of sellars and Quine as "epistemological behaviourism". According to him explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by former is the essence of epistemological behaviourism. Rorty inherits this view from Dewey and later Wittgenstein. This sort of behaviourism is a species of holism, which is bereft of idealistic or metaphysical presuppositions.[29] Rorty warns that advocating epistemological behaviourism is not to advocate a new subtle epistemological position, but to abandon epistemology as an independent and isolated enterprise. A holistic approach to knowledge is not a matter of anti-foundationalist polemic, but a distrust in the whole epistemological enterprise. The charge against epistemological behaviourism and holism is that they abandon objectivity, truth and the growth of knowledge. Rorty dismisses this charge by holding that "to say that truth and knowledge can only be judged by the standards of the inquirers of our own day is not to say that human knowledge is less noble or important or more "cut off from the world' than justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence."[30]

Rorty attacks those philosophers who envisage that epistemology can be salvaged by reformulating the relevant issues in logically perfect philosophy of language or empirical psychology. Rorty argues that neither of them helps us in resolving the epistemological problems. It is only a desperate attempt to save analytic philosophy. Rorty employs the method of deconstruction in

29. Ibid, P. 174
30. Ibid, P. 178

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

order to project a new perspective as against the old. His reinterpretation of the doctrines of historicism, skepticism, relativism, and nihilism vindicates this point. If historicism is meant that history is the foundational discipline that the explanations that philosphers seek can only be found in the study of history or that there are laws of history that enable us to predict the future course of events. In this sense Rorty is not a historicist. He argues that there is no foundational discipline at all. Similarly He refutes skepticism, particularly extreme skepticism. Nowhere this kind of skepticism is found. Even in Wittgenstein's book "On Certainty" skepticism has been ridiculed. Like later Wittgenstein Rorty mainatins that skepticism must provide adequate grounds for suspecting the very foundations of history, foundations of knowledge, language or philosophy. Such a form of skepticism serves as a permanent neutral framework for evaluating all claims to knowledge.

Rorty also attempts to show the inconsistencies found in relativism and nihilism. If relativism is understood as a doctrine according to which there is no truth, objectivity and standards for judging better and worse arguments or moral positions, then Rorty does not subscribe to such a form of relativism. According to him, relativism as "epistemological behaviourism" enables us to justify our claims to knowledge or truth by appealing to those social practices that have been hammered out in the course of human society. These are the forms of inquiry within which we distinguish truth from falsity and objectivity from idiosyncrasy. To Rorty, nihilism is a thesis which claims that whether it is knowledge or morals, anything is just as good or as true as anything else. Thus it fails to distinguish good from bad and truth from falsity. Rorty doesnot accept this claim of nihilism. In his view nihilism liberates from the illusion that there is something to which we can always appeal. There is, as Rorty views, nothing that has universal assent. Every moral decision is voluntary and there is no binding on moral agents to accept a particular moral will. In fact, nihilism provides individuals with moral freedom and independent decision-making.

Commensurability is normally understood as an effort, as Rorty claims, "to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be searched what would settle the issue on

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

every point where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an ideal situation, in which all residual disagreements will be seen to be "non-cognitive" or merely verbal or else merely temporary-capable of being resolved by doing something further."[31] Rorty believes that such a quest for commensuration is the trait of epistemology. Philosophy identifies itself with epistemology, and has a tendency to block the road by putting itself forward as the final commensurating vocabulary for all possible rational discourse. In Rorty's views hermeneutics is not a name of the new method or discipline or an alternative way of arriving at commensuration, but a struggle against the assumption that all contributions to culture are commensurable. For a hermeneutic interlotor, as Rorty views, cluvility (societies) is very important whereas to an epistemologist thinking in terms of universal (universitas) is very essential. The history of philosophy, as Rorty says, is consisting of periods of "normal discourse" where there is an agreement about problems, procedures, and the "correct" way of finding solutions. It is followed by periods of abnormal discourse in which strange and new ways of speaking and writing appear. Rorty criticizes the distinction between "normal" and 'abnormal' discourse. According to him epistemology thrives during the periods of "normal" discourse, because these are the times when there is agreement. This gives legitimacy to philosophy as if all discourse might be commensurable and philosophy might be able to clarify the rules of commensuration. But there is always a danger of confusing that the domain in which such stability has been achieved is the measure of all other domains. By introducing such bland distinctions as the "normal" and the "abnormal" or the "familiar" and the "unfamiliar", Rorty deliberately makes us aware of how "relative" these distinctions are to the changing scene of culture.

The hope that one can formulate the right conceptions of reason, of science, of knowledge and of morality, which express their essences drove Kant to make philosophy more formal, systematic, rigorous and professional. Pragmatists tell us that this is a vain attempt to establish the Socratic virtues such as willingness to talk, to listen to others, to weigh consequences of our actions upon others are simply moral virtues. They can neither be inculculated nor

31. Ibid, P. 326

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

forfeited by theoretical research into essence. According to pragmatists our moral duty is to continue with the project of conversation. It has no metaphysical or epistemological guarantee of success. We are not conversing because we have a goal, but because Socratic art of conversing is an activity that has its own end. We, in the view of Rorty, cannot substitute the notion of "conversation" with that of "reason". Rorty attempts to deconstruct the very notion of "reason" as used in the Platonic and the Kantian traditions. The term "reason" in these traditions interlocked with the notions of "truth as correspondence", of "knowledge as discovery of essence", of "morality as obedience to principle."

Edifying Philosophy

Rorty shows the two-faced of philosophy or epistemology. One is foundationalist philosophy and other is ironist philosophy. Foundationalist philosophy is systematic, whereas ironist philosophy is edifying. In his book "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity" Rorty highlights the role that irony plays within edifying discourses. An ironist is someone who refuses to accept any "final vocabulary" as absolute. The systematic or foundationalist philosophy have a certain and definite view about world and its nature. According to this philosophy world is either created by the supreme and Absolute Reality i.e. God or substance or idea or is evoluted by the Supreme reality i.e. matter or atom or energy. But ironist philosophy are always ready to challenge this view of systematic or foundationalist philosophy. In Rorty's words "ironists are always prepared to challenge the idiom that they presently use."[32] According to Rorty ironist philosophers seek to recreate themselves by inventing new vocabularies like the Romantics who wanted to make their lives works of art.

Neitzsche, Heideggar, Foucault and Derrida are ironists in the eyes of Rorty. All these philosophers aim not at truth, as their analytic or systematic counterparts. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitze etc. by using rational method reached the truth. Locke, Berkely, Hume etc. by using empirical method reached the truth. Kant synthesized both the methods and attempted to reach the truth which is unknown and unknowable i.e., noumena. But all the ironist

32. Rorty, contingency, Irony and Solidarity, P. 73

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

philosophers mentioned in the above line, criticized this view of systematic philosophers. In fact, they are trying to diconstruct the classical or foundationalist theories of truth, and accept the theory of selftransformation. Selftransformation means to transform our inner self. In other words, a man must accept the challenge of the present days's circumstances and attempt to win these circumstances. It is possible, when we transform ourselves according to circumstances. As cutrofello says, selftransformation is an exemplary activity provided that it remains within its proper bound.[33]

According to Rorty selftransformation is limited to one's own thinking. A person doesnot follow what has established, but he wants to think for a new discovery, new establishment. Therefore in edifying philosophy we cannot find a systematic and organise theories. In fact the edifying philosophers like Nietzsche, Derrida etc. has established a new theory called deconstruction. The theory of deconstruction mentions that no word has its definite meaning, but the meaning of words differs time to time in accordance with the circumstances or uses of the word. So, ironist or edifying philosophers' thought varies in accordance with their own interpretation. Therefore Rorty argues that an individual's efforts at self-creation should be carried out in such a way that they do not interfere with anyone else.[34] It implies that there is a classical liberal distinction between what one does in private and what one does in public. In real sense irony or edifying philosophy has its proper place in private, not in public. In public what we need is a sense of solidarity which reflects our shared commitment to a particular way of describing ourselves and the world around us. For this, systematic philosophers are more helpful than ironists. Edifying philosophers or the ironists have nothing contribute to the public domain, because they are useless. "Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to form a private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics."[35] It is the observation of Rorty about edifying philosophers. He also mentions

33. Andrew Cutrofello, Ibid, P. 16
34. Ibid
35. Rorty, Ibid, P. 83

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

that "Anti-liberalism of Nietzsche who often speaks as though he had a social mission, as if he had views relevant to public action."[36] Though Nietzsche's antiliberalism should be rejected, it is separable from his aesthetic conception of "self-knowledge-self-creation". Self-overcoming is a merely private affair that has nothing to do with participation in the public domain. For Nietzsche and other ironists there is nothing more powerful or important than self-redescription. Rorty distinguishes between two Nietzsches—the perspectivalist and the theorist of the will to power. The perspectivalist is such who wants to give himself a unique perspective on the world.

Though Rorty distinguishes the characteristics of edyfing philosophy from that of the systematic philosophy, he claims that both have complementary roles to play in a liberal society. According to him a liberal society is consisted of a harmonious amalgam of persons who peacefully pursue their individual interests. Their preferences for specific interests are determined by the public institutions of these societies, such as free elections, free media, free universities etc. These institutions also guarantee that their members pursue their plurality of goals in a tolerant and unhindered manner. Thus, freedom, equality, tolerance and plurality are values that are actively operative in liberal society. The divide between the public sphere and the private sphere cannot be reconciled only because plurality needs to be preserved without coercion. Thus, tolerance, equality and respect for autonomy and its resultant plurality are all virtues that find a place in the public sphere. The private sphere accords primary to the virtue of freedom for self-creation. It is clear, in Rorty's view, that in a liberal society both edifying and systematic philosophy have their own significance. Therefore Rorty says that edifying philosophers like Nietzsche, Derrida etc. have not thought of themselves as merely seeking private grandeur at all, on the contrary, their principal claim has been on the public realm itself.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906)

Emmanuel Levinas was born in 1906 in Lithuania. His parents who migrated to France were jewish. So, heirarcally he is also

36. Ibid, P. 99

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

jewish. But being an inhabitant of France, he is french. He studied under the guidance of Husserl and Heidegger at Freiburg. Husserl is a phenomenologist. Heidegger is an existentialist. So, Levinas was influenced by both the philosophy of phenomenology and existentialism. But he criticized both phenomenology and existentialism; and made his own thinking about philosophy. His own philosophy developed between 1950's and early 1960's. According to his philosophy, metaphysics is not the philosophy but ethics. To establish ethical relationship with the other is the primary task of philosophy. Sartre, Derrida etc. were influenced by this view of Levinas very much.

In 1961 his first book entitled "Totality and Infinity" is published. His second major book entitled "otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence" in 1974. In addition to these two major books, Levinas is also the author of "The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's phenomenology" published in 1930 and "Existence and Existents' published in 1947. He taught at different places like university of Paris and from 1973 to 1979 at the University of Sorbonne from where he retired in 1979.

The centre theme of Levinas' philosophy is the ethical responsibility to the 'other'. So his philosophical thought has been termed as "ethics of alterity" by Andrew Cutrofello.[37] But Levinas himself calls his philosophy as ethics of responsibility. To him ethics of responsibility is the first philosophy.[38] According to him the ethical relation of responsibility is not an ethical instance that he takes in the existential context that is already his but instead continues the first philosophy, replacing ontology, as that which is "otherwise than being" because it is better than being"[39] Being is related to metaphysics or ontology. But the first philosophy doesnot deal with being but the responsibility towards others, and it is the subject matter of Ethics. Therefore, Levinas terms Ethics as better than Ontology. But before to reach this assertion, Levinas criticizes the phenomenological idea of Husserl and the existential view of Heidegger.

37. Andrew Cutrofello, Continent Philosophy a contemporary introduction, P. 158
38. Sean Hand (Editor), The Levinas Reader, P. 77
39. Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the other, P. 3

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Ethics As First Philosophy

Levinas' conception of first philosophy has been drawn by the critical assessment of Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl's phenomenology deals with the method by which it analyses the consciousness inherent in human beings. Heidegger's existentialism deals with the existence of human beings. So, existence and consciousness is the major problem in these two thinkers thought. But these problems are not new. Descartes' philosophy has also dealt with these two problems. To Descartes both consciousness and existence belong to "I". This "I" is nothing but a metaphysical or ontological entity. This entity is of no value in the human society, if it doesnot relate to another "I". In Descartes' philosophy "I" is absolute. Absolute "I" has no relation of "others" who also live in the society. So, Levinas says that the concept of Reality as "I" or together consciousness and existence is null and void, if doesnot relate to the "Others". Relation of "others" means the social responsibility to others, and it is only the core subject of Ethics. So, Philosophy starts with Ethics. In Levinas' words, "Ethics is the infinite obligations and responsibilities of social life. Ontology, that is, the intelligibility of being—only becomes possible when Ethics, the origin of all meaning, is taken as starting point."[40]

Phenomenology, as Levinas observed, is a metaphysical exteriority, because Husserl tried to found intersubjectivity in the subject's relationship to an "alter ego". But Levinas says that the subject, being windowless, has no immediate intuition of an alter ego. Hence it is still represented as another "me" rather than as that which escapes the order of egoity in general. Thus, in the view of Levinas Husserl did not succeed to get rid of traditional philosophy, i.e., metaphysics or ontology. Similarly, Heidegger is also unsuccessful to get rid of metaphysics. Levinas has initially sympathy with Heidegger's conception of care as the fundamental mode of Dasein's being-in-the world. But he finds Heidegger's conception of being-with (Mitsein) to be woefully inadequate, because it characterizes the relation to the other as always already belonging to the order of being. This kind of relation is found in ontology itself. It implies that Heidegger, by remaining within the

40. Ibid, Also, Sean Hand (Editor), Ibid, P. 231

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

horizon of the question of being, reduces the ethical relation to a coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other, a neutral intersubjectivity. Therefore Levinas blames Heidegger for forgetting the metaphysical question of good. In fact, Ethics is the first philosophy, not ontology or metaphysics.

According to Levinas the principal error of naturalism is to equate "the existence and the conditions of existence of the physical world with existence and the conditions of existence in general." Here there are three terms—existence, conditions of existence of the physical world, and the conditions of existence in general. All these terms have been identical in naturalistic ontology which Husserl doesnot accept. In view of Husserl "to exist doesnot mean the same thing in every region.' Levinas accepts Husserl's this view, but he also found lacuna in it. He points out the failure of Husserl in recognising that some intentional objects are not subject to objectifying acts of consciousness. This is called "doxic theses". Husserl maintains that every act is subject to doxic modification. Even then he privileges a particular kind of intentionality, i.e., judging and knowing. Both intentionality (judging and knowing) belong to the subject only. Therefore Levinas says like Heidegger, that practical and axiological attitudes of caring and valuing have a unique structure that Husserl did not manage to elucidate. In other words, it can be said that "Levinas characterizes the ethical relation not as an intentional relation to a unique region of being but rather as a relation to that which is beyond being."[41] In the words of Levinas "The movement which leads an existent toward the Good is not a transcendence by which that existent raises itself up to a higher existence, but a departure from Being, an ex-cedence."[42] These words of Levinas also indicate that he doesnot accept ontology as first philosophy. To assert his own principle, he further criticizes Heidegger's concept of nothingness and death. According to Heidegger the "there is" (il y a) has such a complete hold on us that we cannot take nothingness and death lightly, and we tremble before them. What horrifies is not nothingness but the haunting spectre, the phantom." The horror of "there is" (il y a) concerns the threat of an "anonymous existence". What cannot disappear, the

41. Andrew Cutrofello, Ibid, P. 159
42. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, P. xxvii

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

sheer fact of being in which one participates. But, for Levinas, the 'there is'—"the absence of the world, the elemental"—pertains to a condition that terminates in "hypostasis", the event by which the subject is constituted as a subject, thereby putting an end to its impersonality. To give an account of hypostasis it is necessary to go beyond mere phenomenological description, for phenomena only appear as such after hypostasis, that is, after the ego has already taken a "position" within the world—"A method is called for such that thought is invited to go beyond intuition."[43] Similarly, the relation to the other escapes phenomenological thematization—"Neither the category of quantity nor even that of quality describes the alterity of the other, who doesnot simply have another quality than me, but as it were bears alterity as a quality."[44]

Heidegger conceived, as Levinas claims, of intersubjectivity as a kind of "communion" in which the other was reduced to the order of "the solitary subject" who had to face death alone. Against this view Levinas argues that death represents the limit of possibility not in the ontological sense of a possible impossibility but rather in the ethical sense of an impossible possibility. Though this distinction is crucial, for death is not something that the subject can appropriate as its own. On the contrary, death always comes to us as the most passive of events—"Death is thus never assumed, it comes. Suicide is a contradictory concept."[45] As the announcement of alterity, death doesnot individuate Dasein but rather breaks apart its solitude—"My solitude is thus not confirmed by death but broken by it."[46] Clearly it is said that there is no relation to the future apart from the relation to the other. Relation to the other means an "obligation". Heidegger thinks of obligation as "Obedience to Being" only. But, to Levinas obligation originates in the call of the other and exceeds the subject's pretension to mastery.

Philosophy of the 'Other'

The concept of obligation, as mentioned in the above paragraph, shows that Levinas is not interested in any transcendental and

43. Ibid, P. 63
44. Ibid, P. 97
45. Ibid, Time and the other, P. 73
46. Ibid, P. 74

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

infinite entity. He himself says that "the relation to the Infinite is not a knowledge but a Desire."[47] In Ontology the Infinite is the ultimate reality, which is the Absolute. It is to be known, or, it is the subject of knowledge. But according to Levinas, it is not the subject of knowledge rather it is the desire of human beings to achieve it. So, the Absolute or Infinite is the subject of feelings and emotion. It is in the domain of feelings and emotions. Therefore the Infinite is incapable of being captured in what he considers to be the totalizing vision of philosophy and theology. In Levinas' view ethical relation is possible, but not ontological relation. In fact, "Transcendence bespeaks a kind of "metaphysical desire", a desire for the infinite, where infinity would represent the "beyond" of a closed ontological totality. The idea of the infinite exceeds the subject's capacity to think it, arising in the welcoming encounter with another person, who, irreducible to the thematic object of noesis, first constitutes the intentionality of the subject."[48] These words indicate the ethical relation to the "other", not the absolute relation of the infinite. In his book "Totality and Infinity" Levinas said, "This book will present subjectivity as welcoming the other, as hospitality, in it the idea of infinity is consummated. All knowing qua intentionality already presupposes the idea of infinity, which is preeminently non-adequation."[49] This statement of Levinas terms ontological infinite entity as an ethical concept in respect of the relation of "others"—"It is not I who resist the system, as Kierkegaard thought, it is the other."[50] It means ethical relation resides in the radicality of the responsibility for the "other". Responsibility must be freed from its moorings in intentional consciousness, anterior to the knowledge of being. It must be reconfigured as the response to the appeal of the other. The appeal to my ethical responsibility that the human being bears (whom I come across in my life), calls me to be directly responsible and commands me to respond in discharging my responsibility. Responsibility is not something that one can escape. One has to be

47. Ibid, Ethics and Infinity, P. 92
48. Andrew Cutrofello, Ibid, P. 160
49. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, P. 27
50. Ibid, P. 40

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

responsible for one's neighbour. Levinas says that "The I before the other is infinitely responsible."[51]

Responsibility is a process that empties the "I' of its imperialism and egoism. Because the "I" exists through and for the 'other' : The "I" has to substitute itself for the other. Levinas expresses it through "the state of being a hostage", thus, by doing so, it increases its degree of responsibility for the other and helps one to grasp the true meaning of "compassion, pity, pardon and proximity." Alterity, i.e., a radical acceptance of the other is a positive ethical force, because the egoist tendencies of the "I" (self) are reconditioned when it is exposed to the alterity of the other. It is possible, because "we recognize the other as resembling us."[52] Even though the other appears as exterior to us, he or she is still our brother or sister and our neighbour. Within the context of my proximity to the other, I might substitute myself for the other. However, the substitution of the one for the other doesnot signify the substituting of the other for one. It implies that the "I" (self) becomes more concerned for the other and tends to it first, rather than, selfishly caring more for itself. According to Levinas, ethical relation is a kind of substitution in which "I" put myself in the place of the other. In other words, "I" find myself always already obliged to assume responsibility for the other, even to the point of being responsible for the other's responsibility. In his work "Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence" Levinas writes, "I have to answer for his very responsbility."[53] He further says that the substitution is the state of being "held hostage" by the other, of being wounded with a "good violence" that is different in kind from all ontological forms of violence.[54] As the taking on of the other's responsibility, substitution involves not only the subject's persecution, but the subject's responsibility for its own persecution by the other—"It is as though persecution, by another were at the bottom of solidarity with another."[55] It doesnot imply that substitution involves sacrifice. On

51. Alphonso Lingis (Translator), Collected Philosophical Papers (author : Emmanuel Levinas), P. 97
52. Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the other P. 76
53. Ibid, Otherwise Than Being, P. 84
54. Ibid, P. 43
55. Ibid, P. 102

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the contrary, there is a way in which it preserves, and even constitutes, the integrity of the subject—"It is through this substitution that I am not "another", but me."[56]

Thus Levinas' philosophy of the 'other' mentions the responsibility of all individuals to their neighbours and this responsibility is infinite. Infinity lies in ethics, not in ontology or metaphysics. In the words of Anselm Kyongsuk Min, "The goal of Levinasian ethics is a genuinely plurastic society where each is bound to the 'other' by ethical responsibility, beyond all totalizing categorization, beyond the unity of genus, mutual resemblance and even a common cause."[57] This observation of Min sketches the characteristics of Levinas' philosophy of the 'other'. Levinas establishes the ethics as responsibility to the 'other'. This responsibility makes the society pluralistic. A society beyond the world of the absolute infinity and integrity makes human beings responsible to each other. So, the philosophy of the 'other' aims at one's ethical relation and responsibility to the others. It also implies that one cannot escape from his or her responsibility to the 'other'. Here Levinas refutes moral skepticism. Moral skepticism can be expressed in a statement of the form, "I am not obliged." But this statement refutes itself. If "I" deny obligation, "I" at first accept obligation. So no one can escape from the ethics of obligation. So, no moral skepticism rather moral determination. Without determining to take responsibility towards others, no one fulfill his or her desire of social feelings and emotions. Therefore, Levinas' philosophy of the 'other' has been called as the ethics of alterity.

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004)

Jacques Derrida was the most prominent postmodernist french thinker. He was born on 15th July, 1930 at El Biar, a place situated at near Algiers town of Algeria. He was brought up there and educated in primary level there. At the age of nineteen he came to Paris for higher education. He admitted in Ecole Normale Superior. After obtaining higher education at Paris, he started to teach Philosophy at Sorbonne (Paris). He taught there almost for five years, i.e., from 1960 to 1964. Then he was appointed as a professor

56. Ibid, P. 127

57. Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the other P. 76

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

of philosophy in Ecole Normale Superier in 1964 and he worked there till 1984. After that he started to teach philosophy at Ecole des Hantes Eludes. He also worked as a Professor of philosophy, French literature and Comparative literature in California university of U.S.A. He got honarary degree of D. Litt. from Cambridge University of Britain, after the resolution of controversy among British professors by voting.[58] He died at the age of seventy four on 8th October, 2004 in Paris. After coming Paris, he never went to his birthplace of Algeria. It is said that when he was the school student, he read Nietzsche, Rousseau, Bergson and Sartre. But he was more influenced by Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. He himself accepted that his philosophical formation owed much to the thought of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger was probably the most constant influence, and particularly his project of overcoming Greek metaphysics.[59] He further said, "In fact, it was Husserl's method that helped me to suspect the very notion of presence and the fundamental role it has played in all philosophies."[60]

These words of Derrida clearly claimed that Greek metaphysical notions as the Idea of Plato, the Pure thought of Aristotle, as well the modern metaphysics of Western Philosophy as the cogito of Descartes, the Transcendental consciousness of Kant and the Geist of Hegel are questionable and suspectable. Derrida suspected all these metaphysical notions. He questioned these metaphysical notions, and built his own ideas which is called the "theory of Deconstruction".

Theory of Deconstruction

Though, as Derrida accepted, the influence of phenomenological movement of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas[61] was originally hailed in him (Derrida), in fact he coind his own method himself to

58. Prof. Nityananad Mishra, Samkalin Pashchatya Darshan, P. 257–58
59. Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, P. 109
60. Ibid
61. Plato, Phaedrus, 275 Quoted in the article "Derrida and the Philosophy of Deconstruction", Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3, July 1992, P. 256

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

understand the above notions of metaphysics, and his method is deconstructive. In his two books, "An Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry" (published in 1962) and "Speech and Phenomena" (published in 1967), Derrida gives a deconstructive reading of Husserl's philosophy of signification. He argues that phenomenology as a quest for radical origins and beginnings contains within itself the seeds of its own undoing—the possibility of its own self-overcoming. In short, there is the "logocentric spell" Husserl and Heidegger according to Derrida. He also said that the history of western thinking always centres its understanding on notions of "presence". By commenting the history of metaphysics in his work "Writing and Difference" (published in 1967), he defines it (history of metaphysics) as a narrative of the "determinations of being as presence in all the senses of the word." He argues that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have designated the constant of a presence-eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man and so forth. Thus Derrida shows through his method of deconstruction that there is no such "centre" of logocentrism.

According to Derrida logocentrism is phenocentrism. In western philosophy, the logocentric prejudice actually operates through the priority to speech (phone) over writing (Gramme). This priority can be seen, for example, in the writings of Plato. Writing was treated with great suspicion by Plato. It has been argued that in "writing", there is a possibility of other interpretations quite different to those originally intended. In Phaedrus, Plato has said that speech is the only authentic medium of language and writing is merely a debased and derivative function, substituting lifeless signs for the ideal self-present unity of thought and speech. The priority to speech over writing degrades writing as "parasitical on speech, a secondary medium arbitrary signs, deprived of the authenticating "presence" vested in spoken language. According to Plato once speeches have been written down, they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not; and if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them, and they cannot protect or defend themselves. But Derrida said that writing takes on an extended

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

significance beyond its customary sense. According to him, "proto-writing" is such which precedes and places in question the entire structure of assumption which governs traditional thought. The idea of speech as self-presence goes along with a belief in the ability of thought to arrive at an authentic knowledge beyond reach of doubt, because it is transparently open to inward self-scrutiny. In his book "Of Grammatology" Derrida has shown how this "phonocentric" bias operates across the widest divergences of western philosophic thought by taking numerous examples from Plato to Saussure and Husserl.

In his famous book "Margins of Philosophy" (published in 1972), Derrida, through the Austin's concept of utterance assimilates speech with writing. He says that "The justification of last appeal is that in these forms (speech and writing) reference is made to what Austin calls the source (origin) of the utterance. The notion of the source—whose stakes are so evidence—often reappears in what follows and it governs the entire analysis in the phase we are examining."[62] This quotation clearly refutes the Plato's view on speech and writing. In fact, Plato approached dualistic view towards not only speech and writing but also to his metaphysical view. In addition to Plato, the modern western philosophers like Descartes and others also accepted dualism in their metaphysical views. Therefore it is said that "the western metaphysics relies upon a series of oppositions-between mind and body, the intelligible and the sensible, culture and nature, male and female, signifier and signified, speech and writing, parole and langue, diachrony and synchrony-in which one pole is elevated above the other, but can only be so prioritized through denegrations of its dependence on its contrary, which generate a fundamental incoherence. Here, the opposites are not maintained in dynamic tension, but are placed in a hierarchical order which gives the first priority. Derrida says that at the point at which the concept of differance intervenes all these metaphysical oppositions become non-pertinent."[63]

In the view of Derrida, writing has dual function to play. He uses the term "differance" to denote the dual function of writing as both

62. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, P. 328
63. Ibid, Positions, (Translated by Alan Bas), P. 29

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

a differing (where each sign differing from the other) and a deferring (the endless chain of signs postpones and termination of the chain in some original signified.) The functioning of difference within speech is the "arche-writing". According to Derrida arche-writing is a sort of writing before writing and it cannot be objectively defined. It can not be reduced to the form of a presence. It is a non-logocentric linguistics, i.e., "grammatology". In Derrida's words, "one can expose only that which at a certain moment can become present, manifest, that which can be shown, presented as something present, a being-present in its truth, in the truth of a present or the presence of the present. Now if difference (and I also cross out the is) what makes possible the presentation of the being-present, it is never presented as such. Difference is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological-ontotheological reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology-philosophy produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return."[64]

Saussure, the linguist, claimed that language finds its source in "difference", according to Derrida.[65] The arbitrary nature of linguistic signs and their constitution through difference, are the chief notions by means of which Saussure attempted to explain langue (language) as a system. The idea of difference completes the insulation of langue as a self-contained system. According to Saussure, in language there are only differences.[66] Derrida accepts Saussurean contribution to the inseparability of the signifier from signified. However, Derrida finds difficulty in this inseparability approach of Saussure. According to him, the signified is a determinate "idea" or "meaning" fixed by the conjunction of word and thought in Saussurean approach. This would lead to the view that the signified could exist as the "pure concept" or "pure thought" independent of the signifier.

According to Derrida, meaning is created only by the play of difference in the process of signification. For Derrida, writing doesnot refer to a script as such, but to the spacing inherent in the

64. Ibid, Margins of Philosophy, P. 5-6
65. Ibid, Of Grammatology, P. 52
66. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, P. 120

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

notion of differance. Differance permits all thought, speech and writing. It makes possible the opposition between the signifier and the signified. It presumes a "spatial" dimension which is also a "temporal" one. Space is in "time", it is time's pure living-itself, it is the "outside-itself" as the self-relation of time. According to Derrida, differance indicates that difference involves an integration of the "spatial" and "temporal". By breaking away from the Saussurean distinction between synchrony and diachrony, Derrida argues that once this distinction is abandoned, difference is recognised to exist only within the temporal process of deferring, continual loss of present to future and to past. Signification only operates through difference or "trace". It is "origin of all repetition, origin of ideality .... is no more ideal than real, no more intelligible than sensible, no more transparent signification than an opaque energy, and no concept of metaphysics can describe it. All signs and all texts include traces of others. Language is the active force, as Derrida says, for differentiation present in trace form in all consciousness.[67]

Some critics term the Derrida's theory of deconstruction as nihilism, because it criticizes the idea that there is a centre or fixed point. If there is no such fixed point, then it follows that there is no fixed and final meaning to a text. If there is no ultimate meaning, then any interpretation is as good as any other. But this criticism is not proper. Derrida himself says in one of his interviews, "I regret that I have been misinterpreted in this way .... people who wish to avoid questioning and discussion present deconstruction as a sort of gratuitous chess game with a combination of signs, closed up in language as in a cave. I totally refuse that label of nihilism which has been ascribed to me. Deconstruction is not a enclosure in nothingness, but an openness towards the other."[68]

For Derrida, no term or text is the bearer of a self-evident meaning. This meaning must be instituted through a further term or text, and the meaning of this in turn, by a further term or text. This process has been called as the "logic of supplementary" according to Derrida. Thus meaning for Derrida is a textual activity.

Peter Dews in his book "Logics of Disintegration" criticizes

67. Jacques Derrida, of Grammatology, P. 65, 51
68. Richard Kearney, Ibid, P. 124

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Derrida's philosophy of difference. According to him, the "philosophy of difference" is no real advance on a philosophy of identity.[69] It implies that the process or method of deconstruction is nothing but an empty reversal of the domination of identity over difference. Even this criticism is not proper. For Derrida, identity is not something given, something simple, but rather it is a product of both differing and deferring. Both are included in "difference". Hence deconstruction is not an empty reversal of the domination of identity over difference. Richard Kearney defends the Derrida's philosophy of difference : "Derrida was working out his central notions of the irreducible structure of differance as it operates in human consciousness, temporality, history, and above all in the fundamental and overriding activity of writing. By means of this concept of differance—a neologism meaning both to 'defer' and 'differ'. Derrida proposed to show how the major metaphysical definitions of Being as some timeless self-identity of presence (e.g. logos...), which dominated Western philosophy from Plato to the present day, could ultimately be "deconstructed". Such deconstruction would show that in each instance difference precedes presence rather than the contrary."[70]

❑❑❑

69. Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration, P. 26–27
70. Richard Kearney, Ibid, Prefatory Note. Quoted from Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 2006, P. 188

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

6. REALISM

Realism : Neo And Crticial

Both neo and critical realism are epistemological which differ from the traditional metaphysical realism. The problem, described in traditional metaphysical realism, is the nature of universal. Berkeley, the subjective idealist and J. S. Mill, the empiricist accepts that universal is nothing but merely a name. It is a sign by which we denote a thing. The word "chair" is a name which signifies the object "chair". But for idealists (absolute) like Hegel and Bradley universal is mere an idea and nothing else. However, being an objective idealist Plato emphasizes that universals are real. So, the Plato's idea of universal is called as 'realism', whereas Berkeleyian conception of universal is called as "nominalism" and that of Hegel and Bradley is called as "conceptualism". However, both neo and critical realism are not as good as Platonic realism. In fact, the foundation of these modern realism is empiricism, the theory of knowledge begins with John Locke. Locke's theory of knowledge is called as "representative realism". According to this theory, human mind is "tabula rasa" before perceiving anything. When we perceive a thing, say a chair, we perceive simple ideas of chair through our senses—eyes etc. Our empty mind receives these ideas, and then mind becomes active to make complex idea of the chair by assimilating scattered all simple ideas into one complex. Through this complex idea we know the chair. Therefore both simple and complex ideas represent the real object, chair. Hume terms the representative realism of Locke as inconsistent, and results it into skepticism. But, neither neo-realism nor critical realism yield into skepticism. The foundation of these two modern realisms—neo and critical-is ideas of Brentano and Meinong. D. M. Datta says that "Kulpe, Hoffding, Bretano, Meinong, Husserl, among other may be mentioned as the forerunners of contemporary realism. But the last three deserve special notice."[1]

1. D. M. Datta, Ibid, P. 298

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Husserl is the propounder of phenomenology, the theory which has been discussed in the previous chapter. He is also influenced by Franz Brentano, particularly Brentano's idea of "intentionality". Brentano drives his idea of "mind as intentional" from Aristotle and Scholasticism[2]. According to him, the characteristics of physical activity is "to be directed primarily an objects, which may either exist or not exist : and only secondarily, in retrospect, upon itself"[3] Mind decides whether objects exist or not, so there are two factors necessarily involves in knowledge—the mental act and the object to which it refers. Brentano's disciple Alexius Meinong developed a branch of philosophy called "The theory of objects". This theory is different from psychology, epistemology and metaphysis. This theory maintains that the object is what can be referred to or thought of. So, it includes physical thing which exist and qualities, numbers, propositions which merely subsist, but even the "round square". Therefore Meinong holds that even a mental act of merely assuming, without belief, has got some complex object. "The white horse" and "that the horse is white" are both objects, the former is in the narrower sense and the latter in the wider. Meinong distinguishes between the "object" and the "content" of the mental act. The content is always existent in the mind, so it is called as "Inhalt", like the act of the mind. It is present and psychical. But the object may be non-existent, past or future or physical, provided only that it is what the mental act is directed to. Thus, knowledge has three factors—mental act, content and object. Meinong distinguishes between an ordinary object and the object of reference or supposition. According to Meinong the object of reference or supposition is an "objective"— "An objective is something thought of as existing or referred to its place in the real world. An objective is thus, if we insist on regarding it by itself, epistemologically an abstraction."[4]

Neo-realism is influenced by Brentano, whereas critical realism is influenced by Meinong. Brentano's two factory theory of knowledge is the foundation of neo-realism but critical realism is

2. Ibid
3. R. B. Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, P. 206
4. L. A. Reid, Knowledge and Truth, P. 89

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

based on three factor theory of Meinong. Besides, neo-realism accepts that the object perceived and the object as it is (unperceived) are the same and identical. Object perceived means knowledge of an object what we gained. So, neo-realism accepts the identification of knowledge of object and the object itself. In this way, the theory of knowledge accepted by neo-realism is called epistemological monism. But critical realism denies the identification of object and its knowledge. Therefore, the theory of knowledge accepted by critical realism is called epistemological dualism. Moore and Russell as well as Alexander are regarded as pioneers of neo-realism in Britain. Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin and Spaulding are neo-realists in America., They jointly wrote a book "The New Realism" in which they placed their thought of epistemological monism. The propounders of critical realism are Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars and Strong. They authored a book "Essays in critical Realism." In this book they presented their ideas of epistemological dualism.

Moore and Russell's realism would be discussed in later chapters.

The third kind of modern realism is relativistic or functional realism. J. E. Boodin is the propounder of this realism. According to this third modern realism all things, perceivers, substances and qualities are mutually interdependent, and everything is the function of, that is, determined by, all the other things in the universe. It holds that "things exist only in fields, in mutuality with other things and that they have properties only in their dynamic inter-relations."[5] This view is realistic, because it holds that the object revealed in perception is real. This theory of realism doesnot accept that the object is independent of the perceiver. It holds that the object perceived is the function of and therefore, dependent on the percipient as well as the entire environment. Every reality is determined by everything else in the universe. Functional realism, in fact, a kind of relativistic realism.

Samuel Alexander, the British realist, refuted idealism. According to him, idealism is the theory which doesnot fit with

5. J. E. Boodin, Functional Realism, The Philosophy Review, March, 1934

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

experience. The simplest kind of apprehension of external things, such as the perception of a tree, contains in relation to one another two separate things—the tree and the act of perception—such that the tree is not yourself, nor dependent on yourself. In his book "The Basis of Realism" Alexander says that the experience of the relation of knower to known declares that the mind and its object are two separate existences connected together by the relation of togetherness or compresence–and this is not an argument but rather a fact of experience. This idea of experience, by Alexander, is a kind of British Neo-realism.

Neo-Realism

Neo-realism is "a return to naive or natural (popular) realism,"[6] as authors of "The New Realism" mention and tell, "historical significance of the new realism appears most clearly in its relations with "naive realism", "dualism" and "subjectivism." The new realism is primarily a doctrine concerning the relation between the knowing process and the thing known and as such it is the latest phase of a movement of thought which has already passed through the three phases just indicated."[7] This assertion of new realists points out that the foundation of new-realism is "naive realism" and mentions lackings or faults in all the three theories—naive realism, dualism and subjectivism.

Naive realism : According to this theory, objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas, they are themselves directly presented. Consciousness is thought of as analogous to a light which shines out through the sense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower. Thus, according to naive realism an object is quite independent from our mind. It is a common sense thought. Therefore, it is called as common sense or popular realism too. But, neo-realists say that this theory is unable to explain error, illusion, dream, relativity of perception with respect to space, time and personal factors. This inability leads to dualism of Descartes and Locke. Dualism observes that the mind never perceives anything external to itself. It can perceive only its own ideas or states. But as it seems impossible to account for the order in which these ideas

6. Hott, Perry & Others, The New Realism, P. 10
7. Ibid, P. 2

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

occur by appealing to the mind in which they occur, it is held to be permissible and even necessary to infer a world of external objects resembling to a greater or less extent the effects, or ideas, which they produce in us. What we perceive is now held to be only a picture of what really exists. Consciousness is no longer like a light, but rather a convass or plate on which objects get represented. Thus, this theory accepts the significance of both mind and physical objects. It also explains error and illusion etc. easily. But its explanation of error and so on is purely subjective. However, this theory cannot demonstrate the validity of the inference of an external object from the mental picture, since the external, as this theory mentions, is never perceived. Therefore there is no means of knowing that the mental picture at all corresponds to an external counterpart. This fallacy of dualism leads to subjectivism of Berkeley and others.

Subjectivism : New realists criticize, in detail, subjectivism on the following grounds—

(a) The fallacy of ego-centric predicament : Perry points to this fallacy in his article entitled "The Ego-centric Predicament" published in "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1910." The Ego-centric predicament means the rather inconvenient situation in which a philosopher finds himself when he sees that his knowledge of objects centres round his ego, or self. If he has to know whether objects exist, and if so, how they exist, he has to relate them to his self, make them the objects of self's knowledge. So, it is impossible for him to know the existence and nature of things unknown and unrelated to the self. Perry takes an example of Berkeley's subjective idealism. Berkeley argues that when we perceive an object, say table, infact we cannot perceive the table as such but what we see, it is the idea of table. In other words, subjectivism uses to prove the existence of things unknown by the self is impossible for the non-existence of unknown objects. Perry calls this argument as "ego-centric predicament." This argument ignores the method of difference, only accepts the method of agreement. "This is simply observation of agreement in presence. It can prove nothing, unless agreement in absence is observed, that is to say, unless some objects which are not known by the self are observed to be non-existent." It is the argument of Perry, who further

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

says that "such negative instances are not possible and no conclusion can, therefore, be drawn with certainty. Except the inductive argument (method of agreement), idealists sometime use the deductive argument too. "Nothing can be known to exist unless it is an object of knowledge (predicament). Therefore, nothing can exist unless it is an object of knowledge. (subjectivism deduced)." The premise is tautology, however, not objectionable. But the conclusion doesnot follow from the premise except by the fallacious omission of an essential part of its predicate, namely, "be known to". Thus, deductively subjectivism is also fallacious. Perry terms this inductively and deductively fallacious subjectivism as "ego-centric predicament."

(b) The Fallacy of exclusive particularity : When anyone thinks that a term which is found to belong to one particular system must belong to that system only, i.e., exclusively, the fallacy falls and it is the fallacy of exclusive particularity. For example, a person who is a father is also at the same time a son, brother, master, servant in other relations. Similarly, the same point B might belong to more than one straight line such as ABC, DBE, FBG, etc. As subjectivism argues that things known are object of knowledge, they are the exclusive possession of the mind, independent of which they cannot exist; it (subjectivism) commits the fallacy of "exclusive particularity." It ignores the possibility of a thing being at the same time related to the mind as object and also existing in the external world.

(c) The fallacy of definition by initial predication : This fallacy is a sequal to the last one. Something is viewed first in one of its various possible aspects, and then by a fallacy of exclusive particularity, that aspect is regarded as being essential to it. The initial characterization becomes definitive and final. For example, a child who first comes to know a male adult in its father, calls other such adults also father, or thinks that every such person must be someone's father. Subjectivism attempts to define a thing as an object of knowledge, and to interpret the universe in terms of human consciousness, under the impression that as we are first acquainted with things as objects of our consciousness, every reality must be the object of some consciousness. This attempt of subjectivism falls in the fallacy of definition by initial predication.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Features of Neo-realism : The following are main features of neo-realism :

(a) The most notable feature of neo-realism is the emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology. This means that the nature of things is not to be sought primarily in the nature of knowledge, but things must be studied in the objective way, in their objective setting.

(b) Neo-realism is against anti-intellectualism as well as all mythical philosophies. It depends on analysis and accepts nothing as unanalysable, indefinable and simple, before applying analysis and finding it really unanalysable.

(c) Neo-realism rejects two main grounds of metaphysical monism—(i) all relations are internal and (ii) knowledge is universally present in all existence. By rejecting these grounds, neo-realism tends to pluralism.

(d) This realism also rejects subjectivism as indicated previous paragraphs, and holds that cognition, which is not universal, is generated by certain conditions like all other phenomena in space and time. In every case of knowledge, there are the object and the subject which are interrelated in certain ways like any two other objects. The subject-object relation is nothing unique and mysterious. This relation also discloses the characters known and does not produce or modify them. The knower and the known pre-exist the external relation of knowing. Even in cases of illusion and hallucination what is known is not made by knowledge, but is a product of already existing conditions like the body, the object, etc.

(e) Neo-realism holds that "the content of knowledge, that which lies in or before the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically identical with the thing known."[8] All the media of immediate knowledge have only the effect of producing immediate knowledge. Therefore they do not stand in between the subject and the object. These media do not form any class of entities qualitatively or substantially different from other entities. Neo-realists say that "things when consciousness is had of them become themselves contents of consciousness; and the same things thus figure both in the socalled eternal world and in the manifold which

8. Ibid, P. 34

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

introspection reveals."[9] Here, neo-realism establishes that the object known and the object as it are one and the same. This is epistemological monism, opposed to epistemological dualism—the object known and the object as it are two independent entities.

(f) "The neo-realist is also a Platonic realist, in so far as, he accords full ontological status to things of thought as well as to the things of sense, to logical entities as well as physical entities, or to subsistents as well as existents."[10] In fact, according to neo-realism analysis and conception are regarded as means of access to reality and not as transformation of it.

(g) Neo-realism also rejects the idealist's view of internal relation, it accepts external relation. It gives following arguments in favour of external relation :

(i) Idealists maintain that all relations are internal, because the universe is an organic whole, things it being organically and necessarily related. They think that the relation of the part of an organism to the whole is such that the part would altogether cease to be what is if it is separated from the whole. But neo-realists refute this idea of internal relation of idealism. Pitkin, the neo-realist, criticizes idealism's view of internal relation by citing some examples. The anterior half of a frog surgically separated and joined to the posterior part of another has been found to live and thrive in the new position without loss of its previous characters. Again, when the tail of a fish is cut off, a new one is grown. The example of frog shows that the part of an organism does not necessarily depend on a particular whole, where it happened to be, and it is not inseparable from the whole. The example of fish shows that a whole does not necessarily depend on a particular part which it happens to possess. Even an organic relation is not then necessarily inseparable and internal.

(ii) To defence idealistic view of internal relation idealist thinkers argue that when a term is separated from another to which it was related it becomes different. For example, the arm of a chair when separated from the chair becomes different, because it ceases to be the arm of that chair. But against this idealistic argument the

9. Ibid, P. 35
10. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

neo-realist points out that this argument propounds only a "verbal proposition"—a truism that proves nothing. For the conclusion simply means that a part separated from the whole is not a part of the whole, or in a general way, a term unrelated is not a term related. The point, which being proved, internality of the relation will be proved is whether the separated term loses its identity.

(iii) Idealism accepts the internal view of relation. If it is true, then everything would be modified in innumerable ways by its innumerable relations to other things. But if this conclusion be true, it would be impossible to know what a thing itself is. Then, no one can even state and prove the internal view of relation, because one can say that terms undergo change when related, only when one knows what the terms themselves were without relation.[11]

(iv) The neo-realist says that if the internal view of relations, like other relations, must be said to modify the object. Then truth can never be said to be attained, because as soon as truth becomes related as an object to some mind it is modified. Therefore, truth in itself is not grasped. Whether the internal view of relations is true, whether even idealism is true, cannot be ascertained. The internal view either remains unproved or becomes self-contradictory. Thus, the external view of relations is found to be presupposed by every system which claims to be true.[12]

(v) According to Spaulding the internal view of relations has two motives : (I) In epistemology, it is employed to check realism and monism by showing that the object known is constituted by its relation to the mind, and cannot be independent of the subjects. Therefore, the independent existence of the object cannot be proved, and even if there is such an object it is not identical with what is known. (II) In metaphysics, the internal view of relations is employed to prove a kind of monism by showing that things found in this world are related in such an inseparable way that what they are is due to their mutual relations. Hence the reality of an individual object depends on the whole system of inter-related objects. Therefore, absolute reality belongs to the system as a whole, not to its parts which are only relative to and dependent on the

11. Ibid, P. 165 footnote

12. Ibid, P. 479

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

whole. But the external view of relations has the opposite motives. In epistemology this view is used to prove both realism and monism. If all relations are external, then the knowledge of relation must be so. So, the thing known is not modify by being related to the knower. Hence, it cannot be said to depend for its existence on knowledge, it is independent of the mind. Also, as we know this unchanged object, what is known is identical with the object existing independently. In metaphysics the external view of relations is used to disprove absolutism that is based on the internal view. If things are not changed by their interelation, they have all their independent existences. Their reality is not dependent on any whole. On the contrary, the whole, which is nothing but a collection of individuals, depends on them as its component parts. Thus, in metaphysics the external view tends towards pluralism.

Perception and Consciousness : According to neo-realism perception must have an object independent of the perceiving consciousness, and that object cannot be modified by being known, i.e., it is known as it really is. Perception is an external relation between the subject or a living organism and an object, and none of these two are altered by this (external) relation. According to Montague this position overcomes three kinds of opposition to realism, and they are the psychological argument, the intuitional argument and the physiological argument.

The psychological argument : The mind can have for its direct object only its own ideas or states; and external objects, if they exist at all, can only be known indirectly by a process of inference, of questionable validity and doubtful utility. Montague refuses this idea and say that "this principle is fallacious because a knowing process is never its own object, but is rather the means by which some other object is known. Thus the object known or referred to may be another mental state, a physical thing, or a merely logical entity."[13] Hence, neo-realism holds that "ideas" cannot be said to stand in the way of the knowledge of objects, they do not stand between the subject and the object. On the contrary, the subject's having ideas of the object means its having knowledge of it, and when such ideas are generated by the presence of the object, the subject has direct knowledge of it.

13. Ibid, P. 474–5

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

The intuitional argument : Montague refutes intuionalism on the basis of a confused identification of a truism and an absurdity. The truism "we can only know that objects exist, when they are known" and the absurdity, "we know that objects can only exist when they are known". The argument of absurdity derives from the word "idea" as follows : "Every idea (meaning a mental process or state) is incapable of existing apart from a mind, every known entity is an idea (meaning an object of thought); therefore every known entity is incapable of existing apart from a mind." This argument of the absurdity proves the failure to perceive "these fallacies that idealism owes its supposedly axiomatic character."[14]

The physiological argument : The sensations we receive determine what objects we shall know, therefore, the objects known are constructs or products of our perceptual experience. According to Montague the premise of this argument "sensations are the ratio cognoscendi of the external world" is true, and the conclusion "therefore they are its ratio fiendi or essendi" is false. Thus, the fallacy occurs. This argument only proves that sensations are merely the means of the knowledge of the objects, and not the ground of the existence of objects.

Holt and some other neo-realists regard knowledge as not a passive reception of sensations, but rather biologically as a response. The subject is that which responds and the object is that which is responded to. Therefore these neo-realists hold that "the difference between subject and object of consciousness is not a difference of quality or substance, but a difference of office or place in configuration.[15] These neo-realists describe consciousness as "searchlight". They say that as a light doesnot modify the object it reveals, so also the mind doesnot change the object it knows.[16] Holt sometimes describes consciousness a "specific response" to extra-organic objects which by virtue of being responded to become the field of objects in consciousness. He sometimes terms consciousness as a cross-section of neutral entities that subsists in the universe, the cross-section being made by the selective response of the

14 Ibid
15. Ibid, P. 476
16. Ibid, P. 251

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

organism. Montague doesnot accept Holt's this behaviouristic theory of consciousness. He says that consciousness is not behaviour, it is the relation of self-transcending implication, which the brain-states sustain to their extra-organic causes.

All neo-realists accept the theory that perceived objects are directly present to the mind without any mediating idea. But they differ in describing the process of this direct presentation. According to Holt the extra-organic object is perceived by way of being responded to by the organism. In view of Pitkin the external objects produce on the brain some effects which may be called projections of the objects on the brain. Montague points out that to think of perception as a response is to expose oneself to the criticism to which behaviourism is rightly subjected, for treating consciousness as a behaviour. To think that the object is known through its projection on the brain is to hold virtually that we are directly aware of these brain-projections, and not the objects outside. This would be a lapse into epistemological dualism. Holt seems to avoid this dualism sometimes by saying that "the objects of which we are conscious are within the brain."[17] Montague holds that we must admit some sort of self-transcending implication which the brain-states sustain to their extra-organic causes. Consciousness is this relation of implication. The brain-states which are the effects of an object, just as every effect implies its cause. According to Pitkin this conception of self-transcending implication raises some serious difficulties. For example, why should not the effect imply its proximate cause rather than a distant cause ? How is it that instead of becoming aware of the immediate neural change we become beware of distant use like the object ? Implication doesnot always become confined to effects and causes, it may be found even between two events not causally connected. For instance, the triangle and its three angles, where the relation is of whole and parts.

The major difficulty that neo-realism has to face is the explanation of error. If the object known is identical with the object as it is, then the problem raises of how errors and illusions can be explained. Holt and Montague try to solve this problem. According to Holt, error of any kind doesnot prove the existence of any

17. Ibid, P. 481

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

subjective interference nor even much of physiological distortion. Error is due to contradictory facts and laws which exist in the objective world. One law says "up", another says "down"; and the one even reduces the effect of the other to zero. Contradiction which the subjectivist attributes to knowledge or the knowing mind is only a patent fact of the objective world. Holt further says that common men's thinking about illusion is nothing but "brickbat notion of physical object"[18], that means that an object has some permanent, unvarying predicates which are always true of it under all conditions. He cites the common men's doubt about the same stick be both straight and bent at the same time in water. Common men think that the stick has only one character. Holt removes this doubt by saying that the physical universe contains both the contradictory characters, and the organism or the knower only selects one of these under a particular set of conditions. According to Holt error is not subjective. Errors of space (e.g., perceiving a thing farther, nearer, smaller, larger, distorted, double etc.), errors of time (e.g., perceiving things earlier, later, etc.), errors concerning secondary qualities (e.g., perceiving other shades of colour, touch, etc.) are all examined fully and it is shown that such illusory experiences are explained by physical and sometimes physiological conditions. Many of these errors actually produced by a suitable arrangement of such objective condition. Therefore it is to suppose that such errors are produced by subject or knowing mind. Thus, subjectivism is not established in any way by illusory experience. Therefore Holt claims that "all errors are cases of contradiction or contrariety. One has met error who has experienced that A is B, and that the same A is not B....A thought, then, which negates another thought is neither more nor less significant than a physical law which negates another law. The problem of error, as that of "reality", is in no way involved in the problem of knowledge."[19]

Montague explains the problem of error differently. He says that "the unreal object or content of an error subsists extramentally but it doesnot contribute in any causal manner to its being apprehended. It is the nature of the unreal, or merely subsistent, to

18. Ibid, P. 371
19. Ibid, P. 365-6 & P. 361

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

be sterile of consequences. It can be known but it cannot cause itself to be known, and apart from being known it has no efficiency. The non-existent bent stick cannot cause us to perceive it, but an existent straight stick, partly immersed in water, can produce, by reason of the different refracting powers of water and air, an effect upon the eye and brain of the same kind as would have been produced by a stick that was really bent, with the result that a non-existent bent stick becomes the object of an (erroneous) apprehension."[20] The brain-state, the effect, makes us aware of its cause, the external object, by the process of self-transcending implication. Every object has this power of self-transcendence and can thereby point to its effect, cause and co-existent objects. Montague maintains that a cause takes our mind to its effect, an effect of its cause, and any object to coexistent objects, is commonly admitted by all. Seeing dark lowering clouds we think of rain, on hearing the hooting of a horn, we think of a car, at the sight of the head of a man peeping through the window we think of the other parts of his body. In all these cases the mind passes from one object to another beyond it. Therefore, there is transcendence which is but another name for passing beyond. This has been explained by Montague as follow : "every event has self-transcending implication is that every event has the power to imply some other event beyond itself. He again says that "the source of error is due to the plurality of causes and to the counteraction of effects."[21] He explains this view by epistemological triangle, the three corners of which are the three elements. They are : the actual external object, the cerebral state generated, and the object perceived. Symbolically these elements are Oe, Oc and Op respectively. Oc implies Op. If the same effect (Oc) in simple case is caused only by the cause (Oe), then from the effect (Oc) we may correctly know, by implication, its cause (Oe). Here Op and Oe will be identical. But it may be that the same effect is due to different causes in different cases. In such cases Op is not necessarily the same as Oe, and consequent by error many arise.

Critical Realism

The main problem for critical realism is the explanation of

20. Ibid, P. 481
21. Ibid, P. 298

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

perception. According to this realism external perception is the result of the interrelation of three factors—physical object, psychical state and a datum. What we are directly in touch with in perception is not the physical object, but the datum which is the content of the perceiving mind. Therefore, the datum acts as a mediator between the subject and the physical object. The identity of the perceived object and the one is denied by the critical realists. Memory disproves the identity between the content and the object. In words of Rogers, "how are we going to render plausible the claim that when I remember a past object, the object is there bodily and identical with the memory"[22] This question of Rogers indicates that critical realism denies epistemological monism, and accepts epistemological dualism. In fact this realism itself is the epistemological dualism. This realism explains conveniently truth and falsity as agreement and disagreement, respectively, between the datum and the object. Besides refusing epistemological monism of neo-realism, critical realism also refutes subjectivism and objectivism. Drake, the critical realist, says that there are two familiar starting point of knowledge—the objective and the subjective. According to objective point, we can start from the physical existents, because they are the data directly given in experience are the mental states, not the external objects. But neither of these "correctly describes what we have to start with what is given" in immediate experience. Therefore critical realists expose the error of these two points and point out a third view which combines the insight of both points.

Refutation of subjectivism : On the following grounds subjectivism has been refuted by critical realists :

(i) It is doubtful if pure subjectivism is really accepted by any one. Belief in unexperienced objects, as also in the independent existence of experienced objects, is universal.

(ii) We instinctively feel that the data of perception are the characters of real objects, and react to them even in sleep as if they had an existence of their own.

(iii) This instinctive belief in the physical world is practically inevitable, and is pragmatically justifiable.

22. Arthur K. Rogers, The Essays in Critical Realism, P.130

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(iv) Subjectivism is confined to what appears in experience. It can only describe such appearance, but cannot explain it. It cannot answer "why should our sensedata appear and disappear and change just as they do in the abrupt fashion?"

(v) If a subjectivist believes in other minds external to his, he should, for the same reason, believe also in external objects; or he should be a complete sceptic and cease to believe everything other than his mind.

(vi) Even if it is assumed that the data are mental states, it doesnot follow that there is no other kind of existence as Perry's discussion on the ego-centric predicament has shown.

Refutation of Objectivism : Objectivism has been refuted on the following ground by critical realists :

(i) Objectivism is falsified by the many examples where it is found that the data are not only inadequate aspects of external objects but also very different from what is believed to belong to objects.

(ii) The mechanism of perception, on which epistemological monism and objectivism of the neo-realist are based, is mainly of two alternative forms as we find in the ideas of Holt and Pitkin. According to Holt all the qualities which we seem to see in objects are really there, we only select some at a time. This theory of selection is untenable. When a colour is seen by you and me from the same side of an object, etherwaves from the object themselves come and affect our organisms, we do not select them to affect the organisms. If there are different effects on two persons, it can be explained as due to differences produced in the organisms. The differing sensedata cannot be said to belong to objects outside us. According to Pitkin the sensedata are produced by organism, and spatially projected in the object at the moment of perception. This theory of projection lacks evidence. We do not know of any projection mechanism in the organism. Perception is a oneway process proceeding from the outer source of radiation to the organism. But if "project" means "imagine something out there", then we cannot say that the projected quality is really there.

Thus, both subjectivism and objectivism fail to explain

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

perception. According to Drake the existing object as such doesnot get within our consciousness. We only immediately apprehend some characters or data and imagine them to be out there, and implicily believe them to be existing in objects. This imagination is immediate. Therefore, it is not a kind of inference. In this sense, alone objects can be said to be directly perceived, perception being a kind of instinctive imagination. Thus, dualistic view of critical realism maintains that objects experienced are not identical with objects existing, and this has the advantage, for epistemological dualism, of being able to explain all kinds of consciousness such as conception, memory and introspection uniformly. The epistemological monism fails to explain how in memory a past extinct object can actually be identical with the present datum of memory, or to explain how the other side of the moon can actually be identical with the thought of it. Drake further says that mental states must be admitted to exist, because nothing except consciousness can make us aware of the data. A brain-state cannot reveal the data, because it is itself unconscious. The data must be different from the brain-states, since we cannot think that these states are red or round while the data are so. The data must be different from the mental states too, because one and the same essence or datum can be revealed by different mental states such as vivid sensation, faint sensation, memory. The data cannot be regarded as qualities of mental states, since when we have for the perceptual datum a character complex like "around-wheel-about-three-feet-in-diameter-moving-away-from-me-and now-between-this-house-and-the-next", the mental state cannot be regarded as round, etc.

Similarly, the critical realism denies the neo-realist's conception of the world. Neo-realist Holt asserts that the physical world is actually made of contradictory objective contents and cites the examples of forces and long which oppose one another. But critical realist Drake points out that "opposition of forces or laws is not really a case of contradiction, these laws or forces are really but tendencies, which are not actualized simultaneously."[23] Though one law says, "Up" and another says, "Down", they never make an object go up and down at the same time. Mixtures of opposite forces produce one kind of quality or effect at the same time. Therefore the

23. Ibid, P. 13

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

existence of diverse incompatible sensedata in the physical world is unproved. Lovejoy propounds his critical realism by pointing out difficulties in pragmatism, particularly James and Dewey. He accepts pragmatism as realistic in tune with critical realism. However he points out the different spirits of different pragmatists like James and Dewey. James has mixed up two conflicting motives : anti-idealist or realist and radical empiricist. In Dewey's pragmatism the fundamental and essential insight of pragmatism is found as a philosophy of man as agent, as reflective agent, in a physical and social environment. This is obviously realistic implying, as it does, a belief in a real objective situation in which man is placed and is required to adjust himself. But this legitimate realistic basis is blurred by the identification of pragmatism with James' radical empiricism. The radical empiricism of James holds that philosophy "must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experience, nor exclude from them any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced."[24] The strict logical consequence of this empiricism is denial of all non-experienceable or transexperiential objects, such as past existents, other selves, unperceived objects, and confinement to experience of the present moment. All this is opposed to the realistic foundation of pure pragmatism. The influence of radical empiricism, as Lovejoy thinks, makes pragmatism (even in Dewey) exclude restrospection from the pale of knowledge. Dewey asks, how can the present belief jump out of its skin and dive into the past ? Consequently, all knowledge, worth the name, is, for him (Dewey), of the nature of anticipation, and the past, the finished and the done with is of import as affecting the future. According to Lovejoy this view confuses between import and important. The past may not be important, but this doesnot make it devoid of import or meaning.

Lovejoy tries to show that the true pragmatism, unmixed with empricism, should recognise on the following grounds :

(i) All instrumental knowledge is, or at least includes and requires, presentative knowledge, a representation of not present existence by present data.

24. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, P. 42

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(ii) Pragmatism considers knowing as necessarily and constantly conversant with entities which are existentially transcendent of the knowing experience, and frequently with entities which transcend the total experience of the knower.

(iii) If a real physical world having the characteristics set forth by natural science is assumed, certain of the contents of experience, and specially the contents of anticipation and restrospection, cannot be assigned to that world, and therefore must be called "psychical", that is experienced but not physical, entities.

(iv) Knowledge is mediated through such psychical existences and would be impossible without them.

Thus Lovejoy concludes that "the doctrine commonly put forward as "pragmatism" may be said to be a changeling, substituted almost in the cradle. I have here had the privilege of proclaiming the rightful heir and pointing out the marks of identity. I invite all loyal retainers to return to their allegiance. If they will do so, they will I think, find that there need be-and, over the issues which have been here considered, can be no quarrel between their house and that of critical realism. Pratt points out that neo-realism fails to explain error and many other things, because it fails to distinguish the three necessary factors of knowledge—mental states (e.g. sensations), their meanings (data), and existing objects (e.g., physical objects). Neo-realism abolishes the distinction between psychical (mental) states and physical objects. Therefore it fails to convince common sense. Critical realism tries to avoid this mistake of neo-realism. Pratt, by analysing conception and perception, attempts to remove this mistake of neo-realism as well as Locke's dualism in the shape of representative realism.

Analysis of conception : Pratt holds that there are three factors involved in conceiving anything, and they are :

(a) a collection of revived images of various sorts—visual, auditory, verbal with various slight kinaesthetic sensations due to incipient tendencies to reaction; though these images are not the same in every thinker. If different thinkers are asked to think of object like a square table, they will have different images of the object.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(b) Though these images or psychic states are different, all will convey the same meaning, as all will stand for the square table. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the meaning of the mental states and these states themselves. The states are discovered by introspection, the meanings are directly given or conveyed by these states. In conception the states are the machinery of thinking which reveals meanings. As directly given, meanings can be called "data".

(c) Besides the above two factors, there is present in conception (especially of physical objects and very faintly in logical ones) an outer reference.

Thus, "When I think of the moon I can distinguish (a) images of various sorts, (b) a meaning or datum not to be identified with my introspectively discovered images, and (c) a conscious outer reference of this datum (not of the images) to a point of space thousands of miles distant from the earth."[25]

Analysis of Perception : All the abovementioned, factors are also present in perception, though it needs a little introspection and reasoning to discover them. Sensations or psychic states can be distinguished, here also, from their meanings. In words of Pratt, "It is a common place of psychology that one perceives a table-top as having four right angles, but that the sensuous images by which one perceives it are of obtuse and acute angles. The characters meant and the characters sensed in perception are thus by no means identical, although it must be noted that the two groups come much nearer to coinciding than they do in conception. In most cases of perception, except that of the visual type, in fact, all the sensed qualities are included within those meant, though even here the two groups do not absolutely coincide, since the qualities which we mean usually extend out beyond those which we sense."[26] In pure sensations, if any, there is only feeling—"we simply live through or have experience." There is no meaning, and hence, no datum. Thus, sensuous image and meaning are distinguishable in perception, though here they tend to be fused together. Pratt also distinguishes between outer reference and the datum. Outer reference means the

25. Arthur K. Rogers, Ibid, P. 91
26. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

attribution of the datum to some existent outer object. It may be regarded as a part of the datum or meaning of perception, but it is an easily distinguishable part. This can be proved by the fact in cases of "pseudo-hallucination". We may "have the full quota of psychic images with their perfectly definite meaning or datum, and yet not attribute this datum to any existent spatial object."[27] In day dream, we have images with meanings, but no belief in, or reference to, external existing objects. Thus, meaning and outer reference are found in perception too, but like neo-realism or naive realism critical realism does not identify them in together, or they are not identical with each other.

Now, if objects and the data are not identical, and objects transcend the data; it means that objects are not grasped by the mind at all, and then knowledge is impossible. But Pratt, by citing an example, shows the possibility of knowledge. He says that transcendence must be admitted on the evidence of experience, to be an undeniable fact about the mind. In accepting transcendence critical realism simply writes down transcendence as one of the facts of the world, just as the physicist writes down X-rays as a special sort of fact. In referring to past or future events, experience of others, in inferring things not within the contents of present mental states, etc., one must admit that the mind goes beyond or transcends its own present events. When the doctor knows the headache of his patient from the latter's description, it would be absurd to think that the headache existing in the patient becomes a content of the doctor's mind. This would mean that he himself gets headache. Therefore, the possibility of knowledge is understood as the recognized power of transcendence of mind. Now, the question is whether possible knowledge is direct or indirect. The answer of this question, as Pratt says, will depend on the meaning of direct perception. If direct perception means the identification of object with content, then certainty perception is not direct. But this identification is improbable as shown in the previous paragraphs, the only tenable sense of direct perception is perception of the object with the help of the datum. The existence of some medium or instrument like the sense-organ, the nervous system as well as the mental states and the datum are necessary for perception. The first

27. Ibid, P. 92

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

two have been accepted by the neo-realists too. 'However, last two have been added by the critical realists. In indirect perception, according to critical realism, the datum is present directly in the mind; it must be said to be directly perceived, and so the object which is perceived through this datum cannot also be said to be perceived directly. But in Pratt's view this is a misunderstanding. The datum itself is not perceived as such, it only makes the object perceived, as eye-glasses are not seen, but the object is seen through them. It means that realists donot distinguish between direct and indirect perception. For them, indirect perception is such which would not "quarrel with the designation."

Pratt answers the another question "whether one's perception is veridical or illusory" in this way that one has several practical test which taken together are sufficiently decisive and trustworthy. One appeals from one of the senses to the others. If they mutually confirm one another, the veridical nature of our perception is strongly probable. But we need not satisfy with that. One may appeal to other persons. For a still further test one watches the supposed object function. If it works out consistently with all the rest of one's experience, and with the exerperience of all other observers, one concludes of finally that it is no illusion, that one is dealing with an existent object. Coincidences of the results of so many different tests cannot be explained away as so many more chance coincidences except by "a mad lover of doubt." The tests described should that our knowledge works. But that gives no guarantee that objects supposed by knowledge do really exist. According to Pratt belief in the existence of external objects is instintive and spontaneous. This ionstinctive faith is justifiable by a reasoning of the following kind—"The task of Philosophy is to construe the facts of experience in the most reasonable manner, and the construction which the solipsist gives to them surely be called fanciful in the extreme. To refer to no other aspects of the situation, the fact that each one of us finds such large masses of information, so many answers to questions, so much resistance to one's efforts, such new experiences, from what appears to be an outside and independent world, and not to be accounted for by anything that one finds within oneself, makes the solipsistic view altoghether preposterous." In this way the inborn belief n the external world is

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

also justifiable by reasoning, though it is to fundamental and spontaneous to be based on any form of reasoning. However, critical realism is not sure of the ultimate nature of the world, because the critical reaslists have no exhaustive theory upon the subject.

According to critical realism truth and error can be explained : "When we 'know' an object, we are assigning a certain "essence"— a character or group of characters—to some reality existing independently of the knowledge process. And as "truth" is the identity of this essence with the actual character of this reality referred to, so "error" stands for the lack of such agreement, and the ascribing of an ideal character to what we are mistaken in supposing to be real, or the ascribing to a reality of wrong character instead of a right one."[28] In other words, error is explained not as having a meaning before the mind, something which we believe, but in wrongly supposing that this characterises a real. In fact, error is the incorrect ascription of an essence to an existence, according to critical realism.

British Realism : Moore and Russell

George Edward Moore was born on 4 November, 1873 in London, England. He was a British philosopher and one of founders of analytic philosophy. He was a fellow at the university of Cambridge from 1898 to 1904. During this period his two influential papers, "The nature of judgement" (1809) and "The Refutation of Idealism" (1903), published. These two papers did much to break the hold of absolute Idealism on British Philosophy. His major ethical work, "Principia Ethica", was also published in 1903. His intuitionism was the dominant metaethical position in Britain for the next thirty years and it exerted considerable influence within the Bloomsbury of artists and intellectuals. In epistemology Moore is remembered for his "common sense" philosophy. He was professor of philosophy at Cambridge from 1925 to 1939. From 1921 to 1917 he edited the journal "Mind". He took his last breath on 24 October, 1958 at Cambridgeshire, Cambridge.

Moore–Refutation of Idealism

According to D. M. Datta, it is the works of G. E. Moore in which

28. Ibid, p. 117–118

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the beginning of neo-realism could have been traced[29]. Moore revolts against German transcendentalism and absolutism, and his thinking entirely changed the process of thinking in western philosophy. Moore gives a common sense philosophy which turns into the non-metaphysical thinking or analyticalism. He emphasizes on the common-sense realism. He wrote an article entitled "The Refutation of Idealism" which published in 1903 in the Journal "Mind". In this article be points out that the ultimate premise of all kinds of idealism is "esse-est-percipi". If premise is false, conclusion must be false. Moore attempts to prove this ultimate premise is false, so idealism (conclusion of this premise) is also false. For the purpose, Moore analyses this premise. According to him, the original meaning of "percipi" is sensation. But most idealists take the meaning of "percipi" as thought. If the term "percipi" has only one meaning or sense, i.e., perception, the copula "is" has at least three senses or meanings. They are :

(a) Complete identity of the meanings of subject and predicate. Here subject is "esse" (existence) and predicate is "percipi" (perception). So, esse and percipi are identical.

(b) Partial identity, the connotation of the predicate being a part of that of the subject. Here connotation of percipi is the part of esse.

(c) The mere inferability of the presence of the predicate from the presence of the subject. It means, if "esse" is present, so "percipi" is also presence. Therefore, the relation between esse and percipi is inferential.

Now, the first meaning in which subject (esse) and predicate (percipi) are identical. If both are identical, it means that both esse and percipi are synonymous terms. Being synonymous both terms have the same meaning, but it is not possible. Existence (esse) and perception (percipi) cannot be the same. Therefore Moore terms the first meaning or sense as "an extremely bad definition" and untenable.

The second sense or meaning, predicate is the part of subject, is also not acceptable, because from the "percipi", "esse" cannot be drawn as conclusion. For example, "Man is rational animal"—the

29. D. M. Datta, Ibid, P. 301

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

subject of this proposition "man" has two connotation—animality and rationality. Animality is one part of the subject "man". From animality "man" cannot be drawn, because man is not only an animal. Man is human being having rationality too.

According to third meaning or sense the meaning of "esse" is not constituted by the meaning of "percipi", but by something else, say P, Yet there is such an inseparable relation between that P and percipi that P cannot exist without percipi; just as smoke cannot exist without fire. This meaning would support the idealistic contention that wherever there is esse, there is percipi. The first meaning of copula presents the identical relation between esse and percipi. The identity between the two terms implies their oneness like P is P. The third meaning of copula "is" presents the inseparability between the two terms, esse and percipi. Inseparability means "esse" and "percipi" have their independence identity, but they are not separable. Thus, where is esse, there is percipi. But Moore says, the connotation of esse is more wide than percipi. However, according to the third meaning the proposition "esse is percipi" must be necessary and synthetic, because it asserts a necessary connection between the two terms, esse and percipi, which have distinct meanings. But this "necessity" makes the proposition "self-evident", as the necessary connection between man and rational animal. If the proposition is self-evident, no reasoning would be either necessary or possible. But the idealist attempts to support the proposition "esse is percipi" with reasoning. This shows that the idealist is not himself sure of its self-evident nature.

The idealist argues in favour of "esse is percipi" that "the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the object." This proposition is supposed to be necessary, because its opposite is inconceivable. A proposition whose opposite is inconceivable is generally known as an analytic proposition. But the third sense or meaning of the proposition "esse is percipi" proves that it is a synthetic proposition. Therefore the idealist, according to Moore, falls in the fallacy of self-contradiction. So, the third meaning is also untenable. The idealist also argues that the subject and the object are necessarily connected because he fails to see that they are distinct. For example, he thinks of "yellow" and "sensation of yellow" are the same and indistinct. In other words, the idealist identifies

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the object and the idea of object. But the object and the idea of object cannot be the same and indistinct. Idea is abstract, object is concrete. However, the idealist assumes that the idea and its object for an organic unity, and they are both identical and distinct. According to Moore, the principle of organic unity is used conveniently for justifying the truth of two contradictory propositions (The idea of an object exists, therefore, an object exists) as a mere attempt to glorify a kind of fallacy, and that fallacy is the "fallacy by erecting the contradictory truths into principle", and gives it a name. To Moore, to exist (esse) and to be perceived (percipi) are two distinct terms like "green" and "sweet", and therefore cannot be necessarily related together. Moore further shows that the existence of an object is different from the consciousness of it. To prove it he argues in the following manner :

Each and every one knows that the sensation of blue differs from that of green. This difference is in respect of the objects, blue and green, of the sensations and not in respect of sensation which is a form of consciousness common to both. It follows that there must be two distinct elements in every sensation : (a) consciousness in respect of which all sensations are alike, and (b) something else, the object, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. Hence it is a mistake to identify the object with the consciousness of it. If an idealist says that (i) blue is the same thing as sensation, he identifies one part of a complex whole (sensation of blue) with another part which is distinct from the first; (ii) blue is the same thing as the sensation of blue, he identifies a part with the whole. Therefore, in both cases (i) and (ii) he holds something absurd.

May be, the idealist argues that though the object, blue, may not be identical with the sensation of blue, it is inseparable from the sensation being a "content" of the sensation. According to Moore, the object of any knowledge cannot be regarded as its content. Blue is surely a content of a blue flower, as blue is contained within the flower as one of its qualities and constituents. But such kind of relation doesnot exist between blue and the awareness of blue. Where we see a blue flower, we see that the flower contains the blue and the flower is blue. But we do not feel that our perception similarly contains the blue, that is, that the perception is itself blue. To be aware of an object is to have an image of it in the mind,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

therefore what we are aware of is contained in the mind. This argument of the idealist has also been refuted by Moore. Moore points out that "to have a mental image of an object is not the same thing as knowing the existence of an object." When one, for example, is aware of a tiger, he doesnot think that it is contained in his mind as a mere image but believes in its existence outside the mind. Therefore, there is no question of how we are to get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations. Merely to have a sensation is already to be outside that circle. Therefore the object of any knowledge, worth the name, is not a content of that knowledge. Moore further argues that if what we know is not an object outside knowledge, but a content of knowledge, then we cannot assert the independent existence of even knowledge or the self. For knowledge then cannot be shown to be separable from and independent of the knowledge of knowledge, and the self cannot be shown to be existing independent of the knowledge of the self. Therefore, not to allow the object its independence of the knowledge of it is to deprive idealism itself of its own grounds. If idealism avoids this suicidal conclusion and holds that knowledge and self can exist independently of the knowledge of them, he must concede that other objects of knowledge can also exist independently of the knowledge of them. Thus unknown objects can also exist. What is known is the object, is not a content of knowledge. If the word "content" is used to mean simply "what is known" and not what is contained in knowledge, the content is nothing but the object of knowledge.

Thus, Moore concludes that the idealistic premise "esse is percipi" is wholly untenable.

The Defence of Common Sense

Moore's philosophy rejects Idealism and affirms popular realism, when Moore argues for the defence of common sense. In his 1910–11 lectures he also delivered on the defence of common sense which was later published in the book "Some Main problems of Philosophy" in 1925. According to A. J. Ayer, this lecture was published in "Contemporary British Philosophy" in 1925, and later on it was published in the work of Moore "Philosophical Papers."[30]

30. A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the twentieth century, P. 60

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Moore begins this article with listing of a large number of truism or true propositions. He classified these propositions into three groups. For example, "the Earth had existed also for many years before my body was born." By analysing this proposition, he asserts first that he knows it for certain, second that other people likewise know for certain the truth of comparable truism about itself, and third that he knows this second general truth, and by implication others do too, So, the truth and general knowledge of these truisms is a matter of common sense. Moore says that some philosophers have denied their truth or more commonly denied our knowledge of them, even though they also know them and it can be shown that these denials are incoherent or unwarranted.

In the last part of the paper Moore argues that his defence of common sense leaves completely undecided the question as to how the truistic propositions which make up the common sense view of the world are to be analysed. The analysis may be as radical as one likes as long as it is consistent with the truth and knowability of the propositions analysed. Thus, philosophical argument may show that a phenomenalist analysis of propositions about the physical world is correct. This last point shows that Moore's defence of common sense is not as much of a constraint on philosophical theory as one might at first have thought, for philosophical analysis can reveal to us facts about the principal or ultimate subject of a truistic proposition which are by no means what common sense supposes. This implication is important when one turns to consider Moore's most famous paper "Proof of an External World", delivered in 1939. In this paper Moore maintains that "how ? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, "Here is one hand", and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, "and here is another."[31]

Moore then argues that this demonstration of his hands is a "perfectly rigorous" proof of the existence of external objects. For its premises certainly entail its conclusion, and they are things which can be known as true. In Moore's words, "I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of "here" and that there was another in the different

31. G. E. Moore, Proof of an External World, P. 166

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of "here". How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case. You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking that perhaps after all I am not, and that it is not quite certain that I am."[32]

The significance of this performance has been debated ever since Moore set it out. It is commonly supposed that Moore here sets himself to refute philosophical skepticism, and that his performance, though intriguing, is unsuccessful. But this interpretation is incorrect. Moore's avowed aim is to prove the existence of an external world, not to prove his knowledge of the existence of an external world. Moore himself set this out clearly in a subsequent discussion of his lecture—"I have sometimes distinguished between two different propositions, each of which has been made by some philosophers, namely (1) The proposition "there are no material things", and (2) The proposition "nobody knows for certain that there are any material things." And in my latest British Academy lecture called "Proof of an External World" I implied with regard to the first of these propositions that it could be proved to be false in such a way as this; namely, by holding up one of your hands and saying "this hand is a material thing." But with regard to the second of the two propositions, I do not think I have ever implied that it could be proved to be false in any such simple way."[33]

Therefore, setting aside any anti-skeptical intent what needs assessment is the metaphysical significance of Moore's proof, as a proof of an external world. In fact, everything here depends on what is to count as "external", in particular whether Moore's demonstration of the existence of his hands proves the existence of things that are in no way at all dependent upon experience or thought. It is obvious that it doesnot; for that issue is one which depends on broader philosophical questions about idealism which can not possibly be settled that way. Moore's own distinction between questions of truth and questions of analysis should be introduced here. Moore's "proof" demonstrates the empirical truth

32. Ibid
33. Ibid, A Reply to my critics, P. 668

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

of a simple truism, that he has hands, but it leaves entirely open the question of the analysis of this truism. Yet it is at the level of analysis that the "transcendental" question of whether things such as hands are altogether independent of experience and thought is to be answered.

Although Moore did not intend his "proof" as a refutation of skepticism, he did frequently argue against skeptical views. In his early writings, despite the passage quoted just now, he does sometimes give the impression that he thinks one can refute skepticism by simply bringing forward a straightforward case of knowledge, such as "I know that this is a pencil". But on examination it turns out that his strategy here is more subtle. He wants to argue that we get our understanding of knowledge primarily through straightforward cases of this kind, and thus that skeptical arguments are self-undermining, for on the one hand they rely on general principles about the limits of knowledge. Thus they assume some understanding of knowledge but on the other hand, they undermine this understanding by implying that there are no such straightforward cases of it. The force of arguments of this kind is disputable, since the skeptic can always present his argument as a "reductio ad absurdum" of the possibility of knowledge; and the same point applies to Moore's other attempts to convict the skeptic of some kind of pragmatic incoherence.

In two of his last works "Four Forms of Skepticism" and "Certainty" Moore dissatisfied with these earlier arguments and with the misunderstanding of his "proof", returned to the issue and set himself the challenge of refuting Cartesian skepticism. Notoriously, by the end of "Certainty" Moore acknowledges defeat : having agreed that if he doesnot know that he is standing up and talking, he accepts with reservations that he cannot know for certain that he is not dreaming. Most commentators agree that Moore lost his way here. But it is not clear where, since Moore makes no obvious mistake. Nonetheless the viability of a "common sense" response to skepticism remains an important feature of later discussions of the topic. Moore was clearly right when, for example, he remarked that despite Russell's frequent skeptical professions, Russell was nonetheless perfectly sure, without a shadow of doubt, on thousands of occasions, that he was sitting down. But what is

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

difficult to achieve here is a formulation of the skeptical dialectic which both shows the importance of Moore's "common sense" affirmations of certainty and yet avoids a dogmatic insistence that knowledge doesnot need to be vindicated in the face of skeptical argument.

The Proof of External World

In his an essay entitled "Proof of an External World" Moore poses skeptical hypotheses, such as "You may be dreaming" or "The world is 5 minutes old", and then provides his own response to them. Such hypotheses ostensibly create a situation where it is not possible to know that anything in the world exists. These hypotheses take the following form :

Where S is a subject, sp is a skeptical possibility, such as "the brain in a vat" hypothesis, and q is a knowledge claim about the world.

If S does not know that not-sp, then S does not know that q.

S does not know that not-sp.

∴ S does not know that q.

Moore doesnot attack on this skeptical argument, but he reverses this argument from being in the form of "modus ponens" to "modus tollens".

Moore argues :

If S doesnot know that not-sp, then

S does not know that q.

S knows that q

∴ S knows that not-sp.

This argument of Moore is often called as Moorean shift or G.E. Moore shift. Fred Dretske says about this shift that "one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens."[34] Moore further explains this argument with the example of his hands. Raising his right hand, he says that "here is one hand". Then he raises left hand and says that "and here is another." Here Moore takes his knowledge-claim q to be that he has two hands, without rejecting the

34. Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, P. 9

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

skeptic's premise, seeks to prove that we can know the skeptical possibility sp to be untrue.

According to Moore, a good proof must have three requirements—(a) The premises must be different from the conclusion. (b) The premises must be demonstrated. and, (c) The conclusion must follow from the premises. Moore claims that his proof of an external world meets all these three criteria or requirements. Some philosophers, who are inclined to skeptical doubts, have found this argument or proof is unconvincing.[35] According to them, Moore's second criterion for a good proof doesnot point out the difference between demonstrating the "perception" that his hands exist and demonstrating the "knowledge" that his hands exist.

The second objection is that Moore's intuition cannot be shared by everyone. If a person finds the skeptical possibility, sp, more intuitively likely than the knowledge claim, q, then for that person Moore's own defense of intuition provides a basis for their skepticism. In words of Wittgenstein, "I know ..... in its language-game it is not presumptuous, so that even if P implies Q, knowing P is true doesnot necessarily entail Q Moore has displaced "I know ...." from its language-game and derived a fallacy."[36]

Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell was born on 18th May, 1872 at Trelleck, Monmouthshire (England). He is best known for his work in Mathematical Logic and for his advocacy on behalf of a variety of socio-political causes, especially pacifism and nuclear disarmanent. He was born into the British nobility as the grandson of Earl Russell who was twice prime minister of Britain in the mid-19th century. He studied mathematics and philosophy at Cambridge University. He was influenced by the idealist philosopher, J.M.E. McTaggart at this university. However very soon he rejected Idealism in favour of an extreme Platonic Realism. In his early paper "On Denoting" (1905) he solved a notorious puzzle in the philosophy of language by

35. Daniel Podgorski, Intuition All Alone : on G.E. Moore's Tempting but insufficient answer to Radical Skepticism, in "The Gemsbok Retrieved", April, 13. 2016.
36. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, passage # 554.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

showing how phrases such as "The present king of France", which have no referents, function logically as general statements rather than as proper names. Russell later regarded this discovery, which came to be known as the "theory of descriptions", as one of his most important contributions to philosophy. He authored the famous books "Principia Mathematica" (3 Vols., 1910–13), "The Principles of Mathematics" (1903), "The Analysis of Mind" (1921), "The Analysis of Matter" (1927), "Human Knowledge : Its scope and Limits" (1948) and "A History of Western Philosophy" (1945). In addition, he also wrote "Marriage and Morals" (1929), "On Education" (1926), "The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism" (1920) and "Roads to Freedom" (1918). He died at the age of 89 in 1961.

Bertrand Russell is an unique British philosopher, because he does not think on metaphysical or epistemological problems and their solutions but he also tries to give a solution of socio-political problems. Therefore, he is called as an encyclopedic scholar. In his early writings he attempts to establish him as an empiricist philosopher, but in his later writings he deviates himself from empiricism and goes to neutralism. He has been influenced by the natural science, but his scientific thought is not experimental. His scientific thought is logical and rational. So, the method of his philosophical thought is also logical, rational and scientific. His view on "Logical Atomism" proves his scientific approach to philosophy based on logic and reason. Therefore Prof. B. K. Lal says that "the way of thinking in Russell's mind is always the same, though his ideas in different times are changeable. His way of thinking is always based on empiricism and rationalism. In other words, this way is a way of scientific common sense."[37]

Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description

According to Russell we get two kinds of knowledge— Knowledge of Truths and knowledge of things. The first kind of knowledge is not related to both knowledge by acquaintance and description. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are related to the second kind of knowledge, i.e., knowledge of things. In fact, we at first introduce ourselves to

37. Basant Kumar Lal, Samkalin Pashchatya Darshan, P. 172

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

things, and then we describe them. So, we get knowledge of things at two levels : primary level is acquaintance and secondary is description.

Knowledge by acquaintance is so simple that it is indefinable. It is an immediate knowledge. It is a knowledge of which we are directly aware. In other words, when we have a direct cognitive relation to an object, our knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. For example, we see a table. Here we directly aware of shape, colour, hardness etc. of the table. So, we do not know the table directly, but what we know is the sensedata of the table. Shape, colour, hardness etc. are sensedata. Through sensedata we know the table. Therefore a table or any physical objects cannot be known directly. It is clear that the direct knowledge of sensedata of an object is knowledge by acquaintance, and the indirect knowledge of an object is knowledge by description. We describe the colour, shape etc. of the table, but we cannot describe colour, shape etc. themselves because they are beyond description. Thus, knowledge by acquaintance is indescribable and simple knowledge by description, as it's name, is describable and complex. Knowledge by acquaintance is independent, knowledge by description is dependent.

According to Russell, we besides sensedata, get the knowledge of memory through knowledge by acquaintance. Our memory is directly aware of. It doesnot need any mediatory weapon (means). The knowledge which we get through introspection is also a direct and immediate knowledge. So, this introspective knowledge is the subject matter of knowledge by acquaintance. Feelings of pain, happiness, hungriness etc. are introspective knowledge. "Self-consciousness" is also an example of knowledge by acquaintance, because it is directly and immediately aware to us. Knowledge of self-consciousness leads the knowledge of "I" too. "I" is not self or soul, but it is a knower or a person who feels his pain, happiness etc. So, "I" is an existent who see physical objects. Thus knowledge of I is also knowledge by acquaintance. We also know "universals" through knowledge by acquaintance. Whiteneness, honesty, meekness etc. are general ideas because Whiteness resides in physical objects like wall, clothes, pens, papers etc. So these ideas are universals. These ideas cannot be described. These are so simple that they are immediately and directly known. So, universals are

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

also the subject matter of knowledge by acquaintance. According to Russell, each and every proposition has an "universal". A proposition or sentence has a verb and verbs are universals. Noun or subject in a proposition represent particulars, but predicates (verbs, adjective etc.) are universals. Universals are concepts, according to Russell, because they reside in particulars. For example, whiteness is found in many white particular objects.

Russell means description as "phrase" in the form of "a so and so", "the so and so". The phrase which has "a so and so" is called as an ambiguous or indefinite description. The phrase which has "the so and so" is called as definite description. Any man, a book, an animal etc. are examples of indefinite description or phrase. But "the author of Meghdoot", "That man", "this cow" etc. are examples of definite description. According to Russell, through knowledge by description we get only knowledge of definite description. Description of an object (physical) points out that the object is "of such kind." "This table is brown"—this proposition definitely describes the definite colour of a particular definite table. Similarly, the author of Meghdoot describes the particular definite writer who wrote this particular definite book.

According to Russell "proper names" reflects the definite description in our mind. But this description needs the acquaintance too. In fact knowledge by description ultimately rests on knowledge by acquaintance. "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquaintaed."[38]

Theory of Descriptions

In the previous caption "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" I have mentioned two kinds of descriptions—Indefinite and definite. In this caption I shall analyze these two kinds of descriptions in the view of Russell.

Indefinite descriptions have their form in the phrase "a so and so". "I met a man" is my answer of questioning "who did you meet?" This question really means "what do I really assert when I assert "I met a man"? Now, for a moment anyone can assume that my

38. Quoted in James Baillie, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, P. 46

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

assertion is true, because I, in fact, met Jones. This assumption means clearly what I assert is not "I met Jones". I may say "I met a man but it was not Jones." In this case, though I lie, I do not contradict myself, as I should do if when I say "I met a man I really mean that I met Jones." Not only Jones but no actual man enters into my statement. This is obvious that when the statement is false because there is no more reason why Jones should be supposed to enter into the proposition than anyone else should. Though the statement could not possibly be true, indeed it would remain significant, even if there were no man at all. "I met a unicorn" or "I met a sea-serpent" is a perfectly significant assertion, if we know what it would be to be a unicorn or a sea-serpent, in other words what is the definition of these fabulous monsters. Definitions are nothing but concepts. Thus, it is only what we may call the "concept" that enters into the proposition. For example, in the case of "unicorn" there is only the concept. Thus it is significant, though false, to say "I met a unicorn", it is clear that this proposition, rightly analysed, doesnot contain a constituent "a unicorn", though it contains the concept "unicorn". Here we confront the question of "unreality", a very important question.

According to Russell, the great majority of those logicians who have dealt with this question have dealt it on mistaken lines, misled by grammar. They have regarded grammatical form as a surer guide in analysis than, in fact, it is. They have not known what differences in grammatical form are important. "I met Jones" and "I met a man" would count traditionally as propositions of the same form, but in actual fact they are of quite different forms. The first names an actual person, Jones. But the second involves a "propositional function." We can explicit this (second) proposition in such way : "The function 'I met x and x is human' is sometimes true." It is obvious that the first proposition is not the form of "I met x", which accounts for the existence of the proposition "I met a unicorn" in spite of the fact that there is no such thing as "a unicorn".

In absence of propositional functions, as Russell opined, many logicians reached the conclusion that there are unreal objects like "the golden mountain", "the round square" and so on. We can make true propositions of which these are the subjects. Hence they must have some kind of logical being, otherwise the propositions in which

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

they occur would be meaningless. But this view of many logicians including Meinong is a failure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies. According to Russell, Logic must no more admit a unicorn than zoology, can, because logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, in spite of it has more abstract and general characters. To say that unicorns have an existence in heradly is a most pitiful and paltry evasion. What exists in heradly is not an animal, made of flesh and blood, moving and breathing of its own initiative. What exists is a picture, or, a description in words. Thus unicorns, golden mountains, round squares are nothing but pseudo-objects.

The sense of reality is vital in logic and very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions about the above mentioned pseudo-objects. In the process of correct analysis of these propositions, we have to admit that there is no unreal or pseudo objects. If there is nothing unreal, the question raises "could we admit anything unreal ?" The reply is that, in dealing with propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols. If we attribute significance to groups of symbols which have no significance, we shall fall into the error of admitting unrealities, in the only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described. In the proposition "I met a unicorn", there are four words and all together make a significant proposition, the word "unicorn" by itself is significant as good as the word "man" significant in just the same sense. But two words "a" and "unicorn", that is, "a unicorn" do not form a subordinate group having a meaning of its own. If we falsely attribute meaning to these words, we find ourselves in trouble with "a unicorn". The trouble or problem is how there can be such a thing in the world where there are no unicorns. "A unicorn" is an indefinite description which describes nothing. It is not an indefinite description which describes something unreal. Such a proposition as "x is unreal" only has meaning when "x" is a description—either definite or indefinite. In that case the proposition will be true if "x" is a description which describes nothing. But whether the description "x" describes something describes nothing, it is in any case not a constituent of the proposition in which it occurs, like " unicorn" just now, it is not a subordinate group having a meaning of its own. All this results from the fact that when "x" is a description,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"x is unreal" or "x does not exist" is not nonsense, but it is always significant and sometimes true. For example the proposition "men exist" or "a man exists" if the propositional function "x is human" is sometimes true. Generally "a so and so" exists if "x is so and so" is sometimes true. The proposition "Socrates is a man"is no doubt equivalent to "Socrates is human", but it is not the very same proposition. The "is" of "Socrates is a man" expresses identity. The identity in "Socrates is a man" is identity between an object named (Socrates is a name) and an object ambiguously described. An object described ambiguously will "exist", when at least one such proposition is true. In other words, when there is at least one true proposition of the form "x is a so and so", where "x" is a name. It is the feature of indefinite or ambiguous descriptions that there may be any number of true propositions of the above form—Socrates is a man, Plato is a man etc. Thus "a man exists" follows from Socrates, or, Plato or anyone else. But the definite descriptions "x is the so and so" can only be true for one value of "x" at most. This brings us to the subject of definite descriptions, which are to be defined in a way analogous to that employed for indefinite or ambiguous descriptions but rather more complicated.

Now, we come to the definite description "the so and so". Though "a so and so" phrase and "the so and so" phrase are different in their character, the first phrase can be applied to the second. In the case of "a so and so", it is fairly obvious that no one could suppose that "a man" was a definite object, which could be defined by itself. "Socrates is a man" "Plato is a man", "Aristotle is a man". However we cannot infer that "a man" means the same as Socrates means, as Plato means and as Aristotle means. All these three names have different meanings. When we have enumerated all the men in the world, there is nothing left of which we can say, "This is a man, and not only so, but it is the "a man", the quintessential entity that is just an indefinite man without being anybody in particular". It is, of course, quite clear that whatever there is in the world is definite. If it is a man, it is one definite man and not any other. It implies that there cannot be such entity as "a man" to be found in the world, as opposed to specific men. Thus, it is natural that we do not define "a man" itself, but only the propositions in which it occurs. In the case of "the so and so" it is equally true, though at first sight less obvious. This

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

can be understood by a consideration of the difference between "a name" and "a definite description". For example, in the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverly" we have a name "Scott" and also a description "the author of Waverly", which are asserted to apply to the same person.

Russell distinguishes between a name and all other symbols in the following way : A name is a simple symbol whose meaning is something that can only occur as subject, i.e., something of the kind which can be defined as an "individual" or a "particular". A "simple" symbol is one which has no parts that are symbols. Thus, "Scott" is a simple symbol, though it has parts as constituents of separate letters, s, c, o, t, t, but these parts or letters are not symbols. "The author of Waverley" is not a simple symbol, because the separate words "the", "author", "of", "waverley" which compose the phrase or the definite description are parts and they are symbols. Now, we have to compare two things : (a) a name, which is a simple symbol, directly designating an individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings of all other words. (b) a description, which consists of several words, whose meanings are already fixed, and from which results whatever is to be taken as the "meaning" of the description.

A proposition, which contains a description, is not identical with the proposition substituted by a name, even if the name names the same object as the description describes. The proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" is obviously different from the proposition is a historical fact, the second is a trivial truism. If we put anyone other than Scott in place of "the author of Waverley", our proposition would become false. Therefore, it would certainly no longer be the same proposition. However, our proposition is essentially of the same form as "Scott is Sir Walter" in which two names are said to apply to the same person.

If "Scott is Sir Walter" really means "the person named "Scott" is the person named "Sir Walter", then names are being used as descriptions. It means that the individual, instead of being named, is being described as the person having that name. In this way names are frequently used in practice.

When a name is used directly, merely to indicate what we are speaking about, it is no part of the fact asserted, or of the falsehood

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

if our assertion happens to be false; it is merely part of the symbolism by which we express our thought. What we want to express is something which might be translated into a foreign language, it is something for which the actual words are vehicle, but of which they are no part. On the other hand when we make a proposition about the person called "Scott", the actual name "Scott" enters into what we are asserting, and not merely into the language used in making the assertion. Now the proposition will be different, if we substitute the person called "Sir Walter". But so long as we are using names as names, whether we say "Scott" or "Sir Walter" is as irrelevant to what we are asserting as whether we speak English or French. Thus so long as names are used as names, "Scott is Sir Walter" is the same trivial proposition as "Scott is Scott". This proves that "Scott is the author of Waverley" is not the same proposition as results from substituting a name for "the author of Waverley", no matter what name may be substituted. It can be explained in other way. By using a variable "X" and speak of propositional function ϕx we may apply general statements about "X" to the particular one by substituting a name for "x" and assuming that ϕ is a function which has individuals for its arguments. Suppose that, ϕx is "always true". It means that we accept the "law of identity", $x = x$. Now, we can substitute for "x" any name what we choose, and obtain a true proposition. Here Socrates, Plato or Aristotle is name which has substituted for "x" and the proposition is "Socrates is Socrates" or "Plato is Plato" or "Aristotle is Aristotle" and all these propositions are true by the law of identity. But some propositions, being identical like these propositions are not true. For example, "the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley" is not true, though it seems identical proposition. Because this proposition is different from the proposition "Socrates is Socrates" or "Plato is Plato" or "Aristotle is Aristotle". "The author of Waverley" is not a proper name as Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. The proposition "The author of Waverley is the author of Waverley" is false as good as the proposition "the round square is the round square" or "the present king of France is the present king of France" is false. Thus when we substitute a description for a name, propositional functions which are "always true" may become false, if the description describes nothing.

The difference between the phrase "a so and so" and the phrase

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"the so and so" is only the implication of uniqueness. We cannot speak of "the inhabitant of London", because inhabiting London is an attribute which is not unique. We cannot speak about "the present king of France", because there is none. But we can speak about "the present king of England". Thus, propositions about the "the so and so" always imply the corresponding propositions about "a so and so". The proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" could not be true, if "Waverley" had never been written, or, if several people had written it, and no more could any other proposition resulting from a propositional function "x" by the substitution of "the author of Waverley" for "x". We may say that "the author of Waverley" means "the value of x for which 'x wrote Waverley' is true." Thus, the proposition "the author of Waverley was Scott" involves at least three meanings :

(i) "x wrote Waverley" is not always false.

(ii) "If x and y wrote Waverley", x and y are identical" is always true.

(iii) "If x wrote Waverley, x was Scott" is always true.

All these three propositions may be translated into ordinary language as such :

(i) At least one person wrote Waverley.

(ii) At most one person wrote Waverley.

(iii) Whoever wrote Waverley was Scott.

All these three propositions are implied by "the author of Waverley was Scott". Conversely say, the three together (but no two of them) imply that "the author of Waverley was Scott". We can further simplify all these three propositions. The first and second together are equivalent to : "There is a term c such that "x wrote Waverley" is true, when x is c and false, when x is not c. In other words, there is a term c such that "X wrote Waverley" is always equivalent to "x is c". It is a logical rule that when two propositions are either true or false simultaneously, they are equivalent. Here, we see two functions of x—"x wrote Waverley" and "x is c", and form a function of c by considering the equivalence of these two functions of x for all values of x. Now, we proceed to assert that the resulting function of c is "something true", i.e. that it is true for at least one value of c. These two conditions together are defined as giving the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

meaning of "the author of Waverley exists." Now, we can define "the term satisfying the function ϕx exists." This is the general form of which the above is a particular case. "The author of Waverley" is "the term satisfying the function "x wrote Waverley". It means that "the so and so" will always involve reference to some propositional function, namely, that which defines the property that makes a thing "a so and so". Our definition is as follows : "The term satisfying the function ϕx exists" means "there is a term c such that ϕx is always equivalent to "x is c".

Now, the third proposition "whoever wrote Waverley was Scott" may be analysed in the following way : "There is a term c such that (i) "x wrote Waverley" is always equivalent to "x is c", (ii) c is Scott. And generally "the term satisfying ϕx satisfies ψx" is defining as meaning : There is a term c such that (i) ϕx is always equivalent to "x is ψ", (ii) ϕc is true. This is the definition of propositions in which descriptions occur.

Russell maintains that descriptions occur in propositions in two ways, or, there are two kinds of occurrances : primary and secondary. A description has a "primary" occurance when the proposition in which it occurs results from substituting the description for "x" in some propositional function ϕx. A description has a secondary occurance when the result of substituting the description for "x" in ϕx gives only part of the proposition concerned. "The present king of France is bald." This example clearly distinguishes between two occurances-primary and secondary. This proposition is a primary occurance and is false. Every proposition in which a description which describes nothing has a primary occurance is false. But the proposition "the present king of France is not bald", is ambiguous. If we firstly take "x is bald", then substitute "the present king of France" for x and then deny the result, the occurance of "the present king of France" is secondary and the proposition is true. But if we are to take "x is not bald" and substitute "the present king of France" for "x", then "the present king of France" has a primary occurance and the proposition is false. Confusion of primary and secondary occurances is a ready source of fallacies where descriptions are concerned. These two occurances, primary and secondary, are nothing but references which signify the meaning (sense) of a proposition.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Sense and Reference

James Baillie points out two puzzles involved in Russell's theory of descriptions.[39] The first is concerned with "identical statements", and secondly "negative existentials". How do we account for the difference between "A is A" and "A is B"? If A and B are coreferential terms, then by the referential theory of meaning the two statements must be equivalent. But clearly they are not equivalent. One statement (A is A) is tautology and the other (A is B) is an empirical discovery. One can believe that A is A without believing that A is B. Idea of "identical statements" influences Frege. By inspiring this first puzzle Frege distinguishes between sense and meaning (reference) in his own way.

Now, we come to the second puzzle. Take an example, "Satan does not exist". Clearly this is a meaningful statement, because the subject "Satan" has meaning. If the meaning of a referring expression is the thing it denotes, then "Satan" must, in some sense, exist. Yet that is what the statement explicitly denies. Thus, the statement seems to be self-contradictory.

Russell gives solutions to these puzzles. He says that none of the grammatical subject terms in these problematic statements are genuine singular referring terms. They are descriptions and therefore they require an entirely different analysis to genuinely referring expressions, i.e., names. They are incomplete symbols, propositional functions. So, they are general expressions, concerning properties, not particular things.

Solution of these two puzzles given by Russell and Frege is different. Russell insists on a distinction between names and descriptions, but Frege not. Russell rejects Frege's introduction of "Sinn" which sticks to a pure referential theory. We should understand these differences with some examples. The famous and popular example Russell has taken is "The present king of France is bold". According to Frege in this proposition there is no reference, because one of its components, the descriptive phrase, lacks a referent. However, Frege says that this proposition must express a thought, because the description has a sense. But Russell doesnot accept this view of Frege. According to him, this proposition has no

39. Ibid, P. 43

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

sense but reference only. Now, we take examples of "The author of Oliver Twist is dead". and "The author of David Copperfield is dead." These proposition, as Frege says, express different thoughts and the descriptions have different senses. Also, both propositions and their embedded descriptions are coreferential. But according to Russell the descriptions are not referring expressions at all. Russell maintains that indefinite descriptions (a so and so), i.e., expressions of the form "an F" which prima facie have the potential to pick out more than one individual. For examples, "A philosopher is drunk in the Twilight Room", and "Jim Baillie is drunk in the Twilight Room". The first proposition is true, because some philosophers be drunk in the designated location. "some" does not mean "specific", it means anyone, or we can say "all". But the second proposition denotes the "specific" name. This proposition is true, if the first proposition is true, but not vice-versa. In other words, from the second proposition, being true, we cannot draw the truth of first proposition. According to Russell, the truth-conditions of the first proposition make essential reference to my "good self", where as the truth-conditions of second proposition mention no person or object all, but express a relation between two properties (being a philosopher and being drunk in the Twilight Room) which have at least one coinstantiation.

Russell, in similar way, analyzes the definite descriptions with the example of "The present king of France is bald." He says,

(i) There is at least one thing which is a present king of France.

(ii) There is at most one thing which is a present king of France.

(iii) Whatever is a present king of France is bald.

Here the analysis shows "a present king of France", not "the present king of France." It means that the analysis of this proposition mentions a propositional function only. Thus this proposition is really a conjunction of all these three distinct claims, and is false.

(a) "The author of Waverley is Scottish", and (b) "Sir Walter Scott is Scottish." These two propositions have different truth-conditions. So they say different things. There is no reference to "Sir Walter Scott" in the proposition (a). It merely mention the property of being "the author of Waverley" is uniquely instantiated by something "Scottish". If it would be true if any other Scott wrote that book. So,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

as before, the true logical form concerns a relation between properties, with no reference to individuals. Here Russell falls in a fallacy, as James Baillie points out, and the fallacy is "accusations of inconsistency."[40] According to James Baillie, Russell is committed to denying that "Sir Walter Scott" is a name but as much a description as "the author of Waverley". In fact, Russell uses "Sir Walter Scott" to stand in for name in order to illustrate the distinction between names and descriptions.

Logical Atomism

As Russell himself says that the philosophy of logical atomism faces the following problems :

(a) Does it discover the kinds of atoms from out of which logical structure are composed ?

(b) Are the things that look like logically complex entities really complex ?

(c) Are they really entities ?

The problem (a) and (b) leads to the logical structure of logical atomism, the problem (c) is related to metaphysical structure of logical atomism. Therefore Prof. B. K. Lal says that "there are two sides of the philosophy of logical atomism—Logical and Metaphysical."[41] Before discussing these two sides, we must define logical atomism. Here there are two terms—logical and atomism. Atomism is a metaphysical theory which points out that the ultimate reality of the world is "atoms", as Greek philosopher Democritus says. An Atom is an indivisible and the simplest element. Russell also accepts that atoms are simplest and indivisible, but they are not "physical" or "material" as Democritus says, but they are "logical" one. We cannot reach these simplest and indivisible atoms through the process of physical analysis. We have to adopt the process of logical analysis to reach these atoms. Therefore Russell says that his atomism is logical, not physical or material. According to him there are at least three characteristics of atomism. Firstly it is a metaphysical theory which gives us the knowledge of universe. Secondly, atomism is pluralistic, because it

40. Ibid, P. 45

41. B. K. Lal, Ibid, P. 194

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

assumes that there are many different things in the universe which are made of different atoms. Thirdly and finally, atomism has a unique and specific character and that is to seek atoms for explaining the universe is the end (aims) of our thought. Russell accepts all these characteristics and applies to his logical atomism too. Logical atomism also seeks to the simplest element for explaining the universe. However, logical atomism is different from traditional or ancient atomism.

Ancient atomism is purely metaphysical and material, but logical atomism is neither metaphysical nor material rather than logical. It is also not spiritual, like Leibnitz "monads"—a spiritual atoms. According to Russell, we know the universe through which atoms are a language unit. So, we know facts from logical propositions. These facts are logical or linguistic but not physical or mental (spiritual). We reach these facts through the process of logic. So these facts are logical and atomic. Some facts are particulars and some are relation or qualities or predicates. Shape, colour, sound etc. are particulars.

To know facts we have to adopt the method of analysis. In fact, logic has its best method in the process of analysis. Generally we know material or existent elements as facts, but Russell denies it. According to Russell no any existent objects are called as facts. Facts are complex entities as tables, chairs, the Sun, persons etc. All the kinds of things to which we habitually give proper names are on the face of them complex entities as Socrates, Napolean etc. According to Russell, the Sun is not fact but is the fact that the sun rises in the east everyday. Napolean is not the fact but the fact is that he has married with Josephin. Tables are not facts but the fact is that they are oblong. These analysis of complex entities shows that tables, Napolean etc. are not facts but qualities and relations are facts. "Oblong" is a quality of a table, and marriage of Napolean to Josephin is a relation between two persons. Thus facts mean relations and qualities. It means that facts cannot be expressed by names or a word. In stead of they must be expressed in propositions. Hence Russell says that facts are such which indicate truth or false of a proposition. "It is raining"—this proposition is true for the rainy season, but false for other seasons. Similarly 2 + 2 = 4 is a true proposition and 2 + 2 = 5 is a false proposition in regard to

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

arithmatics (mathematics). Thus, Russell gives the definition of facts as such : Facts are such which make propositions true or false.

In fact, the relation of facts and words or names are not as good as the relation of facts and propositions. Socrates is a complex proper name. The name is not true or false. But when we say that "Socrates is alive." This proposition makes the fact as truth or false. This proposition is really false. But when we say that "Socrates is not alive", the proposition is true. Thus facts themselves are not true or false, but they make propositions as true or false. According to Russell, facts are parts of objective world, so they are objective. We cannot constitute facts. We generally assume that objective facts reside in the world are particulars. But Russell denies it. In his view, if we make an "inventory" of the objective world, we cannot mention only particulars but facts too. Then our inventory will complete. In other words, we can say that the experience of relations of particulars with each other is facts. Rose and redness are not facts, but the experience of "rose is red" is fact.

In ordinary experience we assume that facts are the same. But in Russell's view they are different, because propositions are various kinds and facts make propositions as true or false. So, facts are also of various kinds.

Particular and General Facts : A definite fact which makes a definite proposition as true or false is a particular fact. "This is white". It is a definite proposition which will be true, if "this is white" is real. But it is false, if this proposition is not real.

From which facts a general proposition becomes true or false, those facts are general. In other words, general facts make general propositions true or false. For example, "All men are mortal". This is a general proposition. From which facts this will be either true or false are general facts. However, some critics say that to accept truth or falsity of a general proposition it is not essential to use general facts, because at last it depends upon particular facts, "A is mortal", "B is mortal", "C is mortal" .... therefore "all men are mortal". So, the truth or falsity of a general proposition ultimately depends upon particular facts. So, there is no need of general facts. But Russell doesnot agree with this view. He says that all these particular propositions are premises from which we draw the conclusion of "all men are mortal". Conclusion is not particular but

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

general proposition. So, it needs general facts to prove its truth or falsity. In fact A is mortal, B is mortal, C is mortal .... etc. are particular propositions separately, but they meet altogether and make a universal proposition "All men are mortal." So, universal propositions must have general facts. Russell further distinguishes between facts which denotes particular objects or things, qualities and relations and wholly general facts. Some facts are such which denotes qualities (table is oblong), gives information or relation (A is the son of B). But some facts doesnot indicate relations or qualities but they are purely universals. Truth and falsity of these facts do not depend upon particular facts but logical facts. For example, "if a square is part of the other square, the member of this class of square must be the member of that (other) class of square." This proposition expresses only the logical relation, does not indicate qualities or relation of particular facts or not denotes particular things. It is merely a logical expression of universal or general facts, because the above proposition indicates only universal or general facts. In other words, wholly general facts merely inform logical relation, i.e., syntax, and they are logical facts.

Positive and Negative facts : Facts which make the proposition like "Socrates was alive" or "This wall is white" true or false are called as positive facts. But facts which make the proposition like "Socrates is not alive" or "This wall is not black" true or false are called as negative facts. Some critics say that there is no need of negative facts, because from which facts any affirmative proposition be true or false, the same facts prove any negative proposition be true or false. For example if "this wall is white" is true from which facts, "this wall is not white" be false from the same facts. But Russell refutes it. According to him, "This wall is white" and "This wall is not black". Both propositions are true in regard to "this wall". Both are true on the same (positive) facts. It means there is no need of negative facts, because "This wall is not black" simply indicates that "this wall is white". Russell says that it is a misunderstanding. "This wall is not black" does never imply this wall as white. May be, "not black" implies "green", "yellow", "blue" etc. Therefore, for being a negative proposition true or false, negative facts are essential. Similarly "Socrates is not alive" doesnot depend upon for its truth and falsity on positive facts rather than

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

negative facts. This proposition doesnot prove from any positive facts. Its truth or falsity always depends on negative facts.

Intentional fact and Atomic fact : The proposition "A believes that his wife loves B." Now, the problem is by which facts this proposition can be proved true or false. If we analyse this proposition, we must find two subpropositions—(i) A believes (ii) His wife loves B. If subproposition (ii) is true or false, no matter for truth or falsity of the whole proposition. Truth and falsity of this proposition depends upon the "intention" of subproposition (i). So, belief of A has intention towards his wife and B. Thus, truth or falsity of "intentional facts" inherent in beliefs. Atomic facts have significance place in Russell's "Logical Atomism". Atomic facts are used for the simplest facts, or they are synonymous to the simplest facts. These facts are not only simplest, but indivisible too. They are partless. However, a proposition or statement which expresses atomic facts is not simple, because it has two or more constituents. "This is white" this proposition has two constituents—an object and qualities of object. "This" is an object, "whiteness" is its quality. Now, we take other example, "A is right to B". This proposition has three constituents—A, B and relation (right). "P hates R due to S" in this proposition there are four constituents—P, R, S and relation (hateness). All these examples of propositions show that all these propositions have different constituents, two, three, four. But the facts which they expresses are the same, not different. Here, facts are things or persons, qualities and relations. These are simple facts organised in hierarchical order. Therefore, Russell terms the organisation of simple or atomic facts as "hierarchy of atomic facts".

Quality and relation are constituents of atomic facts. These constituents have been expressed by "verb" or "predicates". The constituents like two, three, four which are relations are particulars in Russell's view. Clearly, atomic facts inhere particulars. There are many particulars in one atomic fact, and all particulars are related with together. Therefore, Russell defines particulars as "constituents related to atomic facts." Relations always express in propositions. So, we must have to distinguish between proposition and atomic proposition.

Proposition and Atomic Proposition : Russell defines proposition as a sentence in the indicative, a sentence asserting

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

something, not questioning, or commanding or wishing. It is a system of words which make the proposition true or false. Russell says that all propositions are symbols—complex symbols. Propositions are complex, because it has constituents. So, symbols, having constituents are complex. Symbols are not merely signs but it has meaning. Symbols seem in what form is not their meaning. Their meanings are different to as they seem. There is a relation between "symbol" and "what symbols indicate". Both these terms indicate "existence", "reality" etc., even then they are different. Because, characteristics of symbols cannot apply to things which are indicated by symbols. Being a complex symbol a proposition has its constituents or parts. Parts of a proposition are also symbols. But the way of knowing parts of a proposition and that of a proposition itself is not the same. "Rose is red" is a proposition and its part is "red". We know "red" through knowledge by acquaintance. But the proposition "Rose is red" is known through the description. However, it is not necessary to know this proposition earlier. It can at once be known if we know the meaning of rose and also that of red. So, knowledge by description depends upon the meaning of parts or constituent of a proposition. "Rose" and "red" are facts, but the proposition "Rose is red" is not a fact. It simply describes facts. What is difference between proposition and name will be discussed in the forwarding pages.

According to Russell logical atomism is meant by a relation between propositions and facts, but this relation is not the same as between words and facts. Propositions do not give "names" to facts. There are two kinds of relation regarding facts and propositions : the relation of truth and the relation of falsity. "This wall is white". Here facts are "wall" and "white". Their relation is affirmative, so the proposition is true. It is the relation of truth. Vice-versa, "this wall is not white" has the negative relation between facts "wall" and "white". So this proposition has the relation of falsity.

Russell further distinguishes two kinds of propositions : Atomic and Molecular. Atomic proposition is the simplest proposition. It has only one "verb". It indicates a specific quality or relation. Some propositions are simple. Russell divides terms them as molecular and them into two kinds—Mixed and Complex. Mixed proposition is such which "atoms" are atomic propositions. By assembling two or

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

more atomic propositions together, construct an atomic proposition, and this atomic proposition is called "mixed molecular proposition". Two or more atomic propositions assemble with each other through the conjuncts "or", "if", "and" etc. For example "Ram is intelligent and Shyam is laborious", "If it rains, I will go out with umbrella", "He is either honest or fool", etc. Conversely, when we use more than one verb in a proposition, the proposition is called "complex molecular proposition". For example, "I believe that our team will win". This is an "intentional" proposition which has more than one verb-believe, will and win. So, this proposition is complex molecular proposition.

Russell gives examples for atomic proposition but he varies.[42] Sometimes he gives the example of "this is" and sometimes only "this". Wittgenstein says that there is no need of examples to explain an atomic proposition. According to him there is a logical necessity for atomic propositions. Atomic propositions exist according to its logical demands. So, it is essential logical demands for atomic propositions, not examples. Without examples we can easily understand atomic propositions. But Russell does not support this view, and feels for giving examples in the form of "this" or "this is" to understand atomic propositions. In his view atomic propositions indicate facts. He distinguishes between proposition and name. Propositions indicate facts but name indicates "particulars". There are two ways of indicating. "Socrates is mortal". This proposition indicates two facts : either Socrates is mortal or Socrates is not mortal. First fact will be true and the second will be false. It means these facts (Socrates and mortal) make an atomic proposition as either true or false. In regard to molecular proposition it is not the case. "Ram is either laborious or honest." We can symbolize this proposition as "pvq" (p denotes laborious, and q denotes honest", Ram is common in both propositions). This proposition includes two atomic propositions—Ram is laborious and Ram is honest. It is a disjunctive proposition according to Aristotlean Logic. But Russell says there is no any disjunctive fact here. This proposition does not depend upon only one fact for its truth or falsity. If both p and q are true, this proposition will be true. If both p and q are false, this proposition will be false. So, the truth and falsity of a molecular

42. Ibid, P. 203

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

proposition depends upon the truth or falsity of its constituents. Here the constituents are p and q. These constituents are atomic propositions. Clearly, indication of facts by molecular propositions must depend indication of atomic propositions. In other words, the foundation of facts-indication through molecular propositions is facts-indication of atomic propositions.

The primary aim of logical atomism is to list inventory of primary (original) elements and we know this inventory through language. But it is very difficult to find out which language can successfully analyse facts and elements. In this regard Russell faces two questions : (i) What knowledge we gain from what languages ? (ii) What is the logical analysis of claims which give knowledge of the world ? The reply of first question is : the immediate knowledge of world we get from the unit of language which is atomic and molecular propositions. Molecular proposition is finally made of atomic proposition. Russell explains this answer as follow :

(A) Propositions are symbols. Symbols means the indication of some "other" from "some". Propositions give knowledge of "other" which is different from propositions. The basis of this knowledge is "meaning" of facts used in propositions. Meaning may be ambiguous. For example, "Socrates is mortal". Socrates means a man, mortal means a quality and this proposition is fact. Merely "Socrates" or merely "mortal" cannot indicate facts because they are words only. But when the proposition "Socrates is mortal" completes, it indicates fact. "Socrates" is a proper name, and "mortal" is a predicate. From proper names we know "particulars". But in view of Russell the logical meaning of "Socrates" is not a proper name. This is only description. Proper names raise different "descriptions" in different human minds. "Socrates" may be an indication of a man. It may be an indication of a book, may be it is the name of a house etc. So, proper names give only description, not indicate "particulars". However, Russell says that we can indicate "particulars" by "logically proper name". It is very difficult to give examples of logically proper name. Even then Russell tries to give example as "this" and "that". If we can gain the immediate knowledge of any particular in any moment, it will be called "this".

According to Russell, predicates are qualities or relations. These are different from "names". To understand any name it is necessary

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

to have the knowledge by acquaintance of a particular. It is also necessary to know whether the name indicates that particular. Without proposition we cannot understand predicates. "Red" is a predicate. But what is the real meaning of this word we can never know if it will not use in a proposition like "Rose is red". Symbolically, we may say if "x" denotes "this", then "this is red" replaces as "x is red". It means we know "x" as red.

(B) Russell replies the first question in other way too. According to him general propositions are not existential. For example, "All Indians are men." The proposition does not indicate the word "Indians", but indicates the truth of all values in a propositional function of general propositions. The statement which has more than one undetermined constituents is called as propositional function, if these constituents would be determined. Then, this statement will be proposition. "x is man" is a propositional function, if we determine "x" (an undetermined constituent) as "Socrates" and the proposition will be "Socrates is man". Therefore, Russell says that the general proposition "All men are mortal" does not indicate "the existence of men" or "Men exist", because this proposition is a propositional function "if x is man, he is mortal" which all values are true. If propositional function is always true, then it is necessary. If it is sometimes true, not always, it is possible. If it is always false, then it is impossible. Thus, propositional function is of three kinds—necessary, possible and impossible. These are modalities which are characteristics of propositional function, not of propositions. Propositions are never necessary, possible or impossible. They are always either true or false.

Russell also says that existential propositions do not indicate "existence" but propositional function. Existence is not characteristic of existential proposition. It is characteristic of propositional function. "Man exists" means that at least one value of propositional function "x exists" is true. Here propositional function is possible, because "x" does not indicate any particular "man" rather it indicates the possibility of truth at least one existence.

Now, Russell gives the answer of second question. According to him, statements given for physical objects may be translated into sensedata statements. Table is a physical object. When we say that "table is brown", in fact we say about the sensedata of table which

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

is "brown" or "brownness". Similarly, statements regarding other minds, universals etc. can be transformed into statements of definite and clear elements. The method of this kind of transformation is found in the philosophy of mathematics. Theory of numbers, an important method of mathematics, points out how we transform perfect mathematical language into logical language. For this there are two conditions : to decide logical form in which transformation will be, and, to see finally in which kinds of elements transformation will be in course of analysis. So that definiteness in elements will come and contradictions will go. Fulfilling these conditions Russell draws an outline of precise language (in his philosophy of mathematics) in which indefiniteness or contradictions have no place or negligible place. Statements which claim the knowledge of world, by analysing we have to see whether these statements will transform into the language of atomic propositions or not. Facts are indicated by atomic propositions. Now, if statements claiming the knowledge of world (statements regarding facts) are finally made of atomic propositions, the claim indicating facts of world must be true. On this basis Russell analyses different kinds of statements, say, general statements, belief statements, existential statements.

The view mentioned in above paragraphs is the logical aspect of Logical Atomism. This aspect concludes that at least there must be a theory in which knowledge of such simple elements, which constructs the world, can be gained. These simple elements are called "metaphysical entities". Metaphysical entities are ultimate parts of the world through which the world is made of. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse metaphysical entities. The analysis of metaphysical entities is concerned with two problems :

(a) to find out the metaphysical entities through which the universe is made of.

(b) What is nature of metaphysical entities, if they are not as good as physical (empirical) objects known by our sense-experience. We know physical objects, persons etc. by our sense-experience. These objects are different from metaphysical entities.

Russell lists an inventory of such simple elements which construct the world. These elements are particulars, quality, relation and facts. Logically proper names indicate particulars.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Quality and relation are indicated by predicates and verbs. But propositions indicate facts. So, atomic propositions give the knowledge of atomic facts. Atomic facts are ultimate or metaphysical elements or entities. In our general experience we get the knowledge of physical objects and persons. We see a table. This experience of a table is not a metaphysical entity or substance. This particular table can be seen today, tomorrow and saw yesterday. But the table is the same, however, there is no identity among the seen table in different times. Rather it is different experiences (appearances) of the same table altogether. Therefore, Russell says that the table is a series of appearances. Series are logical fictions. Hence physical objects, being series of appearances, are logical fictions. It implies that physical objects are not metaphysical entities. Russell does not deny the existence of physical objects, but he accepts them as series of appearances, i.e., logical fictions. Physics mentions some primary atoms like electrons, protons etc. In Russell's view they are physical elements only, not metaphysical entities. They are also logical fictions like physical objects. Similarly, persons are also logical fictions, because they are also series of appearances. For example, we see James and do not have any experience of metaphysical entity through acquaintance of James. This acquaintance is based on series of our experiences. So, persons are also logical fictions, not metaphysical entity.

Thus, Russell analyses his philosophy of logical atomism in two ways : logical and metaphysical. But at last his analysis is merely logical, because the analysis of metaphysical aspect of logical atomism is finally a logical analysis. So, Logical atomism is only logical based on his principle of mathematics.

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

7. FREGE

Gottlob Friedrich Ludwig Frege was born on 8 November 1848 at Wismar, Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Germany) and died on 26 July, 1925 at Bad Kleinen (Germany). He was a German mathematician and logician. He studied at Jena university in 1866 and in 1868 he studied mathematics, physics, chemistry and philosophy for 2 years at Gotlingen university. After that he taught at the university of Jena from 1891 to 1917. He invented modern mathematical logic. Also, he was one of the founders of the analytic tradition in philosophy. His "Conceptscript" (1879) was the first presentation of a system of mathematical logic in the modern sense. Using an original notation of quantifiers and variables he was able to give formal expression to sentences containing multiple quantifcation, such as "Everybody loves someone"; this is impossible in the syllogistic derived from Aristotle, which had been considered complete until the time of Kant. In the "Basic Laws of Arithmatic" in two volumes he attempted to establish the doctrine later known as logicism. He also made significant contributions to the Philosophy of Language, including a highly influential theory of the distinction between sense and reference. Though Frege's works was admired by Russell and early Wittgenstein, it was unknown to or ignored by most other philosophers and mathematicians during Frege's lifetime, its significance was not generally appreciated until the mid-20th century.

Sense and Reference

Frege in his theory of meaning develops predicative expressions in a very wide sense in which even name of an "argument" is a proper name. The main point he stresses on the distinction between the "sense" and the "reference".

The reference of a proper name is the object it means or indicates, whereas its sense is what the name expresses. The

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

reference of a sentence is its truth value, whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses.[1] Frege justified the distinction in various ways :

(a) Sense is something possessed by a name, whether or not it has a reference. For example, the name "Odysseus" is intelligible, and therefore has a sense, even though there is no individual object (its reference) to which the name corresponds.

(b) The sense of different names is different, even when their reference is the same. Frege argued that if an identity statement such as "Hesperus is the same planet as Phosphorus" is to be informative, the proper names flanking the identity sign must have a different meaning or sense. But clearly, if the statement is true, they must have the sense reference.[2] The sense is a "mode of presentation", which serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the referent.[3]

Frege developed his original theory of meaning in early works like "Concept Script" of 1879 and "Foundations of Arithmetic" of 1884. On this theory, the meaning of a complete sentence consists in its being true or false[4], and the meaning of each significance in the sentence is an extralinguistic entity which called it "Bedeutung", literally meaning or significance, but rendered by Frege's translators as reference, referent, meaning, nominatum, etc. Frege supposed that some parts of speech are complete by themselves, and are analogous to the arguments of a mathematical function, but that other parts are incomplete, and contain an empty place, by analogy with the function itself.[5] "Thus Caesar conquered Gaul" divides into the complete term "Caesar", whose reference is Caesar himself, and the incomplete term "Conquered Gaul", whose reference is a concept. Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the complete sentence—its truth value—appear.

1. Frege, On sense and Reference, P. 31
2. Ibid, P 25
3. Ibid, P. 27
4. Evans Gareth, The Varieties of Reference, P. 8
5. Frege, Function and Concept, P. 16

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

This early theory of meaning explains how the significance or reference of a sentence (its truth value) depends on the significance or reference of its parts. Frege introduced the notion of sense to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning.

First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value.[6] The reference of the whole is determined by the reference of the parts. If the evening star has the same reference as the morning star, it follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun. But it is possible for someone to think that the first sentence is true, while also thinking that the second is false. Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its sense.

Second, sentences that contain proper names with no reference cannot have a truth value at all. Yet the sentence "Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep". Obviously has a sense, even though Odysseus" has no reference. The thought remains the same whether or not "Odysseus" has a reference. Furthermore, a thought cannot contain the objects that it is about. For example, Mont Blanc "with its snowfields", cannot be a component of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than four thousand metres high. Nor can a thought about Etna contain lumps of solidified lava.

The term "reference" has been the most widely adopted, but this fails to capture the meaning of the original German word "Bedeutung" (i.e., meaning or significance), and does not reflect the decision to standardise key terms across different editions of Frege's works published by Blackwell. (According to Beaney, the decision was taken at a meeting in the early 1970s attended by Michael Dummett, Peter Geach, William Kneale, Roger White and a representative from Blackwell. The translation of "Bedeutung" by meaning was unanimously agreed after lengthy discussion.) The decision was based on the principle of "exegetical neutrality", namely that if at any point in a text there is a passage that raises for the native speaker legitimate question of "exegesis", then if at all

6. Ibid, On sense and Reference, P. 32

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

possible, a translator should strive to confront the reader of his version with the same questions of "exegesis" and not produce a version which in his mind resolves those questions.[7] The term "meaning" best captures the standard German meaning of "Bedeutung" and Frege's own use of the term sounds as odd when translated into English as it does in German. Moreover, "meaning" captures Frege's early use of "Bedeutung" well, and it would be problematic to translate Frege's early use as "meaning" and his later use as "reference", suggesting a change in terminology not evident in the original German.

A disciple of Socrates, Antisthenes apparently distinguished "a general object that can be aligned with the meaning of the utterance" from "a particular object of extensional reference". According to Susan Prince, this suggests that he makes a distinction between sense and reference.[8] The principal basis of Prince's claim is a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias' comments on Artistotle's "Topics" with a three way distinction : the semantic medium, an object external to the semantic medium and the direct indication of a thing. The stoic theory of "lekta" refers to a correspondence between speech and the object referred to by the speech, as distinct from the speech itself. This has been cited as an anticipation of the distinction between sense and reference.[9]

The sense-reference distinction is commonly confused with that between "connotation" and "denotation", which originates with John Staurt Mill. According to Mill, a common term like "white" denotes all white things, as snow, paper. But according to Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract concept. We must distinguish between the relation of reference, which holds between a proper name and the object it refers to, such as between the name "Earth" and the planet "Earth",

---

7. P. Long and A. White, On the Translation of Frege's Bedeutung : A Reply to Dr. Bell, published in the journal "Analysis" and also D. Bell's article "On the Translation of Frege's Bedeutung" in the same journal, vol. 40, Oct. 1980, P. 196–202 & P. 191–195
8. S. H. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens : Texts, Translations and Commentary, P. 20
9. Ibid, P. 518–22

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and the relation of "falling under", such as when the Earth falls under the concept "planet". The relation of a proper name to the object it designates is direct, whereas a word like "planet" has no such direct relation to the Earth at all, but only to a concept that the Earth falls under. Moreover, judging of anything that it falls under this concept is not in any way part of our knowledge of what the word "planet" means. The distinction between connotation and denotation is closer to that between concept and object, than to that between sense and reference.

Bertrand Russell, in his theory of descriptions, held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact disguised definite descriptions. For example, Aristotle can be understood as the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander, or by some other uniquely applying description. This is known as the descriptive theory of names. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory.

Thus, Russell's theory of description was conflated with Frege's theory of sense, and for most of the 20th century this "Frege-Russell" view was the orthodox view of proper name semantics. However, Saul Kripke argued compellingly against the descriptivist theory. According to Kripke, proper names are rigid designators which designate the same object in every possible world. Descriptions such as "the President of U. S. in 1969" do not designate the same in every possible world. For example, someone other than Richard Nixon, e.g. Lyndon B. Johnson, might have been the President in 1969. Hence a description or cluster of descriptions cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot mean the same as a description. However, the Russellian descriptivist reading of Frege has been rejected by many scholars, in particular by Gareth Evans in "The Varieties of Reference" and by John McDowell in "The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name", following Michael Dummett who argued that Frege's notion of sense should not be equated with a description. Evan further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. He and McDowell both take the line that Frege's discussion of empty names and of the idea of sense without reference are inconsistent and that his apparent endorsement of descriptivism rests only on a small number of

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

imprecise and perhaps offhand remarks. And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction does have (i.e., to solve at least the first two problems), even if it is not given a descriptivist reading.

Frege's notion of sense is somewhat obscure, and neo-Fregeans have come up with different candidates for its role. Accounts based on the work of Carnap and Church treat sense as an intension or a function from possible worlds to extensions. For example, the intension of number of plants is a function that maps any possible world to the number of planets in that world. John McDowell supplies cognitive and reference-determining roles. Michael Devitt treats senses as causal-historic chains connecting names to referents, allowing that repeated "groundings" in an object account for reference change.

Reference does not determine sense. Often two expressions with the same reference will differ with respect to sense.

Indirect reference : Thus still doesnot explain what we should say about opaque contexts. Frege made the following suggestion about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions : "When words are used in the customary manner then what is talked about is their reference. But it may happen that one wants to talk about the words themselves or about their senses. The first occurs when one quotes someone else's words in direct (ordinary) discourse. In writing we make use of quotes enclosing the word-icons. In indirect discourse we speak of the sense, e.g., of the words of someone else. From this it becomes clear that also in indirect discourse, words do not have their customary reference; they here name what would ordinarily be their sense."

Concept and Object

According to Frege, the concept is predicative but the name of an object, i.e., a proper name is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate. This view has difficulties which derive from the fact that the subject of an assertion very often appears to name a concept, and proper names to function as grammatical predicates. All such assertions, as Frege says, are "systematically misleading." For example, "the morning star is Venus". This assertion certainly looks as if it were parallel to "the morning star is a planet" in which 'planet' is certainly predicative. But logical analysis is distinct

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

from a merely grammatical. Hence, it (logical analysis), in the thought of Frege, reveals that the "is" of the first assertion expresses identity, it is not the copulative "is" of predication. "The morning star is Venus" asserts that the expressions "the morning star" and "Venus" refer to the same object. Therefore, despite appearances "Venus" is not used predicatively.

Similarly, Frege suggests, in "all mammals have red blood "mammals" does not refer to the concept "mammal". This proposition merely asserts "whatever is a mammal is red-blooded", i.e., that certain (unnamed) objects come under both the concepts "mammal" and "red-blooded". Thus "mammals" in this sentence is predicative, not a subject, in spite of appearance.

A more serious difficulty arises out of the fact that there are statements about concepts in which "concepts are described in terms of second-order concepts." It is all very well to assert that "all mammals are red-blooded" describes not the concept "mammal", but the "extension" of this concept; that is the objects which can truly be described as "mammals"—we can see a certain point in the assertion that it is not the concept which is red-blooded. But in regard to the concept "round square" it is impossible to argue that we are really talking about a certain class of objects those referred to by the expression "round square", because it is the whole point of our remark that there are no such objects. Frege argues in his theory of arithmetic that numbers are assigned to concepts, not to objects. He has trouble to prove that numbers are nevertheless objects, not concepts. The problem still remains to show how, in statements in which we assign numbers to concepts, we can avoid to treat the concept as something which is named by the subject of our assertion. This trouble has been shown by denying the expression "the concept horse." In the words of Passmore, "In concept and object Frege distinguishes between subject, copula and predicate. So he speaks of the predicate in "the morning star is a planet" as "a planet", not, as Peirce would have said, "is a planet". But elsewhere Frege's view seems to be identical with Peirce's. A full account of Frege would have to take account of many such changes of view, or at least, of emphasis itself the name of a concept. In such a statement as "the concept horse is a familiar one", the subject, he says, is not the name of a concept, but the name of an object—"the concept horse". That

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

this is so comes out, Frege argues, in the fact that "concept horse" is preceded by the definite article "the", whereas true concepts are referred to by phrases containing the indefinite article "a". We speak of "a mammal", "a whole", "a man" in order to refer to a concept; of "the evening star", "the capital of Australia", in order to refer to an object. Similarly, then, "the concept horse" must be the name of an object, not of a concept."[10]

The above quotation clearly indicates that Frege distinguishes between concept and object. But this distinction yields the fallacy of Paradox. Here Frege says that "the concept horse is not a concept", but the city of Berlin is certainly a city and the volcano vesuvius a volcano. However Frege remarks that the parallel is not an exact one. We recognise the necessity of putting into quotation marks, the horse of "the concept horse", but we cannot feel such kind of necessity in regard to "Berlin" in "the city of Berlin". To talk about concepts we have first to "represented them by an object". This is accomplished by using the phrase "the concept x".

There is logical difference between "the concept x" and "x". x refers to a concept. According to Frege both "the concept x" and "x" work differently in sentences. A sentence which is perfectly sensible when "x" appears as a constituent within it is quite without meaning when "the concept x" is substituted for "x". For example, "there is at least one square root of 4." If we try to replace "square root of 4" by "the concept square root of 4", then according to Frege, the resulting sentence is neither true or false but senseless. Quite generally, if we try to use a proper name—the name of an "argument"—predicatively, i.e., in the manner of functioning appropriate only for a concept, the resulting sentence will be nonsensical. This fact may be concealed from us, because in our imperfect language the same phrase can stand indifferently for an object or for a concept. Here the question arises whether Frege is using a concept (operating with it predicatively) or talking about a concept (representing it by an object). Frege's insistence, as Passmore remarks, on this point is one of his most conspicuous legacies to recent philosophy.[11]

❑❑❑

10. John Passmore, A Hundrd years of Philosophy, P. 153
11. Ibid, P. 155

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

8. LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Logical Positivism is a revolution in thought which shook the building of traditional philosophy, i.e, metaphysics. It modified traditional philosophy in various ways. The leader of this revolution in thought was Moritz Schlick. Schlick was inspired by Whitehead and Russell's significant book "Principia Mathematica" and also by Wittgenstein's popular book "Tractatus". He was born in Berlin in 1882. He studied physics at the university of Berlin under Max Planck. He received his doctorate degree from the same university in 1904. His interests always spanned both physics and philosophy. He published the book "Space and Time in Contemporary Physics" in 1917. This book is an exposition of Einstein's Relativity Theory. His second book "General Theory of Knowledge" was also published in 1918. He taught in the universities of Rostock and Kiel. Then he took the chair of Philosophy at the university of Vienna in 1921. At Vienna he remained till his last breath of life. One of his student committed a heinous act of murdering him.

The next important philosopher of this revolution in thought was Rudolf Carnap. He was born in 1891 in Ronsorf, Germany. He studied at the universities of Jena and Frieburg. He taught primarily at the university of Vienna, the German university in Prague and the university of Chicago. His earliest philosophical influences were Frege with whom he studied in Jena, and also Russell. He in his autobiography, mentioned the influence of Russell's book "Our knowledge of the External World" on him in these words : "Henceforth the application of the new logical instrument for the purposes of analyzing scientific concepts and of clarifying philosophical concepts has been the essential aim of my philosophical activity."[1] Thus Carnap proposed the aim of

1. Rudolf Carnap, Autobiography, P. 13 Quoted from James Bailley, Ibid, P. 97

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

philosophy is to analyze scientific concepts and to clarify philosophical concepts and statements. His famous book "The Logical Syntax of Language" is the first major work in which he attempted to analyze ordinary concepts in terms of "a temporal sequence of continually changing forms in the two-dimensional visual field."[2]

In addition to these two active members of philosophical revolution in the shape of logical positivism were philosophers like Freidrich Weismann, Herbert Feigl, Victor Craft and Otto Neurath. Neurath was the Marxist socio-economist. There were some mathematicians and scientists were also members of this revolutionary group. They were Hans Hahn, Kurt Godel, Philip Frank and Karl Menger. This group of philosophers, mathematicians and scientists were influenced by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein along with positivists Comte and Mach. This group of philosophical revolution emerged at Vienna. So, the group was called "the Vienna Circle", established in 1929. Carnap, Neurath and Hahn produced a manifesto of logical positivism in this year (1929) entitled "The Scientific World View : The Vienna Circle". The entitled soon stuck. In the next few years they publicized their views through various conferences and monographs. They published their own journal "Erkenntnis" under the joint editorship of Carnap and Reichenbach (a German positivist). A J. Ayer, Karl Popper and W. V. Quine were also influenced by logical positivists. They were often visiting to them and discussed philosophical problems in the scientific outlook. A. J. Ayer was the most influential supporter of Logical Positivism. His famous book "Language, Truth and Logic" published in 1936. Ayer termed this view as Logical Empiricism, instead of positivism. He was born in London in 1910. After school at Eton, he entered Christ Church, Oxford, on a classical scholarship in 1929. On the advice of his tutor, Gilbert Ryle, he visited the Vienna Circle in 1932. He was Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London from 1946 to 1959. He received a knighthood in 1970. He retired in 1978 and remained a well known public figure until his death in 1989. He wrote about two books, among them the most populars are The Foundations of

2. Ibid, "The Logical syntax of language", P. 16

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Empirical knowledge (1940) and The problem of knowledge (1956), besides his first book (mentioned in above paragraph) which remains his best-known work.[3]

Wittgenstein was the most influential over logical positivists, though meeting with them was not always harmonious. Wittgenstein's religious, artistic temperament conflicted with Carnap's scientific outlook. By the time of Schlick's death, the Vienna Circle had began to break up. Some members of this circle went to the United States of America and some went to Britain. Neurath went to Holland, Carnap, Feigl and Godel went to U.S.A and Waismann went to Oxford. Thus, the revolution in philosophical thought as the form of Logical positivism ended in the very few years. It did not go longest time. However, it influenced the coming philosophical thoughts as philosophy of language and philosophy of science. Now, traditional metaphysics vanished in the sky of philosophy, rather a new metaphysics has emerged in the philosophical thought of Quine, Strawson and Derrida.

Logical positivism is a turning point for western philosophy. It is the philosophical thought of many philosophers, mathematicians and scientists including A. J. Ayer and Karl Popper. So here logical positivism or empiricism (in Ayer's word) deals with some important questions of Philosophy. Traditional philosophy attempts to seek the Truth. But without knowing truth how can we say that it is the Truth ? It is the major problem of Logical Positivism. To curb this problem logical positivism deals with the verification theory of meaning. On the basis of this theory logical positivists refute or eliminate metaphysics and then they point out the function of philosophy too.

The Verification Theory of Meaning

According to logical positivists philosophy's traditional problems could be revealed by logical analysis to be "pseudo-problems", so they are literally nonsensical problems. Like Kant, logical positivists were extremely conscious of the discrepancy between philosophy and sciences. Sciences seem to be progressive in leaps and bounds. Yet philosophical problems had long been in

3. James Bailley, Ibid, P. 97

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

stalemate. Sciences were accumulating data and constructing better theories, traditional philosophy was still struggling with the same set of problems since the Greeks. Only exceptioin of traditioned philosophy is logic. But logical positivists differed from the Kant on this point as Schlick said, "Metaphysics collapses not because the solving of its tasks is an enterprise to which the human reason is unequal (as Kant thought) but because there is no such task."[4]

Ayer calls the verification theory of meaning as the Criterion of Verifiability. There are several aspects of the criterion :

(a) Criterion of Meaningfulness : The first aspect of the criterion of verifiability theory is meaningfulness of philosophical statements.

(b) Theory of Meaning : It is a principle stating the specific meaning of certain sentences. The meaning is determined by the experiences whether sentences are true or false.

(c) Theory of understanding : The verification theory yields a theory of understanding. I understand a sentence if I know how to verify what it states.

The verification theory of meaning Judges in many areas of discourse as meaningless. Traditional metaphysics claims about the nature of reality, God and so on. If God, or the nature of reality is inaccessible, and thereby uncheckable by experience, any statements regarding them are meaningless. Traditional philosophical disputes (between Realism and Idealism, for examples) were also judged meaningless. Since no possible experience could decide between such theses, there is no substantive disagreement here. In other words, they are "pseudo-problems". Thus Carnap says that such conflicts are best understood as questions about which language to adopt. Logical Positivists also said that ethical statements, religious statements and aesthetical statements lacked cognitive meaning, that is, having no descriptive content. They express various feelings or emotions or a certain attitude of life; but they lack a truth-value. According to logical positivists a common source of intellectual

4. Moritz Schlick, The Turning Point in Philosophy (1978) Quoted from James Bailley, Ibid, P. 98

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

confusion was mixing up fundamentally different classes of sentences. For example, when only emotive meaning was present, we take cognitive meaning. "Non-violence is a good act." This has no cognitive meaning but emotive one. However, we apply cognitive meaning to it. Therefore, the meaning of this sentence is meaningless.

There are two aspects of the verification theory of meaning : Verifiability in practice and verifiability in principle. Certain claims, perhaps about distant planets, may not be actually verifiable right now due to technological limitations. These kinds of verifiability is found in principle only, not in practice. We can think of their verification but not able actually to verify them. On the other hand, we have a clear idea of the way in which they could be verified. This clear idea is the verifiability in practice. Carnap distinguishes between confirmability and testability. Confirmability is the verifiability in principle and testability is the verifiability in practice. Carnap says : "A proposition is confirmable if we know which type of procedure would confirm it, it is testable if we can actually perform this procedure."[5] The demands of confirmability or testability has to be interpreted as "weak", because the tests provide grounds for a proposition's probable truth, rather than its certain truth. But logical positivists like Schlick and Waismann did not want a probable truth of a proposition. Schlick and Waismann initially favoured "a strong verifiability". By a strong verifiability a sentence "S" would be meaningful only where there is an entailment between "S" and some set of observational statements "O". This demand implies that all significant sentences be analyzable in terms of, i.e., reducible to, sets of elementary propositions.

The weak thesis demands only that O gives grounds for S's acceptance. But it seems far more plausable. Any attempts to show any logical entailments between reports of sensations and statements about the world fail. For example, from the fact that it is raining outside, it doesnot follow that anyone sees it, or even that they would see it, if certain specifiable conditions were satisfied. Consider it : It is raining outside—(If I were to look out the open

5. Rudolf Carnap, Testability and Meaning, Quoted from James Bailley, Ibid, P. 100

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

window, with my glasses on, in normal light—I would have sense impressions as of rain).

The trouble here is that no matter how much the antecedent of the parenthesized conditional have been add, it is still logically possible for it to be all satisfied, yet the consequent not occur. Secondly, if certain sense-impressions have been occurred, this doesnot commit to the existence of any particular object or event in the world, as dreaming or hallucinating. Thus, any entailment doesnot occur the other way round.

Strong verifiability also faces a problem with universal statements. Science postulates laws, i.e., counterfactual-supporting universal statements. But no finite number of observed cases can entail a statement of universal form. Given that a true universal statement is equivalent to a negative existential, then these would be meaningless. However this is not the end of problems for universal statements. Let p be the universal statement "All Water boils at 212 F". P would not be strongly verifiable. Now consider its negation p : "Some water doesnot boil at 212 F". This is verifiable. According to Ayer, it logically follows from a finite, consistent class of observation statements, namely "This is water" and "This does not boil at 212 F". So, in such a case ~ p would be verified as true and thereby meaningful. But in that case, given a classical account of negation, ~ ~ p would be false and thus meaningful. But by classical or traditional logic ~ ~ p is equivalent to p. In traditional logic it is not possible that at the same time both p and ~ p are meaningful. Ayer in his book "Language, Truth and Logic" tried to solve this problem. According to him, for any statement to be meaningful, some "experiential proposition", i.e., an observational statement must required from which it be deducible some other premises, without being deducible from these other premises alone. Later on, Ayer came to see that this did not work. For example,

(A) If God exists, then Oregon is larger than Rhode Island.

God exists.

Therefore, Oregon is larger than Rhode Island.

(B) Either God is finite or Oregon is larger than Rhode Island.

God is not finite.

Therefore, Orgon is larger than Rhode Island.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Example (A) is a modus ponens syllogism and (B) is a disjunctive syllogism. They can be symbolized as :

(A) $p \supset q$		(B)	$p \vee q$
p	And		$\sim p$
$\therefore q$			$\therefore q$

The minor premises of both examples "God exists" or "God is not finite" are metaphysical statements which cannot be verified. Therefore, the truth of conclusion in both examples (A) and (B) stands on the "weak verifiability" which make conclusions of both syllogisms are meaningless. Therefore, Ayer says that "I propose to say that a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these other premises do not include any statement that is not either analytic or directly verifiable or capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable. And I can now reformulate the principle of verification as requiring of a literally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be either directly or indirectly verifiable, in the foregoing sense."[6]

According to Ayer, as his above statements, analytical propositions or statements cannot be verified, because they are tautology. So, they are meaningless. But empirical or observational statements must be verified either directly or indirectly. "This is red"—this proposition must be verified by our observation directly, if we find this as red. But if we find this is not non-red (yellow, green, etc.), we can indirectly verify the truth of this proposition "this is red". Thus empirical or a posteriori statements are only verifiable and thus they are meaningful. However, some empirical statements cannot be verified. For example, "One great Ashoka was the King of India." It is a proposition related to past. Past has gone which cannot be verified by observation. Similarly, the universal statements "All men are mortal" cannot be verified by observation. It is not possible to observe all men resided in the past, resides in the present and will reside in the future. Thus, historical statements and universal propositions are meaningless. If we assume these statements or

6. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd Edition, P. 13

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

propositions meaningless, it means there is no history and no universal laws given by science. But it is fact there is a history of every country, and science must give general laws. But these statements related to past and general laws are the subject of weak verifiability, as I have already mentioned in the above paragraphs with the views of Schlick, Waismann and Ayer.

Carl Hempel criticizes this view of logical positivism. According to him, the principle or criterion of verifiability is unable to eliminate metaphysical claims by weak or strong verifiability directly or indirectly. Let p stand for "my shirt is blue" and let q stand for "my shirt is red". And, let r stand for "The absolute is infinite." Now,

1. ~ p. r
2. p v ~ q
3. ~ p by 1 simplication
4. ~ q by 2 & 3 disjunctive syllogism

Since both "p v ~ q" and "~ q" are observation-statements, "~ p. r" is a meaningful statement. So, talk of the Absolute or anything else can occur in meaningful discourse. Therefore, nothing is excluded. Alonzo Church, who reviewed Ayer's book "Language, Truth and Logic", proved that one could prove any statement to be meaningful, so long there were three mutually independent observation sentences.

Secondly, Schlick proposed that the verification theory of meaning stands for empirical facts : "nothing but a simple statement of the way in which meaning is actually assigned to propositions." This statement of Schlick is absolutely false, because religious believe often regard themselves as saying something that is literally true, even when they have no idea how to prove their claims. Ayer regarded religious statements as analytic : "not as an empirical hypothesis, but as a definition." The definition actually described ordinary usage, it is false to say that people generally regard "meaningful" and "verifiable" as synonymous or even as coextensive, Carnap gave a proposal to restrict the meaningful to the verifiable. The justification for this proposal to restrict the meaningful to the verifiable. In that case the verification Theory of Meaning would be in the same boat as moral principles and could be granted only non-cognitive meaning.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Logical Positivists did not discover the principle, judge it to be correct, then abide by its decisions. This is shown by their extreme difficulty in getting a satisfactory formulation of what they wanted. It is rather that they already had a clear idea of what they wanted a principle to do-admit science and everyday judgements, but exclude religion, metaphysics and so on.

Karl Popper shows the impossibility of the verification theory of meaning. According to him, we cannot verify, in any manner, any proposition or statement as true. But we can verify its falsity. "All crows are black". On the basis of our observation, we prove this proposition as true. But if we see that even "a crow is white", the proposition "all crows are black" proved false. Thus, Karl Popper accepts the theory of falsification rather than the verifiable theory. However, Karl Popper's theory of falsification is unsatisfactory. "Snowman exists." This proposition is not false. It may be, in future snowman will exist, if we get him.

In sum and substance, Logical Positivism's principle of verification is not satisfactory, though it changed the direction of philosophical thinkings. Philosophy, in western views, has now various dimensions. This is the success of Logical Positivism, being its failure in its assessment of the verification theory of meaning.

Elimination of Metaphysics

The verification theory of meaning, according to Ayer, is a criterion to eliminate metaphysics. Ayer tells that a meaningful statement or proposition is either apriori (analytic) or aposteriori (factual). Analytic proposition or statements are such which have been apriorily drawn from any analytic statement or which them self are analytic. In both conditions it is very true that no analytic statement gives us any knowledge about the world, nor we can able to draw any factual statement from an analytic statement. It is the drawback of an analytical statement, because it is a tautology. It does not give us any new knowledge about facts. From tautology what analytic statements be drawn are also tautology. Predicates of analytic or apriori statements (propositions) do not give us new knowledge about subjects of these propositions. For example, "Four is the sumtotal of two plus two". Subject, here, includes its predicate. Four being subject, itself implies two and two, the predicate. Thus,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

here there is no new or factual knowledge. According to Ayer metaphysical statements are either apriori or aposteriori. He takes the example of "God". I shall explain in forwarding paragraphs. At this point, it is necessary to know what is synthetic (factual) or aposteriori statements. Aposteriori or synthetic statements could be factual, if their truth or falsity must be determined by observation. Observation-based statements are always probable. Factual statement may be either true or false. So it is difficult to determine synthetic propositions or statements as absolutely true or absolutely false. Metaphysical statements are not probable, so they are meaningless. Empirical facts can be verified, but not metaphysical one. Probability is related to facts, not to speculation. For example, "Soul is simple". This proposition or statement cannot be verified by the criterion of observation. We cannot say that this proposition is either true or false. It is beyond truth and falsity. So, it is not factual or empirical proposition or statement. It is merely "gibberish". Therefore, this kind of metaphysical statements are meaningless.

Ayer analyzes the proposition (statement) "God exists" and proves it meaningless. According to him metaphysical statements should be either analytic (apriori) or factual (aposteriori). Analytic statement is tautology. "God" and "exists" are subject and predicate respectively. Subject "God" not only an existent element, but many other things also exist. Existance as predicate does not include in the subject "God" merely. So, "God exists" is not tautology. In other words, it is not an analytic or apriori statement. Now, can we observe the existence of God ? Atheist does not believe in the existence of God, because God is not perceived or observed. Theist believes that we feel the existence of God in our inner body, heart. Many sages realized God. If God can be realized, it must be the subject of our experience. According to Ayer, the realization of God's existence is merely face. We cannot verify the existence of God directly or indirectly. Some theists say that we can verify God's existence on the basis of perceiving the design of world. God creates world with a view of teleology. We find a systematic happenings of happiness, sorrow, days, nights, seasons, natural events like earthquakes, floods, etc. These show to prove the existence of God. But Ayer refutes this theory of design or teleology. According to him, it is

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

merely speculation. It has no any scientific or empirical ground. These systematic happenings leads to a divine element which can never be verified on the basis of observation. So, "God exists" is not a factual statement, and therefore, it is meaningless. Thus, Ayer says that all metaphysical statements are neither apriori (analytic) nor aposteriori (factual), therefore, they are meaningless.

Carnap says that metaphysical statements are pseudo-statements. According to him, "Vocabulary" and "syntax" are two essential parts of any language. A statement or proposition would be meaningful, if meaningful vocabulary are arranged in accordance with their syntax. A statement in which arranged vocabularies are pseudo, i.e., they seem to be vocabularies but no indicate any meaning. It is the first type of pseudo-statements. The second type of pseudo-statements are such which all vocabularies are meaningful but their syntax are misarranged or wrong. In Carnap's view every meaningful vocabulary indicates a concept. Earlier the meaning of a vocabulary is definite, but in due course with the temporal progress its original meaning would be changed and no new meaning would be added. It is possible that we use some vocabularies, without seeing, whether they construct any concept or not. For example, barrenson, sky-flower etc. They do not indicate any meaning. Therefore, they are pseudo-vocabulary, and the statement which has pseudo-vocabulary is meaningless. They never indicate any concept.

Carnap analyzes second type of pseudo-statements with some examples. "Honesty plays football", "George V is the square root of virtue", "Ceaser is a prime number", etc. All these statements are meaningful, but they violate rules of logical syntax. Grammatically, they are correct. Carnap distinguishes between logical syntax and grammatical syntax. In logical syntax every vocabulary has its own logical power by which it related to a certain vocabulary, not to other vocabularies. For example, the logical power of Ceaser is not in accordance with that of prime number. Logical powers are both vocabularies are different. Though grammatically the statement (sentence) is correct, but logically it is meaningless. Logical power of Ceaser can never include the logical power of prime-number. Similarly vocabularies "honest" and "football" as well "George V" and "the square root of virtue" are not logically arranged in order to

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

syntax. Therefore, all these statements, being correct according to grammar's rules and hence grammatically meaningful, do not indicate in real sense any meaning. Thus, they are pseudo-statements and meaningless.

Besides pseudo-statements, Carnap accepts "protocol proposition". Protocol proposition or statement is the criterion of verification of meaning. It is an observational statement. Hence in the view of Carnap verifiability of meaning of any statement has its foundation (ground) in protocol statements. Pseudo-statements do not have protocol statements as their foundation. These statements can not be verified on the basis of protocol (observation) statements. Therefore, they are meaningless. According to Carnap metaphysical statements are pseudo-statements, because they are meaningful in their used vocabulary but their logical power has been ignored in metaphysical statements. Therefore, metaphysical statements are psudo and meaningless.

Carnap takes examples of "principle of Being" and "God". Metaphysically, both vocabularies do not construct any concept and indicate any meaning, though they point out some classical (speculative) meaning. They have no foundation of protocol statements. So they are unable to construct any conception. Therefore, they are meaningless. According to Carnap almost all metaphysical statements are meaningless due to ignore the rules of syntax. He cites Heidegger's metaphysics in this regard : "What is to be investigated is being, only and—nothing else; being alone and further—nothing, solely being, and beyond being—nothing, what about this nothing ? .... Does the Nothing exist only because the not as the negation exists ? Or is it the other way around ? Does Negation and the not exist only because the Nothing exists ? We assert the nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation. What do we seek the nothing. How do we find the nothing ? We know the Nothing .... Anxiety reveals the Nothing .... That for which and because of which we were anxious, was really nothing. Indeed—Nothing itself—as such-was present .... What abouts this Nothing—The Nothing itself nothings."[7] Carnap analyzes these words of Heidegger and points out that every sentences are interdependent

7. Quoted from Basant Kumar Lal, Ibid, P. 259-60

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

with each other, though they are meaningless. Heidegger has used the word "Nothing" as name, so it indicates an element. But logically negation is a kind of logical form, not "name". The use of negation as a name, not logical form, is an ignorance of logical power of the word "negation". "Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negatio" or "We know the Nothing"—these statements are similar to the statement "Ceaser is prime number." Here the use of vocabularies ignores the rules of logical syntax. It is absurd to say that "Nothing is prior to not and negation", because all three words nothing, not and negation are synonymously the same. Therefore this statement does not construct any conception and so, meaningless. The same result we can find with the statement "We know the nothing." Nothing is not the subject of knowledge, rather something. Thus, Heidegger's metaphysical statements are meaningless. By which protocol sentence or statement these Heideggerian metaphysical statements can be proved their truth or falsity ? Carnap replies, no any protocol statement is the basis of truth and falsity of these metaphysical statements. Thus, in view of Carnap, metaphysics must be eliminated, because it proposed a nonsense theory to explain world.

In this way, logical positivism eliminates metaphysics, the classical or traditional metaphysics. But it has also cleared the way for new or modern metaphysics in form of Quine's and Strawson's philosophy.

Function of Philosophy

Though logical positivism eliminates metaphysics, it is concerned with the function of philosophy or concept of philosophy. Carnap himself asks, "But what, then, left over for philosophy, if all statements whatever that assert something are of an empirical nature and belong to factual science ?" He himself replies that "what remains is not statements, nor a theory, nor system, but only a method of logical analysis." Thus, in view of Carnap, philosophy is a method of logical analysis. In other words, philosophy as method is a concept of philosophy. Through this concept or method philosophy removes vaguerness and ambiguity of meaningful statements. In science we concern with facts and elements. In our everyday knowledge we have the knowledge of our experience. But

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

philosophy is not related to facts, elements or experience. All these are related to science and human daily experience. The function of philosophy is not to analyze scientific and empirical facts and elements but to remove vagueness and ambiguity of scientific-empirical statements. Statements are expressed in languages, either it be English, French or Sanskrit, Urdu or Sanskrit, Persian etc. Therefore, function of Philosophy is to analyze statements related to scientific or empirical facts. It is not related to facts. Philosophy uses a method to analyze scientific and empirical statements, and that method is nothing but logical analysis. Now, the nature or concept of philosophy is not speculative but analytic. According to Carnap scientific statements are first order statements, because they are related to facts or empirical objects. Science only describes facts or empirical objects. But philosophy analyses statements related to these facts or objects. Therefore Carnap terms Philosophy as second order enquiry. Some thinkers opine that philosophy studies with worldly objects analytically. The analysis of world is called physical or material analysis. According to Logical Positivism this analysis is not the function of Philosophy, because it can never prove validity or invalidity of scientific facts or worldly objects.

According to Carnap Philosophy uses ideal language to analyze factual scientific statements. Science uses an ordinary language to establish its conclusion. Philosophy, by transforming scientific language into ideal language, analyzes scientific statements. This transformation of language is a kind of reductive analysis. Reductive analysis has some rules. Carnap points out two kinds of rules : Formation Rules and Transformation Rules. Formation rules are such which arrange vocabularies in logical syntax. Transformation rules are such by which statements could logically be transformed. Formation rules are related to Grammar, and transformation rules are related to Logic. In other words, Philosophy has two functions :

(a) to see grammatical syntax whether it is correct or not.

(b) to see transformation of a statement to other statement whether it is logically valid or invalid implied from one to other.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Carnap explains the distinction between formation and transformation rules with three sentences, object-sentences, Pseudo-object or Quasi syntactical sentences and syntactical sentences. In fact, these three sentences are modes of speech. There are two kinds of modes of speech : Material mode and Formal mode. If our statements expressed in language indicate facts, not language itself, these statements are material mode of speech. For example, "Five is a number." Here it seems that "five" is a name which indicates an object. But, statements which do not indicate any fact but only language are formal mode of speech. These statements are purely linguistic, it is not beyond language. If the word "five" used in the above example doesnot indicate facts but only indicate "number", then the above example of "Five is a number" is a formal mode of speech.

Object-sentences indicate objects or facts only. So, they are only empirical statements. Pseudo-object or Quasi syntactical sentences are material mode of speech and syntactical sentences are formal mode of speech. One can be transferred into each other. Take some examples :

	Object-sentences (Empirical statements)	**Pseudo-object sentences** (Material Mode of Speech)	**Syntactical Sentences** (Formal Mode of speech)
(A)	Babylon was a town.	Babylon was treated off in Yesterday's lecture.	The word "Babylon" occured in yesterday's lecture.
(B)	Five is a prime number.	Five is not a thing, but a number.	Five is not a thing-word but a number-word.
(C)	The rose is red.	It is a fact that the rose is red.	"The rose is red" is a sentence.

Ayer also says that linguistic analysis is the function of Philosophy. He distinguishes two kinds of definition—verbal definition and definition in use. In verbal definition only synonymous words are used. For example, "Seven sisters" is synonymous to states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram. In fact, dictionary represents verbal definition. The best example of "definition in use" is Russell's theory of description. In this definition there is no

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

definiendum nor synonymous. As well, the meaning of definition is the same to the meaning of definiendum because the relation between definition and definiendum are logical equivalence. For example, "The author of Waverley was Scott". Russell analyzes this proposition and says it is logically equivalence into the following three propositions :

(i) At least one person wrote Waverley.

(ii) At most one person wrote Waverley.

(iii) Whoever wrote Waverley was Scott.

This example given by Russell is a suitable example of "definition in use."

Thus, logical positivism establishes that philosophy is not speculative, but analytic. Carnap terms philosophy as "logic of science", because it analyzes statements regarding facts given by science. "Logic of Science" i.e., analysis of scientific concepts and sentences, must replace philosophy because logic of science is nothing but logical syntax of language of science.[8]

A. J. Ayer—The Problem of Knowledge

Alfred Jules Ayer was born in London on 29 October, 1910. He was a precocious but mischievous child. So, he was sent to boarding school at the age of seven. At sixteen he specialized in classics. At the same time he started reading some philosophy. Russell's "Sceptical Essays" impressed him. He particularly impressed by Russell's argument for the claim that "it is understandable to believe a proposition when there is no ground for believing its truth". This claim is the motto of Ayer in his philosophy. He was also impressed by Moore's view of naturalistic fallacy and Moore's "Principia Ethica" as a whole. He studied both Greek and Philosophy in the Christ Church, Oxford after getting a classics scholarship. There one of his tutors was Gilbert Ryle who suggested him to read Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus". This work of Wittgenstein also impressed Ayer and on the advice of Ryle he went to Vienna in 1933. At Vienna, he studied with Moritz Schlick, leader of the logical positivist movement. He was in contact with Quine and

8. Rudolf Carnap, Ibid, Preface, Quoted from Nityanand Mishra, Samkalin Paschatya Darshan, P. 129

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Popper too. He wrote his first book "Language, Truth and Logic" published in 1936. This book influenced logical positivists. He passed away on 27th June, 1989.

In addition to his first book, "The problem of knowledge" is another important book written by A. J. Ayer and published in 1956. This book deals with the problems of knowledge as meaning of knowledge, scepticism and certainty; belief, etc. According to Ayer, knowledge is a kind of disposition. Disposition means knowing must be actualized at sometimes. The dispositional character of knowledge is like that of being a swimmer, a cook, a singer or a player. A swimmer doesnot swim always in the water, a cook must have cooked at least once in his life time etc., but they do not always perform these business consciously. They have just capacities to perform these business consciously. They have just capacities to perform their business at the conscious level. Ayer further says that "if knowing means to make always conscious judgements, then all knowledge cannot be knowing that."[9] People are not always consciously aware of the procedures which they follow. They apply suitable means to gain their ends without any conscious awareness of the procedures which they follow. But these are not unintelligent. Such types of skills are taken as knowing how. "Know how", in Ayer's sense, will not be required to describe the known object. What is required to know is the fact.[10] From this point of view, birds and animals like dogs, monkey, etc. know their masters, but their knowing is not treated as "knowing that" because they are unable to make statements. However it may be argued that they know some facts and in this sense they also know something. They behave in such appropriate ways as if they know something. In this case "knowing how" corresponds to merely "behavioural beliefs." But epistemology is not concerned with the study of animal behaviour and psycho-analysis. At this point the word "knowledge" has been used by Ayer as noun, not as a verb. According to Ayer, knowledge is neither a mental state nor an episode, nor a mental act. It is just a disposition which includes even behavioural and rational or justified beliefs provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. In this

9. A. J. Ayer, The problem of knowledge, P. 12-14
10. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

context, Ayer advocates three conditions of knowledge, i.e., truth, belief and having a right to be sure.[11]

According to Ayer, "I know that p implies that" I have right to be sure of p". It means that knowledge should be identified with acquiring the authority of having "a right to be sure". It also implies that "seeing", according to Ayer, is a kind of "knowing". If I see that the table is brown, then I have a right to be sure that it is brown. This surity is the knowledge of "brownness". Thus, "seeing" is "knowing" and it may be called as Ayer's common-sense view or emotive sense of knowledge. Here the criterion of knowledge is only sense-perception.

Ayer includes two necessary conditions in the definition of knowledge—notion of being sure and notion of having right to be sure.[12] The notion of having right to be sure is very close to the notion of justified true belief.[13] Ayer points out that nobody can claim to know a fact reasonably, unless he is completely sure of it. But someone may also be sure of what he believes. A mere feeling of conviction cannot be sufficient condition of being sure, even a feeling of conviction may coexist with an unconscious feeling of doubt. Even its presence is not necessary for the possession or even for the display of knowledge. Moreover, from the fact that someone is convinced that something is true, however, firm his conviction may be, it will never follow that it is true. That is to say, inspite of being fully convinced pertaining to some believed statements, there would be no formal contradiction in saying that it is false in fact. Ayer claims that having right to be sure is withheld while someone is merely guessing. If someone has deduced a true conclusion without following the accredited routs to knowledge, we are likely to say that he does not know in fact. But if the knowing subject were repeatedly successful in a given domain, we might claim that he knows the facts in question, even though he could not explain as to how he knew indeed. In this way the "right to be sure" may be acquired in various ways. The description of these conditions cannot be included in the definition of knowledge. Almost questions

11. Ibid, P. 35
12. Dr. Hari Shankar Upadhyaya, Knowledge And Justification, P. 91
13. A. J. Ayer, Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

pertaining to claims of knowledge belong to the legitimacy of the title to be sure. These claims must be examined and this is the main concern of epistemology.[14]

Ayer's concept of "right to be sure" corresponds to "evidential certainty." It means that Ayer has used "certainty" in the evidential sense which is a necessary condition of knowledge. He says that the knower must have a right to be sure pertaining to the known proposition, and it is always psychological. The psychological certainty is called as a subjective certainty. In fact, the word "certain" is used in various contexts. There are four kinds of usage of the word "certain"—

(a) I am certain that p.

(b) I feel certain that p.

(c) I know for certain that p.

(d) It is certain that p.

In the above usage of "certainty", the first two (a) and (b) may be used truly, inspite of the falsity of p. From the mere fact that I feel certain that so and so is the case, it never follows that so and so is the case in fact. That is to say, "I feel certain that p" doesnot entail that p is true. But the last two usage of certainty (c) and (d) respectively logically entail that "p must be p". If these various modes of linguistic expressions are not used in a precise sense, our philosophical discussions pertaining to certainty would be vitiated by fallacious meanings. It is noteworthy that "I feel certain that p" and "I know for certain that p" are sometimes used to mean the same sense, but they do not have the same implications. "I feel certain that p" is almost used in the sense of psychological certainty. The psychological certainty is simply synonymous with being "confident" or being completely convinced.[15] This is the very sense of certainty to which "Ayer was apparently alluding when he claimed that if S knows that P, then S has the right to be sure, i.e., psychological certainty."[16]

---

14. Ibid
15. Firth, Anatony of Certainty, published in the Journal, Philosophical Review, Vol. 76, January 1967, P. 5
16. A. J. Ayer, Ibid, Chapter I

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Ayer has opposed the universality of the evidence requirement against the view that there must be a conclusive evidence for a proposition which is claimed to be known. He claims that those statements which express our private experiences need no evidence at all. Ayer further says that basic propositions are those whose truth or falsehood is conclusively established in a given situation by a meaning rule of the language.[17] These propositions constitute direct reports of experience and they are indubitably true. According to Ayer, there is no possibility of errors in basic propositions. Therefore, basic propositions have evidential certainty based on psychological behaviour. However, our senses sometimes deceive us, but not always. In Ayer's words "A perception is called illusory by contrast with other perceptions which are veridical. Therefore, to maintain that all perceptions must be illusory would be to deprive the word "Illusory of its meaning."[18] So, the sceptical argument cannot be maintain logically.

According to Ayer, veridical and illusory perceptions are relative terms. Therefore, one term proves the existence of the other. Nobody can know that perception is illusory, unless he were in a position to correct them. It is not possible to discover deceptive appearances, unless we know that some of them were trustworthy. Thus, the illusory perceptions and fallibility of memory cannot refute the possibility of non-erroneous perceptions and infalliable or accuracy of memory. Therefore, these general forms of scepticism cannot find justification in experiences. But these objections are only applicable against to absolute scepticism. It also cannot apply to a more "moderate scepticism" which does not challenge every perceptual situation as illusory. It is true that almost people are involved in errors in their everyday life, but these errors are corrected through sense-experiences of the persons who are involved in non-veridical perceptions, i.e., illusions, hallucinations, etc. Indeed, the argument that everything cannot be illusory or at least something must be veridically perceived may be treated as a kind of argument, that is called a "linguistic apriori".

Ayer, in his first book "Language, Truth and Logic" (second

17. Ibid, Philosophical Essays (Basic propositions)
18. Ibid, The Problem of Knowledge, P. 36–38

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

edition), has illustrated four classes of statements and his permissible auxiliary hypothesis was restricted to them. The statements are : analytic statements, observation statements, those statements which in case they are conjoined with observation statements, and those statements which can be established independently as confirmable. The empirical significance or insignificance, as Ayer says, of a statement is based on the way in which it is used. In other words, a demarcation of empirically significant statements must refer to the way in which statements are actually used.

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

9. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. He belonged to a family of wealthy Austrian industrialist. He was educated at home, before attending a school. He entered Manchester University in 1908 as student of aeronautical engineering. But his interests soon shifted the practical problems of the mathematics of propeller design to the foundation of mathematics. The turning point was his discovery of Bertrand Russell's "The Principles of Mathematics". On the recommendation of Gottlob Frege, Wittgenstein transferred to Cambridge to study with Russell in 1912. At that time Russell was at the height of his scholarship, but very soon Wittgenstein reached that height. Their research into the foundations of logic eventually led to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", published in 1922. Besides Russell, Wittgenstein was also influenced by Tolstoy's "The Gospels in Belief". His "Tractatus" was accepted as a Ph.D.thesis in the university of Cambridge in 1929. He was then appointed to a fellowship at Trinity College. He later succeeded G. E. Moore as a professor of philosophy in 1939. He passed away in 1951.

His next popular book "Philosophical Investigations" published in 1953 posthumously. This book was the culmination of ideas which Wittgenstein had been developing since the mid-1930s. This book has the radical difference in content and approach from that of "Tractatus". He delivered many lectures between 1929 and 1947. These lectures was compiled into various books like "The Blue and Brown Books", "On Certainty", "Philosophical Remarks", "Philosophical Grammar" etc.

Languge and Reality (Language Game)

Traditionally, philosophy is a logical inquiry to search the truth or Ultimate Reality. The process of logical inquiry is of two ways : from universal laws to particular happenings and from particular

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

instances to universal laws. In natural sciences the second way has been adopted. The second way of logical inquiry is called "Induction". So, inductive way or method is scientific. But numerical sciences like mathematics and astronomy applies the first way for their inquiries. The first way of logical inquiry is called "Deductive". In philosophy we use both type of logical methods, and try to solve philosophical problems. But Wittgenstein differs this traditional view about philosophy. He criticizes this view, when he says that "philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."[1] This statement of Wittgenstein implies that inappropriate use or misuse of language raises philosophical problems what traditional philosophy mentioned. For example, the word "Saindhava". Saindhava means horse as well as salt. If I say, please give me Saindhava, at the time of lunch; the meaning of this word is salt. But when it has been used in the context of going out, it bears the meaning as horse. It is clear that the use of language is the primary thing to solve philosophical problems. The use of language is based on proper context. The non-contextual use of word is useless or meaningless. Words used in traditional philosophy are generally and mostly, non-contextual. So, in Wittgenstein's view metaphysics or traditional philosophy is useless. "Useless is meaningless, rather it is "not used,"[2] and "nonsense" always arises from analogous, to certain uses, where they have no use."[3]

Every word has a meaning. Without meaning is not a word. Each word is used in a particular context. Use of a word in particular context exemplifies linguistic boundaries. The word "boundary" is to draw a limit to thought or rather not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought.[4] The use of word "limit" in "Tractatus" in the context of "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" is not limited, rather it is extended to the use of word "game" in "Philosophical Investigation". Wittgenstein have raises questions, "how we do use the word "game"? For how is the concept of a game bounded ? What

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, 1. 38.
2. M. Black, A companion To Wittgenstein's Tractatus, P. 134
3. G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, P. 273-74
4. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, P. 3

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary ? No. You can draw one, for none has so far been drawn."[5] In fact, meanings of words and words used in meaningful contexts are not identical. When we use the word in any particular context, we know the meaning of that word. For example, hammers are used to drive nails, screw-drivers to drive in screws and so on. Hammers, screw-drivers, nails etc. have contained in a tool-box. According to Wittgenstein the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects (hammer, etc.) Words are used as tools. Tools are used to do things, to perform certain acts. Therefore, Wittgenstein compares words and their use to tools. He means the word "use" as "linguistic activity". An activity carried on by language is called "linguistic activity". Since language is the vehicle of ideas or thoughts, the use of language is an instrument.' This view of Wittgenstein establishes the instrumental theory of language. Linguistic activities are also interwoven with non-linguistic behaviour. In words of Wittgenstein, "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the language game."[6]

Wittgenstein has used the word "use" in many senses on various occasions. Occasions may carefully be acknowledged in the various use aspects such as grammatical aspect, semantic aspect and speech act aspect for better clarity or understanding of words. The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning. In order to substantiate this point Wittgenstein says, "it is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handless all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve), another is the handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions, it is either off or on; a third is the handle of a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump; it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and from".[7] These words of Wittgenstein show that the meaning of a word is identified with the object named. It is

5. Ibid, Philosophical Investigation, 1.68
6. Ibid, Section 7
7. Ibid, section 12

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

something like thinking that the only role of money is to buy an object. In Wittgenstein's words, "Here the word, there the meaning. The money and the cow that you can buy with it. But contrast : money and its use."[8] Money has multiple uses and diverse functions. It is clear that the word has diverse functions. Diversity in the function of a word in language is known as "language game". Games form "family" and "family resemblances." Also, the use of a word in language is known as "word-game". A variety of functions of language in different context through word-game is known as "language-game". A word-game or language game is used not in a limited but in a wider sense. In words of Strawson, "the application of the word "game" is not limited by any precise boundary, though a boundary could be fixed for a special purpose. We could say it was an "inexact" concept, that there was an indeterminacy in the rules for its use."[9]

Words function within a language. A language is a system. The learning of a language is always possible in the social context. It is a social phenomenon. Words belong to a system. Understanding a word and its meaning means how to use a word. Understanding a sentence means understanding a language. The meaning of any word is fixed by the rules of the system. Meaning is expressed by grammar but the grammar is not a surface grammar, rather it is a depth grammar. Depth grammar at first deals with "word-game". A word-game is nothing but proper use of words and its meaning is sensed in an appropriate context. In other words, a significant word-game is a tool with which certain job is done. A word-game logically constructs a language game. In other words, a word-game prepares the basic philosophic ground for the language-game. A language game is a game consisting of language. Think of multifariousness of what we call "Language", "Language", i.e., word-language, picture-language, gesture-language, sound-language. Wittgenstein speaks of "the whole language game", "the human language game", "our language-game' and also "fictional language game". Fictional language games are hypothetical. They are linguistic practices of a

8. Ibid, 1.120
9. P. F. Strawson, Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, published in Mind, Vol. 58, 1954, P. 75

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

simple or primitive kind. Such "clear and simple language-games" serve as "objects of comparison".

Language is a rule-guided activity. Like a game, language has constitutive rules, namely those of grammar. The meaning of a word is not the object it stands for, but is determined by the rules governing its operation. We learn the meaning of words by learning how to use them, just as we learn how to play chess, not by associating the pieces with objects, but by learning how they can be moved. A proposition is a move or operation in the game of language. It would be meaningless without the system of which it is a part. Its sense is its role in the unfolding linguistic activity. Like game language is a "family resemblance" word. There is no single defining feature which all games have in common including the games we play with words. So language-game can be called "the naming game". Games in language are just like "ring-a-ring-a-roses." The word "game" is like a word "bank". It is a family likeness term. Grammar describes the use of words in the language. For early Wittgenstein language is the totality of significant propositions. Language is pictured through propositions, i.e., picture game. "A totality of proposition is language. Language is a thought. A thought is a proposition with a senses."[10] Language is characterised by its logical form. The logical form of language is governed by reality.

Misunderstanding of the logic of language is the philosophers' occupational disease. When a doctor fails to diagnose the disease of a patient, the patient gets impatient. Similarly, when the functions of language cease to be normal, the philosophical problems arise. In fact, philosophical confusion arises from crossing language games, i.e., from using the words of one language-game according to rules of another. Yet another is that like all games, language-games are "Autonomous". They are not responsible to external goals, unlike an activity like cooking. "Cooking" is defined by its end, whereas "speaking" is not. That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not. Therefore, our language game is behaviour. The use or misuse of words in language either knowingly or unknowingly, consciously or unconsciously causes philosophial puzzlement. The chief source of this puzzlement

10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicals, P. 19.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

is possibly seen in the misuse of our ordinary language or wrong usage of language. Hence Wittgenstein terms philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.[11] The problems of philosophy also arise, because the logic of our language is misunderstood. Philosophical problems are the products of linguistic illusion. It is dangerous. It is like "the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."

Philosophical perplexity also arises due to the precise definition of words and the use of important "odd-job" words. What causes most trouble in philosophy is that we are tempted to describe the use of important "odd-job" words as though they were words with regular functions. The tendency of our craving for generality and uniform appearance of words also causes philosophical puzzlement. The job of philosophy, as Wittgenstein says, is to clear up the puzzles, to cure the ills of the understanding, Philosophical methods are like 'different therapies". The job of philosophy is to cure the conceptual diseases. Philosophy, i.e., metaphysics (or, science of reality) begins in illness and seeks to cure, but cure must be a genuine one and lasting. When we diagnose the disease and try to cure the disease, it must be a complete cure. In Wittgenstein's words, "The clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical (metaphycial) problems should completely disappear."[12] These words of Wittgenstein only proposes that philosophical problems would be completely disappearce, but there is no genuine problem to be solved or philosophical (metaphysical) problems cannot be solved, only disappearance. Perhaps it is the cause Wittgenstein says that where there is no solution, we should keep silence there. According to Wittgenstein philosophy is not concerned with truth or matters of fact, but with meaning. Therefore, he further says that "one might think : if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy' there must be a second order philosophy. But it is not so, it is rather like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second order."[13] He relates this to the idea

11. Ibid, Philosophical Investigations, 1.109
12. A Ambrose and M. MacDonald, Wittgenstein's Lecturers, P. 21
13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations : 121

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

that ordinary language including ordinary non-philosophical employments of specialised languages is fundamental to philosophy. Philosophical problems concern expressions which already have a non-philosophical use. Therefore, Wittegenstein asserts that language is to use for clarification of the propositions related to philosophical problems regarding reality world etc., not to search the Truth or Reality of the world.

Meaning and Use

"Donot ask for the meaning, ask for the use" is a famous statement of Wittgenstein. Here two important terms "meaning" and "use" are used which seem not to be identical. So, we should distinguish between meaning and use. Meaning of a word is determined by use. So, use is fundamental to know the meaning of a word. The term "analysis" is not only used in philosophy but also used in other disciplines. It is evident that the main purpose of analysis is to make the concept in question simpler, more systematic and comprehensive so that the matter may be construed easily. Analysis expects understanding. The object of understanding is the concept itself. Analysis deals with the decomposition of "something". The word "something" is nothing but analytically breaking down of complex ideas or concepts into their simpler forms. This thought fairly brings out the therapeutic analysis and cures sure muddles. This is a good diagnosis which goes with Wittgenstein's remarks "do not think, but look." The term "think" represents "to conceptualize" and the term "look" significantly suggests "look to condition in which words and expressions are being employed or used." That is, the meaning of words and expressions is expressed in their use. We must "look', for the use, not "look" for meaning.

Language is oriented with various functions. Functions explain the meaning through the varieties of uses of words. To understand the use of the "meaning" we must look into the explanations of meaning. In order to understand the meaning of "meaning" one has to understand the meaning of "explanation of meaning". The word "explanation" here "stands for the word "interpretation". Interpretation is required for application of words in the appropriate contexts. For example, when we use the word "time", it refers to hours, minutes and seconds through number 9.9.9, i.e.,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

9.9.9. a.m. and like that. We do not know the meaning of 9 or 9.9.9. a.m. without knowing the use of this or these numbers. In fact, when we look into their (time's) use, we know the meaning of "nine" or 9.9.9 a.m. Thus understanding of the use of the word "meaning" means to "look at the explanations of meaning". To look at a word and see how a word is used in language is the question related to our stream of life or human "form of life."[14] When A commands to his assistant B "go and bring nine pieces of slab", B at first does not understand or know the meaning of the word "nine" and "slab". Then A points out that "that slab present before you is meant for the construction of building." A counts one, after another slab and pronounce the number "nine" by pointing out slab, B then understands or knows the meaning of "nine". Thus the meaning of "nine" and "slab" are cleared by their uses. It means that the meaning is meaningful in the context of communications, i.e., the transaction of language between A and B.

"It is the job of a theory of meaning for a language to give an account of how that language works, i.e., how its speakers communicate by means of it, or, theory of meaning is a theory of understanding i.e., what a theory of meaning has to give an account of is what it is, that someone knows when he knows that language i.e., when he knows the meanings of the expressions and sentences of the language."[15] These words express that meaning is essential to language. The truth-conditions of a sentence in language is to determine its meaning and meaning is accountable through the "way we look at things". Meaning is a "physiognomy".[16] Wittgenstein also says that a word is meaningful, if and only if it is a name. The word "apple" has meaning if it actually denotes an object. But the thing is different when we say "five red apples." Here one cannot point to the number "five". According to Later Wittgenstein the word "five" here refers to the use of this word, not to any number or name—"What is the meaning of the word "five"? No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used."[17] It means that

14. Ibid, 1.19, 23; 2.1, 2.6
15. M.A.E. Dummet, What is a theory of meaning ? published in the book 'Mind and Language" (edited by S. Guttenplan), P. 97-122
16. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ibid, Section 568
17. Ibid, Section 1

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

words do not necessarily imply "names". There are names but all words are not names. They can be used in a numerous other ways. That is to say, the word "name" is used to characterise many different kinds of use of a word. Words are dead, if they were not used. Words are alive, when they are used. Words like "pillar", "slabs", "blocks" "stones" etc. play their significant role and become meaningful accordingly. The psychological terms like "knowing", "thinking', "willing", "feeling" etc. cannot function significantly like "names". They have different role in languages. Looking at these equally and ascribing meaning to them is somehow philosophically misleading. If we do this, then we are not getting free from puzzlements. That is, we fail to understand their logic of use in our different life situations.

Here we see that Wittgenstein has remodelled his early thoughts, i.e., all words function as names. Early Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" has observed that all words must name some object. Only some words (real names) have referents and these stand for their meanings. The word "meaning" has as many referents as there are, but there are far fewer. Internal relations are not something added to their terms. General terms are mere possibilities. To wittgenstein the use of a sign merely displays its combinatorial possibilities, which are determined by the combinatorial possibilities of the object it stands for. It is upto us what NAMES to project onto what objects. Once we have done so, our use has to mirror the essence of those referents.[18] It is Wittgenstein's notion of meaning-body. The term "meaning-body", as Wittgenstein uses, characterizes an idea that behind each sign there is a non-linguistic entity, its meaning which determines how it is to be used correctly. According to this view, a word is analogous to a single painted surface of an otherwise invisible glass-body with a certain geometrical shape, i.e., a cube or pyramid.

The combinatorial possibilities of the visible surface depend on the shape of the body behind it. Similarly, grammatical rules are seen as the geometry of meaning-bodies. In "Tractatus" there is an idea prescribed we cannot derive the rules governing the use of a sign from its meaning, since the sign doesnot have a meaning in

18. Ibid, Tractus Logico-Philosophicus, 3.326 ff, 6.211

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

advance of these rules. In course of his philosophizing, Wittgenstein is of the opinion that rules determine meaning.[19] The expression "the meaning determines the rules" and "the rules determine the meaning" are two different rules of our practice. Both of them are constitutive of that practice. Signs by themselves do not have meaning. We give meaning to signs by explaining and using them in different contexts. It can be said that by employing them differently their meanings can be changed.

The concept "change" implies various uses. These uses are governed by rules. Rules acts no paradigms for the determination of the correct or incorrect use. But the rules we accept are neither correct nor incorrect. They are self-content and justified. A rule covers an unlimited application. This means that use of words belong to the rule-formation. Rule is a family resemblance concept. But, "applying the rule correctly" does not mean "doing what most people do". Rules can be misapplied or misunderstood by a whole group as with the first Newtonian calculation of the moon's orbit. The rule is our standard of correctness. But nothing is such a standard unless it is used itself. There is no rule unless there is an application in both the cases of calling such and such "obeying' or "going against it". In Wittgenstein's words, "What this shows is that there is a way of grasping and rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases."[20] This suggests that use entails following a rule, whether correctly or incorrectly. Following a rule has logical impact upon our use of "language", since it constitutes that meaning. Therefore, the rule determines the meaning. In fact, rules justify the nature of use. Use presents rule-following. It is only possible within the social community. It is not possible to follow a rule privately. A rule cannot be used privately. The use of words in the private language is not at all based on any rules, i.e., grammatical rules. Therefore, Wittgenstein says that ".... "obeying a rule" is a practice. And to "think" one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule "privately".

19. Ibid, Philosophical Investigations, 1.497.8 & Philosophical Grammar, 1.10133
20. Ibid, 1.201

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it."[21]

It is clear that for later Wittgenstein a sign becomes meaningful, not through being associated with an object, but through having a rule-guided use. Rule-guided use means "use in the language". So, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. The word "use" has been employed in significant sense than in purely verbal one in "Philosophical Investigations." According to Wittgenstein language is not only a part of individual human organism, but "form of life" woven into the whole texture of social intercourse, "as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing". Thus, Later Wittgenstein differs from Earlier Wittgenstein in the view of meaning. The Earlier conceives meaning as an object that a word refers to. The Later emphasises meaning as use in accordance with grammatical rules.

Critique of Private Language

According to Wittgenstein language cannot be private under any circumstances. Language is a means of communication. By means of language we can communicate our ideas and thoughts to others. It is expressible and also speakable. It is a public one. As Wittgenstein observes, "the primary function of language is to work for a particular purpose in a particular context. It is a social institution. Its learning is always possible in a social setting. In this sense, language is public out and out. It can never be private. Private language, according to Oxford English Dictionary, is that which is kept from public knowledge, not open to the public. But Wittgenstein differs this definition, because, in his view, there is no such kind of language at all. He criticizes the view on private language. According to him, a private language is not an intelligible language at all. If we mean that a private language can never be taught to others, then the main business of language, i.e., to communicate the ideas or thoughts cannot be transacted. If a private language is understood and heard by the speaker himself, then such a language doesnot have communicative character. "We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue, who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. An explorer who watched them

21. Ibid, 1.202

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours"[22] These words of Wittgenstein show that a person, who spoke only in monologue, acts only, or, the activities of a person speaking in monologue. The logical force of the word "activity" may be termed here as a behaviour of the person who speaks to himself only. As an external observer such as an "explorer" in the physical world can easily follow his activities. If an explorer can follow his activities from our forms of life, then he can be able to translate his language just like ours. This is what we do in our ordinary language. For example, a teacher asks one of his students a question "what makes two plus two ?". The student replies that two times two makes four and that is written in his notebook. From this one can easily draw the conclusion that what the student has thought in his mind is explained by him to his teacher through his written work. It is clear that one's activities of thought can be known to others by means of a language, whether it is in written form or in speakable form. Therefore Wittgenstein says, "A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing connexions".[23]

In the first paragraph of section 243 of Philosophical Investigations it is said that language and the understanding of the language are based on public ostensive definition. The second paragraph of the same section raises the issue of the private language. Wittgenstein raises a question and himself replies in this section that "could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences .... his feelings, moods and the rest for his private use ? Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language ? But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this langauge are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." This passage suggests that private language is distinguished from "our ordinary language". By ordinary language here we mean public language. The distinction between the private language and the public language is based on the logical impression of language and thought. A language is meant for communication, that is a public

22. Ibid, 1.243
23. Ibid, Section 122

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

one. Thought is expressed in language. The public language is not the same as the private one. The private language may have the following explanations. It is meant that only individual words are referred to what can only be known to the person speaking. The reason is that it refers to his immediate sensations. In section 256 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein claims that "I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions." It seems that the idea of private language comes under the discussion by those philosophers who philosophize on the subject of the relation of words to experiences. The idea of private language is necessarily related to the idea of external world and the knowledge of other minds. Descartes, classical British empiricism, contemporary phenomenalistic and sensedatum theories support this view. This view holds that there is not an essential connection between a sensation and its outward expression. Sensations are the typical expressions of the idea of the private language. "I know what the word "pain" means. I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am. Another persons cannot have my pains. But I can (inwardly) undertake to call THIS pain in the future. When I say "I am in pain", I am at any rate justified before myself"[24] These assertions of Wittgenstein present his view on private language. Malcolm puts that "the passionate intensity of Wittgenstein's treatment of it is due to the fact that he lets this idea take possession of him, drawing out of himself the thoughts and imagery by which it is expressed and defended, and then subjecting those thoughts and pictures to fiercest scrutiny."[25] Malcolm's remarks lead to manifold consequences. One of the consequences is that the supporters of the private language discuss the issue in relation to the sensation words like pain, tweak and twickling. Twickling, for example, in Wittgenstein's words "I know only what I "call" that, not what anyone else does."[26] It seems that Wittgenstein becomes aware of his own twickling when he feels it. Nobody can participate in it. So is the case with sensation. Wittgenstein says that he has not

24. Ibid, Section 293, Sect. 303, Sect. 253 & Section 289
25. N. Malcolm, Wittgensteins : The Philosophical Investigations— Modern Studies in Philosophy, A collection of Critical Essays (Edited by G. Pitcher), P. 66
26. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 347

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

learnt what "twickling" means, he has only called it something by that name. But other people have used it differently. This gives rise to a difficult situation in our conceptual framework. It will, as Wittgenstein says, not help us because he has "something" what other people have called sensation. But "having something" is contrary to our common use. It is not found in common (public) language.

According to Wittgenstein public language is a public institution concerning the words extensively defined, and sensation words are also defined ostensively or a different way. To him, the word "pain" is the name of a sensation and "I am in pain" is a proposition. Both the word "pain' and the proposition "I am in pain" have no problem there. In our everyday life we talk about sensation and also give them names. Here the another question arises, "how does the human beings learn the meaning of the word "sensation" and give it a name ?, "how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up ?" It is possible answer given by Wittgenstein that words are connected with the primitive as well as the natural expression of sensation. For example, "a child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour."[27] These words of Wittgenstein carry two questions : (a) What is the meaning to say that the child hurts himself and cries ? (b) What does the child learn from the adult ?

At first the child doesnot know what pain is. When the child is hurt and cries, the adults tell him that "that is pain". His crying exhibits the inward expression. "A cry is not a description, but there are transitions"—it is the assertion of Wittgenstein. Here, the expression "the child has hurt" says nothing but the transition of words from inward pain to outward expression. The word "transition" has a logical power in this context. "Crying" is termed as the behaviour of a child. This behaviour is "pain-behaviour" which is an outward expression, comes from the feeling of "pain", that is something inward. Wittgenstein calls pain-behaviour in order to talk about the inner things. According to him a human being consists of two realms : exterior and interior. So, it is said that the

27. Ibid, Section 244

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

exterior realm is related to the interior realm as sign is related to the thing denoted. According to Wittgenstein, "exterior" means something external, which is used in the sense of showing sign of "pain-behaviour". "Interior" means something internal, which is used in the sense of feeling "Pain". "Pain" and "pain-behaviour" are related to private and public usage of language respectively.

According to Anscombe, pain can be explained by means of its express (pain-behaviour). So, there is no gap between pain and pain-behaviour. Pain-behaviour logically derives from pain. By means of language we can do it. When we use the language, we can learn it. Rush Rhees says that "a use which you learn when you learn what the word means. They cannot refer to anything unless there is a gap way in which the language is spoken. That is why there cannot be a private understanding."[28] But according to Hintikka, there is a gap between verbal expression (pain-behaviour) and the pain. There is a difference between crying and the pain itself. Pain is the name of a private sensation. This opens two lines of thought : one is about the discussion of the private language and other is about the discussion of the public language. The assertions of Anscombe and Hintikka show that there is a gap as well as difference between the private language and the public language. But Wittgenstein does not find the gap between the two languages. Both are logically related to each other. The relation is grammatical.

According to Wittgenstein the idea of private language leads to nothing but to the idea of privacy, which is related to the issue of sensation merely. One cannot feel another person's pain. The word "know" is used in different senses. In one sense it is used as the direct knowledge about the pain which is only obtained by person concerned. No one other than the sufferer can know it. It is confined to the person concerned. Others cannot share it. Even others cannot witness it. It is something internal. The person concerned can only know the use of his own language, the language which he alone can understand. Another person cannot understand it. It implies that one's language, i.e., private language is limited. The limits of one's language (say, my) means the limits of one's (my) thought. The word

28. Rush Rhees, Can There be a Private Language ? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 28, 1954, P. 77-94

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"my" has a logical force. "My' is a possessive adjective in English Grammar which is confined to the person concerned only. No body can take or know "my thought". It is my thought, a thought which can be well-understood by the thinkers only. I can only describe it and this description is not possible publicly. It is rather a private one. According to Wittgenstein if the language describes the inner experience of a person, then it leads to establish one's privacy of experience. It is always something personal. So, one cannot experience others, experience, though one can express many things about experience.

In Philosophical Investigations (section 245), the word "know" is used in the following sense : "If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it ?), then other people very often know when I am in pain—yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself." Here, the verb "know" has been treated into two senses : an ordinary sense and a philosophical sense. In ordinary sense it is that other people who very often can know when "I am in pain" Of course such knowledge regarding pain is not certain. Here the word "certain" is used in the logical sense. The proposition "I am in pain" is based on such certainty (logical) which I alone can know. Others may make guess about my pain but they cannot definitely say about it. In other words, other persons can doubt and say many things about the word "pain" but they cannot say about my pain, the pain which I alone can have. Therefore Wittgenstein says, "I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am". This statement of Wittgenstein can further elaborate with an example. Suppose, one can say that I know that all people other than myself have two hands. If it is asked, how do you know that other people have two hands ? The one and only one possible answer is that I know it from my own case, i.e., I have two hands, namely, left hand and right hand and others also have it like me. But this is not the case with the word "pain". I know that I am in pain. Others cannot know. Even I tell to my friend that "I am in pain" again and again, we cannot know it but only hear my words. Nothing can be ascertained by him so far as the knowledge of my pain is concerned. Therefore, Wittgenstein says that "Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behavior." (Philosophical Investigations, section 246)

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

This saying of Wittgenstein gives us the philosophical sense of the verb 'know". It is clear that here the verb "know" can be expressed in terms of first-person present-tense statements. When I say "I know that I am in pain", others cannot know it. Others' imagination about one's pain or feeling of pain is not one and the same thing. The proposition "I know that I am in pain" is true, because it is a first person sensation statement. I know it, because I feel it. I cannot know what others can feel. I have no access to others' pain. It pertains to the person concerned only. It is neither teachable nor witnessable. It is such a kind of personal experience that nobody can participate it. Personal experience is not something which is publicly exposed. I have only direct experience of it. When I say that I feel it, I say I experience it. Experience is also private. Therefore my feeling or experience is not in the domain of public language.

I feel pain, because I am in pain. Similar is the case when I say I have toothache, because I feel it. My pain, my headache and my toothache are only confined to me. This cannot be verified by others. For example, when I say I feel chest pain in the extreme left side of my body, the doctor comes and examines me properly and prescribes some medicines. Suppose, if the pain increases in spite of that, the doctor is understood to have failed to prescribe the right kind of medicine and perhaps he has not felt the pain of the patient. It seems that the feeling of pain is purely private to the patient. The patient cannot pass it on to others. In other words, all private experiences and states of consciousness are confined to the person concerned only, and therefore can not verified. However, Wittgenstein says that "I am in pain" has the same function as "He is in pain". But both propositions does not have the same logical force. "I am in pain", the first person present-tense singular sensation statement related to private expression. "He is in pain', the third person present-tense singular sensation statement relates to public expression. Thus we have two sets of statements : private and public. Private statement corresponds to private language, and public statement corresponds to public language. A private statement (language) is a statement which is understood by the speaker alone. In Wollheim's words, "the subject of a private statement I mean the person that the statement is about the person

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

who is accredited with the particular feelings. There are those statements so constructed that anyone acquainted with the rules of language is equally competent to establish or to reject : these are called public statements."[29] In case of private statement no one other than the person can feel the pain. It has no place in our ordinary language. In case of public statement one can learn and teach others. It has a role in ordinary language. Our ordinary language is governed by certain linguistic rules, which are meant for the conceptual explanation.

On the above observation it may be said that private language has no scope of communication. It is only self-experience. So, it is not to be called "language" as such. Language as proper is only public language based on grammatical rules, because it is expressive to all. It is communicative, the feature of language.

The Picture Theory of Meaning

In "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" Wittgenstein presents his view of meaning as the picture theory. He claims that a proposition is a picture of reality. Here "picture" is not used in ordinary sense, i.e., a proposition is not a spatial picture but "logical" one. A proposition is the logical picture of reality. "A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern."[30] In words of Anthony Kenny "he (Wittgenstein) would count as pictures not only paintings, drawings, photographs and other obviously pictorial representation in two dimensions, but also maps sculptures, three dimensionaly models, and even such things as musical scores and gramophone record."[31]

The picture theory of meaning is a kind of "model theory". Wittgenstein himself says that a picture is a model of reality. This idea has emerged in the mind of Wittgenstein, when he was reading

29. R. Wollheim, "Privacy", Proceedings of the Aristotlian Society, New Series, Vol. 51, 5th March 1951-52, P. 96-97
30. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Section 4.014
31. Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, P. 54

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

a magazine in which an article about a law suit in Paris concerning an automobile accident published. At the trial a miniature model of the accident was presented before the court. The model here served as a proposition, that is, a description of a possible state of affairs. It had this function owing to a correspondence between the parts of a model (the miniature houses, cars, people) and things (houses, cars, people) in reality. This article inspired Wittgenstein, and he has reversed the analogy and said that a proposition serves as a model or picture by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world.[32]

We normally think of a picture as consisting of patches of colours or certain marks on a surface that are arranged in a particular way and generally having certain features common with some part of reality. It is these common features which make a picture. But Wittgenstein never speaks of propositional signs as pictures, he only asserts that it is proposition that picture reality. According to him any picture must have two features in order to be a picture : (a) the elements of a picture must be related to one another in a specific way, (b) there should be a correspondence between elements of a picture and the reality outside the picture. "What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way. The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way."[33] The connection of the elements of a picture, in Wittgenstein terminology, is called its "structure" and the possibility of this structure is called "pictorial form". The pictorial form of a proposition is only the possibility that reality is like the picture but it need not be necessarily so. By stressing this Wittgenstein is able to explain how even false propositions have sense. In order to be a picture a proposition needs to have a logical form. Wittgenstein considers propositions and not propositional signs to be picture, in this way pictures are not icons.

How does the picture hook on to reality ? To answer this question, Wittgenstein falls in vagueness or inconsistencies. At tunes he views that reality touches the picture—"it reaches right

32. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Section 2.12
33. Ibid, Section 2.14, 2.15

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

out to it." At another place he says, "we picture facts to ourselves." Such an inconsistent view has obviously confounded much of the confusion on his position with regard to this question. Pitcher suspects Witgenstein, on the basis of some explanations in "Tractatus", of his position on correlating elements of a picture (proposition) with elements of reality as a mental act—the mental act, namely, of meaning or intending the former to stand for the latter.[34] A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand, and so a picture conceived in this way also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture."[35] These statements of Wittgenstein has been explained by Stripling as such : "So any picture already has the correlation in question. This is one respect in which Wittgenstein's use of "picture" differs from the ordinary use, since the latter does not always imply that the picture asserts the existence of what it pictures; but any picture as such contains the correlation of names with objects, and is therefore, the assertion that something corresponding to what it pictures in the case."[36] The correlation of elements of the picture and the fact is both external and internal. It is external in that relations of the picture are significant before the correlation, and internal in that the elements actually do have a congruity of structure. The external correlation is thus a result of the practical application of proposition to reality, whereas the internal relation is the necessary condition for the application, and hence is logical.

Wittgenstein, as he himself accepted, was heavily influenced by both Frege and Russell; and like them believed that the meaning of a word is the object to which it refers. Still he made certain observations that reflect his deep philosophical insight. He not only said that logical constants like "not", "is", "and", etc. do not stand for objects, but also classified that sentences do not have any reference, and, therefore are not names. By this he implied that saying is not naming. Moreover, he defined pictorial form as the possibility of the

34. George Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, P. 88
35. Wittgenstein, Ibid, Section 4.022 & section 2.1513
36. S. R. Stripling, The Picture Theory of Wittgenstein : An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus P. 72

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

structure of the picture, that a picture shares with reality and thus, displaced meaning from the world of actualities to the realm of possibilities. Therefore perhaps Ryle comments that "Wittgenstein still had one foot in the denotationist camp but his other foot was already free."[37]

Here the important point is that the concept of pictorial form refers to something underlying the manifest features of language, when it gives us pictures of reality, and the pictorial form of a picturing fact is deep and inaccessible. It seems that it is more than the mere possibility of one thing (or, rather fact) depicting another. We are told that this possibility consists in the elements in each of the facts being related to one another in the same way. Moreover, a picture of spatial coloured reality has a different pictorial form from a picture of spatial but not coloured reality. In so far as these two features of pictorial form can be deducted, the concept of pictorial form seems not so very reconcile. Perhaps this is also true even of what any picturing fact must possess in order to depict reality, namely logical form or the form of reality. This should suffice as a preliminary to understanding how Wittgenstein looked for and believed he had found the definitive solution to the cardinal problem of philosophy, namely, "What can be expressed by propositions, i.e., by language, (and what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown expression."[38] There is distinction between what can be said in language and what can only be shown. In making the distinction Wittgenstein intends to give an exhaustive classification of the possible content of language. This content divides into what we can express in language (the syable), and what only language itself can express. We might say into what can be represented by language and what can only be presented in language.

Logical form cannot be represented in propositions, it can only be mirrored, reflected and shown.[39] The force of these expressions

37. Gilbert Ryle, The Theory of Meaning, in British Philosophy In the Mid-century (Ed. C. A. Mace), P. 254
38. Quoted from G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (from taken Dr. Sabita Rani Hota, Philosophy in Linguistic Perspectives, P. 37)
39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.121

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

is not quite clear. If we took logical and pictorial form to be the mere possibility of structure, a proposition might be said to reflect or mirror its form in the sense that any actual state of affairs reflects its own possibility. But it would be a little forced or misleading to say that the possibility was also represented. If pictorial form is not simply the picture's possibility of being a picture but also something the picture can be seen to have in so far as it is a picture, the notions of reflection, mirroring and showing can be understood in a fairly straightforward way; the form of a picture is directly intuitable. But being shown it cannot be said, even if we can make another picture of that picture. This another picture could never be a picture of the logical form of the first. Thus, form cannot be represented at all. Wittgenstein's account of language in terms of picturing appears to have paradoxical consequences. Gilbert Ryle points out that "In the "Tractatus" Wittgenstein came to the frustrating conclusion that these principles of arrangement inevitably baffle significant statement. To try to tell what makes the difference between significant and nonsensical talk is itself to cross the divide between significant and nonsensical talk."[40]

When we express something in language, it is of course not the state of affairs depicted that we express, but that something is so and so. The sentence "It is raining", expresses that it rains, it doesnot express rain. In Wittgenstein's terminology, what a sentence expressing a proposition says is identical in content with the proposition's meaning, not with a state of affairs, or in Frege's terminology, its reference. To comprehend everything that can be said is therefore, to comprehend all possible meanings, and corresponding to these are all possible meaningful propositions. Thus, Wittgenstein says that the thought is the meaningful proposition.[41] To comprehend a possible meaning is also to comprehend a possible thought. The transition from meaning to reference or possible state of affairs is possible because the proposition has a logical form which is apparent in its structure and which is also the form of reality. Thus, the concept of logical form belongs to both ontology and logic.

40. Gilbert Ryle, "Ludwig Wittgenstein", in Essays on Wittgenstein Tractatus, edited by Copi and Beard, P. 5
41. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractartus, Section 4.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Notion (Concept) of Philosophy

Meaningful propositions fall into one of two classes : the class of true propositions, and, the class of false propositions. Those propositions are true which state that which is the case, that is, which describe existing states of affairs, and false propositions are those that state what is not the case but what nevertheless, logically speaking, might have been the case, in so far as they are not self-contradictory. Wittgenstein calls "science" all speculation directed toward the identifying of true propositions, certainly an unconventional usage, and one suggesting that he had a particular philosophy of science in mind. But of this he says nothing more. Such sentences as "life is beautiful", "It is a sin to steal", "Beethoven's fifth symphony is a valuable work of art", and "God is eternal and unknowable" cannot be said to describe possible states of affairs. "For nothing" can count as their being either true or false. Now, philosophers, moralists, aestheticians and preachers have certainly always been thought to be propounding truths, or, if not at least falsehoods—that is propositions. They have also been claiming to propound something other than science. But if once science has led its say, there is nothing more to be said, then there are no further propositions for philosophers or anyone else to concern themselves with. Still, there is something for philosophers to do. They can undermine belief in their being something beyond reality which can be the subject of meaningful propositions, that is, propositions which picture possible states of affairs.

The sole function of philosophy, then, is to clarify and if, in the process of clarifying, the philosopher is compelled, for didactic purposes, to make statements. Once clarity is achieved, there will be no philosophical propositions left over. In Wittgenstein's words, "The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science or the whole corpus of natural science. Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The word "philosophy" must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, but not beside them. Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions, but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

as it were, cloudy and indistinct. Its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. It must set limits to what can be thought, and in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought."[42]

The above statements clearly defines philosophy as beyond natural sciences, and limits its functions. Philosophy does not clear all the thoughts that we have in our mind. In other words, philosophy is able to clarify only the philosophical statements, not scientific one. "What we cannot speak about we must consign to silence." It means there must be a reality, but it is not possible to describe it. So, on the question of reality or science of reality we must keep silence. It is the real philosophy. Perhaps it is the cause Wittgenstein says that "most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answers to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language."[43] Therefore Wittgenstein says that Philosophy is not a kind of natural sciences, so its propositions are nonsensical. Hence there are, in true sense, no philosophical propositions. Even then there are two useful functions of philosophy : (a) negative or descriptive function, and (b) positive or constructive function. Negative or descriptive function is that what metaphysicians and ethicists and others try to say something that cannot be said, so the error of their ways. In Wittgenstein's words : "The correct method in philosophy would really be the following : to say nothing except what can be said, i.e., propositions of natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy, and then whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person, he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one."[44]

42. Ibid, 4.11, 4.111, 4.112 & 4.114
43. Ibid, 4.003
44. Ibid, 6.53

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Thus good philosophy removes the puzzlement engendered by bad philosophy. The problems that had exercised philosophers in the past seemed real enough to them, and bothered them as much as if they had been real; the new, good philosophy, in showing them that their problems were nonsensical and hence did not really exist (or, were "not problems") would thereby remove puzzlement and anxiety which definitely did exist. There is another, more constructive, job for the philosopher to do. We are often not clear just what it is that we are saying when we make an utterance, e.g., when we talk about democracy or art or intertia or force. A philosopher can help us in this important matter by showing us whether these utterances express genuine propositions and, if so, how they are to be properly analysed. Therefore Wittgenstein says that philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts, and, without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct : its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.[45] Thus, philosophy is not the endeavour to investigate realms of being and to discover new truth, new facts. Natural scientists are the only ones that are properly concerned with discovering new facts.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a body of true propositions, as physics or biology is. It is not a theory. It consists in the activity of making theories and other propositions clear.

The concept of philosophy in "Tractatus" has been reconstituted in "Philosophical Investigations." Though there are differences in the "concept", there are also differences between these two books. In both books Wittgenstein's own philosophical enterprise is concerned to mark out the limits of sense, to indicate boundary between what can intelligibly be said and what can not be said. To be sure the boundary is indicated differently in the two books. The range of the sayable, for example is greatly extended in the "Philosophical Investigations", and the boundary is indicated in a much more simple and straightforward way in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". Another striking point of resemblance between the "two" is in the general conception of a philosophical problem and its source or cause. In the preface of "Tractatus" Wittgenstein says that "the book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, I believe,

45. Ibid. 4.112

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood". (Tractatus, P. 3) The same idea in different words has been occurred in the philosophical Investigations : "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of "depth". They are deep disguietudes, their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work."[46]

Thus, the "Investigations" corroborates the contention of the "Tractatus" that philosophical problems continue to haunt us on account of our misunderstanding or inadequate understanding of the functioin of language. The philosopher is not to propound any theory but to clear the ground for sound thinking along different paths of human enquiry. Clarity is a pre-requisite for systematic investigation of any kind as unclarity is the cause of most of the philosophical problems. In the "Investigations" Wittgenstein maintains that there are different kinds of language or language games with their different sets of rules and practices. So, the confusion between one form of language with another gives rise to philosophical problems.

There are subtle differences between the "Tractatus" and the "Investigations" in the conception of the philosopher's task. In the "Investigations" the task is still to draw the limit of language, but Wittgenstein has come to take a different view of what this task involved. He has ceased to expect the limit to be one continuous line. For factual discourse no longer held pride of place as it held in the "Tractatus". Wittgenstein finds in the "Investigations" that he is not really able to derive its rich variety of different forms from a single essence. Therefore, he regards his new conception of philosophy as a continuous struggle against the "bewitchment" of the intellect — "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[47]

---

46. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 111, 38 & 132
47. Ibid, 109

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

According to this conception of philosophy (as "battle"), as Wittgenstein says, philosophical theories are a product of imagination and they offer us simple but seemingly profound pictures, which blind us to the actual complexities of the language. "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."[48] In fact, as depicted in the "Investigations", philosophy is an organised resistance to this enchantment, and its method is always to bring us back to the linguistic phenomena, with which we are perfectly familiar, but which we cannot keep in focus when we philosophize in the traditional manner. Therefore, Wittgenstein says that "the problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."[49] The philosopher puts before us familiar data about our language games and arranges them in such a way that we achieve a clear view of the uses of certain expressions. This method of doing philosophy is the method of treatment of an illness.[50]

Wittgenstein doesnot think that the philosopher is one who is himself exempt from the illness and who is himself healthy, therefore he can set out to cure others. Instead, the philosopher suffers from the same maladies, the same troubles—"The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many sickness of the understanding before he can arrive at the notions of the sound human understanding. If in the midst of life we are in death, so in sanity we are surrounded by madness."[51]

On the above observation we may conclude that in the conception of a philosophical problem and the method of its solution, the "Tractatus" cares little for the deliverances of common sense or for the niceties of ordinary language. In the "Tractatus" philosophy has been considered as to be entirely apriori, and the nature of language can be discovered by a process of apriori reasoning which

48. Ibid, 115
49. Ibid, 109
50. Ibid, 255
51. L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics, edited by G. H. Von Wright, Rush Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, P. 157

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

determines the nature of reality. But no this kind of claim is made in the "Investigations". Here, we are told that we must look at how language is actually used and thereby achieve clarity. In the "Investigations" there is a new conception of philosophical method, that is, descriptive; though it is no mere matter of passive observation. It is a creative task that requires skill, insight and imagination. New method of philosophy is meant to help to describe the uses of words, but not just any description will do. "What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular uses." (Philosophical Investigations, Section 291).

On Certainty

In his work "On Certainty" Wittgenstein has expounded arguments against Moore and Scepticism. Moore holds the view of independent existence of material objects. With an example of "Here is one hand" and "Here is another" Moore shows that material objects exist external to the mind. This argument of Moore is the main target of Wittgenstein's criticism. According to Wittgenstein, Moore's arguments do not provide any proof for the independent existence of material objects, as the arguments put farward by Moore are not claims to knowledge at all. However, it was not Wittgenstein's intention to deny the general purport of Moore's arguments against scepticism in general. Moore as a champion of common sense philosophy argues to show that there is substantial proof in accepting the view that material objects exist external to the mind in his papers "A Defence of Common Sense" and "Proofs of an External World." In addition to that he expresses the view that there are a good number of propositions which he knows for certain. Some such propositions are "The Earth Existed long before I was born", "There were other human beings besides me." All these propositions, for Moore, are truisms. Wittgenstein doesnot deny this fact. In fact, he recognises the peculiar logical status of these propositions. But Wittgenstein sees what is wrong with Moore's propositions is that they are not the cases of knowledge at all. Even then Wittgenstein, like Moore, criticizes scepticism. According to him, "scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For, doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

answer only when something can be said."[52] This statement of Wittgenstein makes different analysis of the term "doubt."

Doubt is not possible without proper ground—It is one of the pre-conditions for doubt is that it needs some valid grounds. Descartes builds his "universal doubt" upon an ad hoc ground, namely, the "malicious demon."[53] Before anyone questioned the "validity" of such an ad hoc ground, Descartes asserted that it is not a necessary condition that the ground itself be certain. For Wittgenstein, such a ground is as good as not having a ground; because mere imaginary ground for doubting something should not be taken as a ground at all. In this context Wittgenstein says that one has to distinguish a situation where doubt is not reasonable from the one where doubt is logically impossible.[54]

Doubt is not a mere verbal utterance—Wittgenstein contests that doubting something just for the sake of doubting doesnot in any way make any difference.[55] It is beyond one's own imagination what difference that it can make to anyone. Thus, sceptic's doubt concerning the existence of material objects doesnot have any practical significance, as the grounds on which his doubt rests is very shaky.

Doubt is possible only in the context of a language game—In order to doubt, as Wittgenstein expresses, "P", one must know what is meant by "P". For example, when a person expresses a doubt concerning the existence of material objects like "tables", "chairs", "trees", then he must be in a position to know what is meant by such objects like "tables", "chairs" and "trees". Such an understanding, as Wittgenstein holds, presupposes a language-game in which these expressions are used. Thus, the language-game itself rules out the possibility of any such doubt. Because, to doubt these expressions that are being used in a given language game. On this ground, Wittgenstein argues, the sceptic's doubt destroys itself as it questions the meanings of the words used to express it. A language game is a practice that involves agreement or

52. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.51
53. Ibid, On Certainty, 4.
54. Ibid, 454
55. Ibid, 129

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

disagreement of foundational beliefs that give meanings to the words that are being used. In Wittgenstein's words, "Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings. If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either."[56]

There cannot be a universal doubt—The very essence of language game, as revealed in the "Philosophical Investigations", is that there cannot be a universal doubt, since doubts are restricted to their respective language games. For example, a student interested in learning history frequently interrupts his teacher with all sorts of doubts even before he learnt the actual language game of history. The doubts expressed by the student do not mean anything as he is yet to learn how to ask questions in that particular language game. After all, the doubt presupposes belief. Here in this case there is no belief, hence, there is no doubt. Therefore, Wittgenstein says, "A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt."[57]

Doubt presumes certainty—A genuine doubt can only make sense in the context of a language game or in a framework of reference which by itself is not a subject of doubt. "Doubt is only possible where testing is possible". Our doubts rest on the fact that there are many propositions which are exempted from doubt. According to Wittgenstein, these propositions constitute the world view. They form the system within which all testing takes place.[58] As a matter of fact, they serve as "hinges" or "substratum" or "scaffoldings" of our ordinary beliefs that are testable. Thus, doubting presupposes certainty.[59]

All the above analysing of doubt, according to Wittgenstein, draws the conclusion that the nature of doubt does not justify scepticism. If certain propositions serve as "hings" or "scaffoldings" of our beliefs, then those propositions, or foundational propositions, are not doubted. If this were the case, are they also the propositions about which we cannot be mistaken ? Wittgenstein replies this

56. Ibid, 234, 114
57. Ibid, 450
58. Ibid, 90–92, 105
59. Ibid, 115

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

question as a negative one. He says that their certainty cannot in anyway guarantee that they cannot be mistaken. Wittgenstein draws a distinction between a mistake and other forms of false belief. For example, suppose a person may think that he is living in a place for a long time other than the place where he is actually living. According to Wittgenstein, such a claim is not mistake but a kind of mental disorder.[60] The difference between a mistake and a mental disorder is that there can be valid reasons for a mistake committed in the recognition of a fact, whereas in the case of a mental disorder there can only be causes which are strictly pathological.[61] This distinction between a mistake and madness may not be palatable to the sceptic. However, the sceptic may claim that if his belief turns out to be false, then there is sufficient ground for him to cast doubt on it (false belief) irrespective of its place in a rationally accepted system of beliefs.

Wittgenstein observes certain lacunae in Moore's arguments against scepticism. Moore maintained that there are a good number of propositions which he knew them for certain. In line with Moore's claim, Wittgenstein holds the view that there are many propositions which are not doubted and also mistaken. For example, the proposition "I have never been on the Moon" cannot be doubted, since its negation cannot be taken seriously.[62] These propositions have a peculiar logical status. However, Wittgenstein says that since there are a good number of propositions whose validity cannot be doubted, it does not mean that they can be known for certain. The statements "I know where I am feeling pain", "I know that I am in pain" are as senseless as the statement "I know that I have pain." According to Wittgenstein, to give a statement "I know that I am in pain" is to give a misleading interpretation of the "grammatical proposition" that there is no such thing as doubting that "I am in pain." Therefore, it is senseless to lay claim to knowledge where doubt itself is senseless.

According to Wittgenstein, Moore committed the same mistake as sceptic did, when he staked a claim to the knowledge of existence

60. Ibid, 71
61. Ibid, 74
62. Ibid. 117

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

of his own hand which is not considered a knowledge claim at all. Wittgenstein proves the assertion of the proposition "I know that here is my hand" is senseless on the following grounds :

(a) In the assertion "I know that here is my hand", "I" is superfluous. To this extent this assertion of Moore is misleading.

(b) The assertion "I know that here is my hand" can have some significance in a rare and uncommon circumstances. In such circumstances, the meaning of that assertion may be clear, but it does not provide any answer to the sceptic.

(c) Unless it is possible to doubt the assertion "I know that here is my hand", or, be mistaken in believing it, one cannot be said to know that "here is my hand."

(d) Sometimes the assertion "I know that here is my hand" is used in our ordinary conversation either as a misleading "grammatical expression" or as an expression of one's linguistic capability.

The above reasons given by Wittgenstein are logical and convincing. Wittgenstein does not deny the fact that there cannot be any doubt about anything. A doubt can make any sense only in the context of a framework of reference which by itself is not a subject for doubt. Every framework of reference is rooted in certain foundational beliefs according to Wittgenstein. These beliefs are relatively foundational like the bed and banks of a river which determine the direction of the flow of waters.[63] Such beliefs constitute "foundational propositions" whose apodeictic nature in practice and action reveals us "that certain things are indeed not doubted."[64]

Facts, Objects, Propositions and Names

In "Tractatus" Wittgenstein says that language consists of propositions which state facts. At the most basic level, we have elementary propositions from which all other propositions are constructed by logical connectives. An elementary proposition stands for an atomic fact. It is true if it corresponds to an actual fact.

63. Ibid, 96–99
64. Ibid, 342

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

We can use language to describe the world because of these utterly basic propositions, which directly "map onto" facts in the world and whose truth-table doesnot depend on other propositions. All other propositions, that is "molecular" propositions are truth-functions of these—their truth-value is determined by those of their constituent elementary propositions.

An elementary proposition is a structured set of names. "A name means an object which are simple. The object is its (names) meaning. In a proposition a name is the representative of an object."[65] These statements of Wittgenstein show that objects a themselves names which are expressed in language b propositions. Propositions, especially elementary propositions are pictures of atomic facts. A picture can represent a fact because each "element" in it "maps onto" some thing or feature in the world. That is, they share a logical or pictorial form, which makes representation possible. It is a purely abstract, formal requirement, not fixed to any particular material realization. Anything can represent a fact, so long as its shares its form. In such a way, one might say that an analogue recording on vinyle and a digital compact disc are both "pictures" of a live musical performance, since every element in the performance is located, in its correct place, on either format. Linguistic representation is just one special case of a general theory of representation.

So, an elementary proposition is a structured set of names, not just a collection; since the same collection of names, rearranged, would picture some other fact—"John Loves Mary" differs from "Mary loves John". This is the key to the opening lines of the "Tractatus", where Wittgenstein say that world is made up of "facts", not of things. The same objects, in different combinations, would constitute different facts which together, would make up different possible worlds. The actual world is made up of the facts corresponding to the set of the propositions. So, if a proposition pictures an actual fact, then it is true—however, I can understand it without knowing its truth-value. Likewise, its meaning is the same whether it is true or false. In general, a proposition has a sense (meaning), because its names itself stand for something, as is shown

65. Ibid, Tractatus, 2.02, 3.203, 3.22

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

by false propositions being meaningful. It has meaning by depicting a "possible" state of affairs. To understand a proposition is to know which possible state of affairs it pictures, that is, what would make it true and what would make it false. The possibility of being true and of being false is a prerequisite of having a sense at all, as is having a meaning which is graspable prior to knowing its truth-value. However, neither is the case for tautologies or contradictions, since these are always true or false respectively, and can be shown apriori to be so. As Wittgenstein says, I learn nothing about the weather if I know that either it is raining or it is not raining. So such a proposition lacks sense, in that it doesnot represent a possible state of affairs. However, it is not nonsensical in any pejorative way. It can be constructed a truth-table for a tautology, but cannot be constructed for gibberish like "& p ~ v q". Thus Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" in "Tractatus" is that the logical constants do not represent, that is, they are not "names."

In "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein says that "The word to signify" is perhaps used in the most straightforward way when the object signified is marked with the sign. Suppose that the tools A uses in building bear certain marks. When A shows his assistant such a mark, he brings the tool that has that mark on it. It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is given to a thing. It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves : naming is something like attaching a label to a thing .... To repeat-naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But what is preparation for ?"[66]

The above statements of Wittgenstein indicate a theory of naming which explains the relation of things or objects to names. According to Wittgenstein the function of a name is like that of a label and it fulfils its role by being "attached" to that thing which it names, i.e., a bearer of the name. It is clear that Wittgenstein intends his comparison of names and labels to be metaphorical. Obviously, there is nothing as expection to have access to the bearer of a name in precisely the same way as it has in the case of label and thing labelled. For example, a bottle in a medicinal discourses has

66. Ibid, Philosophical Investigations, Section 15 & Section 26

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

its label stuck on to it, whereas there can only be a figurative sense in which "Moses" is attached to Moses. But the important feature of the metaphor is that the name gets attached to its bearer, the linguistic role of the name that it has. That is to say, a name is semantically significant in association with its bearer. Wittgenstein describes that the linguistic (semantic) role of names is like that of labels but that it is not part of that role to guarantee that the item labelled exists.[67] Even names that do not, in fact, have a bearer can have meaning though their linguistic role can still be described as like that of a label which purports to label something. Wittgenstein believes that a name can be like a label without postulating a necessarily existent "object" as a bearer of the name. "Naming appears as queer connection of a word with an object, And you really get such a queer connection when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by starting at an object in front of him and repeating a name innumerable times."[68]

This passage suggests that on account of the linguistic role of names, as Wittgenstein claims, naming is preparatory for language. "Naming is preparatory to the use of a word in language", Wittgenstein does not tell us to think that, as a matter empirical fact, a child first learns names of things and then uses these names in his language. Rather, an association which a child is trained to make between a name and a thing only becomes that of naming when it is part of some language game as described by Wittgenstein consists of answering questions such as : What is that called ? or, inventing names of objects and saying : this is .....[69]. However, this ostensive activity does not alter the basic conception which Wittgenstein makes in the "Philosophical Investigations"— "A thing has not even got a name except in the language game."[70]

Forms of Life

The notion of "forms of life" is primordial for Wittgenstein. He says, "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—

67. Ibid, Section 41 & 42
68. Ibid, Section 38
69. Ibid, Section 27
70. Ibid, Section 49

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

forms of life."[71] In "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein indicates the multiplicity of language-games, and the motif of language-games is centrally important to understanding the notion of "forms of life". For Wittgenstein, words cannot be understood in isolation from the "context" in which they are used. This is so since the meaning of a word is its use in language.[72] The way to grasp the meaning of a word is to observe its use in the "language-game" in which it is used. Doing so enables the observer to see how that word is deployed by individuals in the communal activity of their linguistic community. In order to grasp the meaning of a word in any given context it is necessary to pay attention to the various non-linguistic activities and practices engaged in by that group, since it is within this context that any given language is used and any given language will be interwoven with such activities and practices. It is the use of words together with these non-linguistic activities that make up "language-games". Speaking a language is part of an activity and so of a form of life.

Like games, speaking is a rule-guided activity wherein behaving and acting in certain ways is tantamount to grasping the rule. If they are to be grasped at all, then language-games must be grasped in terms of the context wherein they are played. As Bernard Williams put the point sometime ago, "language, on Wittgenstein's view, is an "embodied, this wordly, concrete social activity, expressive of human needs."[73] Language-games are embedded in a form of life. A form of life is the bedrock or given. It is the irreducible basis for any inquiry into language, and "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life"[74] In "Blue and Brown Books" Wittgenstein has equated the concept of language with the concept of culture[75]. A culture is the totality of communal activities into which language-games are embedded. In so far as language has any foundation at all, this foundation is not something abstract. Its foundation is communal activity itself.

---

71. Ibid, 226e
72. Ibid, 20e
73. Williams
74. Wittgenstein, Ibid, section 8
75. Ibid, Blue and Brown Books, P. 134

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

According to Wittgenstein, linguistic behaviour is as much a part of human evolution as walking, eating and drinking. Nevertheless, the term "forms of life" cannot be reduced to biology, nor it is equivalent to the concept of "human nature". Instead, it is a "humanity's historical practice." In fact, the notion of "forms of life" poses the question of relativism.[76] For Wittgenstein, language-games are a groups's or a community's method of representation. Given the fact that concepts are generated over time through training and education, and that once these concepts are in place the way things "look to us" will be a certain way, it follows that had we formed different concepts the way things look to us might have been quite different. The way we see things ultimately depends upon our language, since our language is the means by which we manage to represent the data of experience. Individuals who make up a shared linguistic community must, by virtue of their concepts and "representational form", generally agree in their judgements about the nature of things. This agreement depends upon individuals being part of a shared "form of life."

If language is to be a means of communication and if an individual can function within a language, then they must be able to understand their utterances and their representations as well as understanding the way in which the group more generally understands and represents things. The issue of relativism arises when we consider the idea of a plurality of "forms of life" each with their own distinct and mutually exclusive "ways of seeing" the world. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of relativism—cultural and cognitive. If we isolate these as two distinct theses we can characterise them as follows :

Cultural relativism is the view that there are differences between different cultures or in the history of one particular culture with regards to social, moral and religious values and practices. Cognitive relativism is the view that there are different ways of "seeing the world", that is, that there is a plurality of different sets of categories under which experience is organised and the world understood. Each set of categories is held to be internally consistent

76. Philip Tonner, Wittgenstein on forms of life : a short Introduction, P. 13-18

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and exclusive. The upshot of cognitive relativism is that the individuals belonging to one conceptual community will be unable to grasp at all what it is like to be a member of another community. If cognitive relativism is true, then the "truth" that a particular group talk of knowing would ultimately be "their truth". Regarding Wittgenstein's notion of "forms of life" the division of relativism into the cultural and cognitive strands is problematic.

The notion of a "form of life" is intended to stress that language is imbued with cultural concerns and vice versa. For Wittgenstein, it is impossible to separate a community's cultural practice from their linguistic practice and ultimately their "being so minded." The "form of life" that individuals share encompasses the concepts that they organise the world into, and the language they use to communicate, as well as their cultural practices and values and so if Wittgenstein is a relativist, he has to be a relativist on both the cultural and cognitive counts. It is what individuals utter and assert in language that is true and false. Wittgenstein asserts that when a proposition or judgement is deemed true or false, this doesnot amount to a true or false claim about the nature of reality. Rather, it amounts to agreement in "forms of life". This suggests that different "forms of life" have different "ways of seeing" the world and this might imply a multiplicity of different standards of truth and falsity. "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him". "We do not understand Chinese gestures any more than chinese sentences." Such kinds of propositions suggest a plurality of "forms of life" and relativism between them.[77]

The problem with a relativist position is that it entails the view that all truth must be truth-in-a-form-of-life. The result is that there is no standard to tell which "form of life" has the "truer" view of things. Such a position is incoherent because it invokes a non-relativistic sense of truth to characterise a relativistic state of affairs, while simultaneously denying the existence of non-relativistic truth. So, the relativists' position is ultimately self-refuting. It claims to be true in a way that it itself rejects. If this is Wittgenstein's position, then his later philosophy would be incoherent. If relativism is true, then there can be no truth other

77. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

than "truth in a theory" and it follows from this that the propositions of physics and chemistry and so on are only true relative to our scientific "forms of life". There is another related problem with relativism for Wittgenstein. If we hold that there is more than one "form of life", then how would individuals in one "form of life" be able to recognise another "form of life" as another "form of life"? To be able to distinguish another "form of life" there must be some means to identify it and to distinguish it as a "form of life". If the other "form of life" is cognitively inaccessible to us, then we would not be able to regard it as a "form of life" and we would be unable to interpret the practices that constituent it. If the lion spoke and we did not understand him, we would not be entitled to say that it was a member of another "form of life". Our failure to understand would just show up our "form of life's" limits of intelligibility.

There is, however, one qualification that should be made before moving on. This is that while Wittgenstein could be a conceptual relativist, he cannot be a philosophical relativist. When Wittgenstein uses the terms that he does he is not applying them in ways that are limited to one "language-game" only. Quite often Wittgenstein's remarks are intended to point our attention to the way in which a word is used in a particular "language-game". His remark is intended to be true in a way that transcends any particular practice of "form of life". Many of Wittgenstein's remarks are "grammatical" in this sense. If it is possible to make remarks that transcend different practices, then it must be possible to acknowledge the existence of other practices or "forms of life". Such "forms of life" must be cognitively accessible to us. Other world-views, "ways of seeing" or "forms of life" are not imaginatively unintelligible to individuals from different "forms of life" for Wittgenstein. Indeed, Wittgenstein encouraged this kind of imagination. "Life runs on differently" in different "forms of life" and our imagination can travel amongst them.[78] Wittgenstein insists that "we" can imagine situations and practices that are quite different from our own. He also insists that when we consider the performance of, for example, a horrific rite, ceremony or festival, and

78. Ibid

feel affected by it, we grasp the concern or mood that gave rise to it in the first place. He says, "what strikes us in the course of events as terrible, impressive, horrible, tragic and so on, anything but trivial and insignificant, that is what gave birth to them."[79] More fundamental than any one particular "form of life" that individuals constitute is this "complicated form of life", and that is, the fundamentally human perspective. It is entirely possible that individuals with different concerns than ours may classify and categories the world differently in light of their interests and needs.

Wittgenstenian Fideism

Fideism is an epistemological theory which maintains that "faith" is independent of "reason", or, that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths. The word "fideism" comes from "fides", the Latin word for faith and literally means "faith-ism" Alvin Plantinga[80] defines "fideism" as "the exclusive or basic reliance upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized especially in the pursuit of philosophical or religious "truth". Therefore, the fideist urges reliance on faith rather than reason, in matters philosophical and religious, and therefore may go on to disparage the claims of reason. The fideist seeks truth, above all, and affirms that reason cannot achieve certain kinds of truth, which must instead be accepted only by faith.[81]

Though Wittgenstein is not by conventional standards "religious", his philosophical remarks reveal that he has a definite sympathy toward at least certain features of religion. For him, religion is less a matter of theory than of practice. In his view, religion is a self-contained and primarily expressive enterprise, governed by its own internal logic or "grammar".[82] This view, commonly, called "Wittgensteinian Fideism", is variously characterized as entailing one or more of the following distinct theses :

79. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3e.
80. Alvina Plantinga, Reason and Belief in God, from Faith and Rationality, ed. by A. plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff, P. 87.
81. Ibid
82. Kai Neilsen, Wittgensteinian Fiderism, Philosophy, VOl. 42, P. 191–209

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(a) that religion is logically cut off from other aspects of life.

(b) that religious discourse is essentially self-referential and doesnot allow us to talk about reality.

(c) that religious beliefs can be understood only by religious believers.

(d) that religion cannot be criticized.

It is highly doubtful, however, whether Wittgenstein would have endorsed any of these claims, let alone all four of them. Their attribution to Wittgenstein seems in fact to depend on a narrowly selective reading of what he actually said. As Richard Bell has pointed out, "It is premised on the view that our language is a series of language-games rooted in a form of life each governed by its own set of rules, as if our life of speaking and acting were like a bag of marbles, separate spherical speech-worlds with their own boundaries and rules governing their size and elasticity and use, some are shooters, others decorative, all rest side by side and affect their neighbors only if they collide."[83]

It is true that Wittgenstein has cautioned us against the tendency to assume a unity of logical form behind the diversity of actual usage. He writes, "Do not say : "There must be something common", but look and see". He suggests that the result of "looking" is that "we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing. A metaphor to which he returns periodically is of language as an ancient city : "a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses." Such remarks seem to militate against the balkanized view of language implied by "Wittgensteinian Fideism".

It is to be noted that the term "Wittgensteinian Fideism" appeared after Wittgenstein's death. The origin of the term "Wittgensteinian Fideism" derive from an article of that name by Kai Nielsen, which appeared in the July 1967 issue of "Philosophy".

83. Richard H. Bell, Religion and Wittgenstein's Legacy : Beyond Fiedeism and Language Games, published in Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, edited by Timothy Tessin & Merio Van der Ruhr.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

In his article Nielson says that "Wittgesteinian Fideism" might in fact constitute a misrepresentation of Wittgenstein's writings, not interestingly enough, by his critics, but by his followers, and that "Wittgenstein might well wish to say of Wittgensteinians what Freud said of Freudians." Accordingly, Nielsen directed the burnt of his critique not against Wittgenstein himself, but against Wittgensteinians like Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch. More recently, the charge of "Wittgensteinian Fideism" has become associated especially with the work of the philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips. Although it is impossible here to explore these allegations in any detail, it is worthnoting that Wittgensteinians generally regard "Wittgensteinian Fideism" as a caricature not only of Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion against the charge of fideism, Phillips writes :

"Many philosophers of religion influenced by Wittgenstein have spent much of their time denying that connections of a "certain" kind hold between religious beliefs and other aspects of human life. Similarly, they have denied the appropriateness of "certain kinds" of criticisms of religion."[84] Those who have been criticized often react as follows : "This is what I mean by the connection between religion and other aspects of human life and this other aspects of human life and this is what I mean by criticism of religion." Here Phillips and others like him denying the intelligibility of such connections and criticism. Therefore, Phillips and others like him hold that there is no connection between religion and other aspects of human life, and that religion cannot be criticized. Of course, all that I and others have denied is their conception of the relation between religion and other aspects of human life and their conception of criticism of religion. Sometimes, the explanation of the persistence of the critical theses concerning Wittgenstein's influence in the philosophy of religion is as simple as that.

Phillips's longstanding debate with Nielsen is commonly portrayed as a modern-day contest between faith and reason, but Phillips never regarded it that way himself. Whereas Nielsen treats

84. D. Z. Phillips, Belief, change and Forms of Life : The confusions of Externalism and Internalism, published in "The Autonomy of Religious Belief", ed. by Frederick Crosson.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Phillips's "contemplative" approach to philosophy of religion as essentially an apologetic strategy meant to shield belief in God from criticism, Phillips contended that "it casts a liberating light on both belief and atheism. Both are rescued from philosophical distortion. As Phillips saw it, his disagreement with Nielsen was a disagreement not between the advocates of competing first-order commitments, but between Nielsen's atheism and his own professed desire to do conceptual justice to rival points of view, both religious and anti-religious—an asymmetry that the term "fideism" with its pietistic connotations, seemed to him to obscure.

❑❑❑

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

10. GILBERT RYLE

Gilbert Ryle was born in Brighton (England) on 19th August, 1900. He went to Oxford as a classics scholar. He achieved remarkable academic success. He got first in both parts of "Literae Humaniors" consisting of Latin, Greek, Ancient History and Philosophy, as well Politics and Economics. He was immediately appointed as Lecturer in Philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford in 1924. He remained at Oxford all his working life. He held the Waynflete Chair in Metaphysical philosophy from 1945 to 1968. He retired in 1968. He was editor of "Mind" for over twenty years, succeeding G. E. Moore in 1947. He died on 6th October, 1976.

Ryle always had extremely wide-ranging philosophical interests and regularly went beyond the rather rigid and narrow Oxford curriculum of the day. Early in his teaching career, he achieved notoriety by teaching a course titled "Logical Objectivism : Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl and Meinong". He also wrote a review of "Being and Time" that showed that he did not see Heidegger as the comical figure, the Postitivists portrayed him as.

Ryle's earliest publications were primarily in philosophical logic, although he would never have thought of himself as a logician, per se. He never displayed any aptitude for, nor interest in, advanced formal techniques, but rather, applied informal methods to reveal the true logical form of sentences. Ryle's technique ties in with his view of the nature of philosophy itself. The first expression of his view was in "Systematically Misleading Expressions" (in 1932) but is shown at its most refined in his inaugural lecture, "Philosophical Arguments" (in 1945). In addition, Ryle represented his view in logic on the different articles, like "Negation" (1929), "Are there propositions ?" (1930), "Unverifiability by Me" (1936), "Induction and Hypothesis" (1937) and "Categories" (1938). But his philosophical and moral view has been seen in the paper "Conscience and Moral Conviction" (1947). But his famous book,

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"The Concept of Mind" (1949) is the major contribution to contemporary western, particulary Oxford, philosophy. In 1954 "The Dilemmas" published. This book carries the delivered lecture by Ryle at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1953. "If, So and Because" (1950), "Heterologicality" and "Thinking and Language" (1951) and "Ordinary language" (1953) are his other influential papers on philosophical logic. Thus, it may be said that Ryle is undoubtedly is a philosophical "Kingmaker" in the fifties and sixties.

Philosophy and Systematically Misleading Expressions

According to Ryle, the first stage of a philosopher's task is to scrutinise and test a theory or statement to see whether it leads to "logically intolerable results" or not. If it does, the philosopher's task becomes that of working out, if it is a proposition, its true logical form, and if it is a concept, its logical powers, by mapping it on to theories and concepts already accepted. "The philosopher may, perhaps, begin by wondering about the categories constituting the framework of a single theory or discipline, but he cannot stop there. He must try to coordinate the categories of all theories and disciplines. The problem, that is, not to anatomize the solitary concept, say, of liberty but to extract its logical powers as these bear on those of law, obedience, responsibility, loyalty, government and the rest. Like a geographical survey a philosophical survey is necessarily synoptic. Philosophical problems cannot be posed or solved piecemeal."[1]

In seeking out the correct logical form of propositions or logical powers of concepts, one should not be misled by grammar or the surface understanding of the words and the manner in which they occur in a sentence. In Ryle's words, "Concepts and propositions carry with them no signal to indicate the logical types to which they belong. Expressions of the same grammatical patterns are used to express thoughts of multifarious logical sorts."[2] Thus, Ryle maintained that there was no special entity which philosophers studied in the way that entomologists studied beetles and

1. Gilbert Ryle, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, P. 195, 202
2. Ibid, P. 200

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

butterflies, but that philosophers asked questions concerning the true logical form and logical powers of the utterances or sentences of ordinary people, or, the more basic theoretical utterances and sentences of scientists and other specialists. Ryle did not hold that philosophical statements were lexicographical ones, nor did he believe that they were analytic in the way that mathematical statements were, that is, derivable by valid rules of inference from axioms, but that they were statements about a sentence which statement was not licenced by observation but by reference to the logical properties (implication) of concepts and the proposition expressed in the sentence. Thus, paradigm philosophical statements work out the true logical form of sentences and display the ensuing arguments used to show that the surface understanding of the grammatical form of a sentence is misleading. In this way paradigm philosophical statements are not statements about the world, but comments about the logical form of sentences and apriori arguments in support of them. That is why philosophy is talk about the word and hence a second order enterprise.

According to Ryle, paradigm philosophical statements were not merely those which revealed a misunderstanding about the logical form of propositions along with restating the logical form correctly and giving arguments in support of it, but also those which tried to show the logic of concepts brought to light by such philosophical enterprise. For Ryle philosophy also had the positive role of mapping the logical geography of concepts, i.e., showing their connections with those concepts which are not in dispute. It is obvious that it is one thing to know how to apply a concept and quite another thing to know how to correlate it with the neighbouring concepts and concepts of other sort. One can operate with concepts in familiar fields but one cannot state the logical regulations governing their use very much, as one can travel along a path but may not be able to draw a sketch map of the path. "To determine the logical geography of concepts is to reveal the logic of the propositions in which they are wielded, that is to say, to show with what other propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them, and from what propositions they follow."[3]

3. Ibid, The Concept of Mind, P. 10

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

As Ryle maintained that there are consistent and inconsistent propositions, and propositions are expressions in language. So, expressions may be accurate or misleading. Ryle says that there are certain expressions in language which are systematically misleading, i.e., they are couched in a syntactical form improper to the facts recorded and proper to facts of quite another logical form than the facts recorded."[4] The ordinary man using such expressions is not misled. It is the philosophical theorist who is liable to be misled. The expression lays a trap "which only threatens the man who has begun to generalize about sorts or types of state of affairs and assumes that every statement gives in its syntax a clue to the logical form of the fact that it records."[5]

Ryle classifies "systematically misleading expressions" into three categories : quasi-ontological statements, quasi-platonic statements and quasi-referential statements.

The first kind of systematically misleading expressions is about the "existence". Therefore, it may be called as "quasi-existential statements." According to Ryle, the socalled existential statements are systematically misleading expressions, because it assumes that "an existent is an entity", and this assumption, being the predicate "is an entity" is bogus, is absolutely misleading.

The second kind of systematically misleading expressions is about "universals." There are statements about particulars like "Johns mertis reproof", and "Smith has given himself the prize." There are statements about universals like "unpunctuality is reprehensible" and "virtue is its own reward." Both the type of sentences appeared to be analogous in grammatical construction. This sort of surface understanding of grammatical form made the philosophers take their meaning analogously and conclude that there were two sorts of objects in the world, particulars and universals. According to Ryle "this is my own thought that all the statements regarding to universals seem as good analytical as the statement "God exists". At result, universal terms are never qualities. Therefore, "universals" are not objects like the Everest

4. Ibid, Systematically Misleading Expressions, P. 14
5. Ibid, P. 17

mountain. Hence, the question, asking since the long ancient periods, "which kind of objects they are" is a fake question."[6]

The last and third kind of systematically misleading expressions is about objects referred to. "The Vice-chancellor of Oxford university is busy"—the subject of this proposition (statement) refers to a person as well as to a definite place. The person and the place are objects, in terms of philosophical logic. This is also a kind of description. Therefore, the quasi-referential statements are also called as quasi-descriptive statements. In fact he quasi-referential or descriptive "The" phrases also lay traps for the understanding. Again it is a trap not for the ordinary man but for the philosopher who is engaged in generalization and abstraction. Ryle suspects-and this is the thrust of the whole discussion concerning systematically misleading expressions—that a lot of Cartesian and perhaps Newtonian blunders about space and time have been generated by the misleading nature of the "The" phrases which are used to date and locate things in space and time like "the region occupied by X", "the path followed by y" and "the moment or date at which z happened." These are not descriptive expressions referentially used. These are rather what Ryle calls hamstrung predicative expressions.[7]

Thus, Ryle's account of systematically misleading expressions is in keeping with what he tells us about the task of philosophy. "Philosophy must then involve the exercise of systematic restatement. For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question. And we can often succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy."[8]

Concept of Mind

In the prominent work "The Concept of Mind" Ryle has

6. Anthony Flew, Logic and Language, P. 21
7. Gilbert Ryle, Ibid, P. 29
8. Ibid, P. 36

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

discussed the concept of mind into two ways—negative way and positive way. Negatively, he criticizes "Cartesian Dualism", and then, positively, establishes his own concept of mind. Under the caption "criticism of cartesian dualism" a problem arises in the form of "category mistake" too. So, here we have to discuss the cartesian dualism as category mistake or "the ghost in the machine" first and then Ryle's conception of mind.

Cartesian Dualism and Category Mistake

Cartesian Dualism, i.e., the dualism propounded by Descartes between mind and body is a core feature of Descartes's philosophy. Mind and body are two distinct substances. They have opposite qualities. Mind is mental, whereas body is physical. According to Descartes, man is the union of these two substances. Man's body is in space and time, observable to every human being and is subject to death. His mind is not in space but in time, observable to nobody except himself and may survive death. Thus a man is a peculiar combination of diametrically opposed principles. In Ryle's view, the Cartesian concept of mind is psychological concept which assumes that man's bodily behaviours are in accordance to the activity of human mind. He denies that mind is anything more than our typical bodily behaviours, that is, there are no such thinks as mental happenings.

Ryle terms Cartesian concept of mind as a "dogma of the ghost in the machine." He has attacked this dogma in two ways : the first, by introducing the notion of "category mistake" and the second, by analysing the meaning of mental concepts. He thinks that the traditional psychology is a bundle of confusion, because there has occurred an improper juxtaposition of the terms of different order or categories. As such terms are incapable of being brought into intelligible relation with one another, Ryle believes that their mixing up has resulted in incoherence and confusion. According to him, mind and matter (body) are terms of different orders or categories. They cannot as such be legitimately conjoined or disjoined. The conjunctive phrase "body and mind" is a meaningless phrase for Ryle. He asserts that the psychologists have committed a category mistake by describing mind in terms which are suitable only to the body. Though Ryle doesnot believe in the dualism

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

between mind and body, still he wants to make a categorical distinction between the mental and the physical. He holds strongly that there is a syntactical difference between the mental and the physical. According to him mental adjectives are terms of a higher order or category. Therefore, they cannot sensible fit in with what is physical. Thus Ryle maintains that Cartesian dualist dogma of "the ghost in the machine" is a large category mistake.

A category mistake is committed when, in seeking to give an account of some concept, one says that it is of one logical type or category when in fact it is of another. "The logical type or category to which a concept belongs is the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with it."[9] In this way one makes a category mistake if one says "My pain was green" for pain is not the sort of thing which can be green. Feelings, such as pains, are not coloured, only visible objects are coloured. Or, to use one of Ryle's famous examples, a foreigner visits Oxford for the first time and is shown round the university. After having seen the colleges, libraries, offices, laboratories and playing fields, he then asks "But where is the University ?" The foreigner had mistakenly thought that "The University" was the name of one of the buildings he might be shown rather than an umbrella term which applied to the whole collection of buildings which he had already been shown.

According to Ryle, the way to expose category mistakes is to attempt "reductio ad absurdum" arguments, for, if they are successful, one has exposed a concept which has been assigned to a logical type or category to which it does not belong. "I try to use "reductio ad absurdum" arguments both to disallow operations implicitly recommended by the Cartesian myth and to indicate to what logical types the concepts under investigation ought to be allocated."[10] That is, Ryle is going to show that, by taking the Cartesian dogma of "the ghost in the machine" at face value, we end up with a string of absurdities which are an indication that the dogma is a category mistake. It is the negative aspect of Ryle's concept of mind. But the Rylean concept of mind must have a positive aspect.

9. Ibid, The Concept of Mind, P. 8
10. Ibid

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Mind as Disposition

In correcting the category mistakes of the dogma of "the ghost in the machine", by and large Ryle is going to argue that what the dogma continually describes as occurrences, episodes, or processes are most often dispositions. Thus, Ryle replaces mind by disposition. He believes that all psychological terms are more or less dispositional in character. He says that "to talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called "physical world" is forbidden to house; it is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world."[11] Ryle denies mind as to be a substance over and above the body. Mind is thought to be a disposition, a set, a style, an organic state of readiness to do and undergo certain sorts of things in their appropriate situations. A disposition is not an occult or mysterious inner quality or potentiality present in the person or the object about whom the disposition is said to be true. It is nothing actual. It simply signifies a tendency for certain events to occur, if some condition are realized. When glass is said to be brittle, it does not mean that brittleness is a property secretly present in glass. If only means that when a certain situation obtains, for example, when it is hit with a stone, a certain event takes place, i.e., the glass breaks into parts. Similarly of human vanity or any other disposition. When a man is said to be vain, it does not mean that there is an inner element of vanity in him which he feels or experiences. It simply means that he is prone to behave in certain ways under some specific circumstances. For example, if he gets into the company of a stranger, he is likely to do such things that will show him to be prominent. Therefore, Ryle believes that disposition—words are not the names of existing qualities. Dispositional statements are not the categorical reports of some occult or secret phenomena. They have only a hypothetical import. In the words of Ryle, "to say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or, shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue."[12]

11. Ibid, P. 199
12. Ibid, P. 123

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Now, this observation makes it clear that according to Ryle, through a dispositional statement may be categorical in form—this sleeper knows French—it is actually hypothetical in meaning, because it is always unpacked in hypothetical statements : If he is addressed in French, he responds pertinently in French; if he is shown any French newspaper, he acts appropriately or translates it correctly, etc. Therefore, being equivalent to one or many hypothetical statements, a dispositional statement cannot be a reporter of existing states or processes. It is, so to say, an "inference ticket" enabling us to move from one fact to the other. If I know somebody to be vain, I am, so to say, in the possession of an "inference ticket", which entitles me to infer about his acts of boasting on finding that he is in the company of strangers.

The above is a brief account of Ryle's idea of disposition with which he has sought to display mind. By arguing that mental-conduct concepts are dispositional or hypothetical, he seems to think that he can remove the misconception that they mental-conduct concepts refer to a certain existing entity called mind. However, Ryle's philosophical analysis of mental-conduct concepts is not divorced from empirical considerations. When he rejects some account of a concept and appeals to what one would say or how we would behave, his appealing to facts. Ryle, for example, dealing with the intellect, argues against the doctrine that knowledge is primarily "knowledge that" or factual knowledge, and that "knowledge how" is subordinate to "knowledge that". The doctrine describes "knowledge how" as performing actions efficiently or successfully in the light of certain prescriptions which a person has been told or has worked out for himself. Thus, the doctrine maintains that one must first have knowledge of what the prescriptions or principles are before he can apply them, and so perform in the light of them. Hence, performing intelligently is at least two things—the consideration of certain prescriptions or principles, and, the action performed in accordance with the prescriptions or principles. Ryle argues against the doctrine of "knowledge that" and "knowledge how" in the following words :

"There are many classes of performance in which intelligence is displayed, but the rules or criteria of which are unformulated. The wit, when challenged to cite the maxims, or, canons, by which he

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

constructs and appreciates jokes, is unable to answer. Rules of correct reasoning were first extracted by Aristotle, yet men knew how to avoid and detect fallacies before they learned his lessons."[13]

Ryle also rejects the Cartesian version of the concept of imagination. Imagination, the Cartesian version, consists in looking at copies in the mind of real things. Ryle remarks that we have no such analogies for smelling, tasting, or feeling. We have no such analogies, not because there is no factual evidence for the existence of copies of smells, tastes and feelings within our epidermis; nor because there is positive evidence against positing their existence, but because the whole notion of a copy of a smell or taste or feeling is an "apriori" impossibility. The language of originals and copies doesnot apply to smells or tastes or feelings. Thus, Ryle often appeals to facts when giving or criticising an account of some concept. His appeal to what we would ordinarily say about some concept or what would be said without oddness in regard to it, is often a convert appeal to facts. For what we do and can say is hedged in by factual considerations as well as by considerations of logical possibility and meaningfulness. However, it is true that the facts that Ryle often appeal to are not concerned with detailed scientific data. This does not mean that Ryle's analysis of mental-conduct concepts are purely apriori.

❑❑❑

13. Ibid, P. 30

11. JOHN LONGSHAW AUSTIN

John L. Austin has a distinct place in the Ordinary Language Philosophy, particulary Oxford Linguistic school. His contribution to the development of analytic thought is recognised as "remarkable".[1] He was born on 26 March, 1911 at Lancaster (U.K.) and died on 8 February, 1960 at Oxford (U.K.) During his brief life time (He alived for 49 years only) he contributed only seven papers which included in "Philosophical Papers", his first work posthumously, published. Among them "A priori concepts" and "Pretending" were appeared in 1939 and 1958 respectively. He gave a broadcast talk on "Performative Utterances" in 1956. This talk was published after his death. "Sense and Sensibilia" and "How to Do Things with Words" also published posthumously. These two books are a collection of Austin's lectures delivered in 1947 and 1955 respectively in Oxford and Harvard Universities.

Analysis Of Speech Acts

Austin's ideas regarding to the concept of meaning sprout in his theory of speech acts, which is based on the insight that speaking of language is an act just like walking, reading and writing etc. Accordingly in uttering a sentence we not just utter certain words with certain meaning but perform an act. This act has been, called by Austin as a speech act. So, the basic unit of communication, according to Austin, is not the word or the sentence but the speech act. Traditionally, sentences have been classified as assertive, exclamatory and interrogative, etc. But such a classification is faulty in the sense that it ignores the great variety of functions-sentences can be used to give perform. For example, "Could you vacate the seat ?" can be used to give an order, a request, a suggestion or even a warning in different contexts. Thus, traditional classification

1. John Passmore, A Hundred years of Philosophy, P. 450

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

ignores several factors that are important for the study of our understanding of sentences which, in turn, can prove useful in the solution of several philosophical problems.

In his article "Performative-Constative"[2] Austin distinguishes between two types of utterances—the performative and the constative. Constative utterances are declarative, i.e., in which we declare something like "Two and two make four", "Patna is the capital of Bihar", etc. These utterances have the property of being true or false. Performative utterances are used to perform an action, to utter a performative is to perform an action. For example, when we issue such utterances as "I name this ship liberty", or, "I apologize", "I advise you ...", "I promise", etc., we are also doing an act of promising, advising, etc. Performative utterances are distinct from constative in the sense that they are not true or false, but are what as "happy" or "unhappy". Broadly speaking, if a person uttering a performative is authorised to perform the act that he is through his utterance and is doing it sincerely, the utterance is "happy", otherwise it is "unhappy". So if someone says that "I name this ship Liberty", without actually having the authority to do so, or, some one says "I promise ....", when he is not sincere in his heart about the promise, he is making their utterances would be "unhappy". But, Austin in his later book "How to Do Things with Words" (posthumously published) says that constantive-performative classification of utterances is "inadequate" due to a number of factors including certain borderline cases like "I suppose that ...", "I assume that ....", "I am sorry ....", sometimes equivalent to "I apologize", sometimes descriptive of the speaker's feelings and sometimes both at once. In the same way, utterances like "I state that ...", "I know that ..." also seem to satisfy the requirements of being performative, even though they are at the same time the "statements" capable of being true or false. These and certain other factors show the inadequacy of this classification. Therefore, Austin invents a new, rather more comprehensive classification distinguishing three types of speech acts. They are Locutionary Act, Illocutionary Act, and Perlocutionary Act.

2. J. R. Searle (Editor), The Philosophy of Language, P. 13-22

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Locutionary Act is the act of saying something, i.e., the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of these with a certain meaning. Illocutionary Act is the performance of an act in saying something and, thus, obviously carries a force in addition to the meaning. We use locutions in a particular way or sense, like we use it for "asking or answering a question, giving some information or an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or an intention, pronouncing sentence, making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, making an identification or giving a description, and the numerous like."[3] The different types of functions, as Austin mentions, determine the "illocutionary force" of the utterance. He also asserts that illocutionary act is a conventional act, an act in conformity to a convention.

To perform a locutionary act in general is also eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act and sometimes, though not always, to include another act, i.e., Perlocutionary Act. Austin defines perlocutionary act as such : "saying something will often, or even normally produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or, of other persons; and it may be done with the design, intention, or, purpose of producing them."[4] This third act is performance of an act by using language in what Austin calls a perlocutionary act or simply perlocution. A teacher, while saying "get out of the classroom" to his one of students, performs a locutionary act when he utters this sentence, the illocutionary act of ordering the student to go out and the same time his uttering this sentence produces a third act, the perlocutionary act, for example, of annoying the student.

This classification of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is not razor sharp. There may be cases where it seems difficult to precisely assign one of these acts. In words of Austin, "Philosophers have long been interested in the word "good" and, quite recently, have begun to take the line of considering how we use it, what we use it to do. It has been suggested, for example, that we use it for expressing approval, for commending, or for

3. J. L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words, P. 98–99.
4. Ibid, P. 101

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

grading. But we shall not get really clear about this word "good" and what we use it to do until, ideally, we have a complete list of those illocutionary acts of which commending, grading etc. are isolated specimens—until we know how many such acts there are and what are their relationships and inter-connexions."[5]

That is why Searle comments that "there is no such difference, because there cannot be a sense without a force. Hence, locutionary acts and illocutionary acts are not two mutually exclusive classes of acts, as much as unmarried men and bachelors are not so, though they can be conceptually differentiated. They are not two different acts but two different labels—meaning-label and force-label—of the same act, i.e., illocutionary act. To abstract meaning from force is just like abstracting unmarried men from bachelors."[6] In this way, Searle keeps illocutionary acts as the minimal units of linguistic communication. Every meaningful sentence must be an illocutionary act of one kind or other, since there remains no meaning without a force and a force is what really becomes the core of an illocutionary act. However, illocutionary act is not arbitrarily performed, it is regulated by certain rules which are constitutives and distinguished from regulatives. The set of rules that governs an illocutionary act does continue that illocutionary act. An illocutionary act cannot exist without the set of rules that constitutes it as much as a cricket-game is not a cricket-game without the rules that govern it.

If one questions about the source of those rules, then the obvious answer is that the rules are in the linguistic activities themselves. Consequently, to lay down the rules for a particular kind of illocutionary act, one is supposed to observe the necessary and sufficient conditions of a successful performance of that act. Searle enumerates nine conditions.[7]

According to David Cooper meaning of all words can be explained by reference to illocutionary acts they perform. Cooper distinguishes two levels of understanding of meaning. The first level

5. Ibid, P. 163–64
6. J. R. Searle, Ibid, P. 408
7. Ibid, P. 57–71

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

is the level of "grasping meaning" or "recognizing an expression to be meaningful[8]. He believes that meaning and illocutionary force are not distinct aspects of an expression. "It may be that the distinction between the meaning of a sentence and a particular illocutionary act performed with it is the distinction between a whole range of acts that can typically be performed with it, and just one out of that range."[9] Cooper seems to opine that when Austin speaks of meaning as an aspect of locution, he uses it in the first sense, i.e., the level of recognizing an expression to be meaningful. Keith Graham elaborates this point by distinguishing two types of theories of meaning : the wide and the narrow. The narrow theory explains meaning on the basis of the words that constitute an expression and their structure. For example, "The boy loves the girl" and "The girl loves the boy"—these two sentences have different meanings, because of the different structure of the words constituting the sentences. The meaning that is dependent on the words and the structure of an expression—the core meaning-remains constant in different uses of the sentence. Graham further says that though the core meaning invariably remains same in different uses of a sentence, the different "dimensions of "significance" can be added to it through its different uses. The term "dimensions of significance" is meant by the meaning of the speaker-what the speakers means may be different from or even opposite of what his utterance means and the implications of what is said, etc. This is the case with Austin's three kinds of speech acts. Austin separates meaning from illocution. He says that it does not make any sense to speak of the part of the meaning of the word and that the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is baseless. In fact, Austin's theory of speech acts is a narrow one in the sense of Graham.

Distinction Between Performative And Constative Statements

If the sole function of language, according to Austin, is to describe something, then it is pointless to claim that we do do things with words. To say that "describing" amounts to do something with

8. David Cooper, Philosophy and the Nature of Language, P. 204
9. Ibid, P. 208

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

the did of words when the only thing we can do with words is to describe something, we really claim nothing more than "we do describe something with words", when we claim "we do do things with words." Thus, the claim becomes philosophically interesting when it really wants to convey that we do perform many acts, besides the act of describing, with the aid of words. Thus, the first task before Austin is to condemn the "descriptive fallacy" i.e., the presumption that a sentence to be meaningful must be reducible to the mould of "descriptive" must express true or false statements. There are cases like "I promise to be there at 4 PM", where the sentence is not used to describe something (as in the cases like "He promised to be there at 4 PM" or "He is going to college"), but the utterer does something in uttering the sentence. Austin calls these utterances as performatives which are contrasted by constatives. And, the fallacy committed by those who claim that the sole purpose of making assertions is to describe some state of affairs is called as "Descriptive Fallacy". "I promise to be there at 4 PM", "This gun is loaded", "You are a fool", "There is a wasp in your right ear", and, "I love you" are all assertions made to do certain things, for example, promising, warning, insulting, and appeasing respectively. It is not only that different sentences do different jobs in different situations, but also that one sentence can do different jobs in varying situations. For example, "There is a piece of fish on table" can be uttered[10] :

(i) in a restaurant complaining to a waiter.

(ii) to a husband by the wife, warning that the cat is in the kitchen.

(iii) to incriminate a child who had raided the refrigerator.

(iv) to assure somebody that his/her lunch has not been forgotten.

In all the above four cases, "there is a piece of fish on the table" is used to perform the act of complaining, warning, incriminating and assuring respectively; it is not used as a mere description of a state of affair. Being performative, it is neither true nor false but can be either felicitous or infelicitous depending upon the context of

10. J. R. Husford & B. Heasley, Semantics—A Course Book, P. 234

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

utterance. If I utter, for example, "I will be there at 4 PM"; but I do not keep my promise, then my utterance becomes infelicitous. This account against the formalistic approach to language which commits the "descriptive fallacy" cannot be said to be substantial one just by citing some counter examples of sentences which are used as performatives.

The performative-constative antithesis consolidates the claim that only some uses of sentences amount to "doing" of certain things other than describing something neutrally. In other words, the distinction between performative utterances and constative utterances assures the bifurcationary division of utterances. It puts utterances like "I promise", "I bet", "I warn ...", "I greet ..." etc. in one group (performatives) and the utterances like "the table is rectangular", "snow is white", "I am writing now", "the sky is blue" etc. in another group (constative). When with utterances belonging to the former group we do something, with the latter group's utterances we do not. If we can blur this distinction of performatives and constatives and can assimilate the constatives into the performatives, then we can say that each and every meaningful utterance is meant for doing something.

The distinction is blurred out considering the following three important points :

(a) There is no purely verbal criterion to distinguish performatives from constatives.

(b) Constatives are liable to the same infelicities as the performatives.

(c) Truth and falsity are not peculiar to constatives alone.

The normal forms which are supposed to be distinguishing performatives from the constatives are : that a verb is to be in present indicative active in cases the subject is a first person singular as in "I promise you that ..." and that a verb is to be in present indicative passive in cases the subject is a second or third person singular or plural as in "Passengers are requested to cross the line by footbridge only." But to say "shut the door" is as much performative as to say "I order you to shut the door", "How do you do ?", when functions as a substitute to "I welcome you" or "I greet you", it becomes equally performative though it does not satisfy the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

said normal linguistic forms. Again, "congratulations" and "thanks" etc. are usually conveyed without the sentential forms. Though "we promise ...", "we argue ..." and "we object" etc. are neither in passive voice nor in singular, yet these cannot be denied as performatives.

The constatives can be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous besides being evaluated as true or false. This assessment gets the logical impetus from the "implying" or "entailing" character of some constatives. The failure state incurred by the non-fulfillment of these characteristic aspects of constatives is not identical with the failurance incurred by contradicting a statement, "There are more ways of killing the cat than drawning it in butter." Those absurdities which are not obtained in terms of "contradiction" can be named as different infelicities and if such absurdities are obtainable for the constatives, then constatives are no more distinct from the performative on the basis of the criterion that felicity or infelicity is pertinent to the performatives alone.

Truth and falsity are not peculiar to constatives, performatives can be assessed as true or false. For example, "I warn you that there is a snake in the garden" becomes a false warning more or less similar to "sugar is sour", if there is no snake in the garden. Many performatives are questionable as good as bad, fair or foul, just or unjust and so on; with reference to facts analogous to the question of truth and falsity of the constatives is to be answered on the basis of facts. For example, if I am authorised to scold my son for his mistakes, whether or not my scolding is just in a particular situation is evaluated with reference to the facts of that instance.

Such an evaluation of performatives cannot be demerited on the ground that performatives are "quasi-objective", because "truth" is no less quasi objective. "Truth and falsity are not means of qualities, relations, not indeed one anything, but rather a whole dimension of criticism"[11], that is, along with the facts, the situation of the speaker, his purpose in speaking, question of precision etc. are also accounted. For example, "Oxford is ninety six kilometers from London" is true so long as I want only a certain degree of precision;

11. J.R. Searle, Ibid, P. 21

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

and "France is hexagonal" is true for a man in the street with some purpose or in some context but not for geographers.

Thus, the distinction between performatives and constatives is null and void ultimately, and Austin merges this distinction into a new conception of "Speech Acts". "The dichotomy of performatives and constatives has to be abondoned in favour of more general families of related and overlapping speech acts"[12], and, "what we need, perhaps, is a more general theory of speech acts, and in this theory our constative-performative antithesis will scarcely survive."[13]

❑❑❑

12. J. L. Austin, Ibid, P. 149
13. J.R. Searle, Ibid, P. 20

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

12. PETER FREDERICK STRAWSON

Peter Frederick Strawson was born on 23 November, 1919 in London. He graduated from St. John's college, Oxford in 1940. Then he served in the British Military during World War-2. On the recommendation of Gilbert Ryle he was appointed to a lectureship at University College, Oxford in 1947. He was elected a fellow the following year, i.e., in 1948. In 1968 he was elected Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford. He replaced Ryle who retired from this professorship in that year. After that he moved to the university's Magdalen College and remained there till his retirement in 1987. He also held numerous visiting professorship in the United States. He died on 13 February, 2006 at Oxford. He was a prominent British Philosopher, and a leading member of the ordinary language school of analytic philosophy during the 1950s and 1960s. His famous work "Individuals" published in 1959 was instrumental in reviving interest in metaphysics within Anglo-American (analytic) philosophy in the mid-twentieth century.

In addition to this book, The Bound of sense (1966), Introduction to Logical Theory (1952), Freedom and Resentment (1974), Analysis and Metaphysics (1992), Scepticism and Naturalism (1985), Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (1974) are some readable books.

Descriptive Metaphysics

P. F. Strawson builds his philosophy on the background of the significant distinction between "revisionary" and "descriptive" metaphysics. The concept of descriptive metaphysics emerges in Strawson's "Individuals" in contrast with what he calls revisionary metaphysics. "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure."[1] This distinction shows that Strawson takes metaphysics to be a deliberation on the structure of human thought. Traditional philosophy (metaphysics) is speculative in which we find that attempts were consistently made to present a philosophically glorified scheme of things, an ontology which virtually amounted to a revision of our conceptual scheme.

The method which Strawson advocates for the discovery of the conceptual scheme has been called the method of descriptive analysis. Descriptive analysis is a close examination of the actual use of words. According to Strawson, this kind of analysis will be philosophically productive. In his words, "the claim to clarify will seem empty, unless the results achieved have some bearing on the typical philosophical problems and difficulties which arise concerning the concepts to be clarified. Now these problems and difficulties have their roots in ordinary, unconstructed concepts, in the elusive, deceptive moods of functioning of unformatised linguistic expressions."[2] Consequently, one has to describe the logical behaviour of the linguistic expressions of natural languages. This alone would solve the problems and difficulties rooted in ordinary language. Descriptive analysis is the attempt to bring out the natural foundation of our conceptual apparatus. Strawson conceives that the descriptive philosophers, that is, the philosophers who intend to describe our conceptual scheme may have to do more than making literal description, but it is nonetheless true that "the actual use of linguistic expressions remains his sole and essential point of contact with the reality which he wishes to understand, conceptual reality."[3]

The use of words in ordinary language doesnot only unveil our conceptual scheme, it also determines our ontology. Jack kaminsky says that "P. F. Strawson has been one of few to elaborate our

1. P. F. Strawson, individuals, P. 9
2. Ibid, Analysis, Science and Metaphysics, in The Linguistic Turn, edited by Richard Rorty, P. 316.
3. Ibid, P. 324

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

ontology which involves a serious ontological commitment."[4] He observes that Strawson begins by assuming that individuals do engage in discussion, and then he raises the question concerning the extra-linguistic conditions which must be present if we are to be assured that communication be actually occurring. The first and the most significant condition is that there are particulars to which the words employed can refer. For Strawson, particulars compose ontology. Strawson's this doctrine has been established by his doctrine of reference and communication as well as by his concept of identification. In the first chapter of the book "Individuals" Strawson seems to be believed in a very close connection between language and reality, but not in the sense in which the ideal language philosophers would conceive it. He does not concede this idea that there is a structural affinity between language and reality, rather that the inclusion of a particular within our ontology is determined by linguistic phenomena, that is, whether the particular in question is such that it cannot be known by us which is in turns, is to be testified by the fact if it can be referred to by and that again successfully. In this context success is determined by fruitful communication. Communition, as Strawson opines, is fruitful only, when the hearer can identify the particular which is referred to by the speaker. If the hearer fails to identify the particular referred to by the speaker, then communication fails and the speaker also fails to identify. According to Strawson, when the hearer is successful to identify a particular referred to by the speaker, the speaker earns the right to include the particular in his ontology. This view of Strawson can be enumerated in the following ways :

"According to Strawson, language is a means of communication. We can identify particular, if we can communicate successfully. Since the world is taken to contain particulars, we use some proper names, pronouns, and descriptive phrases to refer to particulars.

The hearer can identify if on the basis of the referring expression used by the speaker, he can pick out by sight or hearing or touch the particular referred to, knowing that it is that particular. All particulars referred to by the speaker cannot be sensibly

4. Jack Kaminsky, The Ontology of P. F. Strawson, in Language and Ontology, ed. by Southern Illinois, P. 31

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

discriminated. So, when a particular referred to by the speaker is beyond the range of the hearer's senses, it is difficult to ascertain whether the particular identified by the hearer is the same as the particular referred to by the speaker."

Now, the possibility of a question in regard to the guarantee of successfulness identification in such a situation. It is theoretically conceivable that there is a multitude of particulars answering to the same referring expressions. Strawson answers to this question that the particular, which is not sensibly present and hence cannot be demonstratively identified, may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified. The sector occupied by the particular should be uniquely related to the sector which the speaker and the hearer themselves occupy.

The process of identification requires that there is a single system of relation in which every thing or event has a place. Strawson views that there is a system of spatial and temporal relation in which every particular is uniquely related to each other. But the conceptual scheme doesnot simply operate with a spatio-temporal framework. It is not only the case that the experience of a particular must be arranged in space and time, as Kant would endorse. Nevertheless, in the Kantian system there is a question of arrangement of the data received through the faculty of sensibility. The disorganised, discrete or isolated data collected through sensibility would not produce knowledge, unless they are categorised or arranged by the rather active faculty of understanding. The conceptual apparatus in the Kantian system is partially passive and partially active. In Strawson's system we may notice a similar idea, when the spatio-temporal framework is discovered as a passive scheme through which we receive our experience of particulars. But this collection has to be arranged in a certain way. This arrangement does not express itself in the pattern of judgements mentioned by Kant. Strawson's point is that knowledge in the true sense requires identification. From this basic view Strawson discovers that there is a relation of dependence between the identification of one class of particulars and another. It may be that we do not identify a class of particulars without a prior

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

identification of another class of particulars. This amounts to an epistemic arrangement done by our cognitive apparatus. The active imposition of the category of understanding which we find in Kant is here (in Strawson theory) conceived as a process of arrangement according to identifiability dependence.

Descriptive metaphysics (or, the philosophy) of Strawson contains a method determining basicness, which Strawson describes as independent identifiability. Apart from that, he offers certain other criterion of basicness. Material bodies and persons are considered as basic, by Strawson, not only because, they can be independently identified but also because they answer perfectly to the character of the unified spatio-temporal framework. When Strawson speaks of the spatio-temporal framework, he does not take it to be a system where all particulars find a place. The frame work, in his opinion, is not something extraneous to the object in reality of which we speak. There is at least one class of particulars which answers to the description of the framework. As a matter of fact, such particulars by virtue of their fundamental characteristics may be said to confer their characteristics upon the framework. The framework is admittedly spatio-temporal, and material objects are three diamensional and endure through time. Thus, material bodies which meet the key conditions of three diamensionality constitute the framework. Hence, Strawson concludes that given a certain general feature of the conceptual scheme we possess and given the character of the available major categories, things which are or possess material bodies must be the basic particulars.

It is clear that Strawson emphasizes, by examining the actual use of words, on the phenomenon of referring expressions and the significance of identification which bring home some truth about the constitution of our cognitive mechanism. But still several problems raise their heads there. The most serious problem is the supposed necessity of communication. If one can know without publicly referring to that, then ordinary language cannot expose our conceptual scheme. Because the discovery of the conceptual scheme really hangs upon the necessity of communication through referring expressions which, in fact, has been questioned by some philosophers, one of them is B.A. Brody.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Brody doubts, despite admitting the significance of reference, regarding the need for communication and consequently for identification. Therefore, it is really questionable to Strawson's method of unfolding our conceptual scheme as to be totally frustrated[5]. But this remark of Brody is not cogent. It is really a contingent matter, whether somebody will decide to talk to others about a particular which he knows. But such knowledge must be necessarily communicable. We cannot acknowledge the existence of particulars, unless we believe that such acknowledgement is communicated to others. Therefore Strawson says that "it should be possible to identify particulars of a given type seems a necessary condition of the inclusion of that type in our ontology."[6]

Concept of Person

"It is coherent to suppose that a person could continue to exist with an entirely new body or nobody at all."[7]

The above statement of Richard Swinburne raises the controversy regarding the concept of person and that of personal identity. In the contemporary philosophy much of the discussion of the concept of a person is a discussion of the problem of personal identity. The criterion of personal identity cannot be discussed without taking into account what sort of being counts as a person, and what is regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity also provides as answer to what counts as a person. On this basis, we can say that a person can exist in a disembodied state, as well, a person can have two numerically different bodies at two different points of time. A person as two different bodies at two different times is related to the criterion of personal identity. Now, a person as a disembodied state can be interpreted in two ways : (a) a person having once embodied existence can continue to exist in a disembodied state. (b) a person can remain disembodied throughout the period of his or her existence.

5. B.A. Brody, On the Ontological Priority of Physical Objects, Nous, Vol. 5, 1971, P. 139–155
6. P. F. strawson, Ibid, P. 16
7. R. Swinburne and S. Shoemaker, Personal Identity, P. 24

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Strawson accepts the first way. According to him, the concept of pure individual consciousness might have a "logically secondary existence"[8], though it cannot exist as a primary concept. The dualistic definition of a person is that a disembodied or pure consciousness is a person in a full-blooded sense. Swinburne says that "a person needs to be a person are certain mental capacities, for having conscious experience (e.g., thoughts or sensations) and performing intentional actions."[9] Thus, anything that has the required capacities is entitled to be called a person, it being immaterial whether this something is a human being or some other kind of being or a disembodied entity. Having these capacities is both necessary and sufficient condition of being a person. The influence of Descartes here is quite obvious. Descartes allows both for the possibility of a person having different bodies at different times and being a disembodied being. But equating person with an incorporeal thinking substance or a soul fails to provide an adequate analysis of the concept of a person. Two points in this context seem the most important.

(A) If a person is regarded as an incorporeal substance, no account can be given of how a person is to be identified. One cannot observe the soul of another. Strawson emphasizes that one cannot identify other subjects of experiences, if one identifies them only as subjects of experiences or as possessors of states of consciousness.[10]

(B) No criterion of reidentification of such substance can be provided.

It may be argued that in one's own case, one has direct knowledge of one's identity over a period of time. However, this knowledge would have to be restricated to those past moments of which one has personal memories.

Strawson rejects both Cartesian dualism and non-ownership theory. He defines "person" as a kind of subject to which both predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics and those ascribing

8. P. F. Strawson, Ibid, P. 115
9. R. Swinburne & S. Shoemaker, Ibid, P. 26–27
10. P.F. Strawson, Ibid, P. 100

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

states of consciousness can be applied. The concept of a person is a kind of individual to which both M and P predicates can be ascribed. M for person's material body and P for mental states or state of consciousness.

According to Strawson, two things (M and P) emerge clearly from the way "person" words are used ordinarily. One, states of consciousness are ascribed to something, and two, they are ascribed to the very same thing to which corporeal characteristics are ascribed. This does appear to be the case. We never say, "There is a pain" but that "I have a pain" or "He is in pain" or "She was in pain". Similarly, we not only ascribe thoughts, feelings and emotions to persons, we also ascribe height, weight, colour etc. to them. Thus, Strawson claims that a person is a subject, as well as, a subject to which both M and P predicates are ascribable. The first claim goes against no-ownership theory. According to Strawson, no-ownership theory cannot state the relationship between a person's state of consciousness and his body consistently. The statement of this relationship is supposed to be synthetic and significant. But to the theory of no-ownership the statement of this relationship is analytic and trivial. The statement that a person's states of consciousness are causally dependent upon his body is meant to be a significant one. The no-ownership theory must have the concept of a subject of states of consciousness different from that of the body, otherwise, the statement in question is reduced to a trivial one.

The no-ownership theory presupposes correlations between some states of consciousness and certain body, and these correlations must be empirically discoverable. The body is independently identifiable, but states of consciousness can be identified only by reference to the person whose states they are. Then, the question is of the way by which these correlations be discovered empirically. Correlations between a person P's body and states of consciousness can be established only after these states have been identified as belonging to P. A way to avoid this circularity has been suggested by Ayer, and that is, that the general Statement "Every experience is causally dependent upon a body" is analytic, whereas the more specific statements, which describe relationships between states of consciousness and bodily conditions, are

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

empirical."[11] However, this suggestion does not remove the difficulty. From the general statement merely this follows that every state of consciousness is causally dependent upon some body, but which states depend upon which body is a further question which remains unanswered by the no-ownership theory.

Strawson also argues against Cartesian dualism. Cartesian dualism has proposed two kinds of substances : Absolute and Relatives and again relative substances are of two kinds : Mind and Body. These relative substances are of the concerned to Strawson. Both these substances (mind and body) can be ascribed to some subjects which "person" words refer to. It is important, for this dualistic theory, to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of predicates. If some M-predicates must be ascribable to a person, then no disembodied soul or pure ego can be a person. A disembodied soul or ego can be said to be a person only if the following are granted :

(a) Ascribability of only P-predicates matters for personhood, not of M-predicates.

(b) Ascription of P-predicates to a disembodied soul or pure ego is intelligible.

According to Strawson, a disembodied soul cannot be regarded as a person, because it is impossible to provide a principle of individuation for it. Every psychological characteristic can have more than one instance, i.e., can be possessed by more than one person. Even this is logically possible that memories of two persons may be exactly alike. Thus, psychological characteristics cannot enable us to uniquely identify one ego or soul from another. Therefore it is not possible to give a principle of individuation purely in terms of psychological characteristics of an entity. The association, previously, of a soul or a group of psychological characteristics with a body does not leave a mark on the soul or one such group such that in the disembodied state one soul or one such group can be differentiated from another on its basis. The possibility of association with a certain body in the future also does not help. It is possible that any soul or any group of psychological

11. A. J. Ayer, The Concept of A Person and Other Essays.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

characteristics may in future be associated with any body. Even if it is granted that certain psychological characteristics can be associated only with a certain type of body, it remains possible that a soul or a group of psychological characteristics may in the future be associated with any one of a certain type of bodies.

Many philosophers have maintained that a disembodied soul can continue to have not only thoughts and memories, but also sensuous experiences. As far as perceptual experiences are concerned, it far from clear that they can occur without there being any physical body. Even in the case of thinking and memory, it is not obvious that they can occur in the absence of a body. We must distinguish between the two positions : firstly, an experience can occur without being correlated with the part of the body with which it is actually correlated. For example, "seeing" may not be dependent upon "eyes" as it actually is, but on some other part of the body. Secondly, an experience can occur in the absence of a body. The first position can be accepted, since it is a contingent matter that one kind of experience is causally dependent upon a certain part of the body and could be so dependent upon some other part. But from this we cannot come to the conclusion that this experience, say seeing, can occur in the absence of the body. While a proposition asserting causal dependence of (or correlation between) certain kinds of experiences (states of consciousness) and certain parts of a body is contingent, the same cannot be said about the proposition "Every experience is causally dependent upon (or correlated with) some body (or part of a body)". It does not seem possible to define "experience" in such a way that such causal dependence upon or correlation with a body does not figure in it.

The above assessment gives us a point that a subject to which no M predicates are ascribable cannot be said to be a person. It means that the concept of a person does require that some M predicates be ascribable to a subject so regarded. It also requires that certain specific kind of M predicates be ascribable to it. For example, it may be said that only a living being can qualify for personhood. A robot or a non-living thing would not qualify to be a person. However, it is not something straightforwardly clear. Suppose, there is a robot capable of complex behaviour similar to the

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

behaviour of human persons. Now, the question whether this robot is a person or not. Perhaps in such a case it would be incorrect to regard this robot as a non-living object. It follows that having a specific physical form, like that of human beings, is not a necessary condition of being a person, but the subject in question must be a living being. Therefore, the concept of a person does not require that certain M predicates be ascribable to a subject, but only that any of those types of M predicates, the possession of which makes the subject a living being.

Some predicates like "is smiling" or "is walking" do not clearly fall either into the class of M predicates or P predicates, they rather seem to be a complex of both kinds of predicates. According to Strawson P predicates are those which imply possession of consciousness by that to which they are ascribed. Their peculiarity consists in the fact that while M predicates can be properly applied to both material objects and persons, P predicates cannot be ascribed to material objects. In the words of Strawson, "We would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness to material objects."[12] It is not clear, why ascription of P predicates to material objects is improper. The impropriety does not seem to consist in the fact that such ascriptions are always false, since "the idea of a predicate is correlated with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly though not necessarily truly affirmed."[13] Thus, P predicates, for Strawson, cannot be significantly ascribed to material bodies. It is not very clear why such ascription does not make sense. It is not the case that certain M predicates can only be ascribed to persons, nor that P predicates are ascribable to those individuals alone to which certain M predicates are ascribable. Since M predicates are properly applied to both persons and material objects, it follows that any M predicate can be significantly ascribed to a person, whether such ascription is true or false is another matter. In case of ascription of P predicates to material objects, the ascriptions being said to be not merely false but devoid of significance.

12. P. F. Strawson, Ibid, P. 104
13. Ibid, P. 99 (footnote)

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Ascription of P predicates to material objects commits a category mistake. The distinction between material bodies and persons, these two kinds of individuals, is itself down on the basis of ascribability of different types of predicates. Then, it is not open to Strawson to base the distinction between M and P predicates on the distinction between material objects and persons. When Strawson says that ascription of P predicates to material objects does not make sense, he is presupposing a categorical distinction between two kinds of individuals. Secondly, ascription of P predicates to material objects is not significant, since any subject to which P predicates can be ascribed is not a mere material body. Then, ascribability of P predicates to material bodies would be ruled out by way of definition. It would be necessary to provide distinction between M and P predicates without bringing in the distinction between material objects and persons. The distinction between the two kinds of predicates could be proved if "consciousness" and "possession of consciousness" can be explained without reference to persons and perhaps it is possible to do so on the basis of behavioural criteria. For Strawson, behavioural criteria are logically adequate for ascription of P predicates to others, while in one's own case such ascription doesnot depend on behavioural criteria.

The ascribability of both kinds of predicates (M and P) constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition of being a "person". The concept of a being to whom both M and P predicates can be ascribed gives the concept of a sentiment being but not of a person. On this definition any being to whom some states of consciousness can be ascribed would qualify as a person. A monkey or a Chimpanzi seems to satisfy this requirement. This definition misleads that all individuals can be divided into two classes- material bodies and persons. But there is no sharp dividing line between the two classes, rather there is a whole class of beings, namely animals, that fall in between.

On the above observation of Strawson's concept of a person, we can conclude that Strawson does not agree with the theory of no-ownership as well the theory of ownership that represents by Cartesian dualism. According to the theory of ownership mind is the owner or master of all mental characteristics and the physical

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

(material) characteristics belongs to physical body, the material element. In this way both mind and body are independent from each other. But this independency has created many difficulties, as we see in Cartesian dualism. Therefore Strawson refutes the Cartesian dualism. In fact, Strawson, by refuting both theories, he gives a new diamension in the concept of a person as a "logical existence" which has two predicates M and P.

❑❑❑

13. WILLIARD VAN ORMAN QUINE

W. V. O. Quine was born in Akron, Ohio on 25 June, 1908. After majoring in mathematics at Oberlin College, he took a doctorate in philosophy at Harvad. His thesis "The Logic of Sequences : A Generalization of Principia Mathematica" was supervised by A. N. Whitehead. He received a Traveling Fellowship and visited Vienna. At Vienna he started to attend the meetings of the Vienna Circle. He went on to Prague for discussions with Carnap and with Tarski in Warsaw. "Intellectually the most rewarding months I have known"—described Quine his own visit at Prague and Warsaw in these words. Apart from various visiting professorship Quine has spent his academic career at Harvard, from where he retired in 1978. He died on 25 December, 2000 at Boston. He is the author of 19 books and literally hundreds of articles in logic and philosophy.

Two Dogmas of Empiricism

There are two dogmas, Quine points, in empricism. First dogma is the analytic–synthetic distinction and second is reductionism. Most of the papers authored by Quine attack on the first dogma. These articles (papers) prove that no noncircular account of analyticity can be found. According to Quine analyticity and its cognate circle of terms such as "synonymy" and even "meaning" itself are theoretically unsound. He considers Logical positivist criterion that a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independent of fact. This criterion, in his view, alone cannot distinguish logical truths from analytic truths in general. Obviously, we can characterize an analytic truth as one derivable from a logical truth by substitution of synonyms. For example, "All bachelors are unmarried"—this proposition we get from the proposition "All unmarried men are unmarried" by replacing "unmarried men" with the synonym "bachelors." This means that an

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

account of analyticity requires an explication of synonymy. For this explication Quine first attempt is via the notion of definition.

Definition turns out to be either stipulations or reports of preexisting synonyms. The practice of definition presupposes a grasp of synonymy, so it cannot explicate it. Now, Quine introduces the notion of substitution. Two terms X and Y are synonyms if one can replace the other without altering the truth value of the embedding sentence. However, this alone cannot distinguish synonyms from nonsynonymous co-extensive terms, like "creature with heart" and "creature with Kidneys". Such a distinction would require the intensional operator "necessarily". This operator will rely on the concept of analyticity, so it needs must to be clarified.

In the view of Quine these problems with analyticity are not due to the inherent flaws of natural languages, since these difficulties also occur for any artificial language. One can certainly devise a Carnapian semantical rule specifying all the analytic statements in a language L. Thus we can say that "S is analytic in L iff ..." However, it is analytic in L, not analytic per se. More importantly, it does not tell us in virtue of what something is analytic. Mere stipulation has no explanatory power.

Lastly, Quine considers whether synonymy, and thereby analyticity, might be elucidated via the Logical Positivists, verification theory of meaning. For example, could not one say that two statements p and q are synonymous, if they are confirmed by the same evidence ? Quine says that this would be to assume second dogma, reductionism. Each statement, according to the Logical Positivists, is verifiable individually by its own set of confirming data. But Quine contrasts this idea, by asserting that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense-experience, not individually, but only as a corporate body. This is known as "Quine—Duhem thesis" or "confirmation holism". One aspect of this thesis is that no statement is immune from revision. No matter how many observations we make which are, prima facie, confirmations of a claim p, we are not logically bound to admit p. When we confirm p from experience, we implicitly take it that many other statements q, r, s are also true. Experience confirms p only in conjunction with some wider set of claims. I can reject p in the face of observations O_1-O_n by rejecting some other statement from q to

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

z. Whether and how I do so is ultimately a pragmatic matter. What matters is preserving the coherency, simplicity and efficacy of the belief-system as a whole. This very point can be applied to the question of analytic-synthetic distinction itself. Quine would say that whether or not we admit such a distinction is to be justified not by discovering some fact of the matter regarding it, but on whether the distinction earns its keep. Quine concludes that it does not. Sure, one cold presumably keep it by making a host of compensatory adjustments to beliefs and or meanings, but if Quine is right, it is not worth the effort.

When Quine said that no statement was immune to revision, he applied this thesis to all statements, including logical and analytical truths, commonly assumed to be necessarily true, and therefore unrevisable under any conditions. To Quine, as with J. S. Mill, empiricism cannot justify such claims to necessity. Statements that we call "necessary truths" are merely those for which we can imagine no circumstances that would lead us to reject them. But this shows only that they are deeply entrenched beliefs. Thus, they are not different in kind from any other beliefs, but simply in their degree of entrenchment.

Quine uses his thesis of "confirmation holism" to derive a correlated thesis regarding semantics. Thus, Quine uses at least three types of thesis to show the dogmas of empiricism. They are verificationism, Quine-Duhem thesis and Semantic holism.[1]

Verificationism asserts that a statement's meaning is its method of verification. Quine-Duhem thesis proposes that statements are confirmed by experiences holistically, that is, relative to assumptions about other statements. Semantic holism accepts that every statement in a language determines the meaning of every other. However, it is misleading to ascribe "holistic theory of meaning" to Quine. Rather, his position is that the above considerations make the notion of "meaning" theoretically suspect. This would follow from his negative results regarding analyticity and synonymy. If no clear sense of "meaning the same as "can be found, then "meaning" itself remains in need of specification. As he (Quine) said in another context, "no entity without identity".

1. James Baillie, Ibid, P. 309

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Furthermore, since intentional states, e.g., beliefs and desires, are type-individuted by their content. Quine is now considered to have fathered eliminativism over the mind. i.e., regarding folk psychology, as well as in semantics. One of the most influential responses to Quine was from the Oxford school of "Ordinary language philosophy" with Herbert Paul Grice and P. F. Strawson's "In Defense of a Dogma". They accord with Quine's rejection of reductionism, but argue that this doesnot satisfy abondoning the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Grice and Strawson spend a lot of time to clarify precisely what Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction amounts to. They distinguish the following possible theses—

(a) No such distinction exists.

(b) The distinction is vague or inadequately specified.

(c) The distinction is inaccurately specified and cannot fulfill the function it is assumed to have.

Grice and Strawson point out that (b) and (c) require the falsity of (a). Quine could be comfortable with all this, since thesis (c) is closest to him. Grice and Strawson argue not only that theses (a) and (b) are false but also that the distinction is well-understood and thereby legitimate, which is provable, by the fact it is applied uniformly both in common language and in philosophy. Grice later came to doubt the power of this response, since "the fact that a certain concept or distinction is frequently deployed by a population of speakers and thinkers offers no guarantee that the concept or distinction in question can survive rigorous theoretical scruitiny."[2]

Quine stated that no formal distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences can be given. Grice and Strawson read him, plausibly, as thereby demanding that necessary and sufficient conditions of applicability be given in terms which do not themselves require defining in terms of analyticity. They (Grice and Strawson) remark that this is a pretty stringent demand and doubt whether any expression could pass it. Indeed, they offer a clear but "less formal" explication of the distinction, by means of paradigm cases. They begin with the notion of "logical impossibility". While

2. Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner (Editors), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, P. 55

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Quine never explicitly considers this case, Grice and Strawson are correct that it is in the "family" of "analytic", given its interdefinability with "necessity". So, they offer a clear example of the distinction between logical and natural / causal impossibility. Consider these two statements :

(A) My three-year-old child understands Russell's Theory of Types.

(B) My three-year-old child is an adult.

One would be extremely skeptical of (A), but could conceive of evidence that would confirm it, that is, being confronted with the infant prodigy in question. However, we do not understand (B), so long as the words have their standard literal meanings. It makes sense only as a dramatic way of saying that the child is wise beyond her years, that is, as if she were an adult. We can explicate the distinction exemplified in these two sentences via the distinction between "not believing something" and "not understanding something". This informally drawn distinction, in view of Grice and Strawson, is compatible with Quine's claim that no statement is immune from revision, since we can distinguish two ways in which one could hold onto it; by altering one's beliefs or by changing the meanings of the words. The latter would be required for (B). Similarly, certain claims could be rejected only if the meaning of some component were to change. It is debatable how much damage this does to Quine's main point. Perhaps he (Quine) could agree to all this but insist that these two ways of keeping or dropping a sentence are on a par. That is, the fact that a sentence can be dropped only by changing its meaning does not thereby confer on it some epistemological privilege. There is always a choice, justified primarily on pragmatic grounds, whether to adjust one's belief-system in response to an unwelcome observation by changing a belief or changing a meaning.

One more noteworthy point Grice and Strawson hint out that accepting the Quine-Duhem thesis does not rule out a noncircular account of synonymy. Suppose that we grant Quine that any statement p can only be confirmed by experiences O_1-O_n, when p is considered in conjunction with a set of other statements q to z. We could still say that p and q are synonymous if they are confirmed by the same experiences, when considered in conjunction with the same

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

set of other statements. Quine would, no doubt, reply that this set would have to be large, comprising most (if not all) of the language.

Radical Empiricism

Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact; and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism, the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas are ill founded, as Quine says. One effect of abandoning them is a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism. Therefore Quine, as an empiricist, wants to remove both these dogmas and establishes a new empiricism, i.e., Radical Empiricism.

According to Quine the totality of our socalled knowledge or beliefs, from the most causal matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a manmade fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections—the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether they be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.

If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

content of an individual statement, especially, if it be a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision, even of the logical law of the excluded middle, has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics, and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein-Newton, or Darwin-Aristotle ?

Quine further says that certain statements, though about physical objects and not sense-experience, seem peculiarly germane to sense-experience and in a selective way : some statements to some experiences, others to others. Such statements, especially germane to particular experiences, Quine pictures as near the periphery. But in this relation of "germaneness" Quine envisages nothing more than a loose association reflecting the relative likelihood, in practice, of our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the event of recalcitrant experience. For example we can imagine recalcitrant experiences to which we would surely be inclined to accommodate our system by re-evaluating just the statement that there are brick houses on Eln Street, together with related statements on the same topic. We can imagine other recalcitrant experiences to which we would be inclined to accommodate our system by re-evaluating just the statement that there are no centaurs, along with Kindred statements. A recalcitrant experience can be accommodate be by any of various alternative re-evaluations in various alternative quarters of the total system, but, in the cases which we are now imaging, our natural tendency to disturb the total system as little as possible would lead us to focus our revisions upon these specific statements concerning brick houses or centaurs. These statements are felt, therefore, to have a sharper empirical reference than highly

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

theoretical statements of physics or logic or ontology. The latter statements may be thought of as relatively centrally located within the total network, meaning merely that little preferential connection with any particular sense data obtrudes itself.

Being an empiricist Quine thinks of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries-not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits[3]—comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. According to Quine, physicists believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods, and it is a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in a point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

Positing does not stop with macroscopic physical objects. Objects at the atomic level and beyond are posited to make the laws of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of experience, simpler and more manageable, and we need not expect or demand full definition of atomic and subatomic entities in terms of macroscopic ones, any more than definition of macroscopic things in terms of sensedata. Science is a continuation of common sense, and it continues the common sense expedient of swelling ontology to simplify theory. Physical objects, small and large, are not the only posits. Forces are another example, and indeed we are told now a days that the boundary between energy and matter is obsolete. Moreover, the abstract entities which are the substance of mathematics—ultimately classes and classes of classes and so on up—are another posit in the same spirit. Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in the degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense-experiences. Quine

3. W. V. O. Quine, "On What there is" in From A Logical Point of View, P. 17 (footnote)

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

asserts that total science, mathematical and natural and human, is similarly but more extremely under determined by experience. The edge of the system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its elaborate myths or fictions, has as its objective, the simplicity of laws. Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with questions of natural science. Consider the question whether to countenance classes as entities. This is the question whether to quantify with respect to variables which take classes as values. In Carnap's words, this is a question not of matters of fact but of choosing a convenient language form, a convenient conceptual scheme of framework for science.[4] quine accepts this view of Carnap with only on the provision that the same be conceded regarding scientific hypothesis generally.

The above observation on sense-experience and total science (natural, mathematical and human) Quine concludes that he does not believe dualistic standard in empiricism. He views that it is in vain to say that empiricism disregards apriorism. In fact empiricism includes apriorism with aposteriorism, as a linguistic experiences. This is the essence of Radical Empiricism established by Quine.

❑❑❑

4. Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 4, 1950, P. 20–40

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

14. H. P. GRICE

Herbert Paul Grice was born on March 13, 1913 in Bermingham (England). He died on August 28, 1988 in Berkeley. He received firstly in classical honours moderation in 1933 and literare humuniores from Corpus Christi College, Oxford in 1935. Then he taught for a year in a public school and returned to Oxford. He taught there in various position till 1967. After that he moved to the university of California-Berkeley. He, during teaching at Oxford, he also served for five years in the Royal Navy service. He retired in 1979 from the university of California Berkeley. But he continued to teach there after retirement too till his death in 1988. He was philosophically active until his death by holding discussions at his home, giving lectures and editing a collection of his work that was posthumously published as "Studies in the Way of Words." He is best known for his innovative work in "philosophy of language", but he also contributed in metaphysics, ethics and also Aristotle and Kant. His work has also been influential outside of philosophy in linguistics and artificial intelligence.

In Defense of A Dogma

During his life-time Grice wrote a joint paper with P. F. Strawson. The title of that paper is "In Defense of A Dogma". This paper is for the defense of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's attack in "Two Dogmas of Epiricism". Both Grice and Strawson point out in this paper that "He (Quine) declares or seems to declare, not merely that the distinction is useless or inadequately clarified, but that the belief in its existence is a philosophical mistake."[1]

Both Grice and Strawson deploy a number of argument against Quine's position, but the two main ones involve the distinction

1. H. P. Grice and P. F. strawson, "In Defense of A Dogma", published in Philosophical Review, Vol. 65, P. 142

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

between an utterance meaning something and not meaning anything, and between the kind of revision of belief as false and the kind which involves a change of concept and hence a change in the meaning of a word. These two main distinctions can be clarified with the following illustrations by taking the following sentences :

(a) My neighbor's three year old child understands Russell's theory of types.

(b) My neighbor's three year old child is an adult.

According to Grice and Strawson it is easy to understand the sentence (a). What has been uttered in the sentence (a) is not false, but the sentence (b) must be false. Both authors argue that with further investigation one would either conclude that the speaker was using familiar words to express new concepts, or else would conclude that nothing at all was being said. No attempt will be made here to adjudicate the dispute with Quine who would reject both of these dichotomies—new concepts and old concepts, something said and nothing said—as well. But according to Grice and Strawson, the crucial claims are that someone who asserts (b) is either asserting it with a meaning other than the standard conventional one, or with no meaning at all. This dilemma can be better understood with the theory of meaning depicted by Grice.

Theory of Meaning

As James Beillie writes, Grice begins his discussion of meaning by distinguishing natural and non-natural meaning[2]. To understand this distinction Grice puts two examples before us.

(a) What came to be called utterer's meaning : sentences of the form "By uttering X, U meant that p".

(b) Sentence meaning : what sentence X literally means.

The example (b) distinguishes between :

(i) What X meant on this occasion of use, and

(ii) The general meaning of sentence X.

In his original article "meaning" Grice uses the letter A to represent the speaker (utterer). But in the course of developing this theory, he uses U for the speaker or utterer and A represents the

2. James Baillie, contemporary Analytic Philosophy, P. 209.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

audience (hearer). According to Grice the most basic form of meaning NN is utterer's meaning, and that token sentence-meaning—"X means that p"—is equivalent to or elliptical for "By uttering X, U means that p". He proposes to analyze sentence-type meaning in terms of this priori form :

"X means NN that so and so" might as a first shot be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about what "people" (vague) intend (with qualifications about "recognition") to effect by X". In other words, the meaning of that sentence is the content that it is standardly or conventionally employed to communicate, by virtue of the mechanism to be discussed below.

Grice analyzes utterer's meaning in terms of the psychological concepts of intention, belief and recognition. "A meant something by X" is roughly equivalent to "A intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention." Grice explains this statement as follow :

"By uttering X, U meant something" is true if U uttered X intending

(i) to produce some response r in some audience A,

(ii) A to recognize that U intends (i)

(iii) A's recognition that U intends (ii) to function as a reason for (i).

Now, if U utters an indicative sentence, r is some belief, whose content is semantically related to that of X. If U says, "it is raining", A's intended belief is that it is raining. If U utters a command, then r is some behavioural response. For example, if U says, "shut the door", r is A's shutting the door. If X is a question, then r is an appropriate answer. Thus, it is intended to state necessary and sufficient conditions for an utterance to be an example of meaning NN. Secondly, it is a piece of apriori conceptual analysis, that is, not attempting to discover a scientific relationship between kinds, but to describe the relations between our concepts. Then, it is reductive analysis : All other cases of meaning NN are to be derived from utterer's meaning. This is to be explicated in terms of psychological concepts. The central concept is that of a higher-order communicative intention. In other words, cases of utterer's meaning take place between at least two persons. Both participants must be

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

able to have mental states and to ascribe them to others. They must be able to act from reasons, rather than from brute causality. According to Grice, the presence of some naturally meaningful data interferes with meaning NN by making the recognition of the utterer's intention causally superfluous. For example the fact that the saint's head is separated from his torso makes it blantantly obvious that he is dead, no taking of the "intentional stance". In fact, Grice stresses the rational, normative nature of communication and ascription of meaning NN.

Here, meaning NN represents natural sense which differs from nonnatural sense. The meaning draws from brute causality is nothing but a nonnatural sense meaning. Grice shows the deficiency of this kind of meaning. The nonnatural or causal meaning ignores the fact that the meaning in general of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do or should mean by it on particular occasions. Nonnatural meaning analyses statements about standard meaning or the meaning in general of a "sign". To Grice it is not a suitable meaning, because "no provision is made for dealing with statements about what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion."[3]

Like distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning, the dogma of analytic-synthetic distinction is non-avoidable. Therefore, Grice defenses the two dogmas of empiricism which quine attempts to removes or criticizes.

❑❑❑

3. Ibid, p. 217

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

15. DOGMA : QUINE, GRICE AND STRAWSON

In his article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine advances a number of criticisms of the supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and of other associated notions. He rejects this distinction. But Grice and Strawson attempt to show that Quine's criticism (rejection) of the distinction do not just his rejection of it. There are many ways in which a distinction can be criticized, and more than one in which it can be rejected. It can be criticized for not being a sharp distinction for admitting of cases which do not fall clearly on either side of it on the ground that it is confused the different meanings being habitually conflated. Such criticisms alone would scarcely amount to a rejection of the distinction. They would be, rather, be a prelude to clarification. It is not this sort of criticism which Quine makes.

Again, a distinction can be criticized on the ground that it is not useful. It can be said to be useless for certain purposes, or useless together, and perhaps, pedantic. One who criticizes in this way may indeed be said to reject a distinction, but in a sense which also requires him to acknowledge its existence. He simply declares he can get on without it. But Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction appears to be more radical than this. He would certainly say he could get on without the distinction, but not in a sense which would commit him to acknowledging its existence.

Or, again one could criticize the way or ways in which a distinction is customarily expounded or explained on the ground that these explanations did not make it really clear. And Quine certainly makes such criticism in the case of the analytic-synthetic distinction. But he does or seems to do, a great deal more. He declares or seems to declare not merely that the distinction is useless or inadequately clarified, but also that it is altogether

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

illusory, that the belief in its existence is a philosophical mistake. "That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all", he says, "is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith."[1] It is the existence of the distinction that he here calls in question, so his rejection of it would seem to amount to a denial of its existence. Evidently, such a position of extreme skepticism about a distinction is not in general justified merely by criticism, however just in themselves, of philosophical attempts to clarify it. There are doubtless plenty of distinctions, drawn in philosophy and outside it, which still await adequate philosophical elucidation, but which few would want on this account to declare illusory. However, Quine's article does not consist wholly, though it does consist largely, in criticizing attempts at elucidation. He does try also to diagnose the causes of the belief in the distinction and he offers some positive doctrines acceptance of which here represents as incompatible with this belief. If there is any general prior presumption in favour of the existence of the distinction, it seems that Quine's radical rejection of it must rest quite heavily on this part of his article, since the force of any such presumption is not even impaired by philosophical failures to clarify a distinction so supported.

Grice and Strawson point out that Quine's objection is not simply to the words "analytic" and "synthetic", but to a distinction which they are supposed to express and which at different times philosophers have supposed themselves to be expressing by means of such pairs of words or phrases as "necessary" and "truth of fact"; so Quine is certainly at odds with a philosophical tradition which is long and not wholly disreputable. But there is no need to appeal only to tradition, for there is also present practice. We can appeal to the fact that those who use the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" do to a very considerable extent agree in the applications they make of them. They apply the term "analytic" to more or less the same cases, withhold it from more or less the same cases, and hesitate over more or less the same cases. This agreement extends not only to cases which they have been taught so to characterize, but to new cases. In short, "analytic" and "synthetic" have a more or less established philosophical use, and this seems to suggest that it is absurd, even

1. W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, P. 37

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

senseless, to say that there is no such distinction. For, in general, if a pair of contrasting expressions are habitually and generally used in application to the same cases, where these cases do not form a closed list, this is a sufficient condition for saying that there are kinds of cases to which the expressions apply and nothing more is needed for them to mark a distinction. In view of the possibility of this kind of argument, one may begin to doubt whether Quine really holds the extreme thesis which his words encourage one to attribute to him. It is for this reason that we made the attribution tentative. For on at least one natural interpretation of this extreme thesis, when we say of something true that it is analytic and of another true thing that it is synthetic, it simply never is the case that we thereby mark a distinction between them. And this view seems terribly difficult to reconcile with the fact of an established philosophical usage, i.e., of general agreement in application in an open class. For this reason Quine's thesis might be better represented not as the thesis that there is no difference at all marked by the use of these expressions, but as the thesis that the nature of, and reasons for, the difference or differences are totally misunderstood by those who use the expressions, that the stories they tell themselves about the difference are full of illusion.

Grice and Strawson view that philosophers are notoriously subject to illusion, and to mistaken theories. Suppose, there were a particular mistaken theory about language or knowledge, such that, seen in the light of this theory, some statements or propositions or sentences appeared to have a characteristic which no statements really have, or even, perhaps, which it doesnot make sense to suppose that any statement has, and which no one who was not consciously or subconsciously influenced by this theory would ascribe to any statement. And, suppose, there were other statements which, seen in this light, did not appear to have this characteristic, and others again which presented an uncertain appearance. Then philosophers who were under the influence of this theory would tend to mark the supposed presence or absence of this characteristic by a pair of contrasting expressions, say "analytic" and "synthetic". Now in these circumstances it still could not be said that there was no distinction at all being marked by the use of these expressions, for there would be at least the distinction, just

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

described—the distinction between those statements which appeared to have and those which appeared to lack a certain characteristic—, and, there might well be other assignable differences too, which would account for the difference in appearance, but it certainly could be said that the difference these philosophers supposed themselves to be marking by the use of the expressions simply did not exist, and perhaps also, supposing the characteristic in question to be one which it was absurd to ascribe to any statement, that these expressions, as so used, were senseless or without meaning. We should only have to suppose that such a mistake theory was very plausible and attractive, in order to reconcile the fact of an established philosophical usage for a pair of contrasting terms with the claim that there simply did not exist a difference of any kind between the classes of statements so characterized. We think that the former claim would probably be sufficient for Quine's purposes.

According to Grice and Strawson, if we are to accept Quine's account of the matter, the presumption in question is not only so based. For among the notions which belong to the analyticity group is one which Quine calls "cognitive synonymy" and in terms of which he allows that the notion of analyticity could at any rate be formally explained, unfortunately, he adds, the notion of "cognitive synonymy" is just as unclarified as that of analyticity.

To say that two expressions X and Y are cognitively synonymous seems to correspond, at any rate roughly, to what we should ordinarily express by saying that X and Y have the same meaning or that X means the same as Y. If Quine is to be consistent in his adherence to the extreme thesis, then it appears that he must maintain not only that the distinction we suppose ourselves to be marking by the use of the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" does not exist, but also that the distinction we suppose ourselves to be marking by the use of the expressions "means the same as", "does not mean the same as" doesnot exist either. At least he must maintain this in so far as the notion of "meaning the same as", in its application to predicate-expressions, is supposed to differ from and go beyond the notion of "being true of just the same objects as." This latter notion which we might call that of "coextensionality", he is prepared to allow to be intelligible, though, as he rightly says that

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

it is not sufficient for the explanation of analyticity. Now, since he cannot claim this time that the pair of expressions in question, that is, "means the same", "does not mean the same", is the special property of philosophers, the strategy outlined above of countering the presumption in favour of their marking a genuine distinction is not available here or is at least enormously less plausible. Yet the denial that the distinction, taken as different from the distinction between the coextensional and the non-coextensional, really exists; is extremely paradoxical. It involves, for example, that anyone who seriously remarks that "bachelor" means the same as "unmarried man", but that "creature with kidneys" does not mean the same as "creature with a heart"—supposing the last two expressions to be coextensional—either is not in fact drawing attention to any distinction at all between the relations between the members of each pair of expressions or is making a philosophical mistake about the nature of the distinction between them. In either case, what he says, taken as he intends it to be taken, is senseless or absurd. More generally, it involves saying that it is always senseless or absurd to make a statement of the form "Predicates X and Y in fact apply to the same objects, but do not have the same meaning." But the paradox is more violent than this. For we frequently talk of the presence or absence of relations of synonymy between kinds of expressions, for example, conjunctions, particles of many kinds, whole sentences, where there does not appear to be any obvious substitute for the ordinary notion of synonymy in the way in which coexstensionality is said to be a substitute for synonymy of predicates.

If talk of sentence-synonymy is meaningless, then it seems that talk of sentences having a meaning at all must be meaningless too. For if it made sense to talk of a sentence having a meaning or meaning something, then presumably it would make sense to ask "what does it mean ?" And if it made sense to ask "What does it mean ?" of a sentence, then sentence-synonymy could be roughly defined as follows : Two sentences are synonymous if and only if any true answer to the question "What does it mean ?" asked of one of them, is a true answer to the same question, asked of the other. Grice and Strawson do not claim any clarifying power for this definition, but want only to point out that if the notion of sentence-synonymy as

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

senseless would be given up, the notion of sentence-significance of a sentence having meaning is also senseless. It is the typical example of philosopher's paradox.

In the view of Grice and Strawson the main theme of Quine's article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" can be roughly summarized as follows : There is a certain circle or family of expressions of which "analytic" is one, such that if any one member of the circle could be taken to be satisfactorily understood or explained, then other members of the circle could be verbally, and hence satisfactorily, explained in terms of it. Other members of the family are : "self-contradictory" (in a broad sense), "necessary", "synonymous", "semantical rule" and perhaps (but again in a broad sense) "definition". The list could be added to. Unfortunately each member of the family is in as great need of explanation as any other. This is a simple quotation "The notion of self-contradictoriness (in the required broad sense of inconsistency) stands in exactly the same need of clarification as does the notion of analyticity itself."[2] The second quotation is "a notion of synonymy which is in no less need of clarification than analyticity itself."[3] Again, of the adverb "necessarily", as a candidate for use in the explanation of synonymy, Quine says, "Does the adverb really make sense ? To suppose that it does is to suppose that we have already made satisfactory sense of analytic."[4] To make "satisfactory sense" of one of these expressions would seem to involve two things—(A) It would seem to involve providing an explanation which does not incorporate any expression belonging to the family-circle. (B) It would seem that the explanation provided must be of the sense general character as those rejected explanations which do incorporate members of the family-circle, i.e., it must specify some feature common and peculiar to all cases to which, for example, the word "analytic" is to be applied, it must have the same general form as an explanation beginning, "a statement is analytic if and only if ....." It is true that Quine doesnot explicity state the requirement (B), but since he does not even consider the question whether any other kind of

2. Ibid, P. 20
3. Ibid, P. 23
4. Ibid, P. 30

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

explanation would be relevant, it seems reasonable to attribute it to him.

If the above two required conditions have been taken together and generalize the result, it would seem that Quine requires of a satisfactory explanation of an expression that it should take the form of a pretty strict definition, but should not make use of any member of a group of indefinable terms to which the expression belongs. Really, a satisfactory, as Grice and Strawson mention, explanation is hard to come by. The availability of a satisfactory explanation in the sense sketched above is a necessary condition of an expression's making sense. It is perhaps dubious whether any such explanations can ever be given. Even if such explanations can be given is some cases, it would be pretty generally agreed that there other cases in which they cannot. For example, the group of expressions which includes "morally wrong", "blameworthy", "branch of moral rules", etc or the group which includes the propositional connectives and the words "true" and "false", "statement", "fact", "denial", "assertion". Few people would want to say that the expressions belonging to either of these groups were senseless on the ground that they have not been formally defined except in terms of members of the same group. It might be said that while the unavailability of a satisfactory explanation in the special sense described was not a generally sufficient reason for declaring that a given expression was senseless, it was a sufficient reason in the case of the expressions of the analyticity group. But anyone who said this would have to advance a reason for discriminating in this way against the expressions of this group. The only plausible reason for being harder on these expressions than on others is a refinement on a consideration which starts from the point of "analytic" and "synthetic" themselves as a technical philosophical expressions. To the rejoinder that other expressions of the family concerned, such as "means the same as" or "is inconsistent with", or "self-contradictory" are not at all technical expressions, but are common property, the reply would doubtless be that, to qualify for inclusion in the family circle, these expressions have to be used in specially adjusted and precise senses or pseudo-sense, which they do not ordinarily possess. It is the fact, then, that all the terms belonging to the circle are either technical terms or ordinary terms used in specially

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

adjusted senses, that might be held to justify us in being particularly suspicious of the claims of members of the circle to have any sense at all, and hence to justify us in requiring them to pass a test for significance which would admittedly be too stringent if generally applied. This point has some force, though we doubt if the special adjustments spoken of are in every case as considerable as it suggests. But though the point has some force, it does not have whatever force would be required to justify us in insisting that the expressions concerned should pass exactly that test for significance which is in question. The fact, if it is a fact, that the expressions cannot be explained in precisely the way which Quine seems to require, doesnot mean that they cannot be explained at all. There is no need to try to pass them off as expressing innate ideas. Grice and Strawson point out the fallacy of "Logical impossibility" in Quine's two dogmas of empiricism. They also point out the difference between logical impossibility and natural (causal) impossibility with these two examples—"A child of three's being an adult" and "A child of three's understanding Russell's theory of Types"

First example, i.e., "My neighbour's three year old child is an adult" falls under the category of logical impossibility. A child can logically never an adult. The second example, i.e., "My neighbor's three year old child understands. Russell's Theory of Type." Here we find a natural impossibility. The age of three year is naturally a state of learning alphabets. So, it is never possible to understand Russell's Theory of Type at this tender age. Here we find natural or causal impossibility. The distinction between "analytic and synthetic" which has been refuted by Quine comes under the caption of logical impossibility, like child and adult. Child is never adult, so "analytic" or "synthetic" is never "synthetic" or "analytic". So, the distinction between the two is logically sufficient.

Grice and Strawson point out the incompatibility what Quine's showed with the distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" on two following points : (a) It is an illusion to suppose that there is any class of accepted statements the members of which are in principle "immune from revision" in the light of experience, i.e., any that we accept as true and must continue to accept as true whatever happens. (b) It is an illusion to suppose that an individual statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

confirmation or disconfirmation at all. There is no particular statement such that a particular experience or set of experiences decides once for all whether that statement is true or false, independently of our attitudes to all other statements.

Grice and Strawson elaborate these points as follows : (a) Since it is an illusion to suppose that the characteristics of immunity in principle from revision, come what may, belongs, or could belong, to any statement, it is an illusion to suppose that there is a distinction to be drawn between statements which posses, this characteristic and statements which lack it. Yet, Quine suggests, this is precisely the distinction which those who use the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" suppose themselves to be drawing. Quine's view would perhaps also be that those who believe in the distinction are inclined at least sometimes to mistake the characteristic of strongly resisting revision for the mythical characteristic of total immunity from revision.

(b) the connection between the second doctrine and the analytic-synthetic distinction runs, according to Quine, through the verification theory of meaning. He says, "If the verification theory can be accepted as an adequate account of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is saved after all."[5] For, in the first place, two statements might be said to be synonymous if and only if any experiences which contribute to, or detract from, the confirmation of the other, to the same degree, and, in the second place, synonymy could be used to explain analyticity. But, Quine seems to argue, acceptance of any such account of synonymy can only rest on the mistaken belief that individual statements, taken in isolation from their fellows, can admit of confirmation or disconfirmation at all. In view of Grice and Strawson, the relation between these two doctrines and the analytic-synthetic distinction are not as Quine supposes. The acceptance of the second doctrine would not compel one to abandon, but only to revise, the suggested explanation of synonymy. Quine doesnot deny that individual statements are regarded as confirmed or disconfirmed, are in fact rejected or accepted, in the light of experience. He denies only that these relations between single statements and experience hold

5. Ibid, P. 38

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

independently of our attitudes to other statements. He means that experience can confirm or disconfirm an individual statement, only given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements. When we are faced with a "recalcitrant experience", he says, we always have a choice of what statements to amend. What we have to renounce is determined by what we are anxious to keep. This view requires only a slight modification of the definition of statement-synonymy in terms of confirmation and disconfirmation. Now, we have to say that two statements are synonymous if and only if any experiences which, on certain assumptions about the truth-values of other statements, confirm or disconfirm one of the pair, also on the same assumptions, confirm or disconfirm the other to the same degree.

The first doctrine "there is no statement which is in principle immune from revision, no statement which might not be given up in the face of experience." Acceptance of this doctrine is quite consistent with adherence to the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Only the adherent of this distinction must also insist on another, on the distinction between that kind of giving up which involves changing or dropping a concept or set of concepts. Any form of words at one time held to express something true may, no doubt, at another time, come to be held to express something false. But it is not only philosophers who would distinguish between the case where this happens as the result of a change of opinion solely as to matters of fact, and the case where this happens at least partly as a result of a shift in the sense of the words which is a necessary condition of the change in truth-value, and then the adherent of the distinction will say that the form of words in question changes from expressing an analytic statement to expressing a synthetic statement. If we can make sense of the idea that the same form of words, taken in one way or bearing one sense, may express something true, and taken in another way or bearing another sense, may express something false, then we can make sense of the idea of "conceptual revision". If we can make sense of this idea, then we can perfectly well preserve the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, while considering to Quine the revisability-in-principle of everything we say. As for the idea that the same form of words, taken in different ways, may bear

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

different senses and perhaps be used to say things with different truth-values, the onus of showing that this is somehow a mistaken or confused idea rests squarely on Quine.

The adherent of the analytic-synthetic distinction may go further and admit that there may be cases, particularly perhaps in the field of science, where it would be pointless to press the question whether a change in the attributed truth-value of a statement represented a conceptual revision or not, and correspondingly pointless to press the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Thus, Grice and Strawson concludes that Quine's rejection of the distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' is absolutely illusory.

❑❑❑

16. CONCLUSION

The previous chapters contribute to the various aspects of contemporary Western Philosophy from pragmatism to radical empiricism of Quine, and Grice's defense of dogma. All these aspects or theories have originated against the idealism of Hegel or intellectualism of that time. So, the basic tenent of Contemporary Western Philosophy is anti-intellectualism and empiricism in now outlook. Between anti-intellectualism of pragmatism, phenomenology and existentialism and radical empiricism and descriptive metaphysics we find a unique trend in the shape of linguisticism of Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin. Linguisticism has its roots in British empiricism of Russell and Moore as well as logical positivism. But there is an anti-intellectualism also in the philosophy of Bergson and Whitehead, which is so significant as the anti-intellectualism of pragmatism alongwith phenomenology and existentialism. So, it is necessary to know the anti-intellectualist or non-idealist thought of Bergson and Whitehead.

Henry Bergson (1859–1941)

Henry Louis Bergson, a French philosopher, was born on 18 October, 1859 and died on 4 January, 1941. He was influential in the tradition of continental philosophy, especially during the first half of the 20th century until the second world war. He is known for his arguments that processes of immediate experience and intuition. These principles are more significant than abstract rationalism and science for understanding reality. He was almamater of Ecole Normale Superieure, University of Paris. His notable works are Time and Free Will (1889), Matter and Memory (1896) and Creative Evolution (1907) and Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). He was awarded Noble Prize in Literature in 1927. In 1930 France awarded him its highest honour, the Grand-Croix de la Legion d' honneur. In 1900 the College de France selected him to a chair of

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

Greek and Roman Philosophy. He held this chair till 1904. He then replaced Gabriel Tarde in the chair of Modern Philosophy and held it till 1920. He travelled to London in 1908 and met with William James. James hailed Bergson in 1903, by writing, that "I have been re-reading Bergson's books, and nothing that I have read for years has so excited and stimulated my thoughts. I am sure that his philosophy has a great future, it breaks through old frameworks and brings things to a solution from which new crystallizations can be reached."[1]

Duration—Bergson rejected the mechanistic predominant view of Causality, and redefined the mother conceptions of time, space and causality in his concept of "Duration". He introduced "Duration" as a theory of time and consciousness in his doctoral thesis "Time and Free Will : An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness". Kant believed that free will could only exist outside of time and space, indeed the only non-determined aspect of our private existence in the universe, separate to water cycles, mathematics and morality. However, we could not know whether or not it exists, and that it is nothing but a pragmatic faith. Bergson responded that Kant, along with many other philosophers, had confused time with its spatial representation.[2] In reality, Bergson argued, Duration is unextended yet heterogeneous, and so its parts cannot be juxtaposed as a succession of distinct parts, with one causing the other. Based on this he concluded that determinism is an impossibility and free will pure mobility, which Bergson identifies as being the "Duration".

Intuitionism—Duration, as defined by Bergson, then is a unity and a multiplicity, but, being mobile, it cannot be grasped through immobile concepts. Bergson argues that one can grasp it only through his method of intuition. Two images from Bergson's "An Introduction to Metaphysics" may help one to grasp Bergon's term "intuition", the limits of concepts and the ability of intuition to grasp the absolute. The first image is that of a city. Analysis or the creation of concepts through the divisions of point of view, can only ever give us a model of the city through a construction of photographs taken

1. William James, Bergson and his philosophy, Chapter I
2. Henry Bergson, Time and Free Will, Preface.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

from every possible point of view, yet it can never give us the diamensional value of walking in the city itself. One can only grasp this through intuition, likewise the experience of reading a line of Homer. One may translate the line and pile commentary upon commentary, but this commentary too shall never grasp the simple dimensional value of experiencing the poem in its originality itself. The method of intuition, then, is that of getting back to the things themselves.[3]

Creativity—Bergson considers the appearance of novelty as a result of pure undetermined creation, instead of as the predetermined result of mechanistic forces. His philosophy emphasises pure mobility, unforeseeable novelty, creativity and freedom, thus one can characterize his system as a "process philosophy". It touches upon such topics as time and identity, free will, perception, change, memory, consciousness, language, the foundation of mathematics and the limit of reason. By criticizing Kant's theory of knowledge, Bergson attempts to redefine the relations between science and metaphysics, intelligence and intuition, and insisted on the necessity of increasing thought's possibility through the use of intuition, which, according to Bergson, alone approached a knowledge of the absolute and of real life, understood as pure "duration". Because of his criticism of intelligence, he makes a frequent use of images and metaphors in his writings in order to avoid the use of concepts, which, he considers, fail to touch the whole of reality, being only a sort of abstract net thrown on things. For instance, he says in "The Creative Evolution, Chapter 3" that thought in itself would never have thought it possible for the human being to swim, as it cannot deduce swimming from walking. For swimming to be possible, man must throw itself in water and only then can thought consider swimming a possible. Intelligence, Bergson says, is a practical faculty rather than pure speculative faculty, a product of evolution used by man to survive. If metaphysics is to avoid "false problems", it should not extend the abstract concepts of intelligence to pure speculation, but rather use intuition.

3. Ibid, The Creative Mind : An Introduction to Metaphysics, P. 160–161

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

"The Creative Evolution" in particular attempts to think through the continuous creation of life, and explicity pitted itself against Herbert Spencer's evolutionary philosophy. Spencer had attempted to transpose Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in philosophy and to construct a cosmology based on this theory. Spencer also coined the expression "survival of the fittest". Bergon's philosophy of life can be seen as a response to the mechanistic philosophies of his time[4], but also to the failure of finalism. According to Bergson, finalism in unable to explain "duration" and the "continuous creation of life", as it only explains life as the progressive development of an initially determined program—a notion which remains, for example, in the expression of a "genetic program", such a description of finalism was adopted, for instance, by Leibrnitz. Bergson regarded planning beforehand for the future as impossible, since time itself unravels unforeseen possibilities Indeed, one could always explain a historical event retrospectively by its conditions of possibility. He explains that such an event created retrospectively its causes, taking the example of the creation of a work of art, for example a symphony. It was impossible to predict what would be the symphony of the future, as if the musician knew what symphony would be the best for his time, he would realize it. In his words, the effect created its cause. Henceforth, he attempts to find a third way between mechanism and finalism, through the notion of an original impulse, the "elan vital", in life, which dispersed itself through evolution into contradictory tendencies. He substituted to the finalist notion of a teleological aim a notion of an original impulse, the "elan vital".

Elan Vital—Elan Vital ranks as Bergson's third essential concept, after Duration and Intuition. Bergson portrays "elan vital" as a kind of vital impetus which explains evolution in a less mechanical and more lively manner, as well as accounting for the creative impulse of mankind. He says that there is neither purely internal finality nor clearly cut individuality in nature. Thus, it is invain that one pretends to reduce finality to the individuality of the living being.[5]

4. Ibid, P. 11–13
5. Ibid, P. 42–44

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

A. N Whitehead (1861–1947)

Alfred North Whitehead was born in 1861 at Ramsgate, Great Britain. After getting school education, he went to admit in Trinity College of Cambridge University when he got the scholarship and studied mathematics. In 1884 he was appointed as a lecturer in the same college. Bertrand Russell was one of his disciples with whom he wrote the famous book "Principia Mathematica". He left the cambridge in 1910 and went to London where he taught mathematics till 1914. In 1924 he went to U.S.A. and started to teach philosophy in Harvard University. Till his death he stayed in America. He died in 1947, December. He was great mathematician as well as philosopher. "A Treatise On Universal Algebra" is his unique work in which he coined a "universal algebra". In "Principia Mathematica", with Russell, he showed that from formal logic mathematics has been deduced. Quine remarks on this book that "This book is a great Intellectual pillar forever." He started to write a book on "metaphysics"—a different kind of metaphysics—process philosophy. The book is "Process and Reality." Nicholas Rescher defines process philosophy as ontology of becoming or processism which processes in the ordinary everyday real world as its only basic or elementary existents.[6] It treats other real existents, for example, enduring physical objects, thought, as abstractions from, or ontological depends on, processes. According to Whitehead metaphysics is about logical frameworks for the conduct of discussions of the character of the world. It is not directly and immediately about facts of nature, but only indirectly so, in that its task is to explicity formulate the language and conceptual presuppositions that are used to describe the facts of nature. Whitehead thinks that discovery of previously unknown facts of nature can in principle call for reconstruction of metaphysics.[7]

Actual Entities—The process metaphysics elaborated in "Process and Reality' posits an ontology which is based on the two kinds of existence of an entity, i.e., actual entity and abstract entity

6. Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics : An Introduction to Process Philosophy, P. 42
7. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, P. 13–19

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

or abstraction, also called "object". Actual entity is a term coined by Whitehead to refer to the entities that really exist in the natural world. For Whitehead "actual entities" are spatiotemporally extended events or processes. An actual entity is how something is happening, and how its happening is related to other actual entities. The actually existing world is a multiplicity of actual entities overlapping one another.

According to Whitehead, Creativity—the ultimate abstract principle of actual existence is "creativity". Creativity is a term coined by Whitehead to show a power in the world that allows the presence of an actual entity, a new actual entity, and multiple actual entities. Creativity is the principle of novelty.[8] It is manifest in what can be called "singular causality". The term "singular causality" is contrasted with the term "nomic causality". "I woke this morning because my alarm clock rang"—This is the example of singular causality; and "Alarm clocks generally wake people in the morning" is the example of nomic causality. There are, according to Whitehead, many contributory singular causes for an event. A further contributory singular cause of my being awoken by my alarm clock this morning was that I was lying asleep near it till it rang.

An actual entity is a general philosophical term for an utterly determinate and completely concrete individual particular of the actually existing world or universe of changeable entities considered in terms of singular causality, about which categorical statements can be made.

According to Whitehead actual entities are of two kinds—temporal and a temporal. With one exception all actual entities are temporal and are "occasions of experience". (Occasions of experience are not to be confused with consciousness.) An entity that people commonly think of as a simple "concrete object", or in Aristotle's term "substance" considered to be a temporally serial composite of indefinitely many overlapping occasions of experience. A human being is thus composed of indefinitely many occasions of experience. The one exceptional actual entity is at once both temporal and a temporal, God. He is objectively immortal, as well as being

8. Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, P. 851–53

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

immanent in the world. He is objectified in each temporal actual entity, but he is not an eternal object.

The occasions of experience are of four graders. The first grade comprises processes in a physical vacuum such as the propagation of an electromagnetic wave or gravitational influence across empty space. The second grade involves "inanimate matter". Matter is the composite overlapping of occasions of experience from the first grade. The third grade involves living organisms. The fourth and last grade of occassions of experience involves experience in the mode of presentational immediacy, which means more or less what are often called the "qualia" of subjective experience. So far as we know, experience in the mode of presentational immediacy occurs in only more evolved animals. That some occassions of experience involve experience in the mode of presentational immediacy is the one and only reason why Whitehead makes the occassions of experience his actual entities, for the actual entities must be of the ultimately general kind. Consequently, it is inessential that an occassion of experience have an aspect in the mode of presentational immediacy, occassions of the grades one, two and three, lack that aspect.

Inherent in each actual entity is its respective dimension of time. Potentially, each occasion of experience is causally consequential on every other occassion of experience that precedes it in time, and has as its causal consequences every other occassion of experience that follows it in time. Thus, Whitehead's occassions of experience are "all window", in contrast to Leibrnitz's "windowless" monads. In time defined relative to it, each occassion of experience is causally influenced by prior occassions of experiences and causally influences future occassions of experience. An occassion of experience consists of a process of prehending other occassions of experience, reacting to them. This is the process in process philosophy. Such process is never deterministic. Consequently, free will is essential and inherent to the universe.

The causal outcomes obey the usuall well-respected rule that the causes precede the effect in time. Some pairs of processes cannot be connected by cause-effect relations, and they are said to be "spatially separated". Whitehead also respected these ideas, and says, time is relative to an inertial reference frame, different reference frames defining different versions of time.

Scanned with OKEN Scanner

The actual entities, in Whitehead's view, the occasions of experience, are logically atomic in sense that an occasion of experience cannot be cut and separated into two other occasions of experience. This kind of logical atomicity is perfectly compatible with indefinitely many spatio-temporal overlaps of occasions of experience. Another aspect of the atomicity of occasions of experience is that they do not change. An actual entity is what it is. An occasion of experience can be described as a process of change, but it is itself unchangeable.

Eternal Objects—"Eternal object", a term coined by Whitehead, is an abstraction, a possibility, or pure potential. It can be ingredient into some actual entity. It is a principle that can give a particular form to an actual entity. Whitehead admits indefinitely many eternal objects. An example of an eternal object is a number, such as the number "two". Whitehead holds that eternal objects are abstractions of a very high degree of abstraction. Many abstractions, including eternal objects, are potential ingredients of processes. An abstraction is a conceptual entity that refers to more than one single actual entity. Thus, Whitehead's ontological principle is that whatever reality pertains to an abstraction is derived from the actual entities upon which it is founded or of which it is comprised.

❑❑❑

ABOUT THE BOOK



The present book "Contemporary Western Philosophy" is a brief account of contemporary western philosophy from pragmatism to Postmodernism, from linguistic analysis to radical empiricism and descriptive metaphysics. All these trends of contemporary western philosophy are against the intellectualism and rationalism of Hegel and Bradley. So, the book starts with Absolute Idealism of both Hegel and Bradley. The book is useful for graduate and post graduate students as well as for different competitive examinations like UGC-NET–JRF, state public service commissions, UPSC etc.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author Dr. N. P. Tiwary is a self-made personality. He was a brilliants student of Patna University in B.A. (Hons.) and M.A. classes. He got first class in both courses. He started his service as an assistant professor in January, 1979. He promoted as associate professor and professor in January, 1989 and January, 1995 respectively. He retired from his service in June 2016. During his service period he attended and presented many articles on different fields of philosophy in national and international seminars, and conferences. He delivered many lectures in refresher courses organised by different universities of India. He has been awarded as the best teacher of Philosophy by the then Vice chancellor of Patna University in 2018, and as the "Siksha Rattan Puruskar" by Indian International Friendship society, New Delhi in 2011. He also worked as visiting professor in Centrla University of South Bihar, Gaya in 2017 and 2019, where he taught "logic and law" (legal reasoning) to law students of Fourth semester. Dr N. P. Tiwary did his Ph. D. degree from Ranchi University, Ranchi in 1982, and also did B.Ed. course in 1980 (session 1978–79) from Patna University. He has authored many books including Charvaka ka Naitika Darshan, Bhasha Vishleshan (Bhartiya), Bhartiya Tarkashastra, Adhuni, Paschatya Darshan Ki Char Dharaye etc.

MOTILAL BOOKS
PUBLISHER'S & DISTRIBUTORS

Ashok Rajpath, Patna – 800 004
Phone No. 0612–2678442
E-mail : patnamlbd@gmail.com

₹ 369

9 788195 638741

Scanned with OKEN Scanner